Soviet relations between the Kuomintang and CCP 1945-1949

[Gwynn Compton]

Prior to WW2, the Soviet Union had helped both the Communists, and the Kuomintang in China. They had supplied advisers to the Kuomintang, and on the whole, encouraged the Communists to play nice with them. However all this began to change in 1936 when Chiang Kei-shek took over the KMT and purged the Communists from their forces.

My question is, to what extent did the Soviets continue to assist the KMT after the CCP/KMT split. Obviously Mao and the CCP continued to receive Soviet assistance up until the Sino-Soviet split, but I'm curious as to what relationship the KMT maintained with Moscow during this time, and whether Moscow continued to assist the KMT as it had done prior to 1926.

Any books/websites on the subject would be highly appreciated.

Gwynn

[Psycho Mike]

After the founding of the People's Republic, the Chinese leadership was concerned above all with ensuring national security, consolidating power, and developing the economy. The foreign policy course China chose in order to translate these goals into reality was to form an international united front with the Soviet Union and other socialist nations against the United States and Japan. Although for a time Chinese leaders may have considered trying to balance Sino-Soviet relations with ties with Washington, by mid1949 Mao Zedong declared that China had no choice but to "lean to one side"--meaning the Soviet side.

Soon after the establishment of the People's Republic, Mao traveled to Moscow to negotiate the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance. Under this agreement, China gave the Soviet Union certain rights, such as the continued use of a naval base at Luda, Liaoning Province, in return for military support, weapons, and large amounts of economic and technological assistance, including technical advisers and machinery. China acceded, at least initially, to Soviet leadership of the world communist movement and took the Soviet Union as the model for development. China's participation in the Korean War (1950-53) seemed to strengthen Sino-Soviet relations, especially after the UN-sponsored trade embargo against China. The Sino-Soviet alliance appeared to unite Moscow and Beijing, and China became more closely associated with and dependent on a foreign power than ever before.

During the second half of the 1950s, strains in the Sino-Soviet alliance gradually began to emerge over questions of ideology, security, and economic development. Chinese leaders were disturbed by the Soviet Union's moves under Nikita Khrushchev toward deStalinization and peaceful coexistence with the West. Moscow's successful earth satellite launch in 1957 strengthened Mao's belief that the world balance was in the communists' favor--or, in his words, "the east wind prevails over the west wind"--leading him to call for a more militant policy toward the noncommunist world in contrast to the more conciliatory policy of the Soviet Union.

In addition to ideological disagreements, Beijing was dissatisfied with several aspects of the Sino-Soviet security relationship: the insufficient degree of support Moscow showed for China's recovery of Taiwan, a Soviet proposal in 1958 for a joint naval arrangement that would have put China in a subordinate position, Soviet neutrality during the 1959 tension on the SinoIndian border, and Soviet reluctance to honor its agreement to provide nuclear weapons technology to China. And, in an attempt to break away from the Soviet model of economic development, China launched the radical policies of the Great Leap Forward (1958-60; see Glossary), leading Moscow to withdraw all Soviet advisers from China in 1960. In retrospect, the major ideological, military, and economic reasons behind the Sino-Soviet split were essentially the same: for the Chinese leadership, the strong desire to achieve self-reliance and independence of action outweighed the benefits Beijing received as Moscow's junior partner.

During the 1960s the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute deepened and spread to include territorial issues, culminating in 1969 in bloody armed clashes on their border. In 1963 the boundary dispute had come into the open when China explicitly raised the issue of territory lost through "unequal treaties" with tsarist Russia. After unsuccessful border consultations in 1964, Moscow began the process of a military buildup along the border with China and in Mongolia, which continued into the 1970s.

The Sino-Soviet dispute also was intensified by increasing competition between Beijing and Moscow for influence in the Third World and the international communist movement. China accused the Soviet Union of colluding with imperialism, for example by signing the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty with the United States in 1963. Beijing's support for worldwide revolution became increasingly militant, although in most cases it lacked the resources to provide large amounts of economic or military aid. The Chinese Communist Party broke off ties with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1966, and these had not been restored by mid-1987.

During the Cultural Revolution, China's growing radicalism and xenophobia had severe repercussions for Sino-Soviet relations. In 1967 Red Guards besieged the Soviet embassy in Beijing and harassed Soviet diplomats. Beijing viewed the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 as an ominous development and accused the Soviet Union of "social imperialism." The Sino-Soviet dispute reached its nadir in 1969 when serious armed clashes broke out at Zhenbao (or Damanskiy) Island on the northeast border (see fig. 3). Both sides drew back from the brink of war, however, and tension was defused when Zhou Enlai met with Aleksey Kosygin, the Soviet premier, later in 1969.

In the 1970s Beijing shifted to a more moderate course and began a rapprochement with Washington as a counterweight to the perceived threat from Moscow. Sino-Soviet border talks were held intermittently, and Moscow issued conciliatory messages after Mao's death in 1976, all without substantive progress. Officially, Chinese statements called for a struggle against the hegemony of both superpowers, but especially against the Soviet Union, which Beijing called "the most dangerous source of war." In the late 1970s, the increased Soviet military buildup in East Asia and Soviet treaties with Vietnam and Afghanistan heightened China's awareness of the threat of Soviet encirclement. In 1979 Beijing notified Moscow it would formally abrogate the long-dormant SinoSoviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance but proposed bilateral talks. China suspended the talks after only one round, however, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.

In the 1980s China's approach toward the Soviet Union shifted once more, albeit gradually, in line with China's adoption of an independent foreign policy and the opening up economic policy. Another factor behind the shift was the perception that, although the Soviet Union still posed the greatest threat to China's security, the threat was long-term rather than immediate. SinoSoviet consultations on normalizing relations were resumed in 1982 and held twice yearly, despite the fact that the cause of their suspension, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, remained unchanged. Beijing raised three primary preconditions for the normalization of relations, which it referred to as "three obstacles" that Moscow had to remove: the Soviet presence in of Afghanistan, Soviet support for Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, and the presence of Soviet forces along the Sino-Soviet border and in Mongolia. For the first half of the 1980s, Moscow called these preconditions "thirdcountry issues" not suitable for bilateral discussion, and neither side reported substantial progress in the talks.

Soviet leadership changes between 1982 and 1985 provided openings for renewed diplomacy, as high-level Chinese delegations attended the funerals of Soviet leaders Leonid Brezhnev, Yuriy Andropov, and Konstantin Chernenko. During this time, Sino-Soviet relations improved gradually in many areas: trade expanded, economic and technical exchanges were resumed (including the renovation of projects originally built with Soviet assistance in the 1950s), border points were opened, and delegations were exchanged regularly.

The Soviet position on Sino-Soviet relations showed greater flexibility in 1986 with General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev's July speech at Vladivostok. Among Gorbachev's proposals for the Asia-Pacific region were several directed at China, including the announcement of partial troop withdrawals from Afghanistan and Mongolia, the renewal of a concession pertaining to the border dispute, and proposals for agreements on a border railroad, space cooperation, and joint hydropower development. Further, Gorbachev offered to hold discussions with China "at any time and at any level." Although these overtures did not lead to an immediate highlevel breakthrough in Sino-Soviet relations, bilateral consultations appeared to gain momentum, and border talks were resumed in 1987. In the late 1980s, it seemed unlikely that China and the Soviet Union would resume a formal alliance, but SinoSoviet relations had improved remarkably when compared with the previous two decades. Whether or not full normalization would include renewed relations between the Chinese and Soviet communist parties, as China had established with the East European communist parties, was uncertain as of mid-1987.

http://reference.allrefer.com/country-g ... na335.html

[col. klink]

I know it's a little off subject but didn't Germany send advisors to Chaing Kai-shek and the KMT in the 1930s.
One of my favorite novels is Man's Fate by Andre Malraux about the suppresion of a 1927 Communist uprising in Shanghai by Chiang Kai-shek. Although it's a work of fiction the background it gives and the political dynamics involved at the time are fascinating. It would make a great epic movie.

[Windward]

My question is, to what extent did the Soviets continue to assist the KMT after the CCP/KMT split.

Not too much (or no) assistant between 1927 and 1934. The relationship between SU and KMT China get worse not only because the KMT-CPC split, but also because of the 1927 Soviet embasy accident (Beiyang warlords entered Soviet embassy to arrest Chinese commies), the 1929 Sino-Russia conflict and SU sold North Manchuria Railway to the puppet Manchukuo in 1933. But the Sino-Russian relationship became better after Sino-Japanese relationship became worse in 1934.

Chiang considered that if the Sino-Japanese War broke out, China's import route would be cut off, then he sent a professor of Tsing Hwa University to Russian in October 1934 to meet the vice minister of soviet foreign department, tried to improve the relation between two countries. USSR support Chiang in the 1936 Xi'an accident (a coup). After the non-aggression treaty signed on August 21 1937, USSR loaned KMT China 100 million Yuan (around 26.5 million dollars), 3/4 of the loan will be reimburse with metals, the other 1/4 with tea.

USSR also promised to provide 350 airplanes, 200 tanks, 20 AA guns, 50 anti-tank guns, 123,000 shells, 3,690,000 bullets and other war materials, China buy them with the loan money. Some other compacts signed in 1937 and 1938, and USSR provided China 318 bombers, 542 fighters, 44 training planes, 31,600 bombs, 82 tanks, 602 tractor vehicles, 1516 trucks and cars, 1140 guns, 2 million shells, 9720 machine guns, 50,000 rifles, 180 million bullets, military instruments worth 311,800 dollars, and oil products worth tens of thausend dollars between 1938 and 1941. China paid back tungsten, antimony, tin, tea, rice, wood oil, and other farm products. USSR also sent pilots and experts to China.

Soviet aid ended in October 1941, after the Russo-German war broke out (and also because the Russo-Japanese non-aggression treaty signed)

regards

[Gwynn Compton]

My thanks for that information. Perchance could you recommend any texts or websites relating to Soviet involvement during the Civil War (45-49)

Gwynn

[Jacob Peters]

Furthermore, the USSR and Kuomintang signed a Treaty of Friendship in August 1945. The USSR seemed to have been neutral in the post-war conflict between the Kuomintang and communists. This friendship agreement with the Kuomintang regime undermines the absurd notion that the USSR was conducting a policy of expansionism thereby starting the cold war.
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1945/450826a.html

[RJcccc]

Furthermore, the USSR and Kuomintang signed a Treaty of Friendship in August 1945. The USSR seemed to have been neutral in the post-war conflict between the Kuomintang and communists. This friendship agreement with the Kuomintang regime undermines the absurd notion that the USSR was conducting a policy of expansionism thereby starting the cold war.
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1945/450826a.html

Hi, Jacob Peters
You said, "The USSR seemed to have been neutral in the post-war conflict between the Kuomintang and communists."
In my opinion, your conclusion may be not valid. :roll: The USSR exerted a great influence on the communist 'liberalization' of North-East China (Manchuria).They offered lots of advantages to the CCP's occupation of villages in North-East-China after the surrender of Japan. And the Japanese tanks captured by them were presented to the CCP. Many industrial establishments and other military apparatuses were also provided.
Yet they supported KMT on the surface. That’s a cunning strategy of USSR.

Regards,
R.J.

[Peter H]

Its said that 12 military training schools were set up by the Soviets in Manchuria,as well as specialised training in the USSR also offered:

http://www.fredautley.com/appendix.htm

. . . Soviet military aid to the Chinese Communists also included military training which was openly done by Soviet authorities. Soviet instructors were on the staff of Chinese Communist military schools, especially in artillery and mechanized warfare training, at various points in Manchuria. The main school was located at Kiamutse, where a large number of Soviet instructors were concentrated. Soviet instructors also helped in the training of the Chinese Communist air force, with one center at Tsitsihar, in north Manchuria, and another center at Khabarovsk, in the Soviet Union itself. The Chinese Consulate General in Khabarovsk reported that, on June 23, 1948, a group of some 50 Chinese wearing Communist air force uniforms were sighted on Marx Street in Khabarovsk.
In addition, large groups of Chinese youths were sent to the Soviet Union for military training. For instance, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense reported that a group of some 300 graduates of secondary schools, all natives of Manchuria, passed through Suifenho in Manchuria on April 27, 1948, on their way to Spask in the Soviet Union, to revive Soviet training in navigation and in amphibious warfare. Another group of 350, composed of students from the North China provinces of Shansi, Chahar and Hopei, passed through Ulam Bator, capital of Outer Mongolia, on July 4, 1948, for advanced training in the Soviet Union. Still another group of 300, from Inner Mongolia, Suiyuan and Chahar, was reported to have gone to the Soviet Union for training in motorized warfare."

General Wedemeyer also quoted:

"The Soviet Union has assisted the Chinese Communists in Manchuria by the timing of the withdrawal of Soviet troops and by making available, wither directly or indirectly, large quantities of surrendered Japanese military equipment. . . ."

From a review of Dieter Heinzig's The Soviet Union and Communist China 1945-1950: The Arduous Road to the Alliance.

The evidence of the CCP-Moscow cooperation in Manchuria, however, is inescapable. On September 14, 1945, the representative of Malinovskii, the Soviet commander in the Far East, flew to Yenan secretly, and overnight the CCP's military-strategic planning changed direction completely from expanding toward the south to marching into Manchuria. Hundreds of thousands of CCP troops poured into the Soviet-occupied territory in the following months, and they received a massive amount of Japanese weapons turned over to them by the Soviets, who turned over the territory to the CCP as well, when they pulled out of Manchuria.

Heinzig's view on Stalin's aims:

In Stalin's calculation, however, the Chinese Communists played only an instrumental role. In his view, the CCP was a useful vehicle for projecting Soviet power into China--and particularly Manchuria. Stalin was determined to maintain the Soviet influence in Manchuria gained after the war. He feared that the United States would try to advance into both North China and Manchuria. If so, the Soviet Union could not expect the KMT to hinder the Americans from doing so. Stalin, on the other hand, wanted to avoid anything that could lead to an open conflict with the United States. Therefore, clandestinely bringing the Chinese Communists to power seemed to be the best way out of the dilemma, because the CCP could at least be expected not to side with the Americans.

[Jacob Peters]

The USSR exerted a great influence on the communist 'liberalization' of North-East China (Manchuria).

I don't see how that was possible. Soviet troops withdrew from Manchuria in early 1946. The only evidence I've seen of Soviet assistance to the CCP in 1945-49 involved supplies left behind for the CCP in Manchuria after the Soviet withdrawal. Moreover, it should be understood that there was considerable friction between Stalin and Mao especially considering that Stalin officially supported the Kuomintang. This was in exchange for concessions including the Kuomintang's recognition of People's Mongolia and the cession of Port Arthur.

Even after 1945, Stalin advised Mao to establish a coalition with Chiang. Chairman Mao wrote:

At the time of the War of Liberation, Stalin first enjoined us not to press on with the revolution, maintaining that if civil war flared up, the Chinese nation would run the risk of destroying itself. Then when fighting did erupt, he took us half seriously, half sceptically. When we won the war, Stalin suspected that ours was a victory of the Tito type, and in 1949 and 1950 the pressure on us was very strong indeed. Even so, we maintain the estimate of 30 per cent for his mistakes and 70 per cent for his achievements. This is only fair.
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archi ... wv5_51.htm

During World War II, Stalin urged Mao to form a coalition with Chiang to fight the Japanese. Even after the war Stalin advised Mao not to attempt to seize power, but to negotiate with Chiang; Stalin signed a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with Chiang in mid-1945. Mao politely accepted all of Stalin's advice and ignored it in practice, driving Chiang off the Chinese mainland and proclaiming the People's Republic in October 1949. Soon after, however, a two-month visit to Moscow by Mao culminated in the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance (1950), which comprised a low-interest Soviet loan of $300m and a 30-year military alliance against Japanese aggression.
http://www.ibiblio.org/chinesehistory/c ... 05s04.html

[Peter H]

The last Soviet troops left Manchuria on the 28th April 1946.This was 4 months longer than there agreed stay till the end of 1945.Effectively they blocked the Nationalists from "advancing" into the region,also providing a safe haven for CCP forces.

[RJcccc]

I don't see how that was possible. Soviet troops withdrew from Manchuria in early 1946.
Even after 1945, Stalin advised Mao to establish a coalition with Chiang.

It is undoubted that the Soviet Union helped CCP control the Manchuria in 1945 and 1946. In fact, when the Red Army would leave their station, the troops of CCP were usually informed about the specific time of their retreat plan. Thus PLA could quickly occupy the region from which Red Army had just retreated. In sum, the cooperation between the Soviet Red Army and PLA (People's Liberation Army) in Manchuria were compact, regardless of the divarication between Stalin and Chairman Mao.

Moreover, it should be understood that there was considerable friction between Stalin and Mao especially considering that Stalin officially supported the Kuomintang. This was in exchange for concessions including the Kuomintang's recognition of People's Mongolia and the cession of Port Arthur.

These are two reasonable explanations for the “self-contradiction” of Stalin’s diplomatic strategy. And I also have ever heard that Stalin wanted Chiang to transfer some behalf on the North-West-China (Sinkiang) . But I’m not sure about this idea.