The Development of the German Army 1920-1938 (1945)

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David Thompson
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The Development of the German Army 1920-1938 (1945)

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Post by David Thompson » 04 Oct 2007, 01:26

The Joint Statement of Field Marshal von Manstein, Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, General Halder, General Warlimont, and General Westphal, Signed in Nuernberg on 19 December 1945, from Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 10: United States of America v. Wilhelm von Leeb, et al. (Case 12: 'The High Command Case'), US Government Printing Office, Washington (DC): 1951. pp. 521-531.
I. 1. Organization: The army of the Reich was activated in 1920 according to the regulations of the Versailles Treaty with a strength of 4000 officers and 96000 enlisted men. It consisted of 7 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions, which were consolidated under the leadership of the Army Command and two army group headquarters. The Chief of the Army Command was subordinate to the Minister of National Defense [Reichswehrminister]. The soldiers served for 12 years and the officers for a period of 25 years. This was the formation of the 100000-man army which existed until 1984.

2. Weapons: The weapons also correspond to the regulations of the Versailles Treaty. In the case of weapons which were not permitted, dummies were used for training purposes; the cavalry, for instance, used wooden machine guns.

3. Armaments industry: Weapons were manufactured by a limited number of factories which were permitted by the Versailles Treaty.

4. Land fortifications: The western fortifications were blown up. In the East we had only the obsolete fortifications at Koenigsberg Pillau and Loetzen with armament as permitted by treaty. The Oder fortifications at Breslau, Glogau, and Kuestrin had only completely obsolete installations without any weapons.

5. The General Staff, the Army command the War Minster: The so-called Large General Staff, the central office of the General Staff in Berlin, had been dissolved.

However, the officers of the General Staff of the units remained with the superior headquarter agencies with the approval of the Inter-Allied Control Commission. They received later on the designation, "Fuehrerstabsoffiziere" [Leadership staff officers]. They wore the uniform of the former General Staff. Moreover, there was an office in the Army Command staffed by, 'Fuehrerstabsofiziere." It was called, "Truppenamt" [Troops Office] and combined all the essential functions of the former General Staff. Its institution and field of activity were known to the Inter-Allied Control Commission and were approved by it.

There was no General Staff Corps as an independent unit or responsible military agency. The former General Staff had been a military central agency which was immediately subordinate to the Kaiser. The Chief of the Truppenamt worked under the Chief of the Army Command who, in turn, was subordinate to the Minister of War [Kriegsminister] whereas the Chief of the General Staff held a position of equal rank as that of the War Minister and had incomparably more influence than the War Minister.

The jurisdiction of the Chief of the Army Command was confined to the actual military work in the army. All questions exceeding this field in domestic or foreign policy were part of the function of the Minister of National Defense. He was a civilian and responsible to the Reich Parliament as a member of the cabinet. He alone was responsible for the budget, and thus he had the sole power of decision about the funds which had to be requested. The following questions were consolidated under his immediate jurisdiction in the office of the Ministry of the Army and Navy: Political questions, including the press, budget, and counter-espionage; the Legal Department; and questions concerning the League of Nations.

This organization, which distinguished clearly between military and political tasks, was the logical result of the parliamentary system of the German Republic under the Weimar Constitution. At the same time it conformed to the strict separation from politics as von Seeckt demanded from his Reich Army. This separation was a postulate of the time and the practical result of experience from history, as he saw it.

The Prussian Army, from which the German Army developed as it existed before 1914, centered around the person of the king to whom it had sworn allegiance. Its funds had to be requested from the Prussian Diet and later from the Reich Parliament in which body it was represented by the Prussian Minister of War. The appointment of the officers depended upon the military cabinet which was a subordinate to the command jurisdiction of the king. The General Staff was responsible for the operational plans and for the training of the general staff officers for its own purposes and for higher headquarters The Chief of the General Staff was originally subordinate to the Minister of War. The greatest man who held this office, Count Moltke, had developed this position, so that by 1914 it had assumed significance and had become completely independent from the Ministry of War. Count Moltke confined himself to the military field without seeking any political influence. His successor, Count Waldersee, however, was possessed of political ambition which contributed materially to his resignation after a short period of only two years. Count Schlieffen and the younger Moltke who succeeded Schlieffen in 1906 returned to the tradition of keeping aloof from politics as it had been practiced by the older Moltke.

The war of 1914-18, because of its character as a coalition war, unavoidably brought the General Staff in contact with politics. The peculiarity of the late Kaiser and the difficulties of the domestic situation were further reasons for placing the burden of political decision more and more upon the shoulders of the General Staff whose chief became Field Marshal von Hindenburg during the war, General Ludendorff as first Generalquartiermeister [General Staff officer in charge of supply and administration at headquarters of field forces]. Hindenburg had the confidence of the nation to the fullest extent. Ludendorff's superior personality excelled that of the civilian politicians to such an extent that decisions in the political field were made only with his participation. This, however, was in contradiction to all tradition. In the postwar period, remnants of the old army were involved in a political coup d'etat, the "Kapp Putsch", which immediately proved a complete failure. Ludendorff participated in it as well as in the Hitler Revolution of November 1923, in Munich.

In the light of these events, it was von Seeckt's intention to keep the army aloof from all political connections and to erect it as a bulwark against revolutionary movements at home and against attacks from abroad. The soldier had no right to vote. Therefore, he was not interested in any party. His pay,--officer, as well as enlisted man--did not permit any trips abroad. Therefore he had no connections outside the country. He depended completely on his military work; he had no political ambition and was hardly familiar with political events. This heritage of von Seeckt, the army's complete aloofness from the political life of the nation, had far-reaching results which extended deep into the years of the last war.

Von Seeckt was undoubtedly a man of considerable political ability. The temptation to enter the political stage and to play a leading part in it, was very enticing for him. But he never succumbed to it.

6. The army and foreign policy: During the decade in which von Seeckt was the head of the army, he experienced the occupation of the Ruhr and the Rhineland by the French Army in 1922, and the repeated demands for German territory which were voiced in Poland and Czechoslovakia. This meant that he saw Germany exposed on three sides of its extended frontiers to the claims of three powers, each of which had at its disposal an army superior to the German Army. As opposed to the 100000-man army, France possessed an army of 600000, Czechoslovakia of 250000, and Poland 400000 men. The war potential of these armies mounted 1.5 million, 600000, and 1 million men respectively. In view of this overwhelming superiority of Germany's neighbors, the training which von Seeckt afforded to the German Army could be confined merely to defense, and this was actually the case.

7. The army and domestic policy: In the beginning of the twenties, the army at home had repeatedly participated in combating revolutionary movements; it ceased concerning itself with these tasks as soon as the police force was strong enough to cope with the situation. At the time of the Munich Putsch in 11/1923, which resulted in difficulties for the Bavarian Government, troops were used for the last time. The attitude of individual officers of the infantry school, who had taken Hitler's part, was generally rejected by the army.

The national and social motives of the NSDAP [National Socialist Workers' Party] undoubtedly appeared very attractive to many members of the army. The rowdy methods, however, and the intense anti-Semitism had a repulsive effect. In 1930, in Ulm, a few young officers violated the prohibitive regulation of being active in a political field by making propaganda for the NSDAP. They were court-martialed. These events caused considerable commotion. The regimental commander who tried these officers was Colonel Beck, who later became the Chief of the General Staff of the Army.

At that time there were only very few officers who had any personal contact with Hitler or other leading members of the Party. General von Schleicher, the Chief of the Office of the Minister of Defense [Chef des Ministeramtes] had connections with most of the political persons of all parties. He strengthened these even more when he became Minister of War and Reich Chancellor. His intimate friend, von Hammerstein, the Chief of the Army Command, was known as an express opponent of the NSDAP.

Soon after Hitler assumed power, he was dismissed. His successor, von Fritsch, was appointed by von Hindenburg solely because of his military ability. Von Blomberg, who succeeded Schleicher as War Minister had no political past. He appointed as chief of his office [ministeramt], von Reichenau, whom he knew from his former headquarters who had been his chief of staff, and who was friendly towards the NSDAP. This caused frequent difficulties with the leading men of the army. When in 1938, von Reichenau was considered for the position of Commander in Chief of the Army, Hitler could not make up his mind to push him down the army's throat. In this connection he consulted the advice of his Chief of the General Staff, General Beck, and the senior officer of the army, von Rundstedt.

8. The training of the army: The training of troops for defensive war developed a tactical method known as, "prolonged resistance." Its purpose was to win time by evading the enemy over extended areas. During his 12-year term of duty the soldier was trained to fill a position at the next higher level in case of a possible enlargement of the army. An armed force totaling 300000 men was contemplated, and such a force would have been barely sufficient for the defense against one of the immediate eastern neighbors of Germany.

In the early thirties, certain units of the cavalry were motorized. Until 1929, no plans for mobilization were available. The transfer of the army from a peacetime to a wartime status was contemplated for the first time on 1 April 1930. In such a case the seven infantry divisions were to be increased three-fold by drafting former professional soldiers and by recruiting volunteers. The trained reserve to be counted on, was estimated at approximately 150000 men, but they were not registered or controlled in any way. Neither were there enough weapons to equip 21 divisions, and 80 it was provided that only the actual combat troops should be equipped with weapons. Those weapons which were prohibited to Germany by the Versailles Treaty, such as tanks and heavy guns, were studied and developed in cooperation with the army of a country which was not a signatory to the Versailles Treaty. The armament industry in Germany was confined to those firms which were approved by the Versailles Treaty. The large plants of the German arms and ammunition industry, from the period before 1918, did not violate the regulations imposed by the Treaty. A few small manufacturing plants for small arms ammunition were erected, but they proved very expensive and inefficient.

The fighting at the Polish border in the years following 1918, resulted in the formation of a small border patrol, an organization of volunteers from among the frontier population. Its weapons were rifles, a small number of machine guns, and an even smaller number of guns. Its fighting efficiency was equal to that of an untrained militia. The so-called illegal Reichswehr ['schwarze Reichswehr"], which consisted of the remnants of the Free Corps activated after 1918, was dissolved after a Putsch in Kuestrin in 1923.

The funds for the development of weapons abroad and for border patrols were incorporated in the budget and were appropriated by the Reich Parliament after approval of the Reich Government under the Chancellors Wirth, Stresemann, Luther, and Bruening. In the case of the border patrols this was done with knowledge and support of the Prussian Government, especially that of the Minister of the Interior.

This constituted an offense against the provisions of the Versailles Treaty. In 1925, the Inter-Allied Control Commission investigated the level of disarmament and recognized it as complete. According to the Versailles Treaty this should have been the starting point for a general disarmament. But nothing like that happened. As a result, Germany appeared justified in strengthening its own defense.

II. The Development of the Army's Position in the State, its Relationship with the Fuehrer and the Party, 1933-1938:

When Hitler became Chancellor in 1933, Germany was in the threat of an economic crisis. The number of unemployed had reached the seven million mark. The bank crash of 1931, had conjured up all the dangers of the inflation years, years which removed the financial foundation of the upper middle classes whence came the majority of officers. Bloody clashes occurred almost every day. A renewed outbreak of the revolutionary movement which had filled the five years between 1918 and 1923, seemed imminent. The moderate parties seemed unable to cope with this situation. Hitler's program, however, promised peace at home and abroad. The results of his measures were surprising. Unemployment seemed to disappear, and good times seemed to be returning.

Neither the army nor its leading officers had any part in bringing Hitler to power. The army viewed with alarm the increase among the ranks of the SA which constituted the strongest revolutionary wing of the Party. By the end of 1933, Röhm claimed 400000 SA men under his command. The army had 100000 men at the time and the police no more than 60000. The speeches of the SA leaders left no one in doubt that they wanted to assume command of the army. Hitler's attempts, undertaken in April 1934, to reconcile the army and the SA, remained without success. The army was surprised by Hitler's actions against the SA on 30 June 1934. It was quite clear that steps had to be undertaken against these unruly elements, but the methods employed had a repulsive effect upon the army. General von Schleicher's death was considered an insult to the army. The charges which Hitler had leveled against him were by no means believed. Unfortunately, it was impossible to bring proof to the contrary. Representations which were made to the Reich War Minister led to no result, according to information received by the undersigned from Generals von Rundstedt and von Witzleben, who were group commander and military district commander respectively, in Berlin at the time. Further steps were made impossible by the vote in the Reich Parliament which was approved by the Reich President, who was also the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. Field Marshal von Mackensen, as the chairman of the Schlieffen Association, to which retired and active General Staff officers belonged, stated quite formally that von Schleicher and his associate, von Bredow, had fallen on the field of honor; this criticism of Hitler's actions in Mackensen's speech was warmly welcomed by the entire army.

Even though the army was not friendly toward the Jews, the anti-Jewish policy and the methods employed were generally regarded as undignified for the German nation. Streicher and his newspaper the, "Stuermer", were despised. The army tried to protect all those in its ranks who fell under the anti-Jewish laws because of their descent or marriage. The results were, however, only very meager.

At first the army believed the benevolent policy toward the churches was meant sincerely, but we soon learned better. The Party tried to change the attitude of the army by efforts which included a speech Göring delivered in 1938, to his senior officers; these efforts remained unsuccessful.

The fact that concentration camps existed was known. Hardly anything, however, was known about their inmates and about the treatment they received. From time to time, officers who participated in training courses were conducted through the camps in Oranienburg and Dachau. They saw only few political prisoners, but, for the most part, common criminals. The living conditions were beyond reproach from a hygienic point of view and in no way repulsive. All prisoners who were released from concentration camps were sworn to secrecy and did not dare speak freely; the others who were familiar with the true conditions did not speak about them either. The government was completely successful in its policy of keeping the general public and also the army--especially during the war, during front-line service--totally uninformed about the number of concentration camps, the conditions prevailing therein, and the number of prisoners.

When the SA was stripped of its power, the SS gained in influence. The army was opposed to the latter' ambition to bear arms. Their hostile attitude to the church and their unlawful methods were viewed with particular alarm. Until the outbreak of the war, the Waffen SS consisted of only a very few units.

On the whole, relations between the army and the Party were always cool. The personal life of Party leaders, the propaganda methods, and the glorification of the Fuehrer as the greatest German were in no way to be reconciled with the traditional attitude of the army.

III. Rearmament 1933-1938:

1. Organization: Soon after 30 January 1933, Hitler made it known that he intended to restore Germany's independence in the field of armament. In 1933 and 1934, preparatory measures were taken to enlarge the army to 21 divisions, to found a substitute military organization, to build up an armaments industry, and to begin producing modern weapons. The organization of the air force was in the hands of the Minister of Aviation, Göring.

In 1935, universal military training was introduced, limited at first to one year and later extended to two. The High Command of the Army was especially intent upon preventing a hasty construction of the army. The officers of the High Command had weathered all experiences of WWI. They were all under the influence of what Bismarck has called, "le cauchemar des coalitions". They knew that Germany was not equal to a war against East and West and that a war of aggression must necessarily lead to the dreaded war on two fronts. All their efforts were directed to create an army for the defense of the German frontiers, an army which in their opinion could not be completely activated before 1942.

It was this attitude which earned for the General Staff the reproach of weakness or even sabotage from such people as Göring, Himmler, Ley, Kube, and other leading Party officials. Hitler never extended his complete confidence to the General Staff or to the generals.

The frontier patrols were abolished in 1936. In their place, in case of war, 21 home defense divisions were provided which had the character of a militia. The preparations for calling up reserves made slow progress. The spring of 1938, proved that a well-ordered mobilization could not yet be carried out.

2. Land fortifications: The fortifications in the East were strengthened in particular by a fortified zone on the Oder and the Warthe for the protection of Berlin. In the West only small installations were begun until 1936, when it was decided that a line of fortifications similar to the Maginot Line should be undertaken for completion in 1945. In 1938, however, Hitler decided to expedite its construction. He took this task out of the hands of the military authorities and turned it over to the, "Organization Todt." But even in 1939, the West Wall had only a limited defensive value.

3. Training: The training of troops was seriously impaired by the scarcity of noncommissioned officers and by the fact that many officers were transferred to the air force. Former officers who were now returning to the armed forces had frequently attained an age which made them poorly suited for permanent service.

4. The General Staff: In 1935, the General Staff was reorganized under General Beck. It was subordinate to the Commander in Chief of the Army and confined to purely military tasks. Political questions were handled only by the Minister of War, who was, at the same time, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. During General Beck's tour of duty as Chief of the General Staff from 1935 to 1938, he was received by Hitler only twice and was admitted only rarely to report to the Minister of War.

General Beck was responsible for the training of officers for the General Staff. The trips made by the General Staff were the most important part of this training. They dealt with the defense against attacks from the East or West or against simultaneous attacks from both directions. In 1938, no trip was undertaken, and in its place a written problem was assigned. The subject to be investigated was the question of whether in case of war with Czechoslovakia and France, it would be possible to defeat Czechoslovakia before France could come to her aid. In his concluding conference General Beck emphatically impressed upon his audience the opinion that Germany would not be in a position to deal with such a situation from a military point of view. He, like the General Staff, was trying, in addition, to warn the officers of the army against harboring any delusions of grandeur.

The General Staff of any country has the duty to prepare the deployment of its forces in the event of war. Up to and including 1935, no preparation of any kind for the deployment of the German Army had taken place. For the first time a deployment was worked out for the autumn of 1935; it provided for the concentration of German forces to protect western Germany and was designated, 'Aufmarsch Rot" [deployment Red]. For this purpose, a total of three weak [numerically] armies was contemplated. Another weak army and a military commander in Silesia were to cover the rear against Poland. One army command, with the remnants of the army, formed the reserve for the Commander in Chief of the Army.

During the years 1937 and 1938, the possibility of the employment of force by France and Czechoslovakia against Germany gained importance. The trips of the General Staff showed that Germany could not successfully engage in defensive warfare. It seemed that the only possibility was first to defeat the weaker opponent, so that all forces would then be available for action against the stronger opponent. Accordingly, in the autumn of 1937, deployment, "Green" was worked out which provided for the concentration of four armies and one independent army corps against Czechoslovakia. The remaining forces, consisting of three weak armies, were to cover the western frontier. The frontier against Poland was secured by another weak army under the military commander of Silesia.

These deployment directives were issued, however, only to army group headquarters. It was forbidden to pass them on to the next lower command, and so they never reached the troops.

5. The dismissal of General von Fritsch: Von Blomberg was Minister of War, and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces (i.e., of the army, of the navy, and of the air forces) at the same time. It was generally felt in the army that he did not share the points of view of the OKH in many important matters or that he was not able to present his point of view with sufficient emphasis. The army believed, furthermore, that the influence of the OKH upon over-all operations should be decisive, especially during war time. In any war Germany might be forced to wage, the decision would be resolved on land. In addition, the OKH rejected the internationally known theories of General Douhet about operational war in the air. The OKH was of the opinion that it would have to be the function of the air force to furnish tactical support for army operations. Therefore, the OKH endeavored to combine within its own competency the leadership during wartime of the army and of the armed forces.

Out of these differences of opinion frequent difficulties arose between the OKH and the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and his staff. They were finally, albeit somewhat unexpectedly, solved when Blomberg resigned--for reasons of a purely personal nature--and when Hitler simultaneously decided to dismiss the Commander in Chief of the Ground Forces, General von Fritsch, on 4 February 1938. Together with him the Chief of the Army Personnel Office and, a little later, also the Chief of the General Staff, General Beck, were dismissed.

There were unsavory intrigues connected with General von Fritsch's dismissal which emanated from the Gestapo and the SS. It was frequently said that the generals of the army should have protested against that incident at the time and should have taken over the government. If at all possible, in view of Hitler's extreme popularity, this could only have been done under the leadership of von Fritsch himself. General von Fritsch did not see his way clear to decide upon this course. It was too far removed from the traditions of the army in which he had grown up. On the contrary, he himself became the tragic victim of these traditions.

[Signed] Walther v. Brauchitsch, Field Marshal; last position: Commander in Chief of the Army (up to 19 December 1941); [Signed] Erich v. Manstein, Field Marshal; last position: Commander in Chief of Army Group South (up to 31 March 1944); [Signed] Franz Halder, General; last position: Chief of [the General] Staff of the Army (up to 24 September 1942); [Signed] Walter Warlimont, Lieutenant General of Artillery; last position: Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff (up to 6 September 1944); [Signed] Siegfried Westphal, Lieutenant General of Cavalry; last position: Chief of Staff of the Commander in Chief West (up to 7 May 1945).

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