Hello,
You can find very good information here :
http://www.multimanpublishing.com/pp/
http://www.stratisc.org/partenaires/ihc ... v_tdm.html
And in books like this one :
"Le débarquement en Provence – 15 août 1944" by Philippe Lamarque
I have compiled here a few adds to the text which is mainly from the first link when dealing with the battle of Toulon etc. ...
This operation was mainly led by French troops on the ground since only 3 US divisions took part.
On 15th August 1944, the US 7th Army (commanded by General Patch) in a Mediterranean remake of "Overlord", assaulted the French Provence coast in operation "Anvil". The purpose was to open a second front in France, with the hope of trapping the maximum number of German troops possible between "Anvil" and the Normandy "Hammer".
The following days saw the landing of French 1st Army in order to liberate both of the large French Mediterranean harbors Toulon and Marseille. The French 1st Army will participate in pushing the Germans out of France and back to the Rhine and the Danube. This operation is generally not well known, probably because only 3 US divisions were involved in comparison to the 7-8 French divisions. The cities of Toulon and Marseille as it was the case for the Elba and Corsica islands were liberated mostly by French ground troops.
Toulon and Marseille fell to the allies on 28th August, long before the US HQ expectations. They were soon handling more supplies than all the Normandy ports combined, and proved a logistical life-saver for the continued allied advance across France. Patch's 7th army linked up with Patton's 3rd army near Dijon on 11th September. The French 1st and US 7th armies were organized into the 6th army group under US general Devers (15th September), and served on the southern flank of the allied armies, advancing through Alsace-Lorraine into Germany and Austria by VE-day.
The Axis Situation in Provence
Three days after the Anglo-American landings in North Africa, the 8th of November 1942, the Germans and Italians marched into the formerly unoccupied Vichy France. On November 27, Toulon was invested by Axis forces, and the warships of the French Navy stationed there were scuttled by their crews. The portion of Provence east of La Ciotat was occupied by the Italians, with the exception of a Wehrmacht enclave in the Toulon naval dockyard occupied by the Germans in order to enhance Axis naval operations in the Western Mediterranean.
Under the pretext of strengthening the coastal defenses against an eventual amphibious assault, the German army progressively strengthened its position in Provence and Toulon between May and August 1943. Cooperation between the German and Italian troops was never overly enthusiastic, and the armistice between the Italians and the Allies, the 8th of September 1943, ended any possibility of cooperation.
The German plan to invest Italian controlled Provence and disarm the Italian soldiery had been put in place by OKW when suspicions regarding Italian desertion of the Axis had more or less solidified after the fall of Sicily. The German plan was executed without major mishap in the evening of the 8th of September. Including Provence and parts of northern Italy, some 330,000 Italian soldiers were interned while 23,000 fled to Switzerland.
The Germans, assisted by their own Todt organization, then undertook the completion of the French coastal fortifications, which already had been strengthened by the Italians. Large naval guns were recovered from the sunken warships and emplaced to bolster the defenses. During the Provence landing the German Südwall was organized in 3 defensive lines. 150 artillery pieces superior or equal to 75mm were deployed between Cavalaire-sur-Mer and Fréjus (40km), 250 medium and heavy artillery pieces were deployed in the Festung and 200 in the Festung Marseille. There were also 45 coastal artillery pieces between the Rhône river and the Spanish border. Only Toulon had a high density of forts for its protection, overlooking the town from the surrounding heights. Conscious of the vulnerability of the coastal defenses east of Toulon, the German command organized a line of defenses from Hyères to the hills around La Valette, passing through La Garde and the Thouar hills.
The German XIX.Armee was responsible for all of Provence. It was organized in 3 Korps :
• 62. Korps : 148. ID, 242.ID and 244.ID
• 85. Korps : 338. ID + attached elements
• 4. Korps : 189. ID, 198. ID and 716. ID (the last one was already in Normandy)
• The 9. and 11. PzD were initially present but the 9.PzD had already left for Normandy
The 242.ID arrived from Belgium and was installed in the prepared Provence defenses. It was a static division, of a type that was also encountered in Normandy at Utah beach. It lacked a reconnaissance unit, but its equipment allocation was near complete, and its troops, mainly composed of young Nazi fanatics, received 10 months of training. It was reinforced with two Armenian battalions and one Azerbaijani. It was backed up by a number of Flak units, and was positioned along the coast between 148.ID based between St Maxime and Menton and the 244.ID near Marseille. The nearest armored division was the 11.PzD, which would have to move from Montpellier to Toulon if needed. Organizations such as the Reich’s working service youth, Machinery operators from NSKK and the postmen of Deutsche Reichspost Hilfe were progressively militarized and deployed for defense too.
About 30,000 men from the 209,000 of army group G were directly available to defend the coasts in the area of the future landings and 200,000 more in the whole operational area.
The Luftwaffe was not really a threat with only 120 fighters, 110 bombers and 30 various tasked planes in the area of operation. The Kriegsmarine was in charge of many coastal batteries and organized also many marine infantry units. The remaining naval forces were deployed in Toulon, Gênes and La Spezia (8 submarines, 6 torpedo boats and 30 smaller fast attack boats).
Until the Allied landing, all activity was aimed toward improvement of the fortifications and their repair when damaged by the intense allied bombardment. These air attacks were directed against the submarine support facilities, but often resulted in considerable damage to civilian coastal establishments.
Although OKW West ordered all units of army group G to remain in place and defend the coast at any price, they were alarmed at the prospect of fighting against the expected formidable invasion force. The rising storm of Resistance sabotage and harassment unsettled the German command, which was concerned to find itself caught between the Resistance and an expected invasion.
The Allied Situation
The Naval Western Task Force (Admiral Hewitt, USN) with 2,120 ships including 359 combats and escort ships, 600 large transport ships and smaller vessels. There were 34 French ships including :
1x battleship "Lorraine"
5x cruisers : "Duguay-Trouin", "Emile Bertin", "Fantasque", "Terrible" and "Malin".
5x torpedo boats
The MAAF (Mediterranean Allied Air Force) (General Ira Eaker, USAF) was composed of 19,000 aircraft.
The French air force participated with :
6x fighter/bomber groups on P-47
4x bomber groups on B-26
1x reconnaissance group on P-38
The ground forces were composed of 3 US divisions :
36th, 45th and 3rd infantry divisions
Several small rangers and airborne units
and French elements from the French 1st Army :
• 1e Division Française Libre (motorized infantry division)
• 2e division d'infanterie marocaine (infantry division)
• 3e division d'infanterie algérienne (infantry division)
• 4e division marocaine de montagne (mountain infantry division)
• 9e division d'infanterie coloniale (infantry division)
• 1e division blindée (armored division)
• 5e division blindée (armored division)
+ not endivisioned units :
• Bataillon d'Afrique (commandos)
• Bataillon de Choc (commandos)
• Four GTM (groupements de tabors marocains) (infantry)
• Two spahis regiments (recon armored regiments with armored cars and Stuarts)
• 5 artillery regiments
• Four engineer regiments and one bridging battalion
The French ground forces had a strength of 200,000 soldiers from the French 1st Army, including grossly 90,000 French Europeans and 110,000 natives from the French colonies (French department concerning Algeria) in North Africa. All these men had already proved their valor in Italy between 1943 and 1944. The natives formed grossly 25% of the armored divisions, 30% of the artillery units, 40% of the engineer units and 66% of the infantry units. Natives represented 2% of the officers and 20% of the NCOs. In comparison, the 2nd French armored division who landed in Normandy had only one black soldier, this "whitening" was the result of an armored division completely based on the US model where blacks and whites were not mixed.
Allied Preparations
An operation on the coast of Provence was first envisaged at the Quebec conference (11-24 August 1943). This proposed operation had to be coordinated with the main landing in the north of France planned for the spring of 1944, and had to enable the destruction of German forces between the northern "Hammer" and southern "Anvil", as the two operations were code named. At the later Cairo conference, the Allies approved Hammer, which later, of course, became known as Overlord.
Both operations were tentatively scheduled for May 1944. The Allied Force Head Quarters (AFHQ) G3 developed a plan in October to use three American divisions in Anvil, of which two would establish a bridgehead, assisted by seven French divisions. This led to an agreement at the Teheran conference that the major portion of the French forces, formed in the Maghreb (North Africa) and equipped with American materiel, would be used in Operation Anvil after they had proven themselves in Italy.
This decision forced the hand of the British, who were profoundly hostile to the opening of a second front in Europe, but it met the desires of the Free French liberation national committee. Responsibility for overall preparation and execution of the landing resided with the US 7th Army.
As originally envisioned, the plan saw the taking of Toulon as part of a bridgehead in the Hyères harbor, with the French arriving on D+3, and seizing both Toulon and Marseilles. The officers of Force 163 (which name was used to conceal the actual name of 7th Army and its function as headquarters for Anvil) revised the plan and displaced the landing zone to the east in order to avoid the Hyères islands and the artillery covering Toulon harbor. The plan would also profit from the small ports of Saint-Tropez and Saint-Raphaël, and from the plain of Fréjus, that could be used for the construction of airfields.
Huge difficulties appeared in the organization, primarily because of a shortage of landing craft due to the high demands of Operation Overlord. These problems, following the difficulties encountered in Rome and Anzio in January 1944, provided an opportunity for the British to argue for the suspension of the southern landing. Intervention by Roosevelt put off any decision until the 20th of March. The British were convinced that Anvil would finally and definitively be abandoned in favor of the Italian front. However, on the 2nd of March, General Alexander Patch, who had made his name on Guadalcanal, took command of the 7th Army and proclaimed that Anvil would be the second priority of all the operations envisaged by the United States. The plan for Force 163 was then finalized and communicated to the French forces in the beginning of May.
During the Anfa conference in January 1943, Roosevelt endeavored to furnish the equipment and materiel required for eleven French divisions, and to reconstitute a modern French air arm. At the end of the first phase of this equipment program, three infantry divisions were equipped as well as part of an armored division. After the merging of the forces of General Giraud from formerly Vichy North Africa and those of General de Gaulle from Libya, the second phase (from July to August 1943) began. During this phase four infantry and two armored divisions were equipped. The third phase was suspended in November after the removal of General Giraud from the French liberation national committee, because of political reservations of Roosevelt, and because of doubts within the US military leadership regarding the ability of the French to deploy a complete expeditionary corps. Thus, the French had to accept the outfitting of a smaller number of units than had previously been planned. A compromise was finally reached that resulted in 8 French divisions (including five infantry and two armored) being given priority for equipment for Anvil. In addition, a third armored division from the 2nd echelon of Overlord was assigned (this division would ultimately liberate Paris : the 2nd French Armored Division).
By the spring of 1944, the 8 French divisions had been fitted with new American equipment. Four of these constituted the expeditionary corps engaged in Italy since December 1943, under the orders of General Juin. The 2nd armored division prepared to move to Great Britain to prepare for Overlord. The remaining 3 were placed under General de Lattre de Tassigny, who was named commander of land forces in Corsica and North Africa. His problem was now the relationship between the French and the Americans. After long and delicate negotiations, he agreed to place the first echelon under the command of US General Patch, and would provide French reinforcements made up of French African commandos as well as a French parachute regiment. During the initial phase, General de Lattre would command the French 2nd Army Corps, (under US command), then after the French 1st Corps had joined, he would assume the position of overall commander.
The French searched for all possible methods of participation in the development of Anvil, and proposed at the beginning of May an alternative plan with a simultaneous landing of three infantry divisions and two armored groups on each side of Toulon. The Allies rejected this plan, because it divided the forces and was logistically infeasible. Nevertheless, the Americans understood the underlying message and integrated the French within Force 163 and involved them in the detailed planning of the assault.
On May 11, 1944, the Allies launched a general offensive in Italy. On 4 June, Rome was liberated after the French opened the road to the city for the US troops and the collapse of the German front allowed many combatant units to be placed at the disposal of Force 163. Ten days later Allied Head Quarters in Italy received the order assigning 5th US Corps, composed of the 3rd, 36th and 45th US Infantry Divisions plus 2 divisions from French Expeditionary Corps. Nevertheless, the final decision was not yet taken on the operation itself. The British took the opportunity to propose launching the available troops against Trieste and thence onto the Hungarian plain, so as to draw in German reserves that might otherwise be sent to the western front, and thus indirectly support Overlord. The Americans in general and Eisenhower in particular, were violently opposed to this plan of the three generals in Italy (Wilson, Alexander, and Juin - involvement of the latter being to the great displeasure of de Gaulle). The committee of Headquarters’ Chiefs finally gained the notice of Eisenhower and, on 23 June, the final decision to execute Anvil was taken.
On 17 and 18 June the 9ème Division d'Infanterie Coloniale and a French Commando battalion landed on the island of Elba and captured it, in part to prepare for the impending landing in Provence.
The final operational plan, allowing for the reality of limited seaborne transport capacity, foresaw the engagement of three divisions in the first wave. On June 26 the plan was passed to General Truscott, commanding 6th Corps. Final approval was granted July 2, 1944. Force 163 (renamed 7th Army) and French 1st Army regrouped and reconstituted itself in the vicinity of Naples. On July 8, orders were passed to the sea, land and air forces. Winston Churchill made one final attempt to suspend the operation, just 10 days before D-Day, when he proposed to divert the landing force to Brittany to directly reinforce Overlord. This proposal, however, was immediately made irrelevant by the breakout of General Patton. In fact, the speed of the Allied advances now made imperative the capture of a major port for logistics support ... perhaps Marseille.
On August 10, the decision to launch Anvil was confirmed, its name having become Dragoon in the interim for reasons of security. D-Day was scheduled for the August 15, 1944. Its principal objective was establishment of a 30km by 70km bridgehead, and was entrusted to Kodak Force - three divisions of the 5th US Army Corp reinforced by a French armored group. They were to come ashore near Cavalaire, Sainte-Maxime and Saint-Raphaël. The flanks of the landing would be screened by three commando detachments :
- 1st Special Service Force (Sitka Force) on the Hyères islands.
- Commandos d'Afrique (Romeo Force) on Cape Nègre.
- Naval Assault Group of Corsica (Rosie Force) at Theoule.
The advance screen was made up of an airborne division (Rugby Force), which was to drop in the valley of the Argens, near Le Muy.
The second phase required the first echelon of French 1st Army (Garbo Force) to undertake the reduction of Toulon, followed by Marseille, after which the 5th US Army Corp would orient toward the northeast and march on Grenoble in order to cut off a German retreat. The fall of Toulon was expected on D+20 (4 September) and of Marseilles on D+40. The crossing of the Durance River was forecast for 15 October, and the final aim, the occupation of the Lyon-Bourg-en-Bresse-Chalon-Vichy area was envisaged on D+90, or about 15 November.
The Landing
On August 14, at 2300 hours, the first commandos disembarked. In front of Cavalaire the Titan battery was taken without resistance ; this extremely well camouflaged battery proved to be a dummy. By dawn, the beach was entirely cleared. At Port-Cros, the primary objectives were rapidly achieved, and the Vigie fort fell early in the morning after some skirmishing. The capture of the Lestissac and Eminence forts would take a further two days and require the support of naval gunfire, but no infantry reinforcement. Further to the east, the French commandos, despite some navigational errors, seized their objectives as well (batteries and strategic choke points) at the scheduled hour. On the Esterel coast, to the west of the invasion zone, a Corsican naval detachment encountered a minefield and was forced to surrender.
The airborne troops left from Italian aerodromes on the 15th of August at 0300. Despite a thick haze, 60% of the paratroopers landed in their planned drop zones and another 25% in close proximity. Even those who landed far from their intended drop zone served to disorient and confuse the Germans, who were unable to appreciate the true intent of the landings. The majority of the allied objectives were occupied early in the morning, and the dominant heights around Le Muy captured. The gliders, arriving the next day at about 1800 hours, were a little less fortunate because of the limited size of their landing areas and the overcrowded air space. Fifty of four hundred gliders were completely destroyed on landing, but only 125 soldiers were wounded. At dawn on August 16, the paratroopers attempted to seize Le Muy, without success. The action at Draguignan, occupied since the previous day by partisans, resulted in a series of successful attacks on German columns converging on the village. The German reinforcements were thrown into confusion and a number of prisoners taken. Overall, the airborne operation was a success. It completely paralyzed the German garrisons in the interior, and either constrained them to remain in place or flee to the north.
On August 15, the 3rd US Infantry Division landed at Cavalaire. The greatest obstacles were the minefields and barbed wire entanglements. The firebases at Le Cap and La Vigie were rapidly cleared. The amphibious tanks quickly silenced a German counterattack and the sappers set to work to clear the beaches. At 0850, seven waves went ashore and the first prisoners brought back in LCVPs. At 1040 General O'Daniel moved his headquarters ashore. The village of Cavalaire was cleared in the beginning of the afternoon and contact was made with the French commandos who were installed as a blocking force on the neck of Cape Negre. At Pampelunne, the landing was made without incident, the heights northeast of Ramatuelle occupied and the village of Saint-Tropez discovered to already have been liberated by a group of partisans assisted by stray paratroopers. The landing was slowed by a number of minefields, but at the end of the day more than 15,000 men and 2,000 vehicles had been put ashore. Progress into the interior and toward the Maures massif started in the early afternoon, with the infantry riding in-groups on the tanks and TDs.
The 45th US Infantry Division landed at La Nartelle where enemy resistance was weak. Amphibious tanks destroyed the pillboxes ; other obstacles were then rapidly cleared. The first battalions assaulting Sainte-Maxime encountered firm German resistance. The houses had to be cleared one by one by grenade, and two hours of fighting were needed before resistance ended there. Progress resumed along the coast with a link established with the 3rd Division at about 2100 hours. To the north and the interior, the landing forces took up blocking positions for the night. Despite the limited area of the beachhead 33,000 men and 3000 vehicles put ashore during the first day of the invasion.
Operations of the 36th US Infantry Division were more difficult. The first waves of the assault lost several landing craft when subjected to intense fire near Cape Antheor. On the Drammont beach, amphibious tanks were able to open the route and allow rapid occupation of the crest and coastal road. On the other hand, the elements in front of Fréjus were obliged to make an about turn due to the intensity of German fire. 93 Liberator bombers were called in to inundate the area with a deluge of high explosive. Under a violent enemy barrage, minesweepers moved in and cleared the approaches to within 500 meters of the coast. Two demolition teams disembarked and undertook the opening of passages to the beach. But facing the apparent impossibility of destroying the underwater obstacles, Admiral Lewis decided to suspend the landing and to transfer the landing to the Drammont beachhead. There was no longer any question of seizing Saint-Raphaël before nightfall. At 1030 hours, the assault forces, finally landed on the Drammont beach, moved toward Saint-Raphaël, but were stopped at the eastern boundary by a strong German blocking force at Boulouris. At 1700 hours the blocking force was bypassed and progress resumed toward Valescure. By nightfall, the heights to the northeast of Fréjus were reached. The next day, a strong attack allowed clearing Fréjus and Saint-Raphaël.
On D+1, August 16, a liaison was established between the seaborne and airborne elements. From Cape Negre to Théoule, the bridgehead was firmly established. In the Alpha Beach zone, a German strongpoint at Cavalaire blocked all progress. French commandos engaged it from the hills on the landward side in order to outflank the coastal facing defenses. The majority of the German fortifications were cleared during the course of the day. Combat was sporadically violent at Saint-Honoré, the Gratteloup path, at Collobrières, Gonfaron, Montaud and Pierrefeu, but altogether progress was as planned and reached the Blue Line, the planned extent of the bridgehead, around 1700 hours in the evening. Brignoles was freed after the first violent actions that involved the O'Daniel division. Le Luc also was liberated at the end of the day after a sharp action that saw the involvement of armored infantry from the French 1st armored division. The heights of Le Canet were captured only after a massive US artillery bombardment. Le Muy was completely overrun that evening by the joint action of land and airborne forces. North of Saint-Raphaël, the 36th division gained a solid bridgehead and roadblocks were placed in the valley of the Argens. Bagnols-en-Forêt, Les Adrets, and Planastel were freed at the end of the evening.
Also in the evening of the August 17, D+2, the three divisions of 7th Army were solidly installed in the bridgehead and the Blue Line was reached - and in places even surpassed - everywhere on the perimeter. More than 130,000 men, 18,000 vehicles and 7,000 tons of supplies were landed. Even though the Germans anticipated the landing they were unable to block the advance of the soldiers and the US tanks. General Patch, satisfied with the development of operations, decided to move his Headquarters ashore at Saint-Tropez. At this moment, the first French troops of the 2nd echelon landed at Cavalaire and Grimaud.
At the end of the 18th of August, the allied situation could be summarized as follows:
- The advance in the shape of an arch, which stretched out the deployment of the 148th and 242th German infantry divisions, resulted in their rupture at the peak of the arch near Draguignan. The German commander hastily deployed his reserves, which proved incapable of preventing exploitation by the Americans. This last was executed in two directions: while 45th Division oriented itself to the confluence of the Durance and Verdon rivers, a motorized and armored group under General Butler forced its way north.
- On the coast east of the bridgehead, which up to that point had remained quiet, the 36th Division steadily drove back the German defenses towards Cannes and Grasse, which forced Kesselring to shift some troops to protect his flank in the Alps. The airborne division prepared to relieve the 36th Division in order to allow it to thrust towards the north in turn.
- On the western flank, the French were nearest to the Americans at the Blue Line, positioned to relieve them and then to attack Toulon. The exploitation to the north had already commenced with violent fighting near Brignolles. The tanks of General Sudre thrust from this position to the west.
By the end of the day, the landing would be considered an unprecedented success. The exploitation phase of the battle, including the liberation of two great French Mediterranean ports, was about to begin.
THE BATTLE AND LIBERATION OF TOULON
The Terrain
In the planning for Operation Dragoon, the port of Toulon was an important objective. With a large and well-protected harbor, it had been the center of French naval operations in the Mediterranean for centuries. The naval base was the largest in Western Europe, covering hundreds of acres and having maintenance facilities for the biggest warships. As such, and as a supply source for the invasion second only to the larger civilian port of Marseille, its capture was essential to Dragoon’s success.
The Germans were well aware of the importance of the city, and had turned the Toulon area into a fortress. The defenses against a direct attack from the sea included batteries of large naval guns at Mauvannes, on the peninsula of Saint-Mandrier, and at several other locations along the coast. The presence of these guns was one reason why the Allied landings were moved further to the east.
Anticipating such a move, and realizing that the coastal defenses further from the city were unlikely to hold, the Germans also planned to defend Toulon against land attacks; but their attention was mostly focused to the east of the city. In all other directions, Toulon and its surroundings were somewhat shielded by the mountainous terrain - a jumbled mass of steep, rocky hills and narrow valleys extending from Bandol, on the coast west of Toulon, to the Grand Cap Massif and the area west of Solliès-Ville. Only the coastal plain in the east, the area from La Valette to La Crau and Le Pradet, seemed to provide a good attack route. As this was also the part of the perimeter closest to the expected landing zone, the Germans covered the sector with two heavy belts of defenses.
The outer belt extended from the coast south of Hyères through the town itself, thus blocking the major east-west route National Road n°98. The northern flank of Hyères was protected by a group of hills called Redon. From there the line extended along the Gapeau River, past La Crau and as far north as Solliès-Ville and Solliès-Pont. These defenses were also supported by artillery and observation from Coudon, a 700-meter-high fortified rock that overlooks the plains east of Toulon.
As for the inner belt, it extended from the foothills of Coudon south to the coast near Le Pradet. In general, it was based on two ridges : Touar, which ran northeast to southwest and was located between La Valette and La Garde, and Pradet, which ran along the coast south of Le Pradet. These ridges were relatively low but still provided excellent fields of fire across the open coastal plain, so the Germans covered them with pillboxes and anti-tank guns. Although there was a gap of several kilometers between the two ridges, any force trying to attack through it would be exposed to flanking fire from both sides and then would encounter a massive wire barrier, which blocked the western end of the gap and was covered by machine guns.
The last major element of the defenses was the natural obstacle of Faron, a steep barrier that hugs the whole north edge of Toulon and overlooks the entire city and harbor. Here, as in many other places around the city, the Germans made use of fortifications originally built by the French.
Immediately west of Faron, the Las river formed a valley that could provide an entry into Toulon. However, the valley was effectively blocked at a narrow point by the defenses of an installation named La Poudrière. There, inside three tunnels of an old quarry that the French had turned into a munitions dump, German pioneers and engineers had installed their own barracks and arsenal. At the time of the war, the tunnel openings were protected by metal structures that lined the cliff faces, and which provided many protected firing positions for the defenders. (Whether they were built for this purpose or were simply left over from the installation’s days as a quarry is unclear.) This area would become a huge obstacle to a French advance through the valley.
General de Lattre de Tassigny’s Operational Plan
In the operational plan adopted by Force 163, the French troops of French 1st Army were to begin their attack on Toulon on D+9, the 24th of August, after the landing of all elements of Garbo Force had been completed. The main thrust was to be carried out to the north of the city by the 3ème Division d'Infanterie Algérienne (3ème D.I.A./3rd Algerian Infantry Division) while the 1ère Division de la France Libre (1ère D.F.L./1st Free French Division) pinned the bulk of the German forces along the eastern defenses of Toulon. The 9ème Division d'Infanterie Coloniale (9ème D.I.C./9th Colonial Infantry Division) would exploit this by passing through the 3ème D.I.A. to capture the city.
On the 1st of August, General de Lattre de Tassigny, commander of French 1st Army, fleshed out this plan with the following additional details :
- The 1ère D.F.L would attack all across the front of the eastern defenses, in order to draw enemy resources away from the true focus of attack, to keep them occupied, and to prevent them from retreating - especially to the center of Toulon. This attack was to be carried out along two main axes ; the southern would be through Hyères, the northern through La Crau and La Garde.
- The 3ème D.I.A. would outflank the enemy, moving into the jumbled mountains north of Toulon, and then would attack south in order to hit an enemy weak point from an unexpected direction. This outflanking attack would then extend west toward the sea and conclude with a total encirclement. The main axis of advance would be to the west of Faron, through the Las valley.
- The 9ème D.I.C. would be used to reinforce whichever of the attacks seemed to be making the most progress.
- Northern flank cover would be provided by a group led by Colonel Bonjour, composed of the 1st Combat Command of the 1ère Division Blindée (1ère D.B./1st Armored Division) and the 3ème Régiment de Spahis Algériens de Reconnaissance (3ème R.S.A.R./3rd Algerian Light Armored Reconnaissance Regiment).
However, the actual Dragoon landings went better than expected, and as the first elements of Garbo Force began to come ashore on the evening of D+2, de Lattre had to make a difficult decision. The Allies had made significant advances to the north of Toulon, and the Germans were very disorganized. Should he follow the timetable for Operation Dragoon to the letter, or should he take advantage of the success of the initial landings and attack quickly before the Germans had time to regroup ?
On the evening of August 18th (D+3), de Lattre decided to be daring. He therefore ordered the immediate implementation of the August 1st operational plan. The just-landed first elements of the 1ère D.F.L were ordered to march that same evening and relieve the Americans on the Blue Line. Five companies from the 3ème D.I.A. were to push west from the Pierrefeu-Cuers area on the morning of the 19th. It was also decided to use the 9ème D.I.C. along the most promising attack axis as soon as it landed at the beachhead (between D+5 and D+9).
To support these attacks, the Groupe de Commandos d'Afrique (G.C.A./African Commando Battalion, attached to the 9ème D.I.C.) was given the responsibility of taking the Coudon summit forts and neutralizing the artillery and observers positioned there. The Bataillon de Choc ("Chocs"/Shock Battalion, commandos attached to the 3ème D.I.A.) was made responsible for seizing the fortifications on Faron.
Late in the evening of the 18th, an unexpected piece of news bolstered de Lattre’s decision. The 9ème D.I.C. had begun to land, two days earlier than scheduled. A complete battalion was already ashore. The general then decided to strengthen his attack, ordering this unit to move along the right flank of the 1ère D.F.L. and to attack down the Solliès-Pont - La Valette axis without waiting for the rest of the 9ème D.I.C. This attack would be supported by the 2nd Combat Command from the 1ère D.B.
The updated plan was submitted to General Patch, the Allied invasion commander, on the morning of the 19th. Despite the repeated objections of his headquarters staff, who were concerned about the rashness of this plan and who favored following the original timetable, General Patch was finally convinced by de Lattre’s insistence and gave his approval around midday.
Everything was in place - 5 days ahead of schedule - for the liberation of Toulon to begin.
The 3ème D.I.A. maneuvers to encircle Toulon
On the afternoon of the 19th, General de Monsabert of the 3ème D.I.A. ordered Colonel Bonjour to launch the 3ème R.S.A.R. along Departmental Road n°2. The regiment drove past Meounes and Signes without encountering any serious opposition and reached the surroundings of Le Camp by the end of the afternoon. This hamlet is located at the crossroads of the Marseille road (National Road n°8) and the Toulon road. The Germans had set up a strongpoint here the previous day, heavily supported by machine guns and mortars. (This had not been detected by Allied intelligence, so the location was expected only to host a German NCO school.) The initial French attack failed and another one had to be put off until the next day.
The bulk of the infantry also moved forward. Two battalions from 3ème Régiment de Tirailleurs Algériens (3ème R.T.A./3rd Algerian Light Infantry Regiment), under the leadership of Colonel de Linares, turned directly south and climbed the deserted and lifeless Grand Cap Massif north of Toulon. Without any roads, FFI (Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur) partisans and non-combatant volunteers (monks from the monastery at Cogolin) were used as guides. The forced night march over almost non-existent trails without any point of reference was a trial of strength. All equipment had to be backpacked, and each man had to painstakingly follow in the footsteps of the man ahead.
At dawn on the 20th of August, as the skirmishers began the climb down the imposing and desolate slopes of the Massif into the valley of the Las, they could see the distant sea. At 0800, two companies from the 3rd Battalion hurtled down on Revest-des-Eaux. No German sentinel was watching from the Saracen Tower ; the small detachment of Feldgendarmerie (military police) was busy shopping in the marketplace ! But south of Revest, the enemy pulled themselves together. They blocked the French advance around the hamlet of Dardennes and the chapel of Saint-Pierre, near La Poudrière. The Germans even counterattacked with old French tanks in an attempt to supply their almost-encircled troops in Saint-Pierre and to destroy the remaining bridges over the narrow channel of the Las.
The 1st Battalion of the 3ème R.T.A. deployed west of the 3rd and entered the pass between Les Caumes hill and Bau-de-Quatre-Heures. Early in the afternoon, it seized the Quatre-Chemins crossroads, the northwestern entry point into Toulon. One of its companies occupied the hydraulic factory and blocked the southern end of the Las Valley, thereby isolating the La Poudrière garrison. Another company infiltrated the northwestern suburbs of Toulon, reaching as far as the rear of the hill L’Oratoire. Dangerously, there was no link between the two battalions.
Further to the west, Group Bonjour seized Le Camp, mostly deserted by its defenders, then closed in on Toulon by going down National Road n°8. By the end of the day, 3ème R.S.A.R. captured the village of Le Beausset, where it was joined by the 7ème Régiment de Chasseurs d’Afrique (7ème R.C.A./7th African Armored Regiment) which had come ashore some hours before.
On the 21st of August, these last two units descended from Le Beausset toward Bandol on the coast. At 0930, the tank destroyers of 7ème R.C.A. arrived at the beaches. Under heavy bombardment, they nevertheless held their ground and blocked the coastal road, preventing fugitive German groups from escaping to Marseilles. The encirclement of Toulon was now complete. The town was entirely in the bag.
During the evening of the 21st, the lead elements of the 3ème R.T.A. infiltrated from the suburbs of Toulon into the city itself. They reached the Carrefour des Routes crossroads and the Toulon-Marseilles railway. The first enemy positions inside the city were captured, and street fighting began in earnest.
The 1ère D.F.L.’s frontal assault
On the 18th of August, a thorn in the side of the 1ère D.F.L. had been removed when 60 African commandos captured the Mauvannes battery - four 150mm naval guns. But Redon, the key to the defenses of Hyères, still rose in front of the division’s forward positions. Its capture was the first requirement of the operation, and that task fell to Colonel Garbay’s 2ème Brigade.
On the 19th, the 2ème Brigade relieved the U.S. troops holding the Blue Line. While doing so, they experienced several small isolated counterattacks from the Azerbaijani contingents holding the western banks of the river Real Martin, who were trying to take advantage of the inevitable confusion caused by the relief.
On the 20th, the assault on Redon began. The 5th Battalion succeeded in taking and holding several enemy positions despite many counterattacks. However, to its right, the 11th Battalion collided with the stone blockhouses of Les Pousselons. Further to the south, Colonel Raynal’s 4ème Brigade found itself blocked by the Golf Hôtel, a huge building that controlled the section of National Road n°98 just east of Hyères, and whose high gray walls towered over the surrounding forest of maritime pines. Despite two fierce attacks, the 4ème Brigade could not get closer than 400 meters from the hotel. Finally, the 21st Battalion succeeded in infiltrating the eastern outskirts of Hyères, in the Lazarine district, by following a railroad.
On the 21st, the assault resumed with increased momentum. After three murderous attacks, the 2ème Brigade finally succeeded in crossing the Gapeau River and in clearing a way toward the village of La Crau. In front of the 4ème Brigade, the defenders of the Golf Hôtel continued to resist. During the afternoon, an artillery concentration carried out by the newly captured guns of Mauvannes dumped more than a thousand shells on this strongpoint, without any great effect. Finally, toward evening, a special assault group composed of the best infantry platoons from the Bataillon d'Infanterie de Marine du Pacifique (B.I.M.P./Pacific Naval Infantry Battalion) charged down Redon and breached the fortified building in a fierce assault, taking the position.
Immediately, the 21st and 24th Battalions rushed into Hyères, supported by tank destroyers from the 8ème Régiment de Chasseurs d'Afrique (8ème R.C.A.) and reconnaissance vehicles from the 1ère Régiment de Fusiliers-Marins (1ère R.F.M./1st Naval Infantry Regiment). Their first objective was to rapidly take the town’s western suburbs, in order to prevent a German withdrawal that would reinforce Toulon's defenses. The French crossed the town to the cheers of the crowd, but as they approached the western edge of town they were greeted with salvos coming from an 88mm battery to their south. The German battery was installed on the foothills of Montagne aux Oiseaux (Birds’ Mountain), a marvelous position which gave it a commanding view over all of the town’s western suburbs and outskirts. The taking of the western suburbs, under fire from this battery and also from 20mm antiaircraft guns whose fire lanes interdicted any movement on Hyères’ long straight avenues, was accomplished in bloody fighting that lasted until nightfall.
Around midnight, the liberation and cleaning up of Hyères was complete and the 1ère Bataillon de Légion Etrangère (1ère B.L.E./1st Battalion of the Foreign Legion) claimed a foothold on the Birds’ Mountain foothills. The 1ère D.F.L.’s penetration of the first of Toulon's defensive belts was complete.
The 9ème D.I.C. finds its slot
On the 19th of August, while many of its units were still in the process of landing, the 9ème D.I.C. began regrouping around the village of Pierrefeu, in order to be able to attack along its assigned axis the next day.
The 20th of August saw the 6ème Régiment de Tirailleurs Sénégalais (6ème R.T.S./6th Senegalese Light Infantry Regiment, the "Senegalese" appellation being applied to all units from sub-Saharan west and central Africa), supported by an engineer company and Shermans from the 1ère D.B., launch an attack on Solliès-Pont. This flanked the 1ère D.F.L. attack along the La Crau–La Garde axis. Despite the broken terrain, which was not very favorable for vehicles, the Shermans stuck to the skirmishers like glue and gave them immediate and efficient support. In spite of this help, the 6ème R.T.S. remained blocked at the northern outskirts of Solliès-Pont. The remainder of the division continued to regroup around Pierrefeu.
On the morning of the 21st, the 6ème R.T.S. smashed the Solliès-Pont defenses with a vigorous assault, and the 3rd Battalion continued on to seize the village of Solliès-Ville, on the hill to the west, and the crest of the hill at the Notre-Dame Chapel. Despite heavy artillery shelling and five German counterattacks, the battalion succeeded in holding both positions. Another battalion breached and crossed the continuous wire defenses just south of Solliès-Pont, interspersed with machine-gun nests every two or three hundred meters, which blocked the road toward Toulon. The armor immediately lunged through the breach and rushed forward down the road.
But as soon as they reached the hamlet of La Farlède, 2nd Lieutenant Destremeau’s light tank platoon found themselves trapped. Minefields surrounded them, and the first tank had been wrecked and was blocking traffic. Behind them, the Germans quickly built up roadblocks to prevent any withdrawal. More tanks and infantry were needed to remove these obstructions, but since most of the infantry had not arrived at the planned meeting point, the armor had to sort out the situation virtually alone. This lack of coordination cost the 1ère D.B. dearly, as eight Shermans were destroyed.
Nevertheless, the rescue operation succeeded and La Farlède was captured. The armor regrouped, and Captain de Pazzis, leader of the 2nd Squadron of the 5ème Régiment de Chasseurs d'Afrique (5ème R.C.A.), without waiting for the infantry, moved forward with the light tanks and the surviving Shermans. At 1600, the Division H.Q. heard over the radio that they had destroyed the antitank guns around the Pierre Ronde crossroads. At 1915, a last radio message, picked up with great difficulty, said that de Pazzis’ group had just entered the village of La Valette. Then there was only silence - which would continue for the next 48 hours, as the infantry struggled to conquer, step by step, the road that the Germans had closed again behind the tanks. Surprisingly, de Pazzis’ detachment would survive the whole time, despite terrible ammunition and fuel shortages, by fortifying and holding the village of La Valette with the spontaneous assistance of the local partisans.
Also on the 21st, the G.C.A., after an advance under fire that had taken a hard day and two nights, succeeded in infiltrating as far as the depression lying immediately to the north of the Coudon ridge. At 1400, the assault on the fort held by the Kriegsmarine began. The works were assaulted section by section, and at 1530, the six survivors of the company guarding the fort surrendered. Another of the keys to the defense of Toulon had fallen.
Though the first defensive curtain was broken by the evening of August 21st, the German defenses on the northeastern Toulon approaches remained strong and heavy.
The cracking of the final defenses
On the 22nd, things were beginning to look favorable in the eastern sector. In the plains between Hyères and La Garde, the advance of the 1ère D.F.L. was proceeding rapidly. But soon the violence of the artillery fire coming from the Touar and Pradet defenses showed that this second position would be no less hard to secure than the first. Although the pinewoods that surrounded the Touar ridge were infested with minefields, the 2ème Brigade seized one of the hills that comprised the ridge, and managed to hold there despite counterattacks by reinforcements coming from La Garde.
To the left of the 2ème Brigade, Raynal’s 4ème Brigade reduced the Pradet defenses but stalled in front of the village and castle of La Garde, which had been heavily fortified and were occupied by a rifle company, a heavy weapons company, and some anti-tank weapons. Any infiltration was repulsed by violent counterattacks. It was only at 2100 that the B.I.M.P. seized this strongpoint. The 1ère D.F.L. was again closely engaged on all fronts. An assault was planned for the following day to seize the rest of the Touar ridge.
Meanwhile, the 9ème D.I.C. had progressed with difficulty towards La Valette. La Farlède was mopped up and the hamlet of Les Grands captured. Strongpoints in Pierrascas and Les Moulières were reduced and the blockage at Pierre Ronde eliminated. But in the evening, the division still had not crossed the line running from La Platrière to La Calabre and the Redon Chateau, even though the farthest advances had gotten within 600 meters of La Valette. Further to the north, in the foothills of Coudon, a strongly fortified and defended ravine at Les Minimes stopped all progress. The armor of the 1ère D.B., obsessed by the desire to break the encirclement of their comrades in La Valette, attempted several rushes - but they were hit by artillery barrages, and driven back with some losses.
To the west, the Bataillon de Choc pushed into the interior of Toulon. One column advanced as far as the Place d'Espagne to block the trunk road to Marseille. Another column infiltrated throughout the western districts of Toulon, reaching the train station, the Boulevard de Strasbourg, and the Place de la Liberté. However, as night fell, the Battalion HQ wisely decided to consolidate these dispersed forces around the Place d’Espagne. Meanwhile, an assault company climbed Faron and seized the fort of Croix du Faron.
Another party, this one from the 3ème R.T.A., attempted to capture La Poudrière. However, hundreds of soldiers firing from the metal structures, as well as some captured French tanks that were rushed out of the quarry tunnels at critical moments, prevented any advance. Colonel de Linares then called in two tank destroyers and two Shermans, which pounded the approaches to La Poudrière. Soon the defenders of the metal structures surrendered. But the rest of the garrison took refuge in the tunnels, not wanting to hear anything of surrender, and called down an artillery bombardment on the entrances. In the night, to finish things off, the tanks closed in and fired directly through the tunnel openings. At 2100, a shell hit an ammunition depot and the galleries exploded. Hundreds of corpses were pulled out of the rubble in the following days. One of the residents on the west of Faron, whose house faced the tunnels, still remembers the rain of stone that followed the explosion of La Poudrière.
On the morning of the 23rd, on the eastern front, Garbay’s 2ème Brigade continued the attack on Touar. Their advance was hindered by fire from numerous concrete casements and by blazes burning in the pinewoods on the slopes. Meter by meter, the brigade worked its way forward, and the summit of Touar’s tallest hill was captured in the middle of the afternoon. The B.I.M.P. then exploited this conquest and tackled the barbed wire barrier to the west. At the end of the day, the marines deployed between Nole and a walled farm, Le Clos de Pouvenel.
Meanwhile, General Brosset, acting as the 1ère D.F.L.’s point element, drove quickly into Toulon in his jeep, and then turned around to meet up with his leading troops. "Go ahead, I have just kissed at least 200 girls!" he yelled to them. Following this order, some detachments spread out to cross the last enemy defenses through La Palasse and Saint-Jean du Vas and entered into Toulon. One of them succeeded in joining up with the advanced elements of the 9ème D.I.C. and, in a huge gamble, obtained the surrender of the Heeresarsenal (Army Arsenal).
For the 9ème D.I.C., this day saw the resumption of the attempt to reach La Valette. The ravine at Les Minimes remained impenetrable, despite the intervention of the G.C.A., who pushed down Coudon in the fortified position’s rear. But at La Valette, the effort finally paid off, and despite the pits, fences, cypress hedges, and ponds, and under fire from innumerable snipers, contact was made with the encircled armor.
At the same time, a company on the south side of La Valette bypassed Beaulieu and entered the suburbs of Toulon. Seven light tanks of the Régiment Colonial de Chasseurs de Chars (R.C.C.C./Colonial Tank Destroyer Regiment) crossed the city line and made contact with the 3ème D.I.A. They then took part in the capture of the castles of Fontpre and Beaulieu. Some troops joined up with the 1ère D.F.L. and advanced as far as the Place de la Liberté.
To the west, before the break of day, the Germans had regained the initiative, and mixed groups (composed mainly of the Arsenal Maritime garrison) counterattacked the leading elements of the Bataillon de Choc. Some French squads, surprised in the middle of the night, surrendered - and were immediately executed. An indescribable shambles followed, with the main Choc force trying to regroup and the Germans attempting with all their might to clear a way to the west. But the Chocs recovered from their confusion and, with the help of artillery, first reformed as a solid defensive cordon and then pushed the attackers back into the Arsenal Maritime. That was the Germans’ last escape attempt.
The Chocs, assisted by tank destroyers of the R.C.C.C., then resumed their advance into the town, slowly but surely. One platoon reached the Place de la Liberté by evening and assured the link up with the two divisions further to the east.
On the evening of the 23rd, the situation was as follows: the front had disappeared and the French were everywhere inside and outside of the city. The Germans still had operational defenses: the ravine at Les Minimes; large pockets between the 1ère D.F.L and the 9ème D.I.C. in the eastern suburbs of Toulon; and in the middle of the city, small pockets around the interior defenses - isolated and encircled from all sides. Except in some isolated areas, the Germans had fought to the death rather than surrender. During the night, the French colors were hoisted on the sous-Préfecture building.
The last pockets surrender ; the city is liberated
On the morning of the 24th, the French plans were completely revised. The elimination of the last pockets of resistance in the city had to be achieved in a systematic and well-coordinated manner. As the largest part of the 3ème D.I.A. had already been fighting inside Marseille for three days, its units remaining on the western side of Toulon (amounting to little more than a regiment) had to be relieved as quickly as possible to support the rest of the division. On the other hand, the 1ère D.F.L. needed another day to fully reduce the small pockets of resistance which remained within its operations zone - particularly from Sainte-Musse to Cap Brun. Moreover, this division had experienced much of the heaviest fighting and was in serious need of rest. Thus, the 9ème D.I.C. was entrusted with the task of clearing Toulon. The relief of the 3ème D.I.A. had to be undertaken as soon as possible - in other words, that same day.
The Bataillon de Choc commandos were relieved at the start of the day by the 4ème Régiment de Tirailleurs Sénégalais (4ème R.T.S.), the last 9ème D.I.C. unit to land, which entered the city from the northwest by way of Le Camp. The 4ème R.T.S. immediately continued to push toward the Arsenal Maritime and the barracks in the Grignan district. Its companies were thrown into the battle as they arrived, and they found themselves threatened occasionally by local counterattacks. But the regiment requisitioned vehicles from the militia to increase the availability of transport, and thus was able to reinforce the weak points before disaster struck.
The evening of August 24th saw the fall of the Grignan barracks, of the Sainte-Catherine and Lamalgue forts, and of the Arènes ridge - where more than a thousand prisoners were dragged out from underground galleries. To the east, the Les Minimes ravine fortifications were finally conquered by the 6ème R.T.S. General de Lattre de Tassigny, accompanied by the War Commissioner Diethelm and the former American ambassador, Commander Bullit (who had pled with General de Gaulle for the honor of serving in the French Army), made their way into Toulon that same day. Their ride changed from time to time into an assault course as they traversed unsecured areas, and the only safe route across the railway was by means of an improvised ramp ! Nevertheless, General De Lattre established his headquarters in the old Hôtel de la Subdivision by the end of the afternoon.
The dawn of the 25th saw the colonials of the 9ème D.I.C. beginning to clear the naval base. Furious combat took place on the peninsula of Le Mourillon and inside the Arsenal Maritime, which was itself a small city that had to be taken block by block. By dusk, the French closely encircled Fort Malbousquet, whose commander was convinced to surrender by a 15-minute artillery concentration. This example set the pattern, and little by little, the Germans felt their defense a lost cause and started discussing surrender. Exceptions did exist however, and the commander of the Lartigues fort did not agree to start negotiations until under the threat of a no-quarter assault.
The 26th saw the final collapse. The arsenal at Le Mourillon, almost flattened by 155mm shelling, surrendered at 1130. At Cap Sicie, southwest of the city, the garrisons of Fort de Six-Four and of the Bregallion battery surrendered at midday. The 13ème Régiment de Tirailleurs Sénégalais (13ème R.T.S.) mopped up the peninsula during the course of the afternoon. Only Cap Eguillette, Fort Napoleon, and the Balaguier battery offered some resistance. During the night, the colonials occupied the heights that had been the objective of Bonaparte in 1793. Admiral Lambert, without waiting for the end of the fighting, established his office at the Préfecture Maritime and took possession of the port in the name of the Marine Nationale (National Navy).
On the morning of the 27th of August, the victorious troops paraded in Toulon before the War and Naval Commissioners, in the midst of indescribable enthusiasm. However, the noise of artillery drowned out the clamor of the crowd, because on the other side of the harbor the peninsula of Saint-Mandrier still resisted. Since the 18th, the Allied air force had rained hundreds of tons of bombs on the 340mm naval gun pillboxes. Then Allied warships had joined in the onslaught, and since the 21st, the bombardment had been virtually uninterrupted. Despite this, the Kriegsmarine continued serving their guns.
At 2000, Admiral Rufus, commander of the city (considered a fugitive by the garrison for having abandoned his headquarters in La Valette), agreed to receive an emissary to negotiate surrender. At 2245, he resolved to capitulate unconditionally.
The epilogue of this battle comes on the following day, the 28th of August, when, at 0800, the 1,800 marines of the Saint-Mandrier garrison offered their surrender and formed a column to return to the Les Sablettes district, the first stage of their captivity. The surrender of this great French military port on the Mediterranean was completed eight days ahead of schedule. In the course of nine days’ combat, the price paid was about 2,700 French casualties, of whom 100 were officers, as well as many tanks destroyed. On the German side, thousands of corpses confirmed the bitterness of the fighting. The spoils of the French army consisted of 17,000 prisoners, a large amount of war material, and a hundred artillery pieces, which were used to reinforce the war effort. At last, the largest naval base in Western Europe was conquered and opened up to the Allied forces to lay the groundwork for further victories.
Regards,
David
by Jarnob on 17 Mar 2006 09:22 
