http://lists101.his.com/pipermail/intel ... 01240.html
More on Stennes here:Stennes, born in 1895, was an important figure in the SA (Sturmabteilung) until he had a fallout with Hitler and the nazi-party in 1931, which in all probability was a kind of dress rehearsal for the final reckoning with the
SA which came in June 1934, the so-called Night of the Long Knives. Stennes went in 1934 to China where was adviser to the Chinese nationalist leader Chang Kai Shek. He was to act in that capacity till the end of the Chinese civil war in 1949, when he came back to Germany.
http://www.fredautley.com/cawchap1.htm
I was to remember this part of my conversation months later when, on the night I left Hankow, I paced the air-field with Captain Stennes, captain of Chiang Kai-shek’s bodyguard and his confidential adviser. Stennes is a German who was a Left-Wing National Socialist and a friend of General Schleicher. He had been enabled to escape from a German concentration camp by his wife and was now an exile in China. The perfect type of adventurer, absolutely fearless, intelligent, physically a splendid specimen, and with an attractive personality, he loathed Hitler and had a very real loyalty, affection, and admiration for the Generalissimo. In his view the German advisers had been invaluable to Chiang.
‘The French,’ he said, ‘are too arrogant and impatient to be of any use as military advisers in China. They tell the Chinese command what it should do and then shrug their shoulders when it doesn’t get done. The British are too lazy; only the Germans have the necessary patience. You should have seen the tact and patience with which Von Falkenhausen got his views adopted. He would never say, “I think this ought to be done.” He would say, “I think the best strategy would be that plan you suggested a week or two ago,” and then proceed to outline his own plan.’
‘What about the Russians?’ I asked.
‘Not bad, but their psychology is too similar to that of the Chinese. Their nichevo (“can’t be helped”) and the Chinese mei yu fa-tze (“nothing to be done about it”) are too similar. Besides, their military advisers are too specialized. Each knows just one thing and no more. For instance, their technical advisers just understand one particular make of gun, and that is hopeless in China, where we have armaments from all over the world.’
He went on to say how greatly he admired Chiang Kai-shek. ‘He knew he must wait a few years if he were going to resist the Japanese successfully. That’s why he gave way to them time and again until he should have built up his military strength. But he was forced to fight in 1937 by the pressure of the Communists and the Lest intellectuals.’
Yet, although Stennes might have been accused by Eugene Chen of thinking of warfare entirely in terms of the training and equipment of armies, he was well aware of the factor of morale. ‘Give me five men who really believe in what they are fighting for,’ he said, ‘and I will lead them against a hundred.’