The Battle of Nezuet Ghirba 1940

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tigre
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The Battle of Nezuet Ghirba 1940

#1

Post by tigre » 10 Dec 2005, 03:53

Hello to all, here you can read a detailed account about the first tank engagement between british and italian armored forces.

The Battle of Nezuet Ghirba 1940

The first tank action to occur between the Italian armor and British armor was on the 16th of June 1940. This was only six days after the Italian declaration of war and was conducted between an Italian raggruppamento and elements of the British 7th Armored division. The Italians had suffered the loss of two strategic frontier outposts on the fourteenth of June 1940. The outposts were Fort Capuzzo and Fort Maddalena, which were centered on the main roads, and trails, which intersect the border area, know as the wire. The Italian Army responded to these two losses and formed a raggruppamento. This mechanized column was from the Italian XXI Corps mobile element, deployed along the Egyptian border in the Bardia area, and was led by Colonel D'Avanzo, a former cavalry officer, who died during the action. Later, a Gold Medal for military valor was awarded to him posthumously for this action. This mechanized column was to move forward and defeat the enemy penetrations of the frontier wire in the vicinity of Fort Capuzzo. The entire strength of this raggruppamento was one Libyan motorized battalion, elements of one L.3 light tank battalion and one motorized artillery section. The stage was set for the first tank on tank engagement of the western desert campaign.
The raggruppamento’s armored element came form the IX light tank battalion, which was mobilized during November 1939 and sent to Derna Libya. It was composed of three L.3 companies for a total strength of 46 L.3 light tanks. The 3rd company, supported by another platoon from the Battalion headquarters, was task organized as part of the raggruppamento. This would give the raggruppamento a strength of 16 L.3 light tanks. The motorized Libyan infantry element for the raggruppamento came from the 1st Libyan Infantry Division. The artillery section for the raggruppamento came from the Libyan 17th battery, IV Group and was armed with 4 77/28 artillery pieces. This raggruppamento formed itself with the available equipment and personnel in the Bardia area.

When the raggruppamento advanced toward Fort Capuzzo, the British forces thought they spotted two separate columns and decided to withdraw back across the border area. Before the orders could be sent the scouting armored cars that spotted the smaller column attacked it with only two armored cars. This touched off the Battle of Nezuet Ghirba.

The Battle of Nezuet Ghirba would be the first tank on tank engagement of the war. The raggruppamento was sent from Gabr Saleh toward Sidi Omar-Ridotta Capuzzo to clear the area of any raiding British elements. Unfortunately, this action turned out badly. The Italian motorized column was attacked by only two British armored cars initially. This occurred on a large open plain, void of any cover, along the route of march of the smaller Italian column. The Italian commander, Colonel D’Avanzo, instead of utilizing his forces as a combined arms team, instead formed a defensive square. Colonel D’Avanzo placed his four artillery pieces, one each, in each corner of the square. The infantry then formed the four sides of the square. The twelve Italian L.3 light tanks patrolled outside the square. This was clearly a defensive response by the Italian commander and did not conform to any existing Italian doctrine of the period. This was the more traditional Napoleonic defense for infantry against a cavalry attack.

The British reinforced the initial two armored cars with more armored cars and mixed force of light and medium tanks. Only two A.9 medium tanks were involved in the battle. The Italian tanks charged forward unsupported by the infantry or its supporting artillery. They were defeated by the British armor. The light tanks operating independently of the artillery and infantry were no match for the mixed armored forces they faced. Fighting bravely and with courage they charged forward but were all disabled or destroyed.

The British armored vehicles then circled the Italian square and targeted the soft skinned Italian trucks and exposed infantry. It was only after the second trip around the square that the Italian artillery revealed themselves and opened fire on the British armored vehicles. The Italian artillery had only high explosive ammunition and no armored piercing ammunition at their disposal. They were still capable of inflicting damage on the British armored vehicles. There were no antitank guns with the column either. This was a clear violation of the Italian doctrine for combined arms teams operating in conjunction with the infantry and armor. The battle dissolved into four separate fights at each corner of the square with Italian guns and British armor engaging each other. The exposed Italian gunners soon fell and the infantry broke. There was no lack of courage or skill from the Italian gunners as they engaged the enemy armor, just the lack of armor piercing ammunition. The Italians were severely defeated with the loss of this portion of the mechanized column.

General Luigi Sibille commander of 1st Libyan Division in an after action report written for the XXI Corps HQs, wrote the following:
On 15th June, at around 16.00 hours, at Gabr Saleh a superior officer from 10th Army HQ arrived. He had an order concerning a small column, which was to begin operations at 20.00 hours the same day. The order contained the route, the composition and the objectives of the column. As the column was supposed to clear the area along its route and to capture some prisoners, it was necessary to give it adequate infantry support.

Colonel D'Avanzo was the only commanding officer available to lead the column. He made adequate provision for water, ammo, food, etc. At 22.00 hours, the column left Gabr Saleh. At Bir Gibni, some men from the local garrison acted as guides for the column. At 05.00 hours the column rested at Sidi Omar. At 06.30 hours the advance resumed. The column was organized thus:
On the right was a tank company. Prior to this, until reaching Sidi Omar the L.3s were transported by trucks. [This was standard Italian practice and doctrine for all their tanks. It saved on maintenance and lubricants of the armored vehicles for traveling long distances. Once enemy contact was thought to be probable they would dismount their armored vehicles.] These trucks had to follow the track, keeping close to the "wire;" On the left of the tanks, a platoon of four L.3s, with a motorized infantry company, acted as an advance guard; at the rear of the advance guard was the remainder of the column.

[It was these dispositions, that led the British to believe that there were two distinct armored columns. From this point on there followed an incredible succession of Italian mistakes.]
The advance guard (formed by the Infantry Company and the tank platoon) signaled the presence of some British armored cars, but Colonel D'Avanzo at first thought they were the tanks of the L.3 Company on the right.
Soon it was clear they were really enemy armored cars. Two infantry platoons (under the command of Lt. Perinea and Lt. Vitally) of the advance guard left their trucks. The armored cars went after the trucks, now empty and moving away. The drivers, thinking their role was finished, retired westward, to evade the armored cars.

The remainder of the advance guard and part of the main column, now confused, started to follow the empty trucks. Colonel D'Avanzo, worried from what he was seeing, ordered Captain Andolfato, commander of the Libyan infantry Battalion, to stop their movement.

Captain Andolfato reached the trucks carrying the with the artillery section first. This was due to their load that they were carrying and were slower than the others trucks in the column. Immediately, the guns were unloaded and began firing at the armored cars. The L.3s tried to intercept the Rolls-Royces Armored Cars, which being faster, ignored them and surrounded the main column.

In a few minutes it was chaos: the main part of the column (the artillery battery, the infantrymen and some light tanks) was immobile and surrounded by the armored cars, another part was retiring, subdivided into three groups, followed by other armored cars.


Before Captain Andolfato could reach the three groups, more than 20 minutes had passed and some trucks were already at Sidi Azeiz, about 15 Kms from the area of first contact with the enemy." [It is interesting to note that the Rolls-Royces, considered very fast, weren't able to catch the Lancia 3RO trucks, capable of a max road speed of 45 Km/h.]
The three groups were reunited and reorganized by Andolfato. They included some trucks still transporting food, water, ammo and about 70 men.
At this point, Andolfato tried to reach Colonel D'Avanzo and the main body near Ghirba, but the actions of the armored cars obliged him to give this up and to go North, toward Amseat. Before starting the movement, he informed 1st Libyan division HQ of the situation of the column.

Near the airfield of Amseat he found further enemy armored cars and changed direction, following the Trigh Capuzzo. At Gambut he reached the coastal road and, after a few Kms towards Bardia, again found enemy units. They were from "C" Squadron 11th Hussars and had just destroyed 27 empty Italian trucks and captured General Lastrucci, 10th Army's commander of the Engineers.

Changing direction again, Andolfato decided to return at to Gabr Saleh, via El Adem. Along the way he was ordered to go to 10th Army HQ at Tobruk. At Tobruk Captain Andolfato reported to the HQ and, the following day, at last returned to Bir Saleh.
Returning to the immobilized part of the column, it fought with honor: the artillerymen had fallen beside their pieces, all the tanks were destroyed in action and many infantrymen died fighting. (Pignato 1988, 32-34)

Taken from: "FALLEN EAGLES: THE ITALIAN 10TH ARMY IN THE OPENING CAMPAIGN IN THE WESTERN DESERT, JUNE 1940 – DECEMBER 1940" by HOWARD R. CHRISTIE, MAJ, USA B.A., Bloomsburg University, Bloomburg, Pennsylvania, 1986.

Pictures source: "Der Zweite Weltkrieg". Janusz Piekalkiewicz. Econ verlag Gmbh. and "Beda Fomm. La victoria clásica". Kenneth Macksey. Editorial San Martín.

Cheers. Tigre.
Attachments
1940 - Blindados Británicos.jpg
British tanks moving ahead in the desert.
1940 - Blindados Británicos.jpg (61.62 KiB) Viewed 6698 times
1940 - Camiones Italianos.jpg
Italian trucks.
1940 - Camiones Italianos.jpg (55.34 KiB) Viewed 6697 times

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Attrition
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Re: The Battle of Nezuet Ghirba 1940

#2

Post by Attrition » 13 Mar 2015, 00:25



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tigre
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Re: The Battle of Nezuet Ghirba 1940

#3

Post by tigre » 29 Jun 2015, 01:39

Thanks for sharing the link here Attrition :wink:. Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

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Re: The Battle of Nezuet Ghirba 1940

#4

Post by Attrition » 29 Jun 2015, 18:44

Eythenkew!

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frontier_ ... uet_Ghirba

The OoB came in handy too.


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tigre
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Re: The Battle of Nezuet Ghirba 1940

#6

Post by tigre » 04 Jul 2015, 07:15

Thanks for sharing :wink:. Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

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Re: The Battle of Nezuet Ghirba 1940

#7

Post by apple pie » 09 Jul 2015, 04:59

Hi Tigre,

The account is interesting but I wouldn't classify this as a tank on tank battle. The L3 is not a tank but the equivalent of a British Bren carrier, it doesn't even have a gun. The A9 was a true tank.

Dan

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tigre
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Re: The Battle of Nezuet Ghirba 1940

#8

Post by tigre » 18 Jul 2015, 15:39

Hello Dan :D; thanks for shedding light on that :wink:. Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

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