Need help about Chinese Expedition in Burma

Discussions on all aspects of China, from the beginning of the First Sino-Japanese War till the end of the Chinese Civil War. Hosted by YC Chen.
Post Reply
sharpstorm
Member
Posts: 6
Joined: 12 Apr 2003, 11:29
Location: Chengdu,Sichuan,China

Need help about Chinese Expedition in Burma

#1

Post by sharpstorm » 02 Mar 2005, 07:47

As many Chinese articles say, the New 38th Devision of Chinese Expedition rescued about 7,000 English soldier when the Japanese devil surrounded them.

But after I read many other words, I find the contents of History writen by Japanese scholar differs with Chinese , also and English.They say that the Chinese Expedition had never rescued the English Army , just cover they when they escaped from Japsnese devil's encirclement,fought whit about 100~200 Japanese devils,killed and hurt about 10~20.

Please tell me ,who is right?With envidence.

Goldfish
Member
Posts: 410
Joined: 31 May 2004, 14:51
Location: Atlanta, USA

#2

Post by Goldfish » 02 Mar 2005, 15:57

Both are right. Sun's 38th Division attacked to rescue the Burma Division, but did not link up with them. Instead the Japanese response to Sun's attack opened a gap which allowed the British troops to escape. Here is the description from the U.S. Army's official history volume United States Army in World War II, China-Burma-India Theater: Stilwell's Mission to China., pp. 125-126.
The Collapse of the Irawaddy Front

The 17th Indian Division, less the 48th Brigade, held Taungdwingdi, a prepared position. At the other end of the line the 2d Burma Brigade was in Minla, and four brigades in the center were to operate as a striking force. By a clever ruse, the Japanese opened a hole near the western end of the line. In trying to plug that breach, the [British] imperial forces in the center of the line inclined westward, also opening a hole. This was very apparent to British commanders on the spot, who decided to accept the gap, to move the 1st Burma Division back on the great Yenangyaung oil fields, but at all costs to hold Taungdwingyi, the link with the Chinese. On the night of the 15th word was received that some 2,000 Japanese were bypassing the 1st Burma Division and heading north, undoubtedly toward Yenangyaung.

Moving unobserved by the 1st Burma Division, the 214th Regiment [Japanese], plus the 2d Mountain Artillery Battalion [Japanese], established itself along the ford of the Pin Chaung, north of Yenangyaung, believed to be the only suitable exit for motor transport in the area. Beginning at 0100 on 15 April, shortly before the Japanese revealed their presence, the great Yenangyaung oil fields were burned on General Slim's order. At midnight of the 16th-17th the Japanese opened fire on advanced elements of the Burma Division, whose main body was then twelve miles to the south, making the dreaded road block again a grim reality. The block was reported to [Burma] corps headquarters, and arrangements were made through corps headquarters on the night of the 17th for co-operation with the Chinese 38th Division, 66th Army. Once the 38th Division was intended for the defense of Mandalay. But in compliance with the Generalissimo's 10 April order, it had moved toward the Irrawaddy as of 12th April to strengthen the link between the two armies, and so its 113th Regiment was now within marching distance.

Maj. Gen. Sun Li-jen, the 38th Division commander and a graduate of the Virginia Military Institute, took personal command of the operations, supported by the tanks and artillery of the [British] 7th Armored Brigade Group that had crossed the Pin Chaung Ford before the Japanese opened fire. The first phase of the Burma Division's attack on 18th April went according to plan and carried it to the outskirts of the little suburb north and east of Yenangyaung where the roads of the area converge for the ford. There the attack bogged down, with the Indian, Burmese, and British troops exhausted by days of marching and fighting in heat of over 110 [degrees] F. Sun left Kyaukpadaung the night of the 17th to relieve the trapped Burma Division. Unfortunately for hopes of a speedy rescue, he had been informed it was in a perimeter on the main highway highway just north of Yenangyaung. The Chinese attack of the 18th cleared a large section of the Pin Chaung by 1000 but went no further. At 1700 Slim urged the 38th Division to attack again, but it refused to do so without further reconaissance. Sun remarked to [U.S. General Frank] Merrill at the time that every Allied action in Burma to date had failed for lack of proper reconaissance and that he was not minded to repeat the error. Far to the south the 17th Indian Division demonstrated against the rear and flank of the Japanese force, sending out two columns, each of a battalion of infantry and a squadron of tanks, which the Japanese ignored. Within the perimeter of the Burma Division, the situation was now grave, and late on the 18th, [British Major ] General [J. Bruce] Scott asked permission to abandon his transport and to make his way across country, a request refused on the grounds that the Chinese would soon appear.

The Chinese attacked into Yenangyaung at 0800 on 19 April, expecting to meet the Burma Division there. Instead, they found the Japanese entrenched in five strong points. By 1130 three were taken, but there was no contact with the exhausted Burma Division. That force had managed to hold during the night of the 18th-19th, though to the south it was now in contact with elements of the 215th Regiment [Japanese]. An attack toward the ford in the morning made little progress, and some of the troops were demoralized. Another attack planned for later in the morning was canceled for fear it might lead to an inadvertent clash with the Chinese. Unknown to the Burma Division, a renewed Chinese attack by 1500 was making steady progress. To meet it, the Japanese shifted some of their men, leaving a gap. Consequently, when the tanks with the Burma Division were finally ordered to leave the road and look for a way out to the east over the oxcart tracks, at about 1300 they reported an unguarded track, and by using it, a part of the Burma Division with some tanks and vehicles was able to escape to the north. About 1600 under the force of the Chinese attack the Japanese fell back to the south and east and the rest of the division was withdrawn over the black-top road. For its escape the division paid with most of its motor transport, its 40-mm. antiaircraft guns, most of its 3-inch mortars, eight cannon, four tanks, and 20 percent casualties. Stilwell's action in sending the 38th Division to aid the British and guard his flank satisfied the Generalissimo: "I have received the news of the Yenangyaung trouble. The oil fields are lost. We must make our own plans-immediately move the best troops to crush the enemy's left..."
However, according to Louis Allen's Burma: The Longest War 1941-45, pp. 68-69, two companies of the 1 Royal Inniskilling Battalion were captured by the Japanese on the Pin Chaung when they mistook Japanese troops for Chinese. They were rescued by Chinese troops in Twingon two days later.

By the way, terms like "Japanese Devils" and "Japs" in reference to the Japanese are considered racist remarks and also a racial generalization (the idea that Japanese are devils), both of which are forbidden on this forum. I understand that such terms are commonly used in China, but they are considered offensive here. The term "Japanese" is sufficient here.


David Thompson
Forum Staff
Posts: 23724
Joined: 20 Jul 2002, 20:52
Location: USA

#3

Post by David Thompson » 02 Mar 2005, 17:18

sharpstorm -- Goldfish is correct in saying that ethnic and national insults are forbidden here. Please avoid expressions like "Japanese devils" when posting. The forum rules are posted at:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=6&start=0

Post Reply

Return to “China at War 1895-1949”