What if: Hitler wins the war due to slightly stronger Barbarossa forces

[ljadw]

The meaning of "Barbarossa Derailed"(Glantz) was that AGC was fixed in place by relentless Soviet counterattacks for a period of some six weeks or so- critically delaying progress. Soviet reserves, previously unavailable- were deployed.
This can be seen on a day to day basis and the assaults largely fell on German infantry divisions while von Bock pulled the mobile ones into the rear.

If somehow, 20 infantry divisions were magically refitted into motorized ID then the question still exists of the Soviet perspective- could they succeed in fixing an army group again? In the end, the vast majority of German formations in Barbarossa were semi-mobile horse-drawn infantry divisions.

These Barbarossa AH usually don't have much about the Soviet perspective, which is just as important as what the Axis are doing.

All ATL have as aim to make Germany to win the war, I haven't seen a ATL with as title :Stalin enters Berlin in September 1941 with slightly stronger pre June 22 forces .Thus they will totally neglect the presence of the Red Army .
The truth is that from a defensively military point the SU was invincible .

[Cult Icon]

One of the points I got from studying that series (and Stahel) was that defensive combat was very high in ammunition expenditure, particularly artillery compared to offense (which was fuel oriented) .

Soviet assault reserves were of low quality but still had a effect of fixing German infantry units down for weeks as German artillery and defensive fire reduced them over time. The front became rather static. Mobile units were withdrawn from the front and performed counterstrikes, often with great effect. However the main issue was that the von Bock was now fighting a defensive battle and wasting a lot of time & resources to write down these Soviet reserves, which were vast in number and constantly ordered to attack until their own decimation or destruction.

The unit histories of 2.SS "Das Reich", Yerger's Das Reich GCG series, and PanzerKorps G.D. Vol. 1 has interesting personal accounts/histories of their war experience at Yelyna salient which Zhukov tried to eliminate with massed assaults. Even this early in the war for these troops it was a struggle for survival in certain hot spots in the Eastern Front- not a cake walk that it may seem.

[Richard Anderson]

Thanks.

You're welcome.

So by the mid-range estimate in your figures 20 divs (10 mot, 10pz) would burn 1.000,000 gallons per 75km, 13,333gals/km, 40.7t/km.
Moscow is ~1,000km from Bialystok, call the overall advance 1,500km to be safe.
At 40.7t/km that's 61,000t fuel consumed: 0.7% of Germany's 1941 fuel budget.

Even if we use multiples of that figure for diversions from the east-west line of advance, you have to stretch quite a bit to reach even the 3% figure that, as I argue above, Germany would have been more than happy to trade for victory in the East.

I see you chose not to consider the caveat. You might do better to look at the real world. What is the fuel expenditure to get that fuel to the divisions doing the advance? What did it take, for example, to get Rommel's ten divisions (half of them motorized) from Tripoli to outside Tobruk, a similar distance?

Maybe consistent labeling will help relieve some of the mental load of following the ATL.

Perhaps, but a better explanation as to how you can get to the major "deltas" first might help even more.

[Richard Anderson]

Oh, in finishing catching up on the thread I see that Hanny already invoked the real world. How cruel of him.

[TheMarcksPlan]

The meaning of "Barbarossa Derailed"(Glantz) was that AGC was fixed in place by relentless Soviet counterattacks for a period of some six weeks or so- critically delaying progress.

It's a great book series, highly recommended, but I already addressed this issue in my first few posts.
Timoshenko was able to batter Bock during July and August only because he received ~90% of Stavka's reserve.
Stavka was able to so reinforce Timoshenko only because AG's North and South had failed to destroy their opponents.
If Northwest and Southwest front are destroyed in the border battles, then Timoshenko would be lucky to half of his OTL reinforcements.
And if AG's North and South don't need help from Bock's panzers, then Timoshenko's July/August counteroffensive - if the happen at all - run into Guderian and Hoth's panzer groups with predictable results: Guderian destroyed Group Kachalov when it counterattacked; Hoth encircled attacking formations on Bock's left flank (Glantz's treatment of these battles is excellent with great maps btw).

[TheMarcksPlan]

If your interested in a 'minimal Barbarossa' scenario, I could see an Ost Heer composition like this:

Army Group North:
Gains 2 panzer and 1 motorised infantry divisions.
Gains 1 fallschirmjager and 1 air landing divisions.

Army Group South:
Gains 4 panzer and 5 motorised infantry divisions.
Gains 2 regular infantry divisions.

Very interested to hear your and others' ideas of the minimal force delta required for victory.
Here you're adding 18 divisions, right? Not all that much of a reduction but you'd save motorization/fuel burden by stipulating 4 of the divisions as non-motorized.
I'll write more later (it's hot and I need to get out on the water) but at first cut I don't love the idea of trapping 8th army against the sea rather than catching most - but not all - of it via a drive from Memel and Bock's left flank. OTL the RKKA was able to evacuate by sea with minimal losses (Talinn, Odessa) and the Gulf of Riga is probably the easiest evacuation scenario: it's heavily mined and covered by island defences in many spots, so you're not going to have much KM support unless you want to take serious naval losses. The gulf is sufficiently narrow that evacuating ships could make most or all of their runs at night.

I also don't think it's wise to air-drop on the eastern front and, after Crete, I just don't see Hitler/OKH doing so. A retreating Northwest front could turn just a fraction of the mechanized/tank forces used in OTL Rasenai battle to maul any lightly-armed paratroopers.

[Richard Anderson]

"Required for victory"...

I give up. Have fun storming the castle!

[EKB]

Very interested to hear your and others' ideas of the minimal force delta required for victory.

All you have done is catalogue statistics. The history of warfare shows that throwing more money and resources at a problem does not guarantee success. Many times, increased spending was actually counter-productive.

Even if Germany grew their army to a larger size than was historically possible, the equally difficult problem remained of sustaining what was gained. This is largely a political issue that cannot be separated from military action.

Like any big nation that expands its reach, Germany was often ineffective at peace keeping in occupied zones. There was no easy solution to guerrilla warfare and sabotage operations. Few of the German troops were trained to be police officers. Even fewer understood local customs, politics and dialect; more than 120 native languages were spoken in the Soviet Union. All of this forced the Nazis to hire locally recruited mercenaries to compensate for a lack of knowledge in the German armed forces. But the immutable truth is that mercenaries usually have their own agenda and cannot be trusted.

The Nazis did not show the aptitude for long term management of the Soviet Union. Some alternative outcome to land battles is not very interesting unless it was possible for Germany to keep the peace in the aftermath.

[Avalancheon]

There is no proof that more German mobile divisions would result in more Soviet losses in June/July 1941 .
War is not maths : if 30 mobile divisions resulted in 813000 Soviet POWs in June/July ( a questionable assumption ),than is it no so that 50 mobile divisions would result in 1,350,000 Soviet POWs .There is no rule of three in war .
It is also very questionable to say that worse ( for the SU ) encirclement battles would alter the course of the war : most Soviet losses were not caused by encirclment battles .

And again, we're expected to believe all this simply because you say so? Even when it flys in the face all the historical evidence.

''Forced to conduct heavy defensive combat at a time when invading German Army forces possessed marked superiority in manpower and weaponry over them, the Red Armys covering armies deployed along the western border were caught in numerous encirclements of various scales and suffered immense irrevocable (killed, seriously wounded or missing in action), and sanitary losses (lightly wounded or ill), and staggering losses of military equipment.'' -Fallen Soviet Generals: Soviet General Officers Killed in Battle.

''Some have claimed the vast numbers of POWs resulted from mass desertion brought on by years of Stalinist terror. In fact, the great majority of Soviet men entered captivity unwillingly. Christian Streits research reveals that of the 3,350,000 Soviet POWs captured by mid-December 1941, some 2,465,000 were taken in thirteen major encirclements.'' -Kiev 1941: Hitler's Battle for Supremacy in the East.


Just so you know, its not as if the extra divisions are being applied blindly. Its an intelligent application of force designed to encircle the Red Army, especially in crucial sectors like the Ukraine.

About the use of paratroopers : this is out of the question : after operation Mercury, the Germans had no available airborne units .

So your argument can be summarised as: ''If it couldn't happen in the original timeline, then it couldn't happen in this timeline.'' Obviously, that need not be the case.

If the Germans had entered 1941 with two fallschirmjager divisions, then they would have been able to do a landing on Riga, even after the losses at Crete. There might be a slight shortage of JU 52 transports, but this can be worked around.

[Avalancheon]

Very interested to hear your and others' ideas of the minimal force delta required for victory.
Here you're adding 18 divisions, right? Not all that much of a reduction but you'd save motorization/fuel burden by stipulating 4 of the divisions as non-motorized.

Its only 17 divisions, actually. The 22nd air landing division was already present for operation Barbarossa. It was deployed with Army Group South, however, not Army Group North. My scenario would require it to simply be transferred.

Of the 18 divisions, only 12 of them are actually 'mobile.' The fuel and logistical requirements are thus a bit more manageable than with 20 mobile divisions.

I'll write more later (it's hot and I need to get out on the water) but at first cut I don't love the idea of trapping 8th army against the sea rather than catching most - but not all - of it via a drive from Memel and Bock's left flank.

My scenario didn't involve 8th army being trapped against the Baltic sea, but rather, against the Dvina river. The paratroopers would take Riga, while the panzers take the other crossing points at Jekabpils and Daugavpils. 8th army would have no way to get across the river.

I also don't think it's wise to air-drop on the eastern front and, after Crete, I just don't see Hitler/OKH doing so. A retreating Northwest front could turn just a fraction of the mechanized/tank forces used in OTL Rasenai battle to maul any lightly-armed paratroopers.

In order for my scenario to be viable, the Germans would need to enter 1941 with two fallschirmjager divisions (so they still have one at full strength after Crete). I don't think Hitler would object to an airborne landing if it could help clear the Baltics faster.

The fallschirmjagers wouldn't face as much risk as you seem to imagine. If they were dropped on the outskirts of Riga on the first day, then they could have the city in their hands by nightfall. Once they have the airport under their control, then they could bring in the air mobile troops. Thats two entire divisions dug into a city, facing whatever troops from 8th army try to retreat through Riga.

Don't forget that the Soviets were hampered by partisan uprisings in Lithuania and Latvia, which forced them to spread their forces around. That would increase the odds of success for the airborne landing.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Wrong:
1000000 petrol gallons weighs 2,967 tons, at 75 klicks each bound, is 200*2,967=593,400 tons.

200 bounds at 75km each is 15,000km. [200 * 75 = 15,000]
That's the fuel budget for capturing Vladisvostok and Kamchatka, crossing the Bering Strait and ending up in Toronto.
If you calculate correctly for 20 bounds at 75km [20 * 75 = 1,500] then our numbers are the same.

I'm going to assume this is another of your arithmetic mistakes. But it's weird your math mistakes always end up favoring your side of the argument.

I have to repeat that a modicum of intellectual and verbal clarity may help you avoid mistakes like this. I mean how can one fail to notice being off by an order of magnitude unless one is mentally confused about the broader picture?

I might get to the rest of your post later, depending on my appetite for your "writing."

Origami cranes have no military application and are non lethal.

Only you would send the LW to drop non lethal paper creations over the Uk airspace where it lost so many of its most experienced aircrews, for no practical military gain.

Dude...

One possible explanation here is you're an AI bot. Like you respond with statistics involved in the area of discussion but have no sense of humor or ability to detect relevance. Very bot-like.

[TheMarcksPlan]

I give up. Have fun storming the castle!

Au revoir and nice meeting you.

-Christianmunich

[Richard Anderson]

I give up. Have fun storming the castle!

Au revoir and nice meeting you.

-Christianmunich

Thanks for clearing that up. Hopefully staff takes the appropriate action, but considering the slack they've given you up to now I doubt they will. Standards have slipped here as everywhere.

May your self-licking ice cream cone give you all the joys you deserve.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Historically, panzer group 1 achieved its breakthrough at Volodymyr-Volynsky and Sokal. The problem was, the supporting attacks on their left (at Kovel) and their right (at Rava Rus'ka) were unsuccessful. Thus, they were forced to advance on a narrow frontage that only permitted them to employ three of their nine mobile divisions. If Army Group South had been able to more quickly capture Kovel or Rava Rus'ka, this wouldn't have happened.

Thanks for the operational detail, I actually don't have a good high-resolution source on Kleist's advance in the first few week. Where did you learn this?

I don't think its that implausible, especially given that most of the Soviets mobile forces had been flung against panzer group 1. If another panzer group had been stationed in northern Romania, they would have been able to move through this gap into the Ukraine without much opposition. Securing their long flank against the retreating Soviets would be harder, though, which is why this panzer group shouldn't move too far away from the border.

Assuming that Soviet reserves move against PzGr1 even with PzGr5 striking from Romania is too much hindsight for me. IMO you'd need to plan for the worst thing your enemy could do; here it's to concentrate most of RKKA's southern forces against the Romanian pincer and retreat from on Kleist's front. I don't think Stalin/Stavka would have been nimble enough to execute such a turn, nor do I think Stalin would have permitted early evacuation of Galicia, but a competent planner can't leave a significant part of his forces in a position to be overwhelmed. This is why my original ATL Romanian force has nearly as many divisions as the Rundstedt's norther wing.

IMO the most likely course of events is slightly weaker opposition to Kleist in the north, some shifting of forces against Mannstein/Schobert's Romanian pincer, but not nearly enough to stop either. Mannstein would be slowed for a week or so crossing the Dniestr, but the river would mask the true strength of this pincer. After crossing it in force, his PzGr would cover dozens of km/day. That's the ideal case for the ATL: Kleist and 6th/17th armies advance somewhat slowly, concentrating RKKA forces further westwards in the first week before Mannstein suddenly springs the trap with an explosive thrust once he's over the Dniestr in strength. I also give Schobert 15 infantry divisions in my original ATL so that he can comfortably guard Mannstein's flanks and rear. I'd predict the pocket closes closer to Shepetivka than Zhitomir but, yeah, we agree that it probably doesn't matter much in the end where the trap shuts.

[TheMarcksPlan]

I give up. Have fun storming the castle!

Au revoir and nice meeting you.

-Christianmunich

Thanks for clearing that up. Hopefully staff takes the appropriate action, but considering the slack they've given you up to now I doubt they will. Standards have slipped here as everywhere.

May your self-licking ice cream cone give you all the joys you deserve.

Assuming staff can see the location of my IP address and of this other poster you so detest, I'm sure they'll realize this was a joke.
In life you'll not serve yourself well by assuming of your opponents what would make dismissing their viewpoints easiest for you. Assuming I was this other poster, am a wargamer, am a Guderian-stan etc. has not served the quality of your contributions to this thread.