Major KMT and CCP engagements WW2

[CoffeeCake]

What were the most bloodiest engagements between the KMT and the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) during WW2. Were there any recorded battles that were three way between the Kwantung Army, the KMT, and the CCP?

[zstar]

I think your mistaken you see before the war began their was an incident known as the Xi'an incident where 2 of Chiang's generals one of them Zhang xue liang (son of the machurian warlord zhang zuo lin who was killed by the japanese) kidnapped Chiang in co-operation with the communists under zhou enlai in order to force him to ally with the communists, at first he refused but then he agreed so the CCP pledged their loyalty to chiang and chiang reorganised them into the 8th route army with their base in yenan.

But Chiang never truely co-operated with the communists and occasionally tried to blockade them but this pissed off stillwell who wanted him to focus his resources on fighting Japanese aggression but they never really fought each other during the war except for a couple of skirmishes but they never really fought with each other either esentially it was a 2 front war for the Japanese and this severely limited their ability to wage successful campaigns against the other allies.

[CoffeeCake]

I think your mistaken you see before the war began their was an incident known as the Xi'an incident where 2 of Chiang's generals one of them Zhang xue liang (son of the machurian warlord zhang zuo lin who was killed by the japanese) kidnapped Chiang in co-operation with the communists under zhou enlai in order to force him to ally with the communists, at first he refused but then he agreed so the CCP pledged their loyalty to chiang and chiang reorganised them into the 8th route army with their base in yenan.

The Xi`an incident made Chiang more wary of the Communists. He was a very paranoid person IMO. Within the territories the Chinese still held,

The level of actual cooperation and coordination between the CPC and KMT during the Second World War was minimal. In the midst of the Second United Front, the Communists and the Kuomintang were still vying for territorial advantage in "Free China" (i.e. those areas not occupied by the Japanese or ruled by puppet governments). The situation came to a head in late 1940 and early 1941 when there were major clashes between the Communist and KMT forces

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_Ci ... _-_1945.29

[philodraco]

But Chiang never truely co-operated with the communists and occasionally tried to blockade them but this pissed off stillwell who wanted him to focus his resources on fighting Japanese aggression but they never really fought each other during the war except for a couple of skirmishes but they never really fought with each other either esentially it was a 2 front war for the Japanese and this severely limited their ability to wage successful campaigns against the other allies.

Chiang is the leader of China and it was CCP that not truly obey his command. The red eveil only waiting for either Jap or the KMT gevernment falling during the war. so I am very regred that si'an incident was happened and CCP could not be wiped out.

In fact, not only me, the young marshall himself was also regred for his stupid activity.

[Windward]

But Chiang never truely co-operated with the communists and occasionally tried to blockade them

He was the legal leader of a country and it's not his duty nor duty of any other head of states to cooperate with rebellion commies.

but this pissed off still well who wanted him to focus his resources on fighting Japanese aggression but they never really fought each other during the war except for a couple of skirmishes

"a couple of skirmishes" could stop elite Japanese force take over the remained half of China, then I guess France in 1940 or Russia in 1941 need such "a couple of skirmishes" too.

but they never really fought with each other either esentially it was a 2 front war for the Japanese and this severely limited their ability to wage successful campaigns against the other allies.

Commies cooperated with Japanese invaders very well, in north Shaanxi and Zhejiang provinces, they built commerce relations with Japanese. Commies in north Shaanxi sold opium, bought salt, medicine and cloth material from Japanese occupiers. General Peng Dehuai launched "Bai Tuan Da Zhan" (100-regiment battle) and Mao criticized him harshly, during and after the Anti-Japanese War. Mao said in 1944, "Some comrades thought the more Japanese they killed, the more patriotic they are, but they absolutely wrong. These comrades are not our patriots, they are patriots of KMT's state. Japanes, Chiang and ourselves, we are three states."

[Goldfish]

In my opinion, while Chiang considered himself the head of state and he was viewed as such by other Allied leaders, it must be remembered that many Chinese did not regard him as such nor did they agree that his system of government was the only legal one. Wartime China was actually an alliance of the Guomindang with other warlords, many of whom revolted against the center from time to time (ie Feng Yuxiang, Bai Chongxi), and occaisionally the Communists. Many local rulers (former warlords) chose which of Chiang's orders to obey and which to ignore, and all of them had their own armies of various quality and quantity (Long Yun's troops in Yunnan wore distinctive French helmets and equipment gained in their relationship with the French) and chose whether or not to employ them as they saw fit. Zhang Xueliang had been Chiang's chief of staff at Xi'an as part of this alliance, even though Zhang had continued to maintain his own large well-equipped army. Tibet, Xinjiang, and Mongolia did not recognize Chiang as their leader at all, even as part of an alliance and refused to allow Allied convoys moving through Russia to pass through their territory after 1941. So, the Communists were not the only Chinese faction to question Chiang's right to write the law and then make himself the only "legal" ruler, nor were they the only faction to maintain their own army. Chiang's Central Government troops frequently clashed with other warlord troops, even those who were officially allied with the KMT, and had to place elite divisions in each war area to "corset" the local warlord troops to prevent the local ruler from defecting to the Japanese. As for whether the Communists had the right to rebel against the government, it must be remembered that Sun Yat-sen, Chiang, and the KMT had originally rebelled against the Qing rulers of China and the early Republican governments (headed by Yuan Shikai and later a coalition of northern warlords) that were regarded as the "legal" government of China both at home and abroad. In a Civil War of the type China was embroiled in, it is winner take all. The only legitimacy was power. Mao was dead right when he said that power in China came from the barrel of a gun, but he could also have added legitimacy. The Japanese invasion complicated things, but did not change the reality.
Chiang's troops clashed with the Communists and other warlords frequently throughout the war. Everyone tried to maintain the fiction of the United Front (mainly to keep American support coming), but everyone knew that the war against Japan was only a preview before the main event. As Japan weakened, clashes became more frequent. The tension was shown during Japan's final ICHIGO offensive, when Chiang refused to allow the US to send weapons to any troops in ICHIGO's path that were not loyal to the center, leaving out several armies led by warlord Xue Yue, whose army promptly disintegrated, allowing the Japanese to pour into South China. The Japanese had spread rumors (which may have been true) that a coalition of warlords was working to unseat Chiang and create a new government. Chiang struck the warlords in October 1945, disarming several warlords, including Long Yun, Feng Yuxiang and Xue Yue. In fact, some historians have thought that this was one of Chiang's greatest mistakes; disarming tens of thousands of troops, many of whom either joined the Communists or became bandits, on the eve of his greatest challenge.
Also, all sides traded with the Japanese and Japanese-controlled areas during the war, both officially and unofficially. The length of the war made such trade absolutely necessary. The KMT needed trade through Shanghai, their major port, mainly in the opium essential for revenue. In exchange, the central government didn't order its Green Gang contacts or Dai Li's agents to disrupt traffic at the port. The Communists needed salt (the KMT could mine salt in Sichuan) and also needed to move their opium through Japanese lines. Both Nationalists and Communists had tried to stop the trade early in the war, but had given in and taxed the trade when they realized they would lose support by forcing a boycott. Small scale trading existed everywhere else along the line. When General Wedemeyer was preparing his assualt on Fort Bayard (never launched) in 1945 and realized that he could not requisition enough rice in time, was advised by his Chinese advisors to purchase rice from merchants in Japanese-controlled areas, an idea that was eventually adopted. The Japanese also stayed in regular contact with many war area commanders, like Long Yun, throughout the war and used their contacts to get information about Allied troops strength, etc. As the war approached its end, both Nationalists and Communists tried to disengage with the Japanese wherever possible and expand their control into formerly Japanese-occupied territory, leading to increased clashes.
Because of fifty years of propaganda on both sides, the true picture of wartime China is only now beginning to emerge. The old images, black and white, good and bad, of the Nationalists and Communists at war will eventually fade and a complicated, colorful mosaic will emerge. The Communist guerillas were not always the pure, heroic "agrarian reformers" they were portrayed as, nor was Chiang the "undisputed leader" of China.

[zstar]

But Chiang never truely co-operated with the communists and occasionally tried to blockade them but this pissed off stillwell who wanted him to focus his resources on fighting Japanese aggression but they never really fought each other during the war except for a couple of skirmishes but they never really fought with each other either esentially it was a 2 front war for the Japanese and this severely limited their ability to wage successful campaigns against the other allies.

Chiang is the leader of China and it was CCP that not truly obey his command. The red eveil only waiting for either Jap or the KMT gevernment falling during the war. so I am very regred that si'an incident was happened and CCP could not be wiped out.

In fact, not only me, the young marshall himself was also regred for his stupid activity.

Ok don't be stupid your not basing your comments on any facts just your assumption which is illogical because if the Japanese won then no Chinese resistance force would be left.


(quote)Commies cooperated with Japanese invaders very well, in north Shaanxi and Zhejiang provinces, they built commerce relations with Japanese. Commies in north Shaanxi sold opium, bought salt, medicine and cloth material from Japanese occupiers. General Peng Dehuai launched "Bai Tuan Da Zhan" (100-regiment battle) and Mao criticized him harshly, during and after the Anti-Japanese War. Mao said in 1944, "Some comrades thought the more Japanese they killed, the more patriotic they are, but they absolutely wrong. These comrades are not our patriots, they are patriots of KMT's state. Japanes, Chiang and ourselves, we are three states.(quote)

Okay now you're just plain riduculous and again you make no sense as you also don't understand that the moment they saw a communist let alone a Chinese communist they would've been more likely to behead them and stick their head on a pole than co-operate with them so please stop making stuff up.

BTW don't forget the 3 all's which was an attempt at wiping the communists out.

[Windward]

Ok don't be stupid your not basing your comments on any facts just your assumption which is illogical because if the Japanese won then no Chinese resistance force would be left.

Do you have any evidence support you except CPC propaganda and boast?

Okay now you're just plain riduculous and again you make no sense as you also don't understand that the moment they saw a communist let alone a Chinese communist they would've been more likely to behead them and stick their head on a pole than co-operate with them so please stop making stuff up.

Commies behead commies themselves during the "Suqu Sufan", if you professional expert know what the item means.

BTW don't forget the 3 all's which was an attempt at wiping the communists out.

Don't forget the "Hunan Nongmin Yundong" and "Shanghai Gongren Qiyi". If you know what they are.

[Windward]

PS, do you expert know Mao's logion in 1940? "Yi fen kang zhan, er fen fan jiang, qi fen fa zhan", "We should use 10% of our resources to fight against Japanese, 20% to fight KMT, and 70% to expand our separatist regime".

[Snollyg0ster]

PS, do you expert know Mao's logion in 1940? "Yi fen kang zhan, er fen fan jiang, qi fen fa zhan", "We should use 10% of our resources to fight against Japanese, 20% to fight KMT, and 70% to expand our separatist regime".

Sounds like you're doing a bit of distorting here.

"Fa Zhan" means "develop" in Chinese Mandarian, and I'm not familiar with the term "Fan Jiang."

Also, could you post a source for this slogan?

Regards,

Tony.

[Peter H]

Please abide by forum guidelines.Expressing someone elses' view as 'stupid' only lessens your own standing.Attack the agrument not the man.

Peter

[Snollyg0ster]

Please abide by forum guidelines.Expressing someone elses' view as 'stupid' only lessens your own standing.Attack the agrument not the man.

Peter

Who me?

[Peter H]

No Tony,I'm referring to Mr Windward.

[Goldfish]

Back to the subject.

Here is my thumbnail view of the war and both sides' contributions and weakesses. Keep in mind that fifty years of propaganda have hardened the opinions of many who feel they must believe only one or the other without searching for the truth which lies in between.

I think that both sides really beleived in the United Front at first (at least until 1939), or at least the rank and file did. The patriotic fervor observed by Western observers early in the war by both sides was genuine and the resistance was fierce. The Japanese did not attach a priority to destroying the Communists, despite their claims that they were invading China to contain communism. The Communists were a distraction for Chiang and tied down some of his best troops, a good reason for the Japanese to leave them alone. That all changed with the "100 Regiments" offensive. The Japanese were awakened to the threat posed by the Communists on their flanks and in North China and Manchuria. Although the offensive failed, its size and fercocity also drew the attention of the Nationalists, who were suprised that the Communists could have gained so much strength so soon after the Long March and in so desolate and underpopulated a region. The Nationalists responded to the growing Communist threat by adding more troops to the forces blocking the Communist areas and by destroying part of the New Fourth Army in what is now called the "New Fourth Army Incident" or the "South Anhui Incident". Both sides blamed the other for starting it, but regardless of what happened the United Front was only for appearences afterwards. The Japanese responded with the "Three Alls" campaigns. Although the brutality of this policy has been well publicized in China since the war, what the Communists downplayed was their effectiveness. The truth is that Communist activities were severely curtailed and entire regions were rendered almost useless for Communist operations. This is why Mao later criticized Peng Dehuai. Had the Japanese or Chiang launched an offensive on Yan'an itself in response to the "100 Regiments", the Communists might have been destroyed or forced out of China. As it was, the Communists were severely injured by the "New Fourth Incident" and the "Three Alls" and commited themselves to slow steady expansion and rebuilding their field formations in order to wait for the opportune moment.

The Communists role in the war has been widely debated since the war. For the postwar Communists, the war was the validation of all of Mao's theories fo warfare. The lessons the war taught their postwar soldiers was that small units of guerillas could immobilize and even destroy armies as large as Japan's. This was a very important lesson as China faced the United States during the Cold War. The truth was that their guerillas were only a small part of their military operations and most attacks were carried out by the better organized field armies of the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army which, although poorly equipped, were not truly the local guerillas that Mao's theories of "People's War" would suggest. Rather, they were highly organized, well-trained, and professional. They saw considerable combat against the Japanese, but only in small scale operations. They still lacked heavy weapons and air support, so they could not take cities or other fortified positions. The role of the peasants and guerillas in areas controlled by the Communists was mostly logistics, intelligence, and security. Regular units would be sent in for specific attacks with limited objectives.

The Nationalists' attitude also changed after the "New Fourth Army Incident". Many of Chiang's best divisions had been shattered in the Yangtze Valley and the rest were needed to block the Japanese in the Three Gorges near Ichang, stiffen the resolve of War Areas under commanders of dubious loyalty to keep them from defecting to Wang Jingwei's puppet regime, and, of course, to blockade the Communists. This left the Nationalist forces scattered and without the mass of maneuver to mount anything more than localized offensives against the Japanese. The Nationalists and Communists, thus went onto the defensive until the situation improved. Morale, especially in Nationalist areas, began to slip.

After Pearl Harbor, it was assumed that Japan's days were numbered and Chinese morale soared. Chiang, against his better judgement, committed two armies containing three of his best remaining divisions and his best air unit (the American Volunteer Group) to the defense of Burma. The disaster there cost him the AVG (worn down by combat) and his only land supply line to the outside world. His elite divisions had escaped (two to India, one to Yunnan, China), but had lost a lot of men and equipment. The commander in Burma, General Joseph Stilwell, wanted Chiang to reorganize his armies and retake Burma, or at least enough of it to allow a road through the northern part. Chiang reluctantly agreed, but he was skeptical that the Japanese could be defeated by his forces and worried about the effect of another defeat on morale. He preferred the strategy of his former air advisor, now USAAF General, Claire Chennault. Chennault proposed a buildup of air power in China supported only by air (the famous "Hump" supply line) and boasted that his airmen alone could drive the Japanese from China. To make matters worse, Chiang received mixed messages from the American government; Roosevelt backed Chennault, the War Department backed Stilwell. Both plans went forward, with limited resources and limited results.

Stilwell began his push across Burma in the fall of 1943. Stilwell's reorganized and well-supplied troops pushed the Japanese back, but Chiang refused to launch the second part of the plan, an offensive into Burma from Yunnan, until the Spring of 1944. By then, the Japanese had awakened to the threat posed by growing Chinese strength. The Japanese had planned to capture Chungking and scatter the Nationalist forces in 1942, but the operation was cancelled after only a couple of weeks due to the defeat at Midway and the Marine landings on Guadalcanal. Since then the Japanese had been willing to keep the China front quiet except for the occasional rice raid or to blood the bayonets of new formations. The growth of American air power in China (soon to be augmented by B-29s capable of hitting Japan) and the performance of Stilwell's Chinese troops in Burma caused the Japanese to resume the offensive in China.

Operation ICHIGO was designed to open the railway between Beiping and Hankou and then to drive south to destroy the American air bases in East China. The operation was designed to capitalize on the mutual distruct between Chiang and many of his war area commanders (many of them former warlords and opponants of Chiang) and the growing tension between Chiang and his American advisors, especially Stilwell, who would be recalled to the US at the height of ICHIGO. ICHIGO did not destroy Chiang or the Nationalists. In fact, Chinese forces, aided by Stilwell's successor General Wedemeyer and some of the returned Burma divisions, managed a counterattack that stopped the last phase of the offensive. With the Burma Road reopened and supplies pouring into China, Chiang's forces were finally ready to take the offensive in China again when the war ended.

The Communists were ready to take the offensive as the Japanese grip on north China loosened, but without heavy weapons it is not clear what they could have done against the cities. It was not until the Soviets provided them with piles of captured Japanese equipment, including artillery, tanks, and aircraft, that the Communists had forces capable of large scale conventional operations.

So both sides contributed to the war against Japan. Both served their interests and fought each other as well. The Nationalists often blamed the Communists for not taking the offensive more often, especially during ICHIGO, but the Communists, who had to deal with a Japanese and a Ntaionalist blockade, had few of the resources needed for large scale operations. In fact, the Nationalists received more aid, including tanks and aircraft, from the Soviet Union from 1927-1950 than the Communists did. The Nationalists were often blamed by the Communists and Americans for their lack of offensive action, and by the Americans for hoarding resources to fight the Communists instead of Japan. This is not fair, however, when one views Chiang's situation. Chiang's main goal was to keep his territory together, a difficult task considering the dubious loyalty of many of his subordinates and the defeatism which rose throughout the war, sapping morale and encouraging hoarding and a lack of offensive spirit. Many Nationalist commanders were convinced that they would lose any major engagement with the Japanese until very late in the war, when American supplies and airpower gave the Chinese an advantage.

[Windward]

No Tony, I'm referring to Mr Windward.

It's ME who use the word "stupid"? Then find it out from my posts here please, or I'll ask for your apologize, Peter.

Ok don't be stupid your not basing your comments on any facts just your assumption which is illogical because if the Japanese won then no Chinese resistance force would be left.

Okay now you're just plain riduculous and again you make no sense as you also don't understand that the moment they saw a communist let alone a Chinese communist they would've been more likely to behead them and stick their head on a pole than co-operate with them so please stop making stuff up.