Fully mechanised Wehrmacht at beginning of WW2?

[BDV]

It is not because the SU was able AFTER the war to increase its oil production (from 31 million in 1940 to 38 million in 1950) that Germany would have been able to increase its oil production during the war by exploiting new oil fields : where would Germany get the needed workers, equipment, etc...?

Germany was able to increase during the war its own crude oil production from 1,5 million in 1940 to 1,9 million in 1943. More was impossible as Germany could not afford the enormous investments to exploit new oil fields .

Well, unless those workers were created after 1945, and those equipments were invented after 1945, or the factories that produced them were built after 1945, they would be right there.

Historically they were used for different purposes. That is understood. It is also understood that putting a simple price equivalence (1 billion worth of UBoats is means they could have produced 1 billion RM worth of tanks) is simplistic.

Yes, but to say there was no other way of running the war effort is ridiculous.

Besides, the SU was NOT able to increase its oil production during the war .

Was there shortage of oil in SU? Why would SU need to do such increase?

[James A Pratt III]

Clearly Germany could have used more trucks and fewer types of trucks in WW II. The replys on the need for more road construction units are also good. They Germans really needed them. Along with units to repair and change the gauges of the Railroads. It should be pointed out the Germans let hundreds of thousands of Russian POWs die of starvation in 1941-42. They could and should have used these men as laborers.

Da Pamphlets that were on archive.org
The Soviet Partisan Movement
German Armored traffic control during the Russian campaign 20-242
Terrain factors in the Russian campaign 20.290
Effects of Climate on combat in European Russia 20-291

[DerGiLLster]

You are building an IF ,which is ,as most IFs, a castle build on sand .

It is not because the SU was able AFTER the war to increase its oil production (from 31 million in 1940 to 38 million in 1950) that Germany would have been able to increase its oil production during the war by exploiting new oil fields : where would Germany get the needed workers, equipment, etc...?

Germany was able to increase during the war its own crude oil production from 1,5 million in 1940 to 1,9 million in 1943. More was impossible as Germany could not afford the enormous investments to exploit new oil fields .

It was the same in Libya : after the war, Libyan oil production skyrocketed .But it would have been impossible before and during the war to start an oil production in Libya, for the same reasons as in Germany .

If Germany wanted to produce 3 million ton oil from Matzen, it had to close or the other oil field,or the production of synthetic oil .

Between 1940-1944 Germany had some 40 million ton of oil

Imports : 11 million

Synthetic : 21 million

Crude : 8 million .


YOU have to prove that Germany had the means to increase its crude oil production by 3 million .Saying that the SU did it after the war,is not a proof : Germany was not the SU . Besides, the SU was NOT able to increase its oil production during the war .

I DID provide info for my sources. Unlike you who just provided text from a book without us knowing if it is right due to not giving an ACCESSIBLE source.

Again, Germany could not exploit those oil fields, because the steel and workers to put into it was building more synthetic fuel plants, more planes and artillery to counteract the WAllies and the building Soviet offensive.

Nice to use an example for a nation that has barely a quarter of Germanys industrial capacity and ignoring that the oil fields I propose are within the the Reich territory.

Again posting statistics for oil fields that I counteracted with ACCESSIBLE sources does not help you.

All you do is says "this is wrong, because I say so" yet cannot put forward a source and checking if it applies to the situation.

[ljadw]

Clearly Germany could have used more trucks and fewer types of trucks in WW II.

Fewer types of trucks does not necessarily result in more trucks;the opposite is also possible .

[Tomg44]

There is some relevant information here.
https://books.google.com.au/books?id=pu ... 's&f=false

[James A Pratt III]

Mecanized Juggernaut or Military anachronism mentioned above has the German army having over 2000 types of vehicles in service a maintance, supply nightmare. A lack of 4 wheel drive trucks was also a problem in Russia do to bad roads. The railway construction companies were too few ,organized right before the start of operation Barbarossa, and lacked truck transport. one thing the Germans might have done was have other truck companies in Germany build Opel 4WD trucks under license. It would have helped out the above problems.
see also the book "Trucks of the Wehrmacht"

[ljadw]

Mecanized Juggernaut or Military anachronism mentioned above has the German army having over 2000 types of vehicles in service a maintance, supply nightmare. A lack of 4 wheel drive trucks was also a problem in Russia do to bad roads. The railway construction companies were too few ,organized right before the start of operation Barbarossa, and lacked truck transport. one thing the Germans might have done was have other truck companies in Germany build Opel 4WD trucks under license. It would have helped out the above problems.
see also the book "Trucks of the Wehrmacht"

That's why I am saying that "amateurs talk strategy, professionals talk logistics " is a potentially dangerous clincher .

[ljadw]

While a lot of types of vehicles is resulting in maintenance problems, less types do not necessarily result in a bigger production : it can , but ,when it does, it takes time , and, as time was Germany's biggest enemy ...

Examples :

Motorcycles :due to the von Schell standardization program, the number of types in production was going down from 150 in 1939 to 26 in 1942,this resulted in the following production figures :

1940 :116000

1941 : 74000

1942 : 52000

1943 : 34000

Automobiles : number of types was going down from 55 to 29 ,and production figures were


1940 : 67000


1941 : 35000


1942 : 28000

1943 : 32000


Trucks : types from 131 to 23, production figures


1940 : 63000


1941 : 62000


1942 :81000

1943 : 109000


It took 2 years to increase the truck production, 2 years after the standardization decision .

And, one can doubt if the increase of trucks resulted in the same increase of transport capacity,as between 1940 and 1943,the number of 3-ton trucks was going down by 2000 ,the small ones was going up by 15000 and the big ones by 5000 ,while 60 % of the increase came from the production of caterpillars and mules .

[Sid Guttridge]

A fully mechanized Wehrmacht was unrealisable. In 1939 it was already about as mechanized as the Germans could make it.

I like the reason given by an elderly Yugoslav general for opposing mechanization in the 1930s - "At least our bullocks will never run out of fuel".

Cheers,

Sid.

[Paul Lakowski]

Examples :

Motorcycles :due to the von Schell standardization program, the number of types in production was going down from 150 in 1939 to 26 in 1942,this resulted in the following production figures :

1940 :116000 --------------------- [54442 TO MILITARY plus one factory converted to motors]
[/b]
1941 : 74000 ----------------------- [41,979 TO MILITARY]

1942 : 52000----------------------- [33,283 TO MILITARY]

1943 : 34000----------------------= [27,830 TO MILITARY plus one factory converted to aero engines /another 'tank components ]

Automobiles : number of types was going down from 55 to 29 ,and production figures were


1940 : 67000--------------[28510 TO MILITARY plus 5 plants converted to arms aero engines/ tank engines/ marine engines & aircraft components]


1941 : 35000-------------- [27,077 TO MILITARY]


1942 : 28000 ---------------[24,353 TO MILITARY]

1943 : 32000 --------------- [30594 TO MILIARY]


Trucks : types from 131 to 23, production figures


1940 : 63000----------------- [38,420 TO MILITARY]


1941 : 62000----------------- [37,003 TO MILITARY]


1942 :81000------------------ [59,463 TO MILITARY PLUS TWO PLANTS BUILDING TANKS AND ARMS]

1943 : 109000 ---------------- [92,580 TO MILITARY PLUS TWO PLANTS BUILD TANKS & ARMS]


It took 2 years to increase the truck production, 2 years after the standardization decision .
.

HAD TO UPDATE YOUR FIGURES TO INCLUDE THE NUMBERS TO MILITARY PLUS # PLANTS ALSO CONVERTED TO OTHER MUNTIONS.