T. A. Gardner wrote:pugsville wrote:I don't thing the French High command thought much differently, but the decision was political not Pershing's to make. But none of this was actually the subject on debate. The importance of the AEF contribution in 1918.
The subject of this debate is the war continues into 1919 and 1920. The US contribution would have continued to increase in size and importance with every passing month. France and Britain were drained of troops, if not in the poor economic shape Germany was. They would have been heavily dependent, particularly the French who's army had already mutinied once, on the US for troops to send on the offensive.
That, in turn, means that the US Army would have increasingly had a say in decision making. The French and British would have had little choice but to let that happen if they wanted US cooperation. We can already see that the US Army rejected putting US divisions under direct French command. By 1919 I'd think the US could and probably would be dictating where they were going to launch an offensive.
Hi Terry. In terms of influence, think that is more true on the political level than the military side. The Americans would still be dependent on French and British weapons for a long time into 1919, which would have given them a lever in the conduct of the ground war.
I'm not going to discuss in detail your point about the state of British or French war weariness. Generally, I don't think the situation was as dire as you suggest for the French and British - if for no other reasons than the ability to tap into imperial assets and the reduction of commitments resulting from the defeat of Germany's allies allowing for greater use of Anglo-French forces in Western Europe.
We can already see that the US Army rejected putting US divisions under direct French command.
Except when they didn't. The US Army rejected amalgamation. The Army went along with putting US divisions under both French and British command when it made sense to do so. There was some intermingling of US and French divisions right up through the end of the war. For instance, two US divisions were under French XVII Corps command in early November. French XVII Corps was placed under US Second Army, which was going to be transferred to de Castelnau's Eastern Army Group for the planned Lorraine Offensive.
By 1919 I'd think the US could and probably would be dictating where they were going to launch an offensive.
They didn't have the logistical capability to do that and they weren't really building towards it yet - they were busy sorting out their immediate problems. Plus, they were part of a coalition whose members weren't the sort to be dominated.
That doesn't change that neither Britain or France had hundreds of thousands, let alone millions, of fresh troops to shove into the line for an offensive. The US did. Britain and France came close to defeat in the Kaiser offensives of early 1918. Without US intervention, it is highly likely that a negotiated armistice and peace would have occurred. Britain and France on their own were as worn out from the war as Germany. Sure, their economies were doing better but they really lacked the manpower to go on the offensive in mid to late 1918 without the US, particularly France. France was down to using just colonial divisions for offensive purposes. Their own troops had mutinied and France was almost completely unwilling to use them offensively for fear of a second mutiny.
The French only raised something like 660,000 colonial troops during the entire war. While some of these soldiers were used in assault units towards the end of the war, there were only so many - thus, plenty of Metropolitan French troops were on the offensive during 1918.
Also, the mutinies were dealt with and Morale had been restored by the end of 1917 through Petain's reforms and small (well, small compared to the objectives of Third Champagne or Second Aisne), but important victories such as La Malmaison. Morale fluctuated in the French army in 1918 as in every other year. It was fine early, sank a bit during the Spring Offensives, rebounded in the summer and remained good until the very end of 1918, when it started to flag again, if not like the previous year. My take is the soldiers knew the war was as good as done* and they didn't want to suffer anymore. Thus, after Soissons and Noyon, they attacked, but sometimes, even often, without the famed "furia française" of years gone by. What 1919 would have looked like is anyone's guess - and that's true of ALL of the armies in the field.
*I think that was especially true after the German peace feelers in October. I don't give Haig's complaints about Debeney too much credence, although maybe I should, as Foch railed at Debeney too. Notwithstanding, Debeney's First was only one of several field armies, and others performed differently, at different times, as all armies do.
All the US army needed was more experience. So you admit they were not magically the best soldiers at trench warfare on the western front? They also needed to learn from their experience, changing doctrine and belief is not easy for large organisations like the AEF, and winning despite not being all that good does not make the case for change stronger. defeat often is a better educator than victory.
We agree on this. The US needed to learn. 60 to 90 days of combat with a division would have been sufficent and the US within six to nine months would have been on par with British and French troops in terms of combat proficiency. But, given by early 1919 the US would have had several corps consisting of entirely US Army forces in France, they'd be the major player by mid 1919 for offensive action. They'd outnumber the British and like it or not, Pershing and the rest of the top brass in the US Army weren't about to let Britain or France run their war for them.
Yes, the US would have learned a lot had the war went on. Its influence would have grown in proportion to its size, surely. Whether its competence would have matched the French and British is something we'll never know. Those armies got really good and getting that good is something that takes years to do. As for dictating events, remember that Pershing wasn't adverse to working in a coalition (even if he was, he didn't have much choice), and overall strategy was still going to be directed by Foch, whose prestige was sky high.
"The secret of managing is to keep the guys who hate you away from the guys who are undecided." - Casey Stengel
