Luftwaffe Allowed By Versailles

[stg 44]

I say a similar posting on another forum and thought that I should ask the experts. The Luftwaffe is not my area of expertise, but I will try and give a quick outline of what I think would have happened. Assuming it was allowed in a limited form like the Reichswehr, it would consist of fighters for home defense. The lack of bombers would be addressed in Russia and other countries where Germany had clandestine deals with sympathetic governments. However, because bombers would not be allowed officially, I don't see much of a difference from OTL other than the fact that the school in Russia can concentrate on bomber development and tactics instead of both bombers and fighters.

The fighter tactics would be more advanced than OTL, but the LW may have older models by the time the war breaks out, as the LW would have to upgrade through the 20's and 30's. Another happy change would be that Goering would most likely not be in charge of the LW. The LW would not be as Nazified as the service would not be created by the Nazis. Maybe this means less atrocities during the war? Regardless, the LW would probably be able to contest the skies above Germany longer and more effectively. This may mean more fuel reaches troops at the front and production does up. Also, less casualties on the ground and maybe more German ground attack bombers get through later in the war. Perhaps the jet fighters start rolling of the production lines sooner. Most likely this doesn't change the outcome, but the Allies would suffer worse casualties and the war may last longer.

Thoughts, comments?

[Tim Smith]

I don't think this would make an appreciable difference in World War 2.

Even if Germany was allowed to have a fighter force under the Versailles Treaty, it would IMO only be a very, very small one. Probably equivalent, at the most, to the historical strength of the WW1 Jagdgeschwader 1 in 1918 - 4 squadrons, or jastas, of 12 fighters each, 48 planes in total. With about 60 pilots on strength. Plus 2 training squadrons - one for basic training, and one for advanced training.

That gives Germany 1 fighter squadron to defend East Prussia, 1 squadron in Silesia, 1 squadron on the Czech border and 1 squadron on the Rhine. Plus say 4 squadrons of reconnaissance aircraft, 2 squadrons of transports, and 2 squadrons of seaplanes. A total air force of 12 operational squadrons!

Remember, in mid-1920, the British RAF only had 25 operational squadrons of all types - bomber, fighter, and reconnaissance! These were scattered throughout the British Empire - there were only 2 fighter squadrons in Britain, and these were at half strength! And there's no way the British would allow Germany to have anywhere near as many squadrons as they did.

Tactics couldn't advance much without combat experience - in 1935 the Germans would still be using tactics largely based on those from the Great War, the same as every other country. Technology probably wouldn't advance much faster than historically either.

Goring might stay in the air force instead of going into politics, but he would likely still be a Nazi and still be the leader of Hitler's Luftwaffe.

The only real benefits I can see is that the Luftwaffe would be better prepared and ready to fight during the Rhineland Crisis of 1936, and the Czech Crisis of 1938.

[Kurt_Steiner]

I guess that, as the Germans would still have the Air Service working, perhaps the Luftwaffe wouldn't be such an special tool for Hitler, and it would be a bit conservative. So, perhaps it would mean less air ground support but better medium and long range bombers.

[Kurt_Steiner]

By the way, how would be the Luftwaffe called during the Weimar period, in this OTL?

[Tim Smith]

By the way, how would be the Luftwaffe called during the Weimar period, in this OTL?

Possibly the 'Reichsluftstreitkräfte'?

Combining the 'Reichs' prefix of the Weimar Republic (e.g. Reichsheer, Reichsmarine) with the 'Luftstreitkräfte' title of the old Imperial German Army Air Service of World War One.

Luftstreitkräfte means literaly 'air-fight-powers'. One of those odd German words. Not a literal translation of 'air service'.

(I think a literal translation of 'air service' would be 'Fluglinienverkehr'?)

Historically, the official title of the Luftwaffe of the Third Reich was 'Reichsluftwaffe'.

[Kurt_Steiner]

(I think a literal translation of 'air service' would be 'Fluglinienverkehr'?)

It sounds a bit more like a civil airline rather than a military branch of the armed forces, IMHO.

[Kurt_Steiner]

Tactics couldn't advance much without combat experience - in 1935 the Germans would still be using tactics largely based on those from the Great War, the same as every other country. Technology probably wouldn't advance much faster than historically either.

Any ideas about how this may affect the air war during the SCW?

[Tim Smith]

Tactics couldn't advance much without combat experience - in 1935 the Germans would still be using tactics largely based on those from the Great War, the same as every other country. Technology probably wouldn't advance much faster than historically either.

Any ideas about how this may affect the air war during the SCW?

Germans would probably start in 1936 with the Ju 86 as a bomber, instead of having to use the Ju 52 transport in the bombing role. Otherwise no difference IMO.

[Kurt_Steiner]

Tactics couldn't advance much without combat experience - in 1935 the Germans would still be using tactics largely based on those from the Great War, the same as every other country. Technology probably wouldn't advance much faster than historically either.

Any ideas about how this may affect the air war during the SCW?

Germans would probably start in 1936 with the Ju 86 as a bomber, instead of having to use the Ju 52 transport in the bombing role. Otherwise no difference IMO.

Indeed. But, if the Luftwaffe is more "conventionally" minded, would this affect the developing of the Stuka and of the Blitzkrieg concept?

[Tim Smith]

Shouldn't think the Luftwaffe would be 'conventionally minded' as far as bombing tactics went, since bombers would still be banned in this scenario for the Reichsluftstreitkräfte (Weimar air force).

A bomber is a totally offensive weapon, it's a plane that drops bombs on enemy territory. Since Germany is only to be allowed defensive weapons under the Versailles Treaty, she can't have U-boats, because they are an offensive weapon, and she can't have bombers for the same reason, which means she can't develop bombing tactics (except in secret in Russia, as historically).

(In this scenario, fighters are OK because their role is defensive - shooting down attacking bombers. Recon planes are OK because they don't directly attack anything, just report it to HQ.)

[|AXiN|]

While I agree that Germany wouldn't be allowed to develop bombers, would the German Airforce be more impacted by the 20s and 30s theory of the heavy bomber than they were historically? IIRC most countries with an air force spent the 20s and early 30s developing heavy bombers on the belief that they alone could win. In Germany the late formation of the air force as an independent unit and the dominance of the army were major contributors to the development of blitzkreig - if the air force had a longer history as an independent branch they may have been less willing to be tied into the ground forces in this way.

[Tim Smith]

The USAAF was tied to the army too.

[|AXiN|]

The USAAF was, pre-war, very weighted towards heavy and medium bombers, not the divebombers and close-support aircraft needed for a blitzkreig. From the performance of the USAAF I'd suggest they were still adhering to the belief in the heavy bomber when they entered the war - unescorted daylight raids, for example. Off the top of my head I can't think of a USAAF plane designed from the ground up as a close support aircraft, just planes that turned out to be good at it.

[Huck]

The USAAF was, pre-war, very weighted towards heavy and medium bombers, not the divebombers and close-support aircraft needed for a blitzkreig. From the performance of the USAAF I'd suggest they were still adhering to the belief in the heavy bomber when they entered the war - unescorted daylight raids, for example. Off the top of my head I can't think of a USAAF plane designed from the ground up as a close support aircraft, just planes that turned out to be good at it.

A-series of bombers were ground attack bombers, single and twins. A-20 (and later A-26) were important ground attack planes for USAAF. There were also many dedicated dive bombers tested, including already serving USN dive bombers, but I can think of just one that saw service in relatively important numbers: A-36, the P-51 attack derivative. A-31 Vengeance was there too.

[Lkefct]

I am not sure the right term is close air support. What is really known as close air support was really the result of German and British experiences during the spring 1918 offensives, and the Banana wars in central america in the 20's & 30's. I think what most people where thinking of was what is really termed interdiction. Battlefield support was nice, but the mechanics of coordinating troops and planes hadn't really been worked out. As such, a lot of the attack is really devoted to preventing reserves from coming up, rather then close air support as we think of it today.

Again, the tendancy of thinking of air support as strictly offensive predominates, but the fact is much of the early air support was shooting up reserves trying to advance. The German accounts of the spring 1918 attacks noted this a a major cause of the attacks losing momentum. It is probably somewhat overstated, but even so, I suspect it was motivation enough that the Allies would not want the Germans to have access to it.

I think the primary reason that the Allies don't want a luftwaffe, is that the air pundits want their bombers to roam over germany strategically bombing them into submission. If you have planes defending the targets, then it increases the difficulty of it.

As far as an overall outcome there is one thing that I have always noted about WW2. Usually, the vehicles/planes with the best engines win. Germany initally enjoys a great deal of success because their amries are powered by the best engines (at least compared to the french & poles). Not really an engineering failing in my eyes, but a lack of vision in how to take advantage of the mobility and power. The RAF is largely effective because they have the engines to really fight back. First fighter command, then bober command take advantage of the Merlin, and are able to fight back. Early British tanks are at a disadvantage, but eventually get better largely when the help of the US production and engines. USAAF engines are very powerful and givethem the ability to take on and defeat the Germans who struggle to keep up in the 1943 to 1944 period. The russians have some very good engines and are able to force the germans to slow and then retreat despite a less then thrilling tactical ability initally. German armor never really recovers, in large part due to the lack a really good engine for the Tigers and Panthers. Sizeable portions of the German heavy tanks are lost when the germans retreat, more so then to enemy action.

givin the luftwaffe a chance to come into exisitence gives the germans a chance to develop military engines, and get their R&D going. I am pretty sure that it was not a deliberate action, but the '43-44 period the germans lose on the ground and in the air because they lack the engines to power the otherwise outstanding weapons systems. By the time they recover, the war is lost. Looking at the engine performances in the '45-46 period, germany had, or would have had a series of great aircraft and tank engines (fortunately no gas). Had they had the foresight to develop better engines so that the 109 G's and Panthers/Tigers had those engines availible, the Germans might have been able to sustain things, or at least slow the allies until their wunderweapons kick in.