Did the Germans ever really deploy jet fighters on the Eastern Front or not?
I doubt the Soviets would have the means to deal with them like the WAllies did?
Any real use for the Me-262 on Eastern Front?
- Markus Becker
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Re: Any real use for the Me-262 on Eastern Front?
Jets needed airfields with concrete runways, didn't they? They were not plentiful in Western Europe and I bet very, very rare anywhere east of Germany. By 1944 the Soviets did have high performance fighters and well trained pilots. They would have done ok.
- Ironmachine
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Re: Any real use for the Me-262 on Eastern Front?
Take a look at this old thread (from 2012), Me 262 operations against Russian Forces: /viewtopic.php?t=188173
Also, from wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Messerschmitt_Me_262):
Also, from wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Messerschmitt_Me_262):
In the last days of the war, Me 262s from JG 7 and other units were committed in ground assault missions, in an attempt to support German troops fighting Red Army forces. Just south of Berlin, halfway between Spremberg and the German capital, Wehrmacht’s 9th Army (with elements from the 12 Army and 4th Panzer Army) was assaulting the Red Army’s 1st Ukrainian Front. To support this attack, on 24 April, JG 7 dispatched 31 Me 262s on a strafing mission in the Cottbus-Bautzen area. Luftwaffe pilots claimed six lorries and seven Soviet aircraft, but three German jets were lost. On the evening of the 27 April, 36 Me 262s from JG 7, III.KG(J)6 and KJ(J)54 were sent against Soviet forces that were attacking German troops in the forests north-east of Baruth. They succeeded in strafing 65 Soviet lorries, after which the Me 262s intercepted low flying IL-2 Sturmoviks searching for German tanks. The jet pilots claimed six Sturmoviks for the loss of three Messerschmitt. During operations between 28 April and 1 May Soviet fighters and ground fire downed at least 10 more Me 262 from JG 7.[46] However, JG 7 managed to keep its jets operational until the end of the war. And on the 8th of May, at around 4 p.m. Oblt. Fritz Stehle of 2./JG 7, while flying a Me 262 on the Erzgebirge, attacked a formation of Soviet aircraft. He claimed a Yakovlev Yak-9, but the plane shot down was most probably a P-39 Airacobra. Soviet records show that they lost two Airacobras, one of them downed probably by Stehle, who thus scored the last Luftwaffe air victory of the war.[47]
Citations [46] and [47] are both from Bergstrom, Christer (2008), Bagration to Berlin: The Final Air Battles in the East: 1944–1945. Great Britain: Ian Allan. p. 123.
- T. A. Gardner
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Re: Any real use for the Me-262 on Eastern Front?
Jets need very long runways compared to prop planes. The Me 262 would also require one free of FOD so a grass strip wouldn't work. Even a hard dirt runway would be problematic due to dust raised by the nose wheel potentially getting ingested.Markus Becker wrote:Jets needed airfields with concrete runways, didn't they? They were not plentiful in Western Europe and I bet very, very rare anywhere east of Germany. By 1944 the Soviets did have high performance fighters and well trained pilots. They would have done ok.
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Re: Any real use for the Me-262 on Eastern Front?
As a first generation jet the Me-262 had some issues. Obviously pilots were still getting used to its particular quirks as regarding quick changes of speed etc. Reliability of its engines was an issue as well necessitating keeping time in air brief. There was always the fear that a lost plane over Soviet held territory would allow the Soviets to clone the technology.
But more importantly this jet seem to have it highest success in an air superiority role against heavy bombers in large formations. Soviet air operated more as Army cooperation force than a strategic one. Thus interception was at lower altitude, with less warning and against smaller formations.
The risk of loss to AAA fire and low flying Yaks was higher under these circumstances. Not only that, the jets were in quite short supply, so best to use them where the risk vs benefit was lowest.
But more importantly this jet seem to have it highest success in an air superiority role against heavy bombers in large formations. Soviet air operated more as Army cooperation force than a strategic one. Thus interception was at lower altitude, with less warning and against smaller formations.
The risk of loss to AAA fire and low flying Yaks was higher under these circumstances. Not only that, the jets were in quite short supply, so best to use them where the risk vs benefit was lowest.