City Defense in Sino-Japanese War

[Leonard]

It always seems strange to me that, apart from the battle of Hengyang, KMT never succeed in utilizing city to make a stand. Most battles (Nanking, Taiyuan, Wuhan, Canton...) last for only a few days only. KMT seems to be more determined in the defense of cities in the Chinese Civil War (Taiyuan, Changchun, Shengyang). Even though their morale is better in the war against Japan.

Anyone know what may be the reasons for this?

[Jerry Asher]

Hi Leonard:

With the exception of the battle north of Shanghai in the fall of 1937, almost all stands are just to buy time within a general strategy of attrition.

Nanjing in Nov/Dec 1937 was taking place within a near rout to the east. Chinese control, communication, command simply not fast enough to cope. If Jiang had stayed and broadcast he was staying; the psychological lift to his commanders and troops might have made a difference in my opinion. However in my thinking the landing of the 16th Division at Dove Point on Nov 13th and 14th prevented anything like the manning of prepared defense works. Moreover, although it was a bitter, cold winter, the ground was dry and the defenders no longer picked up the advantage of the waist deep water fields of August, Sept. and early October.

Wuhan, a huge battle, was one Jiang wanted to win and not just trade space and buy time. 20th Century technology negated use of city walls and defense measures, moats and waters. Chinese artillery is appalling by its absence, but the air defense by Chinese and Russian pilots was competitive for the spring and summer of 1938. Japanese technology, and equiptmnet always provided edge in battles north and east of Wuhan. (same mix not avilable to PRC in Civil War later). Moreover, Jiang was not about to make the same mistake at Wuhan as he did at Nanjing and pulled his troops out with time to spare.
At Changsha city walls were enlisted in defense , but were not the whole thing.
Intrestingly, in what I think was the largest concentration of Japanese artillery in the war in China, and perhaps of its tank forces as well, Japanese did fail before Changsha.
City walls were just part of the defensive measures however.

Anyway Leonard, thats my thoughts for now. Have a great day.

[sjchan]

The KMT did reasonably well in a number of other cities / towns, including Changde, Taierzhuang etc. But generally the KMT did well primarily only when the terrain favoured them. Hengyang was pretty much an exception, one of those rare occasions where Japanese casualties were comparable to the Chinese defenders. The Japanese had an overwhelming superiority in artillery and air support, and many of the buildings in Chinese cities did not provide that much protection against Japanese firepower. One other reason I could think of is that some of the larger Chinese cities are located near the sea or a major river, making them vulnerable to Japanese seapower as well (e.g. Shanghai, Foochow, even Nanjing where the presence of the Japanese naval vessels prevented many of the trapped Chinese troops from escaping).

The civil war was a different story since the CCP did not have superiority in firepower (and no air force), particularly in the initial stage of the war. The CCP ruled the countryside and the KMT are often confined to the larger cities, which they did a better job of fortifying since they had considerably more resources by that time.

Also agree with Jerry that in certain battles the cities were not the focal points e.g. in the Battle for Wuhan the Chinese picked the more easily defended positions to make a stand but when those defence lines were finally brokern there is little point in holding Wuhan.

I am curious about the statement regarding the largest concentration of Japanese artillery and tanks in the war and yet failing at Changsha; which battle of Changsha would that be?

[Leonard]

I am not referring to the use of city wall, but the fact that KMT defense almost always center outside the city (not the focal point as you put it) in the war of resistance. Wouldn't it be easier to prepare a fortified position, supply the troops, and has more opportunity for hand to hand combat inside a city? Even in Hengyang, the defender surrenders soon after Japanese breach the city wall.

IMO, Taierchwang is too small to be called a city. Even Chengde is small if compare to Canton or Wuhan, which provides much better opportunities for the defense.

The first major concentration of Japanese tanks and artillery took place in the battle of Nancheng in 1938 (according to the Japanese Army). I am not sure whether it is the largest or not.

[wildfire]

I think three reasons,

1. KMT's "buy time with space" strategy. China has 2000 kilometers' depth and thousands of cities for Japanese to take. Base on that overall strategy, KMT thought there's no point to hold a single city for too long. KMT believes that US will beat the hell out of Japan as long as China can hold on for several years.

2. China is rich of manpower, but absolutely not rich in trained soldiers and weapons. KMT wanted to keep as many as skilled soldiers before his allies get involved.

3. By the time of 1930', China is not really a united nation, a lot of local generals take the army as their own force instead of the nation's. I think only Chiang-Keh-Shi's "own" officers will take his order seriously enough and fight to death.

[wildfire]

In addition, KMT wanted to keep a strong force to fight another, for the civil war after WWII.

[Leonard]

Wildfire,

I am talking about the tactical instead of the strategic standpoint. And KMT strategy to give up city so easily is the same even before US entry into the war. Would it makes sense to defend a city if only to delay the enemy's advance?

[Goldfish]

It seems to me that earlier battles, in which the Chinese tried to defend cities, resulted in the Chinese being trapped and eliminated in large numbers by the more mobile Japanese. In Hengyang, however, the Chinese were also trapped but were able to call upon American airpower and other resources to pummel the the Japanese. They were also eventually wiped out, but cost the Japanese dearly.

Later, as Japanese forces threatened Yunnan, Chiang ordered all Chinese troops to turn Kunming into a fortress, horrifying his American advisors who knew that this would mean giving up the surrounding airfields and thus denying them the ability to hurt the Japanese.

Later, during the Civil War, perhaps the example of Hengyang inspired Chiang to try to attrit the Communists the same way by alllowing them to surround the cities and then pounding them from the air.

[sjchan]

Tactically speaking, cities do not offer a huge advantage to the defenders as the Japanese had absoulte superiority in air power as well as artillery forces. For instance in the Battle for Shanghai there were numerous examples of heavy casualties suffered by the Chinese sitting in their immobile defensive positions while being pummeled by Japanese fire. A major weakness of the Chinese army is that the troops were not well trained in building fortifications, this attitude cost them dearly. In the Battle of Shanghai, the Chinese troops marvelled at the digilence of the Japanese forces in digging and taking care of their trenches and other defence works whereever they went.

Since Chinese artillery forces were generally non-existant, in many city fights the Japanese were able to push their light artillery to within point blank range and blasted the Chinese out of their positions. What their artillery could not take out, the air force did.

It is actually instructive to see what the defenders did differently at Hengyang. The 10th Army, being an elite unit, built excellent fortifications and mutually supporting strongpoints. In fact the Japanese forces remarked the fortifications were the best they have encountered in the war. The defenders also had the luxury of an exceptionally large amount of building material including timber (which they gathered locally) etc for building their defence positions. They also had relatively good artillery and air support, as well as a large supply of grenades which they used with devastating effect.

Even then, it is interesting to note that most of the costliest fightings (for the Japanese) occurred in the suburbs where the 10th Army forces once again made use of the hilly terrain (the front slope of some of the hills were cut off) to build excellent defence positions. Of course, during the initial stage of the battle the Japanese underestimated the skill and the tenacity of the Chinese, who also were able to expend their ammunition at a rate that they could not repeat for the latest phase of the battle.

[Leonard]

Thanks for the reply. It seems to me the Chinese prefer mobility in the countryside, instead of defending in an urban environment. Another reason may be that most Chinese cities at the time only have wood and bricks buildings, easily on fire and provide little coverage for the defender. In the civil war, Japanese advisors and WWII fortification networks help a lot in the defense in cities like Shenyang, Changchun, and Taiyuan. In southern China we no longer see this type of city defense.

[wildfire]

Thanks for the reply. It seems to me the Chinese prefer mobility in the countryside, instead of defending in an urban environment. Another reason may be that most Chinese cities at the time only have wood and bricks buildings, easily on fire and provide little coverage for the defender. In the civil war, Japanese advisors and WWII fortification networks help a lot in the defense in cities like Shenyang, Changchun, and Taiyuan. In southern China we no longer see this type of city defense.

good points!