The Sino-Japanese War(Campaigns in detail)

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tigre
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China's Life - Lines

Post by tigre » 09 Jul 2006 04:26

Hello to all something more. Continues from page 11.

Considerable pressure was similarly put on Great Britain and as a result the following Anglo-Japanese agreement was signed on 12 July 1940:

1. Effective 18 July 1940, Britain “would prohibit for three months transit through Burma of arms, munitions, gasoline, trucks and railway materials.
2. Britain would prohibit for a similar period the exports of these goods from Hongkong to China.
3. Japanese consular officials in Hongkong and Rangoon would maintain close contact with British authorities.

regarding measures to be taken for the purpose of making this agreement effective.

The Indo-China route was, in fact, handling only a trickle of war supplies. The Burma route, on the other hand, was the most important supply line available to China. The Burma Highway stretches between Rangoon—through Lashio and Mandalay—to Kunming (formerly Yunnan), across the high and rugged mountains of Yunnan Province. The distance between Rangoon and Kunming is about 2,100 miles and is served by a railroad line only a quarter of the way. Since March 1939, when the Burma highway was ripened, military supplies have poured in an evergrowing flow, and it has been reported that in July 1939 no less than 1000 trucks were operating along this route. Service stations are said to have been set up every 100 miles and there are three major supplies stations evenly distributed along the entire route. The speed with which the road was built and the lack of tools and construction materials have madedefects inevitable. Landslides have been frequent, the sharp turns and twists of the road make driving hazardous, the surface of the Highway is not metaled and rains cause washouts; but, in spite of all these difficulties, the mad bas been quickly repaired by labor gangs and continued in operation with very minor interruptions. British action in closing the Burma Road is unquestionably a severe blow to China’s capacity to resist and will make her practically wholly dependent upon Soviet Russia.

New arsenals which have been established in Free China with the machinery brought from Shanghai and Hankow are
producing munitions. But China is not yet an industrial nation and the bulk of her weapons must come from abroad,
Today, quantities of military supplies—mainly field guns and aircraft—are pouring into China over the Red Caravan
Route. However, over this route goods must be carried the entire distance of over 2,000 miles by trucks. It leads through desolate country and obviously, even with a good road, much of the carrying capacity of the trucks must be devoted to fuel supplies.

For over three years, China has been resisting an invader who possesses immeasurable superiority in te equipment of modern warfare. Her ports, the bulk of her rail roads and practically all her industrial centers fell into the enemy’s hands long ago. The toll of Chinese casualties military and civilian-runs into the millions. Her government has been forced to move from Nanking to Hankow and then to Chungking; yet, at no time has Chiang Kai-shek shown any readiness to capitulate. During these three years, the world has witnessed the conquest or domination of Albania, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Finland, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Norway, France, Latvia. Estonia and Rumania. China has not only managed to preserve her independence, but it has also inflicted heavy damage and has made Japan weak and vulnerable. In fact, it may be said that this war has been converted into a marathon race to see whether China or Japan can stand the strain longer.

The Far Eastern conflict has become a war of tremendous stakes, a war which may lead tn the disappearance of China as an independent nation or the ruin of Japan as a great power. The collapse of France has made possible the choking of China’s main supply lines and thus the outcome of this great war may be to a large extent dependent upon the outcome of another great engagement 10,000 miles away which is, as we go to press, still unfought; China’s fate may be decided in the “Battle of Britain.”

Source: The Sine-Japanese War. BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL E. M. BENITEZ, Coast Artillery Corps. Military Review, Vol XX Nº 78.


Regards. Tigre.
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Re: 20 tanks in the Tsaoyang-Yichang Campaign?

Post by Akira Takizawa » 09 Jul 2006 05:58

> Was wondering if this would have been some Divisional recon tanks or an attachement from a Tank Regiment with the 11th Army?

7th and 13th Tank Regiments were attached to 11th Army.

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Tank Regiments and other attachments to 11th Army 1940-41

Post by asiaticus » 09 Jul 2006 21:44

Thanks for the rest of the article tigre.

Taki thanks for that info on the Tank Regiments. I see that later in Southern Honan Campaign (Late Jan. -Early Feb. 1941) the Japanese 11th Army had 3 tank Regiments involved. I would guess the 7th and 13th Tank Regiments were two of them.

The IJA in China orbat I have does not cover the Japanese Armies in China and especilly the 11th Army in this 1940-41 period, there is a gap there that got overlooked by the posting person, so its a help to fill in what was with with the 11th Army at the time. Were there any other such combat or support units you know of dircectly under 11th Army in this period?

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Re: Tank Regiments and other attachments to 11th Army 1940-4

Post by Akira Takizawa » 10 Jul 2006 04:13

asiaticus wrote:Were there any other such combat or support units you know of dircectly under 11th Army in this period?


6th Field Heavy Artillery Brigade - Major Gen. Sakai
 13th Field Heary Artillery Regiment
 22nd AA Gun Regiment
 2nd Field Gas Unit

Army Engineer Department
 2nd Independent Engineer Regiment
 One company of 3rd Independent Engineer Regiment
 4 Divisinal Bridge Material Companies
 5th Patient Transport Unit


Taki
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Re: other attachments to 11th Army 1940-41

Post by asiaticus » 10 Jul 2006 06:12

Posted: Mon Jul 10, 2006 5:13 am Post subject: Re: Tank Regiments and other attachments to 11th Army 1940-4

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

asiaticus wrote:
Were there any other such combat or support units you know of dircectly under 11th Army in this period?



6th Field Artillery Brigade - Major Gen. Sakai
 13th Field Heary Artillery Regiment
 22nd AA Gun Regiment
 2nd Field Gas Unit


Army Engineer Department
 2nd Independent Engineer Regiment
 One company of 3rd Independent Engineer Regiment
 4 Divisinal Bridge Material Companies
 5th Patient Transport Unit


Thanks for this post.

Interesting, the 13th was a heavy artillery unit left over from the Nanchang campaign.

I take it from your form of listing 6th Feild Artillery Brigade the controling unit for the units you list below it or did it have more units within it not listed?

In the Nanchang campaing there was a 6th Heavy Artillery Brigade was this the same unit renamed as a Feild Artillery Brigade or a different unit altogether?

Am curious about these Feild Gas Units. What was that like? Mortars, gas projectors? What sort of organization did these have?

I wonder if these Divisional Bridge Material Companies were better equipped than the ones at Nomanhan. Any idea what kind of bridge and the length of bridge they were able to make?

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Re: other attachments to 11th Army 1940-41

Post by Akira Takizawa » 10 Jul 2006 08:12

> I take it from your form of listing 6th Feild Artillery Brigade the controling unit for the units you list below it or did it have more units within it not listed?

The brigade was the HQ controlling the units which I listed.

> In the Nanchang campaing there was a 6th Heavy Artillery Brigade was this the same unit renamed as a Feild Artillery Brigade or a different unit altogether?

Sorry, it is my mistake. It is 6th Field Heavy Artillery Brigade. It is the same unit as that of Nanchang campaign.

> Am curious about these Feild Gas Units. What was that like? Mortars, gas projectors?

Gas projectors. See below.

http://www3.plala.or.jp/takihome/gas.htm

> What sort of organization did these have?

I don't know the details of the unit.

> I wonder if these Divisional Bridge Material Companies were better equipped than the ones at Nomanhan. Any idea what kind of bridge and the length of bridge they were able to make?

I don't know.


Taki

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Re: other attachments to 11th Army 1940-41

Post by asiaticus » 10 Jul 2006 09:37

Thanks for the reply.

> In the Nanchang campaing there was a 6th Heavy Artillery Brigade was this the same unit renamed as a Feild Artillery Brigade or a different unit altogether?

Sorry, it is my mistake. It is 6th Field Heavy Artillery Brigade. It is the same unit as that of Nanchang campaign.


Glad I asked.


Gas projectors. See below.

http://www3.plala.or.jp/takihome/gas.htm

> What sort of organization did these have?

I don't know the details of the unit.


Kind of tantalizing not knowing how these were used. I would guess at the least they'd line up when the wind was right and waft their gasses downwind into the Chinese lines ala WWI practice.

Since the vehicles are like tanks maybe they could drive at the Chinese line with gas masked troops following to exploit the disabled troops and cover the vehicles. Given the lack of AT weapons among the Chinese this might work and deliver the gases more accurately.

I assume they also delivered gas with normal artillery mortars and feild guns.

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Re: other attachments to 11th Army 1940-41

Post by Akira Takizawa » 10 Jul 2006 10:25

asiaticus wrote:Kind of tantalizing not knowing how these were used. I would guess at the least they'd line up when the wind was right and waft their gasses downwind into the Chinese lines ala WWI practice.

It is not a thing as you imagine. The vehicle scatters poison liquid which generates gas by evaporation. The scattered poison lasts a couple of days and it makes a dangerous gas area where soldiers cannot enter.

It is not sure how the IJA intended to use it. But, I assume that it was like mine field to privent enemy from advancing.

asiaticus wrote:I assume they also delivered gas with normal artillery mortars and feild guns.

Yes. Many kinds of gas shells from 75mm to 15cm were produced and they were provided for artillery units. IJA heavy infantry mortars were first developed as gas launcher and heavy infantry mortar units were organized for chemical warfare.

Taki

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re: Gas projector use

Post by asiaticus » 11 Jul 2006 04:24

It is not a thing as you imagine. The vehicle scatters poison liquid which generates gas by evaporation. The scattered poison lasts a couple of days and it makes a dangerous gas area where soldiers cannot enter.

It is not sure how the IJA intended to use it. But, I assume that it was like mine field to privent enemy from advancing.


I see how that could work as a sort of chemical minefeild in a defensive role it could be quickly laid down and channel or block an enemy advance or create a barrier a lot quicker than a conventional minefield. Would be useful during an advance to create secure positions along the way in a hurry.

It would be interesting to find out how these were actually used and how that worked out in action.

Thanks for the explaination.

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1st Area Army?

Post by Finnigan » 22 Jul 2006 08:16

I have been researching the First Indochina War.

I have some very incomplete information on the Chinese troops sent into Northern Tonkien to disarm the Japanese troops there in September of 1945.

From what I can tell these troops came from Yunnan.
They were designated as the 1st Area Army, and were under the command of Lu Han.

I have the following KMT divisions as, (possibly), being attached to this army:

52nd Infantry Division
60th Infantry Division
62nd Infantry Division
130th Infantry Division

The Independant 93rd Infantry Division was a separate division sent into Northern Laos.

Any verification, additions, or corrections to this list would be very much appreciated.

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Sine-JapaneseWar

Post by tigre » 22 Jul 2006 17:08

Hello folks, so long. A little more.

The Sine-JapaneseWar by captain M.R. Kammerer, lnfantry.

Military operations in China during recent months have been somewhat obscured by diplomatic maneuvers destined to curtail or to extend outside aid to the Chinese. In July, 1940, the British had conceded to the Japanese demand that the Burma road to Kunming be closed and had agreed to keep that line of communications closed for a period of three months, beginning 18 July. Two months later, the Japanese were able to impose on the helpless Vichy government a treaty permitting Japan to send into Indo-China a force of 6,000 men to garrison three air bases. This meant gaining a foothold which has been considerably expanded since. It also meant the closing of the last southern gateway into China and left the Chinese with but one outlet to foreign assistance—through northwestern China to Russia. When, in late September, Japan signed the three-power pact with Germany and Italy, the Japanese probably had hopes that this step would influence China to give up the struggle, the British to clear out of Asia.

Great Britain refused to be coerced by such a move, however, and quickly decided to reopen the Burma road at the termination of the three-month period. At midnight, 18 October, trucks laden with supplies started to move once moreover the 725-mile road from the border to the Chinese capital at Chungking.

The value of this road to the Chinese lies not so much in the amount of supplies it makes available to the Chinese as in the moral effect resulting from the knowledge that foreign powers are still interested in and willing to aid their cause. Actually more than 1,500 miles separate Chungking from the nearest open seaport—Rangoon. The first 550 miles of this trip, Rangoon through Mandalay to Lashio, are by rail. The remainder of the trip must be made by motor, much of it over difficult mountain roads. The Japanese are in a position to render these roads even more difficult by bombing the many bridges and narrow passes from their newly organized air bases in Indo china. Although the Chinese road gangs are well organized for prompt repair work, it is extremely doubtful that shipments will be able to move steadily or m any great quantities.

Nevertheless, the reopening of the road seemed to revive the hopes of the Chinese who started their own offensive along the entire 1,500 mile front during the last few days of october. Chinese troops moved into parts of Kwangsi province, including its chief city, Nanning, evacuated by the Japanese, probably with some loss of face, when they moved into Indochina. Whether this withdrawal was voluntary or forced appears to be controversial. Death, injury or illness cost the Japanese heavily in Kwangsi.

In central China, regular troops, strong guerrilla bands and revolting Chinese mercenary troops of the puppet regime became unusually active along the Yangtze, forcing the Japanese to evacuate their advanced positions and damaging extensively the long lines of Japanese communications. Regular Chinese units are known to have struck at Yangtze river ports between Hankow and Nanking.

In northern China, a force of 20,000 Chinese bas been harassing Japanese positions in Shansi province. Organized raiders from this force have operated as deep into Japanese sectors as the Tientsin - Peking area.

The Japanese are losing heavily as a result of these Chinese raids, which may be the beginning of a new life for the Chinese. Certainly the Japanese offensive appears to have bogged down. The impasse which had been reached might have been broken had the Japanese succeeded in closing all gateways to China, including the Soviet entrance. Failing that, Japan is forced to carry on her undeclared war against a Chinese nation that is much stronger than she was at the outset of hostilities more than three years ago while Japan’s own position appears to be materially weakened. Her losses in China have been offset by very few gains therein. Her military alliance with Germany and Italy has not been able to replace the iron formerly obtained from the United States and so necessary to Japan’s continued operations.

The Chinese are not of course, in any position to carry on a successful offensive against the Japanese at present.
Their steadily growing army of more than 5,000,000, including guerrillas, is poorly equipped. Japanese air superiority will continue for some tune and will hinder efforts at industrial expansion. Nevertheless, Chinese guerrillas seem capable of getting behind the Japanese lines without having to be dropped from or landed by planes, and their operations behind those lines are apparently just as effective as those of parachute troops.

Source: Military Review. Dec 1940

Cheers. Tigre.
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Re: 1st Area Army?

Post by asiaticus » 22 Jul 2006 23:59


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Post by Ben White » 26 Jul 2006 10:35

Sino-Japanese War, Second, 1937–45, conflict between Japanese and Chinese forces for control of the Chinese mainland. The war sapped the Nationalist government's strength while allowing the Communists to gain control over large areas through organization of guerrilla units. Thus, it was an important factor in the eventual Communist defeat of the Nationalist forces in 1949. In its early stage, the war was often called the China Incident.

Origins

Following the Manchurian Incident (Sept., 1931), the Japanese Kwantung army occupied Manchuria and established the puppet state of Manchukuo (Feb., 1932). Japan pressed China to recognize the independence of Manchukuo, suppress anti-Japanese activities, and form autonomous regional governments in N China. The Japanese were partially successful in 1933 and 1935 when they forced China to form two demilitarized autonomous zones bordering Manchuria.

Outbreak of War

Growing domestic opposition to the Nationalist government's policy of self-strengthening before counterattacking in N China and Manchuria led to the kidnapping of Chiang Kai-shek was kidnapped at Xi'an in Dec., 1936, by Chang Hsüeh-liang. Chiang was forced to agree to a united anti-Japanese front with the Communists as a condition for his release. The situation was tense, and in 1937 full war commenced. A clash (July, 1937) between soldiers of the Japanese garrison at Beijing and Chinese forces at the Marco Polo Bridge was the pretext for Japanese occupation at Beijing and Tianjin. Chiang Kai-shek refused to negotiate an end to hostilities on Japanese terms and placed crack troops outside the Japanese settlement at Shanghai. After a protracted struggle Shanghai and the national capital, Nanjing, fell to the Japanese. The Chinese broke the Huang He dikes (June, 1938) to slow the enemy advance. In late 1938, Hankou and Guangzhou were taken.

Japanese strategy was aimed at taking the cities, the roads, and the railroads, thereby gaining a net of control. Thus, although the Japanese by 1940 had swept over the eastern coastal area, guerrilla fighting still went on in the conquered regions. The Nationalist government, driven back to a temporary capital at Chongqing, struggled on with little help from outside. Chinese resources were inadequate, and the supplies sent over the Burma Road were far from sufficient. The Chinese cause continued to decline despite vast resistance and bloody fighting. Dubious of China's ability to sustain a protracted war, Wang Ching-wei broke with Chiang Kai-shek and established a collaborationist regime at Nanjing (1940).

World War II

The Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor brought the United States into the war and merged the Sino-Japanese War into World War II as China declared war on Japan, Germany, and Italy. American and British loans and supplies, the establishment of military air bases in China, and the aid of an increasing number of U.S. and British advisers helped relieve China as Japan diverted armies elsewhere. Nevertheless, China's military position continued to deteriorate until Apr., 1945. In May the Chinese launched a successful offensive at Zhijiang (Chihkiang) that lasted until Japanese capitulation on Aug. 14. The Japanese troops in China formally surrendered Sept. 9, 1945. By the provisions of the Cairo Declaration, Manchuria, Taiwan, and the Pescadores were restored to China.

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100 Regiments Offensive

Post by asiaticus » 27 Jul 2006 08:06

After the 1939 Winter Offensive and the Japanese counter offensives that followed it in North China during the rest of the winter, spring and early summer, there followed the large Communist 100 Regiments Offensive that lasted through the rest of the year from Aug 20th - Dec 5th 1940.

Details on this campaign is sketchy, mostly from the Communist Chinese .

Here is a pretty good map showing the attacks of the 8th Route Army in red and the positions and movements of the Japanese in black. Its in Chinese so good luck figuring out what is being attacked and defended. :^)
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-0 ... 751052.htm

Positions of Japanese forces are on this little map from a Chinese web article.
http://jczs.sina.com.cn/2005-06-12/1753296293.html

Some detailed articles on the campaign:

百团大战 (Hundred Regiments Offensive) has lots of photos and text in the boxes:
http://jczs.sina.com.cn/sz/btdz/index.shtml
Its in Chinese so use http://world.altavista.com/ to look at the pages in english.
[tranlate chinese-simp to english on http://world.altavista.com/ Just paste in the website address and hit the button]


from Resistance and Revolution in China, Chapter VI— Consolidation of the New United Front, The Battle of One Hundred Regiments
http://content.cdlib.org/xtf/view?docId ... nd=ucpress
Lots of good detail on the campagn. The whole article is worth reading.


Hundred Regiment Campaign
http://uglychinese.org/war.htm#Ichigo
Mentions names of some battles within the campaign.

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100 Regiments Offensive map with locations

Post by asiaticus » 29 Jul 2006 05:58

Here is that map showing the attacks of the 8th Route Army, 100 Regiments Offensive.
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-0 ... 751052.htm

I have managed to ID some of the cities. Cant figure out where that coal mine is.
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