Arras 1940 and Dunkirk

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dcmatkins
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Arras 1940 and Dunkirk

#1

Post by dcmatkins » 27 Dec 2005, 21:01

I have read somewhere that Rommels 7th Panzer panzer div panicked initially when attacked by British Matildas. To deal with the threat the Germans brought 88mm guns directly into the anti-tank role. The French were supposed to support the British but never got near to the action. Is it correct they had fuel problems due to the fact their tanks ran on aviation fuel whilst the germans used petrol. If the Allied tank force had been better coordinated and functioned effectively could it have won. What consequences if any would it have had in 1940.

Another point, how long could the panzer divisions have operated in France before requiring replenishment of fuel and ammunition.
On a recent History channel programme it mentions that the Germans were so concerned by Arras they were reluctant to commit armoured divs to the Dunkirk operation as it would involve street fighting . Goring thus boasted and promised the Luftwaffe would wipe out the BEF whilst the panzer div regrouped for the drive south.

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David Lehmann
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#2

Post by David Lehmann » 28 Dec 2005, 02:12

Hello,

Here is a quote from what I have written about the French cavalry corps, this part includes details about the battle of Arras ... in which 60 French tanks also took part, covering the retreat of the British troops.
The real impact of the battle Arras is very small and has no influence on the whole strategic outcome (even if it had been better coordinated). Indeed several German troops panicked in front of the Matilda IIs, like it was the case many times in front of the Renault B1bis e.g. the Abbeville pocket where a whole infantry battalion was destroyed in Huppy etc.

.../...

3. THE FRENCH CAVALRY CORPS AFTER THE 15th MAY

After the combats in Belgium and in the Netherlands, general Prioux wants to concentrate the 1e, 2e and 3e DLM in the cavalry corps. Nevertheless it seems not possible, all the time the tank brigades are being ordered by the army corps to support different infantry units. Prioux cannot control the fate of his tanks, they are dispersed and cannot be grouped as wished. On 26th May general Prioux takes command of the 1st army and is replaced by general de La Font. After Dunkirk, the tank crews, who are the French troops evacuated in priority reconstitute the cavalry corps but it is only the shadow of the previous one.


3.1 The grouping of the DLMs in the north (16th-20th May 1940)

On 16th May the 3 DLMs move back to France.

The 1e DLM is deployed south of Valenciennes and Cambrai, attached to the 9th army. The Somua S35 tanks are deployed at Quesnoy and will soon meet German mechanized elements reinforced by AT guns during short but violent engagements. Rear guard elements of the French 9th army are engaged in the forest of Mormal, east of Quesnoy. The 7.PzD (general Rommel) have trapped them in the woods and goes on with its advance, letting the 5.PzD (general von Hartlieb) reduce them.

On 17th May, the 1e DLM is ordered to block the German tanks. There is also a fierce battle in and around the Mormal forest. The 1e DLM meets the 5.PzD and elements of the 7.PzD. The 1e DLM is far from having all its units but the counter-attack starts at 18h30 from Quesnoy towards Landrecies. The tanks of the 4e RC (colonel Poupel) and the 18e RD (colonel Pinon) are incomplete, inferior in number and forced to disperse to control the assigned area. Nevertheless the morale and the determination are high. During the counter-attack many Hotchkiss tanks are destroyed by 10.5cm field guns used in AT role. The French counter-attack will significantly delay the 5.PzD.

On 18th May, 12 Somua S35 tanks of the squadron of captain De Segonzac from the 4e RC are holding the town of Jolimetz along with one company of Moroccan tirailleurs in support. During all the day they faced half of the 5.PzD (about 120 tanks and massive infantry, field artillery, AT guns and aviation support) on the move in this area. 1 Somua S35 tank (Maréchal des logis Enfroy) is damaged during a reconnaissance and sent back to Quesnoy. Only 11 French tanks are then controlling the town. The German attack is launched and after a few losses the Germans sent preferentially the heavier Panzer IVs in the town itself. At the end of the day the town was completely surrounded. In 10 vs 1 odd, the French have lost 10 tanks (destroyed or abandoned) and the Germans 26 tanks, mostly Panzer IVs. That is a perfect example of what well-trained French crews were able to do.

On 19th May, the 1e DLM is again under command of the cavalry corps.

On 20th May, the 5e DINA (general Agliany) supported by the 1e DLM and the 39e BCC (45 Renault R35 tanks) attack the German 8.ID, 20.ID (mot), 4.PzD and 5.PzD. The combats last all the day long and on the evening several French troops are trapped in the Mormal forest after having sustained heavy losses.

On 21st May, the French move back to Englefontaine. At 8h00 one battalion of the 24e RTT (Régiment de Tirailleurs Tunisiens) of the 5e DINA, trapped in the forest, launches a bayonet charge under German MG and artillery fire to break the encirclement. At 12h00 300 men of the battalion are KIA and only around 100 men manage to pierce the German lines. The 39e BCC has lost all its 45 tanks and the 18e RD of the 1e DLM has only a few operational tanks.

The 2e DLM and 3e DLM on their side covered the retreat of the French 1st army from 16th May to 19th May. On 18th May, they launched several violent but limited counter-attacks in the area of Douai.

3.2 Difficult battles in the Flanders and the road to Dunkirk (21th-29th May 1940)

On 21st May there is an allied counter-attack at Arras. The British brigade (general Martel) leading the main attack on the Arras-Bapaume on 15h00 consists in :

Right column :

- 7th Royal Tank Regiment (23 Matilda I and 9 Matilda II tanks)
- 8th battalion, the Durham Light Infantry
- 365th battery, 92nd regiment, Royal Field Artillery (12 25 Pdr howitzers)
- 260th battery, 65th anti-tank regiment (12 2 Pdr AT guns)
- One platoon equipped with 3 French 25mm AT guns
- One motorcycle platoon from 4th Northumbrian fusiliers

Left column :

- 4th Royal Tank Regiment (37 Matilda I and 7 Matilda II tanks)
- 6th battalion, the Durham Light Infantry
- 368th battery, 92nd regiment, Royal Field Artillery (12 25 Pdr howitzers)
- 260th battery, 52nd anti-tank regiment (12 2 Pdr AT guns)
- One platoon equipped with 3 French 25mm AT guns
- One motorcycle platoon from 4th Northumbrian fusiliers
- General Martel and is headquarter staff

That makes a total concerning the equipments of :
- 60 Matilda I light tanks
- 16 Matilda II heavy tanks
- 21 armored cars
- 24 25 Pdr howitzers
- 24 2 Pdr AT guns
- 6 French 25mm AT guns
Several sources mention Bofors 37mm AT guns instead of 2 Pdr AT guns.

The British troops faced mainly the 7.PzD and the SS Totenkopf (mot) division, the 5.PzD was arriving from the east but too late to take part to the battle. The Matilda II heavy tank spread some panic in the German ranks, mainly in the SS Totenkopf positions where several troops disbanded, without sufficient mean to destroy the Matilda II. But the 8.8cm Flak and the use of artillery in direct fire rapidly solved the problem.

The French troops began their attack later, covering the western flank of the British attack and later the British retreat. They faced the SS Totenkopf (mot) division and the Pz.Rgt.25 from the 7.PzD. The French forces were composed of elements from the 3e DLM but in fact mainly of the 13e BCC (45 Hotchkiss H35 tanks at full strength). The French had a total of about 60 tanks in this battle, therefore probably about 15 Hotchkiss H39 and Somua S35 tanks from the 3e DLM itself. They were soon confronted to direct 10.5cm artillery and Flak fire as well as PaK and tanks. They were even fired at by British AT gunners. The French tanks destroyed at least 3 Panzer IV and 6 Pz38(t) from the Pz.Rgt.25 while covering the British retreat. There is no precise data concerning the French losses but after the whole battle the 13e BCC had lost about 10 tanks and the 3e DLM itself lost also probably about 10 tanks. The 11e RDP (Régiment de Dragons Portés) had only light losses.

The British lost 62% of the tanks (47 tanks) before retreating and had about 50% losses in the infantry. 75% of the reconnaissance vehicles (16 from 21), mainly from the Northumbrian regiment were also lost.

Concerning the whole German losses, the 7.PzD lost 89 KIAs, 116 WIAs and 173 MIAs as well as about 20 tanks and many AT guns and various vehicles. According to K.H. Frieser, from the 173 MIAs, 90 men integrated again quickly their units in the 7.PzD. The SS Totenkopf (mot) lost about 100 KIAs and 200 POWs. The advance of the 7.PzD is stopped for the rest of day, therefore only for several hours.

[NOTE : the book by Karl-Heinz Frieser was available in English language since 2005]

Elements of the SS Totenkopf (mot) division are facing a British unit defending a bridge on the Scarpe River in the town of Aubigny-en-Artois (15 km west of Arras). In reprisal for this resistance, 98 people from the town are executed by the Germans. The officer in charge, Obersturmbahn Fritz Kuchenlein will be hung on 28th January 1949 for his warcrimes.

The attack started on 15h00 and on the evening it is rather a tactical failure after only 3 km of progression. After the surprise effect, the attack is defeated by the 8.8cm FlaK, the Luftwaffe and counter-attacking German tanks. It illustrates also the inter-allied communications issues because it was a British initiative. The west cover assured by the French tanks went deeper towards Amiens but it was a very limited and secondary action. These troops nevertheless covered the British retreat and inflicted losses to the German tanks.

The counter-attack at Arras by itself is secondary regarding the general situation. It blocked indeed the 7.PzD during a few hours but it is very localized and limited in strength. The core of the German troops went on with their movements towards the northern harbors regardless of the battle that was fought.

On 22nd May, the 25e DIM supported by the 38e BCC (45 Hotchkiss H35 tanks at full strength) drives the German 32.ID from the field near Cambrai on the Escaut River, east of Arras. The French breakthrough is important and the Germans engage massive air support to stop it. 18 Dewoitine D520 fighters from GC 2/3 in patrol in the area intercept a Stuka group and 11 Ju87 dive bombers are shot down. But, the French attack is stopped by the intensity of the bombings.

The same day, general Prioux decides to regroup the cavalry corps in the area of Arras. The I/4e RDP supported byt the 18e RD (1e DLM) leads a brilliant counter-attack which allows to take Mont-Saint-Eloi north-west of Arras. During this attack, the 2e DLM and 3e DLM covered the flanks of the attack.

On 23rd May, the 158e RI (colonel Pucinelli) launches a bayonet charge, between Mons and Valenciennes, against the German 269.ID and takes Thulin despite the numeric superiority of the Germans. Many German soldiers are captured during the assault. Thulin is then shelled by the heavy German artillery. The French troops entrenched in Thulin are finally submerged, colonel Pucinelli is WIA and captured. The last French troops surrender only after having used all their ammunition.

On the same day, the 7.PzD outflanks Arras by the west and the 5.PzD tires to progress by the east after having reduced several infantry resistances.

General Prioux has deployed the 1e DLM east of Arras. The division is strongly and frequently attacked by the Luftwaffe. One Stuka makes a lucky hit on the tank of colonel Pinon, commander of the 18e RD. The colonel is heavily wounded, the two other crew members (captain Beaussant and the driver) are dead.

The 3e DLM tries to lengthen the position of the 1e DLM to the north, up to Notre Dame de Lorette. But, west of Arras, the 7.PzD turns frankly to the east and heavy combats take place south of Béthune. The 3e DLM retreats towards Lens. The Germans capture again Mont-Saint-Eloi to the 1e DLM, which moves north of Arras.

The 2.PzD reaches Boulogne, the 1.PzD reaches Calais, the 6.PzD is near Saint-Omer and the 7.PzD is in the suburbs of Béthune. The allied units in the north are completely encircled.

On 24th May, the salient of Arras is evacuated and a new frontline is established on the canals between Arleux and Béthune. The 3 DLMs will be replaced by infantry units.

On 25th May, the whole cavalry corps (1e, 2e and 3e DLM) has only 75 operational tanks left out of the 585 initial ones. General Prioux is replaced by general Langlois and takes command of the French 1st army.

From 26th to 28th May, the remaining tanks of the cavalry corps led several violent but limited actions, whose victims are mainly from the 5.PzD. Platoon strong tank groups at the best are also used around Watten and Bollezeele in the battle of the Aa canal from 25th to 27th May against the "Grossdeutschland" regiment, the SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler (LAH) regiment, the 20.ID (mot) division and the 6.PzD.

On 29th May, the cavalry corps retreats to Dunkirk. The remaining tanks are first grouped at Coudekerque and fight until the end under the command of squadron commander Marchal (21 Somua S35 tanks, 18 Hotchkiss H35/H39 tanks). Many times their intervention even in small numbers allowed to defeat German attacks on the pocket and to delay the fate of the trapped troops. The last Somua S35 tanks are out of fuel and scuttled.

The German operations launched on 10th May 1940 enable to encircle 13 French infantry divisions, 3 French armoured divisions (DLM), 13 Belgian and 9 British divisions in the north on 23rd May. On 27th May the British evacuation plan is ready and the War Office tells Lord Gort that "his single duty is now to evacuate to Great Britain as much troops as possible". On 28th May morning the Belgian army surrenders.

The priority of the British HQ will quickly be to evacuate as fast and as much as possible. The French HQ priority is to fight as long as possible to gain time for the troops, which will face all the German troops after Dunkirk. This resistance (100,000 French and 20,000 British troops on 30th May) played an important role in the evacuation of the BEF. The ground defense of the Dunkirk pocket itself was mostly in French hands, nevertheless in many Anglo-American documents the French troops are simply ignored. The remaining tanks of the French cavalry corps will play a decent role in the defense of the allied pocket. A total of 123,095 French troops and 338,095 British troops are evacuated from Dunkirk. The French Navy (300 French military and civilian ships are engaged and 60 lost) alone evacuated 68,999 soldiers (20,525 French and 48,474 British soldiers). But the success of the evacuation in the air and on the sea is widely due to British means. On 9th June 52,669 of the evacuated French troops are back in France and about half of them will continue to fight until the end of the 1940 western campaign.

The German operations against the allied pocket are not easy. The German troops are opposed to the best allied troops : the 1st French Army, the French cavalry corps and the BEF. The successful evacuation of the BEF would probably not have been possible without the stiff French resistance around Lille, which blocked 7 German divisions. From 28th May to 1st June, about 40,000 French troops led by general Molinié (also commander of the 25e DIM) held about 800 German tanks and 110,000 soldiers from the 4.PzD, 5.PzD, 7.PzD, 7.ID, 217.ID, 253.ID and 267.ID. The French troops are composed of various more or less complete units. These French troops fought encircled until all their ammunition was used and led several counter-attacks, the commander of 253.ID, general Kühne, was even captured. The Germans let the defenders parade in the streets after the battle granted them the honors of war to salute their fierce resistance. Even Churchill in his memories recognized the role of the troops in Lille.

To defend the 500 km of the so-called "Weygand Line", from the North Sea to the Rhine, there remains only 63 divisions (59 French, 2 Polish depending from the French army and 2 British divisions) to stop 136 German ones, including 10 Panzerdivisionen, 6 motorized infantry divisions and 1 cavalry division. With such means only a frontline on the Somme and Aisne Rivers can be defended. Mathematically the campaign is lost, but the French troops will offer a fierce resistance during June 1940.

.../...




Beside the battle of Arras, British tanks were e.g. involved in Abbeville and around Calais. The 3rd RTR (48 tanks of the 1st AD) was completely lost in Calais without achieving anything. The first attack on Abbeville was led by the 1st AD, which lost 120 tanks out of 165 (73% losses), the attack failed in only 2 hours. Most of the remaining British tanks were simply abandoned or lost due to mechanical breakdowns and could not be recovered and repaired in front of the advancing German troops.

The British tanks except the Matilda II were all too lightly armored and the crew inexperienced. All the British light tanks could be easily penetrated even by the German 2.0cm guns which were not efficient against the French tanks. Some of these British tanks were fast but they did not use this potential advantage to hit and run. As described by German testimonies in Abbeville for example : while fired on, the British tanks generally just stopped to fire or to regroup, allowing the German AT gunners to concentrate easily on sitting ducks. The French tanks at least, even the lighter ones, had the luck to have a 40mm thick armor.

The 1940 British army shared the same weaknesses as the bulk of the contemporary French one like the inability to wage mobile battles, slow-thinking command, poor communications and intelligence. The British did no better job in May/June 1940 than the French army. They were beaten the same way and led their battles more or less according to the same tactics of infantry support. On the other hand, the ability to conduct static defense was good, as in the French army. The BEF generally looks better because that is the kind of battles that it ended up fighting, and because they had not to face the main shock of the German attack, but when you look at the details you find that British units were behaving in much the same way as equivalent French ones. Of course, the British equivalent of B reserve divisions hadn't left Britain and remained unengaged.

It seems that many English language sources only mention Arras and Dunkirk as key points about the 1940 battle of France, whereas there were many other battles which did not at all involve British troops and which were more bloody and equipment costing for the Germans (2nd attack of Abbeville, Stonne, Mont-Dieu, Tannay, Rethel, Gembloux, Hannut, battle of Boulogne where the French troops after the British had evacuated etc.). The battle of Arras was finally only a small one, which had very little impact and which slowed only the 7.PzD for the rest of the day. It had no real impact on the strategic outcome. It is often depicted as being the single allied attack ... which is plain false. There were also only 4 8.8cm FlaK assigned to 7.PzD (perhaps up to 8 heavy AA guns used during this battle) but 8.8cm FlaK and 10.5cm field guns had been often used previously during the battle of France against French tanks (Hannut, Flavion etc.). It is therefore not the first time that these guns are used against tanks. Also the role of the 8.8cm FlaK in Arras is overrated, many kills were achieved by field guns firing directly at the tanks.

The fact that the Panzerdivisionen were not massively engaged against the Dunkirk pocket has already been discussed on this forum, just make a research in the previous threads.

------------

On 25th May, Lord Gort decided unilaterally to retreat all the British troops to Dunkirk. Initially the Belgian army is defending the eastern part of the pocket but it surrenders on 28th May and the size of the pocket is reduced. The eastern part is then defended by the French 12e DIM and British troops.

The British evacuation begins on 27th May but on 30th May the British troops are still playing a role in the defense of the pocket on the eastern part with the French 12e DIM. This role will nonetheless very quickly decrease each day, the troops having the main task to retreat. Nonetheless, until 1st June there are still very small British elements on the south-eastern part of the pocket.

On 30th May the main troops defending the Dunkirk pocket are 100,000 French troops commanded by general Fagalde and admiral Abrial. These men are from various units, often very reduced units :

- Organic elements of various armies and corps (1st Army, 7th Army, Ist, IIIrd, IVth and Vth Army corps), including the 18e GRCA and 4 tank battalions attached to the 1st and 7th Armies.

- Divisions :
---o 1e, 5e, 9e, 12e, 15e and 25e DIM
---o 4e, 32e and 43e DI
---o 1e DM
---o 1e, 2e and 5e DINA

- French cavalry corps with the remnants of the 1e DLM, 2e DLM and 3e DLM. The 39 last operational tanks (21 Somua S35 and 18 Hotchkiss H35/39 tanks) are grouped under the command of squadron commander Marchal. They will play a decent role in the defense of the allied pocket. Many times their intervention even in small numbers of 1-5 tanks allowed to defeat German attacks on the pocket and to delay the fate of the trapped troops. The last Somua S35 tanks are out of fuel and scuttled beginning June.

- Territorial units :
---o Secteur Fortifié de l'Escaut (SFE)
---o Secteur Fortifié de Maubeuge (SFM)
---o 11th regional infantry regiment
---o Cavalry depot of the 1st region

- Various French Navy ground troops (including 2 mobile batteries of 155mm L Mle1932 guns – 8 guns)

- Main AA defenses
---o 8 groups of 75mm self-propelled guns (96 guns)
---o 4 groups of towed 75mm AA guns (48 guns)
---o 12 batteries of 25mm AA guns (45 guns)
---o at least 1 battery of 90mm AA guns (4 guns) from the French Navy
---o AA elements of the 1st region (DAT)

There are also about 20,000 British troops, elements from the 1st, 5th and 42nd divisions for a total of 120,000 men.

Beginning June 1940, about 30,000-40,000 French troops constitute the very last barrier to cover the evacuation of the BEF against about 130,000 German troops. The main elements involved in this last stand are from these main units :
- The 12e DIM (general Janssen) reduced to about 8,000 men
- The 68e DI (general Beaufrère)
- The tank group Marchal with the last tanks of the cavalry corps
- Reconnaissance groups (92e GRDI, 7e GRDI and 18e GRCA)
- Engineer battalion of the 60e DI
- Elements of the 32e DI
- Various units and remnants of units attached to the Secteur Fortifié des Flandres (SFF)
During 9 days (27th May to 4th June) these forces will prevent the German troops to stop the evacuation and to reduce the allied pocket.

---------


Concerning the question about how long could the German units operate I would say that during the battle of France they often lacked ammunition.
If you look at the battle of Hannut involving 3.PzD and 4.PzD mainly against the 3e DLM, according to the war diary of the 3.Panzerbrigade (3.PzD) commanded by colonel Kühne : "huge quantities of ammunition were used during the battles against French tanks because of the lack of power of the 2.0cm and 3.7cm guns. In our brigade, all the 3.7cm and 7.5cm shells were used during a single battle on 13th May. Our unit had to wait for ammunition supply to continue to fight." German sources agreed that the "only really effective" German tank weapon against French armor was the 7.5cm KwK firing APCBC shells. The same source from 3.Panzerbrigade concludes that their 3.7cm gun was effective only at less than 200m range.
As an other example, after the battle of Gembloux (following Hannut) the German artillery is really lacking ammunition and the troops are exhausted. During the battle of Gembloux the losses are heavy on both sides. On 15th May evening, the 4.PzD had only 137 operational available tanks left (including only 4 Panzer IV) from the initial 331 tanks. So there were 194 tanks damaged, under recovery/repair or destroyed after the battles of Hannut and Gembloux. Only 41 % of the tanks were operational.

On 16th May :
- the 4.PzD had about 55% operational tanks = 182 available tanks. Therefore 45 extra operational tanks than on 15th May. But 149 tanks remained unavailable; this number is including destroyed tanks and tanks in the repair workshops.
- the 3.PzD had 75% operational tanks. Therefore about 85 tanks are still destroyed or in the repair workshops one day after the battles.
On 16th May 1940, one day after the battles, 234 tanks (35% of the tanks) were not operational anymore, including an unknown number of definitively destroyed tanks. The Germans repaired more of their tanks during the following days or weeks. They had control of the ground and could easily recover their damaged tanks.

After the battle of Gembloux, general Hoepner estimated that he was unable to continue efficiently the combats the next day. Indeed many tanks were not operational anymore and the artillery lacked ammunition. The heavy guns had to await their supplies from Maastricht in the Netherlands, all the other dumps were empty. A renewed attack against the Gembloux gap is at first planned but it in any case it could not have been launched before 17th May and it was hopeless to think to pierce the French lines quickly, the "Blitzkrieg" was stopped in that area. Hoepner's troops are so exhausted that they cannot exploit the retreat of the French 1st Army on 16th to 18th May 1940 to disorganize it.

Regards,

David


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David Lehmann
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#3

Post by David Lehmann » 28 Dec 2005, 02:22

Hello,

Other elements and/or point of views about the battle of Arras can e.g. be found in "How to lose a battle" by Horn or in the memories of Rommel.

Ref: To Lose a Battle, Ch 18.

1. The Plan.
------------

General Gamelin ordered 'Instruction No12' on 19th May for an attack towards Mezieres from the south, and the Somme from the north. This was cancelled by Weygand on assuming command, who also ordered the roads cleared of refugees and the un-mothballing of as many WWI 75s as possible.

On the 20th while Weygand flew around over Northern France having meetings, General Ironside ordered General Gort to attack south with all possible strength at 0800 hours on that day. Gort pointed out that seven of his nine divisions were already engaged and refused. He said that he was instead planning a limited attack with his two unengaged divisions south from Arras.

Ironside then went to see Billotte (Gorts nominal commander) and bullied Billotte and Blanchard into accepting the attack plan, and it was agreed that both armies would attack with two divisions each on the 21st.

2. Forces committed
-----------

Attack was coordinated by Major General Franklyn (GOC 5th Div) and he was allotted 5th and 50th Div plus 1st Army Tank Brigade.

BUT, the infantry divisions only had two brigades each, one from 5th Div was sent to relieve the French on the river Scarpe and the other brigade (17th) was held in reserve.

50th Div lost a brigade to garrison Arras itself and to hold the river line east of the city.

So, all that was left for the attack were two battalions of 151st Brigade (50th Div), plus the armour.

1st Army Tank Brigade started with 100 tanks, but by the 21st its runners consisted of 58 Matilda Is and 16 Matilda IIs.
It may also have had some light Vickers IV or VI in the regimental scout troops (not mentioned in Horne).

Meanwhile late on the 20th Blanchard informed Gort that the French infantry could not attack until the 22nd, so instead Prioux Cavalry Corps was allotted to provide flank cover to the West. Unfortunately Prioux had already lost mostist tanks fighting General Hoeppner, and the rest of his tanks had lent to various infantry units, even by 1700 hours on the 20th he had not succeeded in reassembling his armour. He was only able to commit "a few weak detachments of 3rd DLM"

No RAF or ZOAN support was forthcoming.

The attack finally went in at 1400 hours on the 21st.

3. The attack
-----------

General Martel led from an open car. The troops were divided into two equal sized columns of a tank battalion, an infantry battalion (DLI - Durham Light Infantry) plus a battery of field artillery and AT guns. These would probably have been 18/25 pdrs (eight or twelve guns) and the AT guns would be Swedish 37mm Bofors AT guns (three troops of four each). The tanks seem to have been equally divided up.
The right hand column - fought to clear Duisans and left two infantry companies & some AT to garrison it. Pushed on to Warlus, again captured after a stiff fight, took Berneville, and put troops across the Doullen-Arras road.
The infantry were pinned down by MG/mortar fire and attacked by Stukas. The tanks left them behind and attacked Wailly where they caused panic among the lead units of 3rd SS. They were now overextended and the whole force fell back to Warlus with heavy losses, where the British AT gunners and Prioux's tanks fought each other! Some of the French tanks then engaged 25th Panzer Regiment around Duisans. The left hand column - fought all the way but made rapid progress. Took Dainville, destroying a "motorised column" in the process (vehicles KO'd, troops made prisoner). Two miles east six Matildas wiped out an AT battery near Achicourt then pushed on to Agny and Beaurains, a few units reached Wancourt on the River Cojeul (the objective of the attack). Most of the heavy fighting took place in the Agny-Beaurains area between 4th RTR and German 6th Rifle Brigade, backed up by the Div artillery and Flak of 7th Panzer Div. Both sides suffered heavy losses. Meanwhile 150th Brigade (50th Div) attacked across the Scarpe to Tilloy, and 13th Brigade also established a bridghead. However it was obvious that the ground could not be held, and the whole force fell back as 25th Panzer Reg approached Arras from the west. They took 400 prisnoers, destroyed "large numbers" of tanks and vehicles, but were left with only 26 Matilda Is and 2 Matilda IIs.

4. The German View
------------------

3rd SS evidently abandoned its positions in Wailly and showed 'signs of panic' (Guderian). Rommel was busy trying to round up 6th and 7th Rifle brigades to support 25th Pz Reg when the attack started. He couldn't find 7th Bde. He found elements of 6th Bde south of Wailly, and howitzers north of the village were engaging British tanks. The village itself came under MG fire as Rommel reached it. He found that the vilage was jammed with troops and vehicles trying to take cover. West of Wailly were some light AA guns and AT guns again hiding in full cover, and there were some destroyed German tanks. The German infantry and gun crews in the village then broke and ran. At this point Rommel brought up all the available guns, both AA and AT and concentrated their fire on each group of tanks, evidently with some success as the attack petered out. Rommel reports several British tanks destroyed or disabled, and the rest retreating. By the time he got the rest of 6th Rifle reg it had suffered 'very heavy losses in men and material' and he reports the overrunning of their light AT batteries. He organised a gun line between Agny and Beaurains from the Div artillery and heavy AA (88) batteries - according to Guderian there were at most six of these. This finished off the attack in the north, one 88 battery claiming nine kills. 25th Panzer Reg eventually intervened, and Rommel reports the destruction of seven tanks for the loss of nine of his own fighting NW of Arras. He had lost 205 dead or wounded, and 173 missing (presumably the remaining 200 prisoners were from 3rd SS).

David

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#4

Post by Andy H » 28 Apr 2006, 23:48

I have read somewhere that Rommels 7th Panzer panzer div panicked initially when attacked by British Matildas. To deal with the threat the Germans brought 88mm guns directly into the anti-tank role
According to Rommel in the War Diary:-
The attack was finally wrecked by 'defensive fire', particularly of all troops of the 78th Artillery Regimet, the 86th Light AA Battery (under Maj Schrader), the 3rd Troop 59th AA Regiment (under Capt.v.Hirschfeld) and parts of the 42nd AT-TK bTN (88mm)
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Andy H

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#5

Post by Pips » 29 Apr 2006, 00:19

The 'panic' claim is again one of those Britiah claims (found throughout the war) cleverly fostered by the Ministry of Information for Home Front consumption. However it having been repeated so often by historians who should have known better - or indeed done better research - it has effectively crossed over into the realm of fact.

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#6

Post by Andy H » 29 Apr 2006, 00:36

Pips wrote:The 'panic' claim is again one of those Britiah claims (found throughout the war) cleverly fostered by the Ministry of Information for Home Front consumption. However it having been repeated so often by historians who should have known better - or indeed done better research - it has effectively crossed over into the realm of fact.
Hi Pips

Panic is a rather emotive & descriptive word, which may well have typified (or not) the German reaction to the intial Allied C/A, or it could just have been concern or worry, but I guess its subjective.

However all sides and nations make claims which cross into fact, and again I guess it all depends which side of the hill you look at the events from.

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#7

Post by Pips » 29 Apr 2006, 04:16

Not really Andy.

The Ministry of Information was responsible for propaganda, and was far more effective than the Goebbels German equivalent. The Department was tasked almost immeditaely by Churchill on his assumption of power with two prime reponsibilities; namely that of downplaying any German victory and promoting any and all British (NB not Allied) effort and secondly promoting British achievements to the Americans.

Arras was an early example of the former. Other successful spin doctoring (to give it the current term) are Dunkirk, the BoB, Britons taking it in the Blitz, dastardly U-Boats as opposed to heroic RN submarines. Perhaps one of the most successful spins was that of the effort of the British armed forces in the Mediterranean, especially to the detriment of the Italians.

Examples of the latter are the numerous 'letter's to the editor' in all majoir US papers throughout 1939, '40 and '41; political representations at all levels; numerous Military commissions to the States; Dowding's dispatch to the States (unsuccessful), Malan's and Tuck's US visits (highly asuccessful) plus many other ploys.

It's a highly fascinating subject, and was well played out by the Ministry. It was deliberate, organised, skilfully conducted and it bent the truth to present Britain in the best possible light to the rest of the world. It was a brilliant ploy on Churchill's part, and did much to maintain support for Britain during the dark, dangerous early years of WWII.

The only drawback to the current scholar or historian is that much information in current belief is not necessarily the truth, and much time has to be undertaken by the serious student in unravelling the web. And that as much as anything proves just how successful the Ministry was.

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#8

Post by Andy H » 29 Apr 2006, 20:49

Hi Pips

I don't disagree with what you wrote, or that the British/Allies were more successful than the Axis.

However one only has to look at the German view of the Eastern Front to see (as you have mentioned) that misinformation/propoganda can pass over into fact. Until recently the vast % of EF Publications were mainly based on German sources and the inherent German spin they had in them, that has in some cases been proved completely false by the vast amount of information now becoming available from the former USSR.

I can't prove or disprove that the Germans did or didn't panic (at some stage and at some level) at Arras, but the use and choice of words or not is a very powerful tool employed by all sides to there own ends

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#9

Post by Pips » 30 Apr 2006, 00:47

Absolutely Andy, on that point I agree wholeheartedly. :)

The Eastern Front is indeed an excellent example of spin doctoring. The Germans then, and even sadly some to a degree now, made up every excuse in the book (and some new ones) to explain why 'conditions' defeated them. It wasn't the Russians really - it was snow, mud, the cold, supply, starting Barbarossa late, other fronts draining resources, poor support by their supposed Allies, Hitler's interference and so on. Many of the above did (to varying degree's) have a bearing on how the war was conducted on the Eastern Front - but they are common to all fronts and all sides, it's part of war. But the fact of the matter is that the average Russian soldier, through herculian sacrifice and capably lead by a new breed of clever, aggressive, skilled general, defeated the German soldier in open battle.

As far as Arras goes the point I would like to make on the British disinformation claim of panic is that it was directed at Rommel. The British claimed that Rommel himself was panicked initially by the bold British move, and failed to act for several hours, allowing the British to make inroads into the German lines and create havoc, before withdrawing in an orderly fashion.

Yes there probably was panic at the point of contact by German soldiers. Maltida's and French Renault tanks were considered monsters in 1940. But Rommel did not panic, he acted quickly and effectively and closed down what was no more than a local probe in force into his flank.

The interesting point of the Arras panic claim is that is only started circulating in late 1941. It's aim was to prove that Rommel - already gaining a powerful reputation in the eyes of the British soldier (and Generals) - was human after all and prone to cracking under pressure.

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#10

Post by Andy H » 30 Apr 2006, 20:06

The interesting point of the Arras panic claim is that is only started circulating in late 1941. It's aim was to prove that Rommel - already gaining a powerful reputation in the eyes of the British soldier (and Generals) - was human after all and prone to cracking under pressure.
Thats answered a question I was going to ask when I read the beginning of your post.

Its logical that the British through misinformation/propoganda would look to somehow deminish the aura of there enemy, who at the time seemed to have a hex over them.

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#11

Post by Jon G. » 30 Apr 2006, 20:46

Just to pipe in on an interesting debate...
Pips wrote:...The Eastern Front is indeed an excellent example of spin doctoring. The Germans then, and even sadly some to a degree now...
I think it's worth noting that most German apologists for 'why we lost the war' only really came out after the war - particularly the oft-repeated argument that Hitler's interference in military affairs cost Germany the war against the Soviet Union. Counter to that, a German officer observing the Soviet-Finnish Winter War commented very favourably on the skill and endurance of the Soviet infantryman and the ability of Soviet leadership to learn from past failure.
...The interesting point of the Arras panic claim is that is only started circulating in late 1941. It's aim was to prove that Rommel - already gaining a powerful reputation in the eyes of the British soldier (and Generals) - was human after all and prone to cracking under pressure.
No doubt the Ministry of Information was able to put a powerful spin on Arras to make it look better from a British point of view, yet there is no monopoly on truth in a democracy: Churchill's often quoted praise for Rommel after the fall of Tobruk very much runs counter to the MoI's efforts.

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#12

Post by Michael Emrys » 01 May 2006, 04:56

Jon G. wrote:No doubt the Ministry of Information was able to put a powerful spin on Arras to make it look better from a British point of view, yet there is no monopoly on truth in a democracy: Churchill's often quoted praise for Rommel after the fall of Tobruk very much runs counter to the MoI's efforts.
This raises a question of some interest to me. Churchill's statement aroused some controversy, both at the time and since, and I suspect that the reputation Rommel has enjoyed in the years following the war derives largely from Churchill's statement and the tendency of many popular Western historians to fall into line with it.

But, to get to the point of my post, I wonder if perhaps a good part of Churchill's motivation for making it in the first place was to try to deflate some of the acute humiliation of the recent reverses in North Africa, especially Tobruk. In other words, sort of a "Well, sure we lost, but look who we lost to. It took a great general to beat us." Churchill has testified as to the embarrassment of being informed by none less than General Marshal that Tobruk had been lost. This came at an awkward point in Anglo-American negotiations over the direction of the war. Plus, it shook confidence in his government at home. This all eventually worked out to Churchill's satisfaction (relatively speaking, that is), but I don't find it hard to imagine him employing whatever means might come to hand to staunch the damage to the reputation of British arms.

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#13

Post by Jon G. » 01 May 2006, 08:38

Michael Emrys wrote:...Churchill's statement aroused some controversy, both at the time and since, and I suspect that the reputation Rommel has enjoyed in the years following the war derives largely from Churchill's statement and the tendency of many popular Western historians to fall into line with it.
Well, I think that Rommel's star was on the rise well before Churchill's famous speech. Rommel was certainly heavily advertised by Goebbels' equally efficient Propaganda Ministry also before he took Tobruk in 1942. After all, the British MoI would probably not have felt the need to advance the 'panic' version of events at Arras if Rommel was some obscure general without any reputation.

But even today, Churchill's (and other Allied leaders') praise of Rommel seems to have outlived the Ministry of Information's version of events: I think it's fair to say that Rommel enjoys a greater reputation with Anglo-Saxon historians than he does with German historians, at least when it comes to evaluating his campaigns in North Africa.
... I wonder if perhaps a good part of Churchill's motivation for making it in the first place was to try to deflate some of the acute humiliation of the recent reverses in North Africa, especially Tobruk. In other words, sort of a "Well, sure we lost, but look who we lost to. It took a great general to beat us." Churchill has testified as to the embarrassment of being informed by none less than General Marshal that Tobruk had been lost...
As I understand it Churchill made his speech praising Rommel right after the fall of Tobruk. A vote of no confidence was looming, and Churchill fought teeth and nail to avoid it - it was a time of several disasters, the loss of Force Z and the fall of Singapore also put a lot of pressure on Churchill's government. I think that goes more to show the different political systems of Germany and Britain at the time, rather than how the fortunes of war were interpreted. It takes an imagination well above average to imagine Hitler being faced with a vote of no confidence from his Reichstag after the fall of Stalingrad...

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#14

Post by Michael Emrys » 01 May 2006, 14:32

Jon G. wrote:Well, I think that Rommel's star was on the rise well before Churchill's famous speech. Rommel was certainly heavily advertised by Goebbels' equally efficient Propaganda Ministry also before he took Tobruk in 1942.
But that was in Germany. How much of that would have reached the British press and public?
After all, the British MoI would probably not have felt the need to advance the 'panic' version of events at Arras if Rommel was some obscure general without any reputation.
Hmmm, Pips did say that it was directed against Rommel. But I have to wonder if that is so. How would the British public have known about Rommel at that point, or cared? He had written a book that a few British officers had read, but even that was about infantry warfare. In 1940, he was just beginning to make a reputation as a Panzer general and I doubt that the public would have known of him yet. It would seem to me more likely that the MoI release would have been a more general smear with Rommel only mentioned by name (if in fact he was) because he happened to be the man on the spot.

Later on, say around April 1941 and after, they would have had ample reason to want to talk him down.

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#15

Post by Jon G. » 01 May 2006, 16:38

Michael Emrys wrote:...Pips did say that it [the panic claim] was directed against Rommel. But I have to wonder if that is so. How would the British public have known about Rommel at that point, or cared? He had written a book that a few British officers had read, but even that was about infantry warfare. In 1940, he was just beginning to make a reputation as a Panzer general and I doubt that the public would have known of him yet.
How much propaganda reached the other side and in which form is an interesting question - but much German propaganda was intended for the public in the occupied countries, whereas I imagine much British propaganda was intended for American consumers. The more neutrally-toned propaganda disseminated to the public at large would probably include the names of opposing countries' generals.
It would seem to me more likely that the MoI release would have been a more general smear with Rommel only mentioned by name (if in fact he was) because he happened to be the man on the spot.

Later on, say around April 1941 and after, they would have had ample reason to want to talk him down.
Yes, but as I understand Pips' point the 'panic' spin only began circulating in 1941, by which time the MoI had every reason to try and kick Rommel off his pedestal by tarnishing his reputation as a great general.

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