Is the Battle of Shanghai a mistake for the KMT?

[Peter H]

Other accounts call the Chinese defense works the Seeckt Line,named after Hans von Seeckt.Supposedly the Japanese were able to outflank the manned points of this defensive work anyway.I think we are talking about blockhouses and earth works in abundance but nothing permanent in concrete.

Its said that "one Japanese division had the firepower of three Chinese divisions. If logistics, supplies, intelligence, medical services, air/naval/armor/artillery supports, and other aspects are factored in, then a Chinese division usually had the strength of a tenth of a Japanese division".

I don't know how true this is but it does highlight why so many Chinese Divisions were consumed in the battle.

[Peter H]

A Military Analysis of the Battle of Shanghai, 13 August - 8 November 1937

http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc ... tTRDoc.pdf

Or:

http://stinet.dtic.mil/oai/oai?&verb=ge ... =ADA378228

Click:Handle / proxy Url : http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA378228

Historians have treated the three-month battle of Shanghai, during the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, as a complete and sealed event. Many descriptions of the battle are incomplete in the manner in which they account for the eventual Chinese defeat. This paper seeks to probe tactical conditions of the battle more deeply and expand more fully upon the reasons why the battle unfolded as it did. The decision of the Chinese to make a stand at Shanghai was deliberate and measured. The opening moves of the battle did not surprise either side. It was strategic, rather than tactical error, along with unfavorable weather conditions that caused the failure of the Chinese offensive. While the number of combatants and the quality of their equipment were of great importance, enumeration and firepower alone can't explain why the Chinese defensive phase was so long. Instead, actual combat ratios together with a well-prepared defense acted with weather and terrain to slow the Japanese. The commitment of numerous combat forces and firepower could be interpreted as an effect of battle, not the cause of its outcome. Chinese soldiers were motivated for reasons other than nationalism. Leadership, discipline and organization were matched on both sides of the battlefield. The Japanese eventually won the battle not only because of superior technology and equipment against a broadly committed force (as is often acknowledged), but also because of mobility achieved through the successful landing at Huangchow. Tactical analysis allows us to revise historiographical interpretations and draw new historical conclusions.

The author mentions the defensive lines on page 12.

The unkind weather of that time is mentioned on page 78."Heavy rain" during September etc limited both sides.

A good 130 page analysis of the battle.

[Leonard]

Thanks Peter! That's one of the best account of the battle in English I have ever seen.

BTW, a Chinese division has about 10000 men (or less), but a Japanese division could have more than 25000 men. So when the firepower comparison is 3:1, the strength is about 9:1. Usually the Chinese uses an Army (Juan) (of 2-3 divisions) to fight a single Japanese brigade. This is mentioned in the memoir of many KMT commanders.

[Peter H]

Interesting also about the massive typhoon that hit Shanghai on the 14th August.He mentions soaked Chinese troops,flooding,but fires were also put out by the rain.

[Leonard]

IMO, The typhoon is more of a hinderance to the Japanese because they cannot take full advantage of the air and sea superiority.

[Peter H]

The "prepared killing ground" is also mentioned.The German defensive lines(started in 1935),the numerous creeks and streams,were seen as limiting Japanese mobility.The section about the change in Japanese tactics,from storming a position with heavy losses,to a more slow outflanking approach,is also interesting.It also states that in hand to hand fighting the Chinese bettered the Japanese.