Why Chiang did not let Stilwell equipped more Chinese units?
Why Chiang did not let Stilwell equipped more Chinese units?
What do you think are the reasons Chaing did not follow Stilwell's plan to equip more Chinese units? I have a few theories of my own but would want to listen to others' thought.
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Unsere_Freiheit
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There were various causes. Here are a few:
1) Chiang didn’t like the idea that Americans would be training and organizing his troops. He wanted American weapons, not American ideas. Also, dispensing/denying weapons and commands was how Chiang rewarded/punished commanders and ensured their loyalty. Chiang knew that passing that powerful position to the Americans was dangerous. Commanders would no longer owe their positions and prestige to Chiang, and he would be vulnerable.
2) The intense personal animosity between Chiang and Stilwell.
3) Chiang suspected (after the beginning of 1944 at least) that Stilwell and others in the group of Americans in China were planning to replace him. This was partly brilliant intelligence work by the Japanese who planted false rumors and partly the result of American contingency planning on what they would do if Chiang was suddenly killed or overthrown. Chiang believed, and many Nationalist supporters still believe, that Stilwell was planning to kill Chiang, but there is no evidence to support this.
4) There was a fear among many Chinese officers, Chiang included, that the US was planning on defeating Japan by using American weapons and money and Chinese manpower. The Chinese, very sensitive to “colonial” attitudes by British and American officers were very suspicious of the fact that so few American combat troops were sent to China. Chiang wanted to defeat Japan, but not if it meant sacrificing his army, especially for American and British interests (like returning Burma to British control).
5) Chiang regarded his internal enemies as a greater threat than Japan. His famous quote is that that Japanese were a “disease of the skin”, but that the Communists were a “disease of the blood”. Chiang intended to use the wartime relationship with the US to build his military and gain international recognition and support for his regime. From Chiang’s perspective, Japan was going to lose the war from the moment they attacked the US, so for him the priority was securing his position in China; making sure all Japanese-controlled territory would be returned to China, making sure that his regime was the “official” government when the war was over, and making sure that America was committed to the continued existence of his regime.
You may ask yourself how he planned to do all of this without agreeing to US Army (Stilwell’s) plans for army reform, training, and fighting the Japanese. Well, he found his answer in the person and strategies of General Claire Lee Chennault.
6) General Chennault proposed a plan by which he could defeat Japan in six months with an air force of less than 300 planes and, naturally, every ton that came over the”Hump”. The planes would be flown almost entirely by Americans, meaning that there would be no problems of loyalty and no need to reform the army at all. Considering that Chennault needed every ton over the Hump meant that there would be almost nothing for the Chinese Army anyway. Chennault was also backed by a powerful public relations team. Columnist Joe Alsop was Chennault’s personal PR man and Chennault had the support of Time-Life magnate Henry Luce. He also had the ear of the President and was allowed to communicate with him directly. So, as the theory went, Chennault would defend China and defeat Japan while making sure China (and Chiang) were credited with helping him and there was no need to do anything Stilwell asked. However, Roosevelt only half supported Chennault, and Chiang was encouraged to help in Burma and train some troops if he wanted to keep supplies coming.
It would seem to have been in Chiang’s best interest to build an army anyway, even if he had to use it against Japan and suffer some losses first. However...
7) By 1944, Chennault, along with other American diplomats and generals, such as Patrick Hurley, Albert Wedemeyer, and Wendell Wilkie had assured Chiang of continued American support for his regime, including military support. Chiang therefore, felt confident enough to run Stilwell out of China and reject any attempts at army reform, figuring that, if worse came to worst, the US Army would bail him out. He was wrong.
1) Chiang didn’t like the idea that Americans would be training and organizing his troops. He wanted American weapons, not American ideas. Also, dispensing/denying weapons and commands was how Chiang rewarded/punished commanders and ensured their loyalty. Chiang knew that passing that powerful position to the Americans was dangerous. Commanders would no longer owe their positions and prestige to Chiang, and he would be vulnerable.
2) The intense personal animosity between Chiang and Stilwell.
3) Chiang suspected (after the beginning of 1944 at least) that Stilwell and others in the group of Americans in China were planning to replace him. This was partly brilliant intelligence work by the Japanese who planted false rumors and partly the result of American contingency planning on what they would do if Chiang was suddenly killed or overthrown. Chiang believed, and many Nationalist supporters still believe, that Stilwell was planning to kill Chiang, but there is no evidence to support this.
4) There was a fear among many Chinese officers, Chiang included, that the US was planning on defeating Japan by using American weapons and money and Chinese manpower. The Chinese, very sensitive to “colonial” attitudes by British and American officers were very suspicious of the fact that so few American combat troops were sent to China. Chiang wanted to defeat Japan, but not if it meant sacrificing his army, especially for American and British interests (like returning Burma to British control).
5) Chiang regarded his internal enemies as a greater threat than Japan. His famous quote is that that Japanese were a “disease of the skin”, but that the Communists were a “disease of the blood”. Chiang intended to use the wartime relationship with the US to build his military and gain international recognition and support for his regime. From Chiang’s perspective, Japan was going to lose the war from the moment they attacked the US, so for him the priority was securing his position in China; making sure all Japanese-controlled territory would be returned to China, making sure that his regime was the “official” government when the war was over, and making sure that America was committed to the continued existence of his regime.
You may ask yourself how he planned to do all of this without agreeing to US Army (Stilwell’s) plans for army reform, training, and fighting the Japanese. Well, he found his answer in the person and strategies of General Claire Lee Chennault.
6) General Chennault proposed a plan by which he could defeat Japan in six months with an air force of less than 300 planes and, naturally, every ton that came over the”Hump”. The planes would be flown almost entirely by Americans, meaning that there would be no problems of loyalty and no need to reform the army at all. Considering that Chennault needed every ton over the Hump meant that there would be almost nothing for the Chinese Army anyway. Chennault was also backed by a powerful public relations team. Columnist Joe Alsop was Chennault’s personal PR man and Chennault had the support of Time-Life magnate Henry Luce. He also had the ear of the President and was allowed to communicate with him directly. So, as the theory went, Chennault would defend China and defeat Japan while making sure China (and Chiang) were credited with helping him and there was no need to do anything Stilwell asked. However, Roosevelt only half supported Chennault, and Chiang was encouraged to help in Burma and train some troops if he wanted to keep supplies coming.
It would seem to have been in Chiang’s best interest to build an army anyway, even if he had to use it against Japan and suffer some losses first. However...
7) By 1944, Chennault, along with other American diplomats and generals, such as Patrick Hurley, Albert Wedemeyer, and Wendell Wilkie had assured Chiang of continued American support for his regime, including military support. Chiang therefore, felt confident enough to run Stilwell out of China and reject any attempts at army reform, figuring that, if worse came to worst, the US Army would bail him out. He was wrong.
Wow! Goldfish, that's really a great analysis!
My opinion on the points:
1. I think this is the most important. But in Chiang's prespective, he may think it is just being patriotic not to let a foreigner command the Chinese troops.
2. That is basically a power struggle, and the cultural barrier also plays a very huge factor. Stilwell seems to despise any Chinese except for those who have lived or studied there for years and speak perfect English. And it is not helping that Chiang is an very old fashioned Chinese.
3. I don't think Stilwell want to kill Chiang, despite their great differences. But there was definitley plans in the US government to replace Chiang, especially during and after the Ichigo Offense. But no right candidate is avaialble. It is no secret that the US want to replace Chiang with someone who they can control.
4. The situation is that everyone (American, British, Chinese, and even Russian) want to defeat the Japanese with minimum lost and greatest gain to their own. In Europe, whoever defeat German fastest gain the most. In Asia, everyone wants everyone else to die for their cause, just see what happened in the counteroffense of Burma.
5. One may agrue that Chiang is not wrong. The communist did cause more deaths and suffers among the Chinese, not to mention the destruction of Chinese morale and culture during the Cultural Revolution. The artrocity commit by the Japanese pale in comparison.
6. I don't think anyone is foolish enough to beleive that the Flying Tigers can defeat the Japanese on their own. It is just a convenient way to keep the American interest on the Chinese front, and could have ultimately led to US marines landing on Chinese coast during the war.
7. China is just too big for the US. Its size virtually ensured that no foriegn power can totally control it (the Japanese never controls more than railroads and cities during the war) . But when it falls, no one can help it as well.
My opinion on the points:
1. I think this is the most important. But in Chiang's prespective, he may think it is just being patriotic not to let a foreigner command the Chinese troops.
2. That is basically a power struggle, and the cultural barrier also plays a very huge factor. Stilwell seems to despise any Chinese except for those who have lived or studied there for years and speak perfect English. And it is not helping that Chiang is an very old fashioned Chinese.
3. I don't think Stilwell want to kill Chiang, despite their great differences. But there was definitley plans in the US government to replace Chiang, especially during and after the Ichigo Offense. But no right candidate is avaialble. It is no secret that the US want to replace Chiang with someone who they can control.
4. The situation is that everyone (American, British, Chinese, and even Russian) want to defeat the Japanese with minimum lost and greatest gain to their own. In Europe, whoever defeat German fastest gain the most. In Asia, everyone wants everyone else to die for their cause, just see what happened in the counteroffense of Burma.
5. One may agrue that Chiang is not wrong. The communist did cause more deaths and suffers among the Chinese, not to mention the destruction of Chinese morale and culture during the Cultural Revolution. The artrocity commit by the Japanese pale in comparison.
6. I don't think anyone is foolish enough to beleive that the Flying Tigers can defeat the Japanese on their own. It is just a convenient way to keep the American interest on the Chinese front, and could have ultimately led to US marines landing on Chinese coast during the war.
7. China is just too big for the US. Its size virtually ensured that no foriegn power can totally control it (the Japanese never controls more than railroads and cities during the war) . But when it falls, no one can help it as well.