During the execution of Plan Gelb, at the cost of less than 2,500 casualties and 42 tanks destroyed (highest of Germany’s 10 panzer divisions), Rommel’s division had captured 97,648 prisoners, 277 field guns, 64 antitank guns, 458 tanks and armored cars, and more than 4,000 trucks in addition to enormous amounts of supplies.
No Panzer III Wins the War
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Re: No Panzer III Wins the War
7th PD France
Re: No Panzer III Wins the War
But, when it arrived it had the same weight and mobility as Panzer IV. So either the konzeptum was DOA (then no Panzer III is needed) or the konzeptum stays and Panzer III is DOA (and one of the options is Skoda tanks).Richard Anderson wrote:The Panzer III as originally conceived was lighter and more mobile that the Panzer IV and was intended principally for maneuver.
I understand that, and I never said or thought that.Yet again, you seem confused and apparently think I am saying the doctrine was correct. It wasn't and I don't.
And my point is that the Panzer III did not fit the leichte-schwere doctrine as it existed in 1939. Beyond Germany hanging on to ONE of the logical consequences of the leichte-schwere konzeptum (that the Wehrmacht needs 2 panzers), the existence of Panzer III fits no rational explanation.That does not change what was believed at the time, which belief changed over time until 1943 when the Germans went to primarily homogeneous battalions.
Of course, the explanation of the Panzer III history as being an offspring of the idiosyncrasies of 3rd Reich's military-industrial complex likely contains most of the truth.
To belabor the point, if Germans were serious about leichte-schwere doctrine, the panzer III would have been rejected.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion
Re: No Panzer III Wins the War
I think the Pz III was 2 tons lighter and had torsion bar suspension instead of leaf spring of the Pz IV, so it did have some greater mobility and ability to fire on the move.BDV wrote:But, when it arrived it had the same weight and mobility as Panzer IV. So either the konzeptum was DOA (then no Panzer III is needed) or the konzeptum stays and Panzer III is DOA (and one of the options is Skoda tanks).Richard Anderson wrote:The Panzer III as originally conceived was lighter and more mobile that the Panzer IV and was intended principally for maneuver.
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Re: No Panzer III Wins the War
No, it did not. You repeat falsehoods as truths, after being corrected. Why?BDV wrote:But, when it arrived it had the same weight and mobility as Panzer IV.
Good.I understand that, and I never said or thought that.
Odd, the leadership of the Panzertruppen seemed to think it did.And my point is that the Panzer III did not fit the leichte-schwere doctrine as it existed in 1939.
Yet again, it was mirrored in similar concepts in the United States, Soviet Union, and Great Britian.Beyond Germany hanging on to ONE of the logical consequences of the leichte-schwere konzeptum (that the Wehrmacht needs 2 panzers), the existence of Panzer III fits no rational explanation.
Of course, the explanation of the Panzer III history as being an offspring of the idiosyncrasies of 3rd Reich's military-industrial complex likely contains most of the truth.
They were, and they didn't. There seems to be a rather big hole in your reality.To belabor the point, if Germans were serious about leichte-schwere doctrine, the panzer III would have been rejected.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
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Re: No Panzer III Wins the War
They were, at best, a better 'roaming' part of the breakthrough 'blitz' that Germany pulled off to good effect in 1939/1940/1941 (early).Richard Anderson wrote:Summer 1941, well, 1 July, was also the peak employment of the 38(t) in the Heer, with 750-some on the books. It was all downhill from there.Yoozername wrote:Panzer (38) t were a poor substitute in summer 1941
They probably swarmed isolated Soviet tanks as far as mass per space. The Panzer Divisions that had them had large numbers. Maybe to offset that they were not exactly Panzer III? I would rate them different.
I consider the 'weak armor' afv Hey-Days to have ended somewhere around the end of 1941.
Re: No Panzer III Wins the War
I was corrected? Where?Richard Anderson wrote:No, it did not. You repeat falsehoods as truths, after being corrected. Why?BDV wrote:But, when it arrived it had the same weight and mobility as Panzer IV.
Yes, it is common knowledge that the Panzer III was 4-8% lighter than the contemporary Panzer IV; depending on the exact year of production. What does that amount to?
Can the Panzer III use lighter railcars? Minimal weight difference, so no.
Can the Panzer III navigate softer terrains? Same ground pressure, so no.
Can the Panzer III cross wider trenches or ford deeper rivers? No.
Can the Panzer III travel farther per gallon of petrol? Not when they had the same engine, and barely so when the Panzer III had a minimally weaker engine.
(this also means they need the same amount of petrol bowsers to support them on the battlefield)
Can the Panzer III be towed by lighter tractors? No, the Sdkfz9 "FAMO" has to lug them both (III and IV).
Can the Panzer III cross smaller/flimsier bridges? Minimal weight difference, so no.
Now, how much did the other nation's schwere/leichte tanks differ?
G.Britain: the Cruiser A9,10 or A13, 55-60% of Matilda II's weight
France: the S35 65% of CharB1's weight
Russia: the BT7 33% of KV1's weight and the T34 55% of KV1's weight
It was only the Germans that looked at a "leichte" tank 95% of it's heavier counterpart weight and said: "yeah, that's good"
And for a resource rich country like US having two very close designs under production and deployment would have been OK. But the 3rd Reich was not resource rich.
P.S.
I suspect that a 5 man-tank with 3 man turret and turret ring able to take a 50 mm gun could not BUT end up in the 20+ ton range. The 14-16 tonne cruiser/fast/light tanks of other nations were usually 2-man turret, 4-man tanks, and were loading guns with a smaller recoil than the 50mm kwk39 of Panzer IIIJ.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion
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Re: No Panzer III Wins the War
Now he is just asking himself questions. I wouldn't bother asking him anything since he never answers regarding actual price etc.No, it did not. You repeat falsehoods as truths, after being corrected. Why?
Re: No Panzer III Wins the War
Then maybe you can clarify how much it cost to deploy one Panzer III vs one Panzer IV in a panzerdivision - cost of machine plus cost of crew, cost of support and maintenance/repair establishment per machine;Yoozername wrote:I wouldn't bother asking him anything since he never answers regarding actual price etc.
and how much of the cost of the attached artillery and support infantry was due to the need to boost the (inferior) firepower of Panzer III compared to the Panzer IV;
and how much it cost to keep one Panzer III vs one Panzer IV in action during the 1939, 1940, 1941, and 1942 campaigns.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion
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Re: No Panzer III Wins the War
You said they were the same price. I quoted you. Others have remarked that the Panzer IV was more expensive.
Clearly, the turret rotation mechanism for the Panzer IV was more expensive requiring a V-2 gasoline engine, generator (needs copper) and an electric motor (needs copper) and controls and wiring (etc). The 75mmL24 was an expensive weapon compared to the 37mm. You seem to think they are closer than they were because 'they look alike to you'.
And how does this win the war? This is probably the most far fetched part of the What If. And least probable..
Clearly, the turret rotation mechanism for the Panzer IV was more expensive requiring a V-2 gasoline engine, generator (needs copper) and an electric motor (needs copper) and controls and wiring (etc). The 75mmL24 was an expensive weapon compared to the 37mm. You seem to think they are closer than they were because 'they look alike to you'.
And how does this win the war? This is probably the most far fetched part of the What If. And least probable..
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Re: No Panzer III Wins the War
As proposed, they utilized the same track width and engines. However, the Panzer III was to be 15 tons and the Panzer IV 18 tons. A 17% weight difference. Yes, as developed, the weight approached each other. By the start of the initial production run (Pz III Ausf E-G and Pz IV Ausf D), they were just a 1/2 ton different...except the Panzer III had a 10-speed transmission giving it a theoretical top speed of 67 km/hr, versus 42 in the Panzer IV 6-speed. Still, in theory, the Panzer III had much greater speed and equivalent mobility than the Panzer IV (same track width, but less weight in the Panzer III, versus more weight but longer track footprint in the Panzer IV).BDV wrote:I was corrected? Where?
Yes, it is common knowledge that the Panzer III was 4-8% lighter than the contemporary Panzer IV; depending on the exact year of production. What does that amount to?
However, by that time, theory was being replaced by field and combat experience, and it was quickly becoming evident the two types were too similar. The problem though goes back to the early discussions between the Schnelltruppen leadership, OKH, and the Heeres Waffenamt starting in December 1935. It was recognized that all the theory and proposals might be trashed by actual field and combat experience and it was. On 28 January 1936, the Allgemeines Heeresamt pointed out that the troops would not receive large numbers of the initial series of Panzer III until fall of 1938 and the Panzer IV series six months later. However, from experience to date they fond that redesign and redrawing production plans took about four months and that it was nine months before the redesigned vehicles began production.
What then followed, the Panzer III Ausf H and Panzer IV Ausf E, in fall 1940, were the first products of that experience. The Panzer III dropped the 10-speed transmission for a less complex 6-speed...and its weight at 21.8 tons actually exceeded that of the Panzer IV.
So, obviously, they should have stopped and changed all production of Panzer III to IV, right? Except by that time, Daimler-Benz, MAN, Alkett, Henschel, Wegmann, MNH, and MIAG were all busily producing it, to the tune of 44 per month. Only Krupp-Gruson was producing the Panzer IV...28 per month, but with Nibelungenwerke and VOMAG scheduled to begin production in the spring-summer of 1941.
They were essentially stuck with the same problem foreseen by the Allgemeine Heeresamt; they could not afford the time and expense to convert all Panzer III production to Panzer IV production with the war already going. Then, of course, they encountered the Soviet tanks and the problem they faced became worse, leading to the decision to bite the bullet and go ahead and convert much of the Panzer III production (except Alkett, which had become vital for its production of the StuG III) to the new Panther.
Indeed, because they followed a slightly different doctrinal and organizational developmental path. The USSR, UK, and France decided to produce two distinct types in distinct organizations. One was for infantry support, the Matilda and CharB (in the Soviet case, oddly, it was a light tank, the T26/T40-series). One was a cavalry tank, the Cruisers, S35, and BT/T34. Light tanks then played a scouting role, either attached to the cavalry/infantry support organizations, or as separate organizations.(snip agreement)
Now, how much did the other nation's schwere/leichte tanks differ?
G.Britain: the Cruiser A9,10 or A13, 55-60% of Matilda II's weight
France: the S35 65% of CharB1's weight
Russia: the BT7 33% of KV1's weight and the T34 55% of KV1's weight
The Germans simply decided in 1934-1935 that they wanted as much as possible to combine the infantry support, cavalry/light scouting, and antitank roles in the same organization, but kept to three different vehicles to accomodate it.
Except it wasn't a "leichte" tank...it was a 15-ton (later 20+ ton tank in the "leichte kompanie" of its proposed organization.It was only the Germans that looked at a "leichte" tank 95% of it's heavier counterpart weight and said: "yeah, that's good"
Indeed, and they recognized it was a gamble they felt they needed to take, especially given the Nazi leaderships predilection for using government funding to control the corporations.And for a resource rich country like US having two very close designs under production and deployment would have been OK. But the 3rd Reich was not resource rich.
I agree, and yes, it would have been wiser if the Heeres Waffenamt had done as suggested and prototyped the Panzer III with a 5cm gun. That may have put paid to the notion as early as spring 1937. That, in fact, may be the only logical take off point for this what if. Under those conditions, they likely could have started series production of a 5cm and 7.5cm armed Panzer IV in early 1939.P.S.
I suspect that a 5 man-tank with 3 man turret and turret ring able to take a 50 mm gun could not BUT end up in the 20+ ton range. The 14-16 tonne cruiser/fast/light tanks of other nations were usually 2-man turret, 4-man tanks, and were loading guns with a smaller recoil than the 50mm kwk39 of Panzer IIIJ.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
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Re: No Panzer III Wins the War
I suppose a problem with this line of thinking is that the Germans somehow knew about these percentages? Not even knowing about the existence of the AFV themselves?Russia: the BT7 33% of KV1's weight and the T34 55% of KV1's weight
The nations had different weights and vehicles and also doctrine as far as using them. Clearly, the Germans early war 'Blitzkrieg' worked with what they had, until they got into a drawn out conflict in Russia. Basically, gun power and armor took on a critical design consideration over speed. Having all Panzer IV's (I lost you BDV...what happened to Panzer 38 (t)'s?), with 75mmL24/37mm/50mmL42, and little armor does not change history.
Re: No Panzer III Wins the War
Richard Anderson wrote:As proposed, they utilized the same track width and engines. However, the Panzer III was to be 15 tons and the Panzer IV 18 tons. A 17% weight difference. Yes, as developed, the weight approached each other. By the start of the initial production run (Pz III Ausf E-G and Pz IV Ausf D), they were just a 1/2 ton different...except the Panzer III had a 10-speed transmission giving it a theoretical top speed of 67 km/hr, versus 42 in the Panzer IV 6-speed. Still, in theory, the Panzer III had much greater speed and equivalent mobility than the Panzer IV (same track width, but less weight in the Panzer III, versus more weight but longer track footprint in the Panzer IV).
However, by that time, theory was being replaced by field and combat experience, and it was quickly becoming evident the two types were too similar. The problem though goes back to the early discussions between the Schnelltruppen leadership, OKH, and the Heeres Waffenamt starting in December 1935. It was recognized that all the theory and proposals might be trashed by actual field and combat experience and it was. On 28 January 1936, the Allgemeines Heeresamt pointed out that the troops would not receive large numbers of the initial series of Panzer III until fall of 1938 and the Panzer IV series six months later. However, from experience to date they fond that redesign and redrawing production plans took about four months and that it was nine months before the redesigned vehicles began production.
What then followed, the Panzer III Ausf H and Panzer IV Ausf E, in fall 1940, were the first products of that experience. The Panzer III dropped the 10-speed transmission for a less complex 6-speed...and its weight at 21.8 tons actually exceeded that of the Panzer IV.
So, obviously, they should have stopped and changed all production of Panzer III to IV, right? Except by that time, Daimler-Benz, MAN, Alkett, Henschel, Wegmann, MNH, and MIAG were all busily producing it, to the tune of 44 per month. Only Krupp-Gruson was producing the Panzer IV...28 per month, but with Nibelungenwerke and VOMAG scheduled to begin production in the spring-summer of 1941.
They were essentially stuck with the same problem foreseen by the Allgemeine Heeresamt; they could not afford the time and expense to convert all Panzer III production to Panzer IV production with the war already going. Then, of course, they encountered the Soviet tanks and the problem they faced became worse, leading to the decision to bite the bullet and go ahead and convert much of the Panzer III production (except Alkett, which had become vital for its production of the StuG III) to the new Panther.
Thank you for the detailed explanations!
I'm suspecting the somewhat magical/seamless appearance of the Panzer III hull as a the hull of choice for the planned infantry assault vehicle has something to do with concerns/uncertainty whether the 2-tank approach will go forth.
However, should the German leadership choose a different path in mid-1939 the loss of hulls compared to historical could be minimal; except they'd be in Sturmgeschutz rather than Panzerkampfwagen form. I presume the Nibelungenwerke and VOMAG facilities would/could be shifted towards either Panzer IV or maybe a unified III/IV design.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion
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Re: No Panzer III Wins the War
You're welcome.BDV wrote:Thank you for the detailed explanations!
The problem - for the Germans - was they already invested in the 1937-1941 time frame to produce the Panzer III at those facilities as part of the prewar and then wartime expansion of the industry. Then, in 1941-1942 when the realization the Panzer III would need replacement sunk in, they then had to reinvest in order to convert them to Panther production, but did not change over the existing Panzer IV production capacity due to lack of resources and the time factor - they could not afford the production loss during wartime.I'm suspecting the somewhat magical/seamless appearance of the Panzer III hull as a the hull of choice for the planned infantry assault vehicle has something to do with concerns/uncertainty whether the 2-tank approach will go forth.
However, should the German leadership choose a different path in mid-1939 the loss of hulls compared to historical could be minimal; except they'd be in Sturmgeschutz rather than Panzerkampfwagen form. I presume the Nibelungenwerke and VOMAG facilities would/could be shifted towards either Panzer IV or maybe a unified III/IV design.
Meanwhile, Nibelungenwerke was built to produce Panzer IV and began doing so in early 1942. It may be illustartive of the overall German problem that it never achieved its planned output due to labor and resource limitations.
They were between a rock and a hard place.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
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Re: No Panzer III Wins the War
Panzer III replacement was the VK 2000, which would have been a better choice if it could be adapted to mount the KWK-40.
With any ATL -based on reaction to Hitler's 4 YEAR PLAN in 1936 - all these programs would have been contracted into fewer models in order to speed up production and many existing factories would have been repurposed to build more essential armaments.
With any ATL -based on reaction to Hitler's 4 YEAR PLAN in 1936 - all these programs would have been contracted into fewer models in order to speed up production and many existing factories would have been repurposed to build more essential armaments.
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Re: No Panzer III Wins the War
So, it would win the war?Panzer III replacement was the VK 2000, which would have been a better choice if it could be adapted to mount the KWK-40.