Can Germany win Barbarossa in May 1942?

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History Learner
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Re: Can Germany win Barbarossa in May 1942?

Post by History Learner » 08 Dec 2019 11:42

T. A. Gardner wrote:
07 Dec 2019 08:38
History Learner wrote:
25 Nov 2019 04:46
They can't re open it because the Japanese have the advantage in bombers and artillery to cut it at multiple points and no other railway exists to replace it. As it were, cutting the railway IOTL would've been the death blow for the USSR.
This is patently untrue. The IJAAF was always heavily outnumbered by the Red Air Force and by the Red Army. The number of bombers available to the Japanese was small (usually less than 100) and they carried relatively small bomb loads. In fact, one of the more important bombers with the Kwantung Army was Japanese purchased Italian BR 20's in 1939. The standard bomber was the Ki 2i "Sally" which was a nearly defenseless low end medium bomber.
Aside from that, cutting rail lines by aerial bombardment isn't that easy to accomplish and repairs can generally be done fairly quickly.

Much of the rail line is really out of range for aerial attack, and all of it is out of range of Japanese artillery.
The G4Ms and Ki-21s were far superior to anything the Soviets had at the time (such as the SB-2), flying faster and farther, with well trained crews. As for artillery, positions along the Primorye Front, such as the Koto Fortress and at Blagoveshchensk, placed amassed Japanese artillery within shelling range of the Trans-Siberia. This assumes a stationary Japan too; if Japan had actually went through with Kantokuen they would've mopped the floors with the Soviets.

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Re: Can Germany win Barbarossa in May 1942?

Post by ljadw » 08 Dec 2019 13:27

Glantz is wrong in saying that the Red Army could have gone to the French coasts without LL .
Other point : the importance of LL was MUCH, MUCH lower for food than
is assumed by the present historians who are unable to imagine Soviet and European societies as they existed 80 years ago .
That LL provided 29 % of the calories for the Red Army is meaningless,unless one can prove that without LL the Red Army would not have these 29 % calories .

During the war the population of the SU and of Britain survived due to
1 The official rations they received from the government . In the SU these rations were totally insufficient '
2 What they produced themselves : during the war everyone was a farmer
3 What they were buying on the Black Market : even before the war Soviet peasants had the right to produce food for their own family and could sell it to those who wanted to buy it .(The Second Economy of the SU by Gregory Grossmann ) and this continued to the end of the SU . There was a black market in Britain,even after the war .And the less official food available, the bigger the black market
4 What they received from LL ,and this was very little .
Americans can't understand this ,as they never were in the situation of the SU/Britain .
That the official rations for the civilians were pushed to their absolute minimum,is meaningless,as the civilians fed themselves .

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Re: Can Germany win Barbarossa in May 1942?

Post by ljadw » 08 Dec 2019 13:34

Communism means shortage economy,shortage economy means black market and corruption .

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stg 44
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Re: Can Germany win Barbarossa in May 1942?

Post by stg 44 » 08 Dec 2019 16:55

ljadw wrote:
08 Dec 2019 13:27
Glantz is wrong in saying that the Red Army could have gone to the French coasts without LL .
Other point : the importance of LL was MUCH, MUCH lower for food than
is assumed by the present historians who are unable to imagine Soviet and European societies as they existed 80 years ago .
That LL provided 29 % of the calories for the Red Army is meaningless,unless one can prove that without LL the Red Army would not have these 29 % calories .

During the war the population of the SU and of Britain survived due to
1 The official rations they received from the government . In the SU these rations were totally insufficient '
2 What they produced themselves : during the war everyone was a farmer
3 What they were buying on the Black Market : even before the war Soviet peasants had the right to produce food for their own family and could sell it to those who wanted to buy it .(The Second Economy of the SU by Gregory Grossmann ) and this continued to the end of the SU . There was a black market in Britain,even after the war .And the less official food available, the bigger the black market
4 What they received from LL ,and this was very little .
Americans can't understand this ,as they never were in the situation of the SU/Britain .
That the official rations for the civilians were pushed to their absolute minimum,is meaningless,as the civilians fed themselves .
Oh the Red Army could have had those calories...from cutting civilian rations even further. Historically as it was people were still starving to death as late as 1944 in the USSR (and again in 1946-47 from famine). It would have been much worse if they had to do without more to feed the Red Army even further. Even in first person accounts underfed Soviet troops scrounging for food in 1943-44 are out there.

Soviet food problems are very well documented:
http://councilforeuropeanstudies.org/cr ... ld-war-ii/

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Re: Can Germany win Barbarossa in May 1942?

Post by ljadw » 08 Dec 2019 21:14

The Red Army strength was 12 million, the Soviet population 180 million, thus the impact of the needed food for the Red Army was not very strong .And I doubt very much that cutting the official rations would have bad results, as the Soviet population did not survive on the official rations,which were often not available .
Fot the civilians, the number one was the food they produced themselves, followed by the black market, the official rations and last and probably least Lend Lease .LL fed 12 million people= 7 % of the population .
In most occupied countries official rations were ridiculously insufficient to survive , but still people survived , notwithstanding the fact that the occupied countries had no LL .
If people in France, Belgium, etc could survive without LL, the Soviet population could also survive without LL .

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Re: Can Germany win Barbarossa in May 1942?

Post by ljadw » 08 Dec 2019 21:33

stg 44 wrote:
08 Dec 2019 16:55
ljadw wrote:
08 Dec 2019 13:27
Glantz is wrong in saying that the Red Army could have gone to the French coasts without LL .
Other point : the importance of LL was MUCH, MUCH lower for food than
is assumed by the present historians who are unable to imagine Soviet and European societies as they existed 80 years ago .
That LL provided 29 % of the calories for the Red Army is meaningless,unless one can prove that without LL the Red Army would not have these 29 % calories .

During the war the population of the SU and of Britain survived due to
1 The official rations they received from the government . In the SU these rations were totally insufficient '
2 What they produced themselves : during the war everyone was a farmer
3 What they were buying on the Black Market : even before the war Soviet peasants had the right to produce food for their own family and could sell it to those who wanted to buy it .(The Second Economy of the SU by Gregory Grossmann ) and this continued to the end of the SU . There was a black market in Britain,even after the war .And the less official food available, the bigger the black market
4 What they received from LL ,and this was very little .
Americans can't understand this ,as they never were in the situation of the SU/Britain .
That the official rations for the civilians were pushed to their absolute minimum,is meaningless,as the civilians fed themselves .
Oh the Red Army could have had those calories...from cutting civilian rations even further. Historically as it was people were still starving to death as late as 1944 in the USSR (and again in 1946-47 from famine). It would have been much worse if they had to do without more to feed the Red Army even further. Even in first person accounts underfed Soviet troops scrounging for food in 1943-44 are out there.

Soviet food problems are very well documented:
http://councilforeuropeanstudies.org/cr ... ld-war-ii/
The problem with this source is that it uses too much the Soviet archives while everyone knows that these are very unreliable . Those of other countries are not much better .Even today one should not put much trust in the official food stats :these are only estimations, better guesses, founded on the belief that the farmers would tell the bureaucrats the truth .If there is anything constant in the war between farmers and bureaucrats, it is that farmers never tell the truth .
Besides, even today, and it was almost a rule 80 years ago , the fact is that a very big part of food production was not declared :outside the cities, most people were their own butcher, made their own bread . I have a neighbour ( 88) who has never bought one kilo of potatoes .
About famines : people are always inclined to explain them by shortages or intentional famines, but they forget almost always the transport problems .Even when there was sufficient food, this did not mean that the local shops had the needed food to sell to their clients .

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T. A. Gardner
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Re: Can Germany win Barbarossa in May 1942?

Post by T. A. Gardner » 09 Dec 2019 11:36

History Learner wrote:
08 Dec 2019 11:42
They can't re open it because the Japanese have the advantage in bombers and artillery to cut it at multiple points and no other railway exists to replace it. As it were, cutting the railway IOTL would've been the death blow for the USSR.
This is patently untrue. The IJAAF was always heavily outnumbered by the Red Air Force and by the Red Army. The number of bombers available to the Japanese was small (usually less than 100) and they carried relatively small bomb loads. In fact, one of the more important bombers with the Kwantung Army was Japanese purchased Italian BR 20's in 1939. The standard bomber was the Ki 2i "Sally" which was a nearly defenseless low end medium bomber.
Aside from that, cutting rail lines by aerial bombardment isn't that easy to accomplish and repairs can generally be done fairly quickly.

Much of the rail line is really out of range for aerial attack, and all of it is out of range of Japanese artillery.

The G4Ms and Ki-21s were far superior to anything the Soviets had at the time (such as the SB-2), flying faster and farther, with well trained crews. As for artillery, positions along the Primorye Front, such as the Koto Fortress and at Blagoveshchensk, placed amassed Japanese artillery within shelling range of the Trans-Siberia. This assumes a stationary Japan too; if Japan had actually went through with Kantokuen they would've mopped the floors with the Soviets.
The G4M is an IJNAF plane. It wouldn't be in use unless the IJN decided to or was operating in this particular theater. The Ki 21 was found during the Nomohan incident to be extremely vulnerable to enemy fighters. It suffered from lack of armor, lack of self-sealing fuel tanks, and an extremely weak defensive armament.
The SB-2 (various models) used in Mongolia initially had some issues with weak defensive armament, but the Soviets quickly learned that the Ki-27 lacking oxygen for the pilot and having an engine rated to 6 to 12,000 feet at most, could simply fly their SB bombers at 18 to 20,000 feet and evade attack entirely as the Ki 27 at those altitudes had insufficient speed and climb to reach the Soviet planes.

The I-16 proved far superior to the Ki 27 being faster, able to out dive it, and having much heavier armament (4 7.62 or 2 12.7 and 2 7.62 versus the Ki 27 having two 7.7mm machineguns). The I-16 also had some armor protection. The I-153 could just barely match the Ki-27 while the older I-15bis was inferior.

The Soviets also had the luxury of having more aircraft and pilots available. This meant that even as the Soviet pilots were often poorer in training, they wore down the IJAAF to a point where it was nearly ineffective. The Japanese couldn't replace their losses while the VVS kept sending in fresh units with better aircraft. One might note, that the Japanese pilots wildly exaggerated their claims both in planes engaged and shot down. According to their reports they shot down more aircraft 1340 than the Russians engaged them with.

http://surfcity.kund.dalnet.se/nomonhan.htm

Japanese defenses you mention like the Koto or Hutou Fortress, weren't intended for offensive operations. The few large guns installed were specifically placed to take down bridges that crossed the Amur River etc., between Manchukuo and the Soviet Union. They couldn't range in on the Trans-Siberian railway at all.

viewtopic.php?f=65&t=187293

On the whole, the IJA would be poorly prepared for offensive ground operations. They lacked motor vehicles in quantity for moving supplies. At Nomohan, the Soviets brought in about 3,000 trucks to move supplies forward while the Japanese could barely maintain a single infantry division roughly 300 miles from the nearest railhead.
The Soviets also brought in upwards of 1,000 AFV of various sorts for their offensives there. That's more than Japan had in the whole of China and barely scratching the surface of what the Red Army could muster up.

Aside from all that, railways are relatively easy to repair from bomb damage, and would have been even easier given the small bombs the Japanese generally used.

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Re: Can Germany win Barbarossa in May 1942?

Post by stg 44 » 09 Dec 2019 15:56

ljadw wrote:
08 Dec 2019 21:33
stg 44 wrote:
08 Dec 2019 16:55
ljadw wrote:
08 Dec 2019 13:27
Glantz is wrong in saying that the Red Army could have gone to the French coasts without LL .
Other point : the importance of LL was MUCH, MUCH lower for food than
is assumed by the present historians who are unable to imagine Soviet and European societies as they existed 80 years ago .
That LL provided 29 % of the calories for the Red Army is meaningless,unless one can prove that without LL the Red Army would not have these 29 % calories .

During the war the population of the SU and of Britain survived due to
1 The official rations they received from the government . In the SU these rations were totally insufficient '
2 What they produced themselves : during the war everyone was a farmer
3 What they were buying on the Black Market : even before the war Soviet peasants had the right to produce food for their own family and could sell it to those who wanted to buy it .(The Second Economy of the SU by Gregory Grossmann ) and this continued to the end of the SU . There was a black market in Britain,even after the war .And the less official food available, the bigger the black market
4 What they received from LL ,and this was very little .
Americans can't understand this ,as they never were in the situation of the SU/Britain .
That the official rations for the civilians were pushed to their absolute minimum,is meaningless,as the civilians fed themselves .
Oh the Red Army could have had those calories...from cutting civilian rations even further. Historically as it was people were still starving to death as late as 1944 in the USSR (and again in 1946-47 from famine). It would have been much worse if they had to do without more to feed the Red Army even further. Even in first person accounts underfed Soviet troops scrounging for food in 1943-44 are out there.

Soviet food problems are very well documented:
http://councilforeuropeanstudies.org/cr ... ld-war-ii/
The problem with this source is that it uses too much the Soviet archives while everyone knows that these are very unreliable . Those of other countries are not much better .Even today one should not put much trust in the official food stats :these are only estimations, better guesses, founded on the belief that the farmers would tell the bureaucrats the truth .If there is anything constant in the war between farmers and bureaucrats, it is that farmers never tell the truth .
Besides, even today, and it was almost a rule 80 years ago , the fact is that a very big part of food production was not declared :outside the cities, most people were their own butcher, made their own bread . I have a neighbour ( 88) who has never bought one kilo of potatoes .
About famines : people are always inclined to explain them by shortages or intentional famines, but they forget almost always the transport problems .Even when there was sufficient food, this did not mean that the local shops had the needed food to sell to their clients .
So by your logic, if we can't trust the numbers, how do you know that your view is the correct one? After all millions died due to malnutrition and that is well documented, including workers in factories dropped dead underweight in 1944 during their shifts.

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Re: Can Germany win Barbarossa in May 1942?

Post by ljadw » 09 Dec 2019 20:02

I know that my view is the correct one ,because it is very well documented that official food figures , in and outside the SU ,always underestimated the real production .People engaged in the black market would not tell the authorities about their actions . The same for the farmers who,already before the war, had the right to produce food for their own needs and to sell the surplus .That in 1944 Soviet workers died during their shifts does not prove the importance of LL claimed by American historians .
At the start of the war, the Soviet regime admitted that it could not feed its own population ,something which was not surprising as it could not do it also before the war : before the war the Soviet population survived due to the private sector of agriculture,due to the fact that most non farmers produced themselves a big part of the food they consumed,due to the black market . Without this, the famine of 1932 would not have resulted in 3 million victims, but in more than 10 million victims ,endangering the survival of the regime .The private sector existed before and during the war, tolerated by the regime, because the regime, including Stalin, knew that the private sector was essential for the survival of population . If they could do it with sovchozes and kholkozes only, there would be no private sector .
From ''The private sector in Sviet agriculture''( by John W.De Pauw )
At the end of the 1950's the private sector of Soviet agriculture produced 69 % of potatoes,43% of vegetables,40% of meat and 39% of milk .
C.A. Knox Lowell writes in ''The role of private subsidiary farming in the Soviet Seven-Year Plan of 1959-1965 that the private sector was good in 1960 for 33% of agriculture output and 12 % of the Soviet GDP and this on only 3% of the sown area.
LL was not responsible for 33 % of agriculture output and 12 % of Soviet GDP. Thus ....

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Re: Can Germany win Barbarossa in May 1942?

Post by History Learner » 05 Jan 2020 03:14

T. A. Gardner wrote:
09 Dec 2019 11:36
This is patently untrue. The IJAAF was always heavily outnumbered by the Red Air Force and by the Red Army. The number of bombers available to the Japanese was small (usually less than 100) and they carried relatively small bomb loads. In fact, one of the more important bombers with the Kwantung Army was Japanese purchased Italian BR 20's in 1939. The standard bomber was the Ki 2i "Sally" which was a nearly defenseless low end medium bomber.
No, it was not. Japanese war planning by 1940 and its Soviet equivalents placed the number of aircraft at between 2,150 and 3,050 for the Japanese and 3,347 for the Soviets after mobilization. The Japanese total includes 350 planes from the IJN, mostly bombers.
Aside from that, cutting rail lines by aerial bombardment isn't that easy to accomplish and repairs can generally be done fairly quickly.
This would come as a shock to most sides of the conflict; if subjected to a sustain campaign, railways could and were seriously damaged. The Allies most famously did this for D-Day.
Much of the rail line is really out of range for aerial attack, and all of it is out of range of Japanese artillery.
It was not, the railway was in visual range of the Koto Fortress and many of the guns there had ranges of 15 miles or more.
The G4Ms and Ki-21s were far superior to anything the Soviets had at the time (such as the SB-2), flying faster and farther, with well trained crews. As for artillery, positions along the Primorye Front, such as the Koto Fortress and at Blagoveshchensk, placed amassed Japanese artillery within shelling range of the Trans-Siberia. This assumes a stationary Japan too; if Japan had actually went through with Kantokuen they would've mopped the floors with the Soviets.
On the whole, the IJA would be poorly prepared for offensive ground operations. They lacked motor vehicles in quantity for moving supplies. At Nomohan, the Soviets brought in about 3,000 trucks to move supplies forward while the Japanese could barely maintain a single infantry division roughly 300 miles from the nearest railhead.
No, they would be perfectly prepared. Japanese war planning placed, by D+30, placed an additional 20 divisions in Manchuria in addition to the 12 already there in 1940. Further on, the Japanese would deploy an additional 10 divisions, bringing their commitment to over 40. Against this, the Soviets could muster 42 divisions, and this was expected to take almost a month longer than the Japanese mobilization, by comparing their documents.
The Soviets also brought in upwards of 1,000 AFV of various sorts for their offensives there. That's more than Japan had in the whole of China and barely scratching the surface of what the Red Army could muster up.
The RKKA has a hard limit of 55-60 divisions-maximum-it can deploy due to the lackings of the Trans-Siberian. Even IOTL, when the Soviets invaded Manchuria against the Kwantung Army, their main exploitation force in the form of 6th Guards Tank Army exhausted its fuel supplies just three days into the operation.

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Re: Can Germany win Barbarossa in May 1942?

Post by T. A. Gardner » 08 Jan 2020 20:31

History Learner wrote:
05 Jan 2020 03:14
T. A. Gardner wrote:
09 Dec 2019 11:36
This is patently untrue. The IJAAF was always heavily outnumbered by the Red Air Force and by the Red Army. The number of bombers available to the Japanese was small (usually less than 100) and they carried relatively small bomb loads. In fact, one of the more important bombers with the Kwantung Army was Japanese purchased Italian BR 20's in 1939. The standard bomber was the Ki 2i "Sally" which was a nearly defenseless low end medium bomber.
No, it was not. Japanese war planning by 1940 and its Soviet equivalents placed the number of aircraft at between 2,150 and 3,050 for the Japanese and 3,347 for the Soviets after mobilization. The Japanese total includes 350 planes from the IJN, mostly bombers.
I don't know where you got your numbers but:

http://surfcity.kund.dalnet.se/nomonhan.htm
Aside from that, cutting rail lines by aerial bombardment isn't that easy to accomplish and repairs can generally be done fairly quickly.

This would come as a shock to most sides of the conflict; if subjected to a sustain campaign, railways could and were seriously damaged. The Allies most famously did this for D-Day.
And, it works against the IJAAF doing it in a campaign against Russia. The IJAAF also isn't the USAAF or RAF in 1944. The Japanese have just a relative handful of bombers that carry a much smaller load of mostly smaller bombs. They aren't going to send several hundred bombers each carrying thousands of pounds of bombs (one Lancaster could carry what a whole squadron of Ki 21 bombers would) to flatten a rail switch yard.
Much of the rail line is really out of range for aerial attack, and all of it is out of range of Japanese artillery.
It was not, the railway was in visual range of the Koto Fortress and many of the guns there had ranges of 15 miles or more.[/quote]

You really need to look at a map...
The G4Ms and Ki-21s were far superior to anything the Soviets had at the time (such as the SB-2), flying faster and farther, with well trained crews. As for artillery, positions along the Primorye Front, such as the Koto Fortress and at Blagoveshchensk, placed amassed Japanese artillery within shelling range of the Trans-Siberia. This assumes a stationary Japan too; if Japan had actually went through with Kantokuen they would've mopped the floors with the Soviets.

On the whole, the IJA would be poorly prepared for offensive ground operations. They lacked motor vehicles in quantity for moving supplies. At Nomohan, the Soviets brought in about 3,000 trucks to move supplies forward while the Japanese could barely maintain a single infantry division roughly 300 miles from the nearest railhead.

No, they would be perfectly prepared. Japanese war planning placed, by D+30, placed an additional 20 divisions in Manchuria in addition to the 12 already there in 1940. Further on, the Japanese would deploy an additional 10 divisions, bringing their commitment to over 40. Against this, the Soviets could muster 42 divisions, and this was expected to take almost a month longer than the Japanese mobilization, by comparing their documents.
http://www.niehorster.org/012_ussr/41_o ... beria.html
http://www.niehorster.org/012_ussr/41_o ... my_02.html
http://www.niehorster.org/012_ussr/41_o ... -asia.html

And, the Japanese build up wouldn't go unchallenged. Aside from that, the Japanese are so limited logistically that it really doesn't matter how many divisions they commit. Only the smallest fraction of those, bound to proximity to one of the few rail lines could be pushed forward. I also don't know where you got your numbers, but unless the whole of the IJA was being committed to this operation, what you claim isn't going to happen.

So, "perfectly prepared" means in reality they have a foot mobile army that must operate close to a railhead or the unit ends up starving and lacking ammunition and other supplies. The IJA is also unprepared for large scale armored combat regardless.

After all, the Soviets need only defend their territory initially while taking time to build up for a counteroffensive. The Japanese are the ones who have to gain ground, and that's going to be very difficult to do given the terrain, and the IJA's lack of mobility.
The Soviets also brought in upwards of 1,000 AFV of various sorts for their offensives there. That's more than Japan had in the whole of China and barely scratching the surface of what the Red Army could muster up.

The RKKA has a hard limit of 55-60 divisions-maximum-it can deploy due to the lackings of the Trans-Siberian. Even IOTL, when the Soviets invaded Manchuria against the Kwantung Army, their main exploitation force in the form of 6th Guards Tank Army exhausted its fuel supplies just three days into the operation.
Sour grapes for the Japanese who couldn't manage more than one poorly supplied infantry division at Nomohan for example.

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Re: Can Germany win Barbarossa in May 1942?

Post by History Learner » 09 Jan 2020 03:40

T. A. Gardner wrote:
08 Jan 2020 20:31
I don't know where you got your numbers but:

http://surfcity.kund.dalnet.se/nomonhan.htm
Available for Nomonhan =/= Japanese war planning for a Strike North
And, it works against the IJAAF doing it in a campaign against Russia. The IJAAF also isn't the USAAF or RAF in 1944. The Japanese have just a relative handful of bombers that carry a much smaller load of mostly smaller bombs. They aren't going to send several hundred bombers each carrying thousands of pounds of bombs (one Lancaster could carry what a whole squadron of Ki 21 bombers would) to flatten a rail switch yard.
In favor here. The Trans-Siberian Railway was only double tracked to Vladivostok in 1942 and was of considerably poor quality; in other words, the Soviets have only one quality line of track to use and which can be targeted by the Japanese. The realities of the Soviet logistical system in the Far East isn't the complicated system the Allies had to face in Western Europe IOTL.
You really need to look at a map...
I did:
Image

Source is August Storm, by David Glantz.
http://www.niehorster.org/012_ussr/41_o ... beria.html
http://www.niehorster.org/012_ussr/41_o ... my_02.html
http://www.niehorster.org/012_ussr/41_o ... -asia.html

And, the Japanese build up wouldn't go unchallenged. Aside from that, the Japanese are so limited logistically that it really doesn't matter how many divisions they commit. Only the smallest fraction of those, bound to proximity to one of the few rail lines could be pushed forward. I also don't know where you got your numbers, but unless the whole of the IJA was being committed to this operation, what you claim isn't going to happen.
Japanese mobilization completed almost a month before the Soviets did. They only need to cut the Trans-Siberian and from there, Primorye Krai will fall and from there they can then clear out the Northern reaches; plan was to remain on the defense in the West. Unlike the Soviets, they also have the benefit of interior lines. Finally, the IJA ended up mobilizing well over 100 hundred divisions historically. It can be conceded the operations in China will be curtailed to defensive ones only, but this operation certainly does not require the entirety of the IJA.
So, "perfectly prepared" means in reality they have a foot mobile army that must operate close to a railhead or the unit ends up starving and lacking ammunition and other supplies. The IJA is also unprepared for large scale armored combat regardless.

After all, the Soviets need only defend their territory initially while taking time to build up for a counteroffensive. The Japanese are the ones who have to gain ground, and that's going to be very difficult to do given the terrain, and the IJA's lack of mobility.
The Japanese have the 4th largest tank arm in the World in 1939 and similar level of motorization as both the RKKA and Wehrmacht. Literally every single dis-advantage you attribute here to the IJA is exactly the same as the Soviets; they only have the Trans-Siberian while the IJA have, for example, the railway and roads from Koto Fortress to attack across the Ussuri to cut the Trans-Siberian.
Sour grapes for the Japanese who couldn't manage more than one poorly supplied infantry division at Nomohan for example.
Just as long as you ignore the relief force they prepared and lavishly provided with munitions. Can't forget those 1937 and 1938 engagements either, where the Soviets got their teeth kicked in. Nevermind the fact that 1939 saw an entire Soviet Corps literally stripping from the European USSR, still nearly failing, and still managing to take more casualties against the worst division in the Kwantung Army.

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Re: Can Germany win Barbarossa in May 1942?

Post by T. A. Gardner » 09 Jan 2020 23:23

History Learner wrote:
09 Jan 2020 03:40
I don't know where you got your numbers but:

http://surfcity.kund.dalnet.se/nomonhan.htm

Available for Nomonhan =/= Japanese war planning for a Strike North
It's better than simply saying something is so an offering zero proof of it...
And, it works against the IJAAF doing it in a campaign against Russia. The IJAAF also isn't the USAAF or RAF in 1944. The Japanese have just a relative handful of bombers that carry a much smaller load of mostly smaller bombs. They aren't going to send several hundred bombers each carrying thousands of pounds of bombs (one Lancaster could carry what a whole squadron of Ki 21 bombers would) to flatten a rail switch yard.

In favor here. The Trans-Siberian Railway was only double tracked to Vladivostok in 1942 and was of considerably poor quality; in other words, the Soviets have only one quality line of track to use and which can be targeted by the Japanese. The realities of the Soviet logistical system in the Far East isn't the complicated system the Allies had to face in Western Europe IOTL.
You really need to look at a map... Cutting the line to Vladivostok from Khabarovsk at Hutou only leaves about 90% of the Trans-Siberian rail line intact...
You really need to look at a map...

I did:
Image

Source is August Storm, by David Glantz.


See pages 109-132. He talks about the Hutou (Koyo) fortress.
Also see:

viewtopic.php?f=65&t=187293&hilit=Hutou

After all, there is a section on this very board that has a wealth of information about the Japanese operations in Manchukuo.
http://www.niehorster.org/012_ussr/41_o ... beria.html
http://www.niehorster.org/012_ussr/41_o ... my_02.html
http://www.niehorster.org/012_ussr/41_o ... -asia.html

And, the Japanese build up wouldn't go unchallenged. Aside from that, the Japanese are so limited logistically that it really doesn't matter how many divisions they commit. Only the smallest fraction of those, bound to proximity to one of the few rail lines could be pushed forward. I also don't know where you got your numbers, but unless the whole of the IJA was being committed to this operation, what you claim isn't going to happen.

Japanese mobilization completed almost a month before the Soviets did. They only need to cut the Trans-Siberian and from there, Primorye Krai will fall and from there they can then clear out the Northern reaches; plan was to remain on the defense in the West. Unlike the Soviets, they also have the benefit of interior lines. Finally, the IJA ended up mobilizing well over 100 hundred divisions historically. It can be conceded the operations in China will be curtailed to defensive ones only, but this operation certainly does not require the entirety of the IJA.
For the most part, the Japanese can't operate in much of the territory they possess at all. They lack the logistical ability to move away from existing rail lines more than maybe 50 miles at most, usually less. They have little motor transport to bring supplies forward, and the ground in much of the areas along the border are unsuited to almost any movement by large military units.
You simply use some 'handwavium' and say it'd all be so easy for them to move forward and take this or that. I severely doubt it. Also, while the IJA did eventually raise over 100 divisions, over half of these were more like divisions in name only. They often lacked heavy weapons and artillery, were usually organized on a reduced scale.
So, "perfectly prepared" means in reality they have a foot mobile army that must operate close to a railhead or the unit ends up starving and lacking ammunition and other supplies. The IJA is also unprepared for large scale armored combat regardless.

After all, the Soviets need only defend their territory initially while taking time to build up for a counteroffensive. The Japanese are the ones who have to gain ground, and that's going to be very difficult to do given the terrain, and the IJA's lack of mobility.

The Japanese have the 4th largest tank arm in the World in 1939 and similar level of motorization as both the RKKA and Wehrmacht. Literally every single dis-advantage you attribute here to the IJA is exactly the same as the Soviets; they only have the Trans-Siberian while the IJA have, for example, the railway and roads from Koto Fortress to attack across the Ussuri to cut the Trans-Siberian.
Sour grapes one more time given that the Japanese tanks in 1939 are mostly just machinegun armed tankettes and even their "Medium" tanks are armed with low velocity 57mm guns or modest velocity 37mm pieces unsuited to fighting other tanks, that the crews are trained in just infantry support tactics and use the vehicles in unimaginative ways in small numbers.
Sour grapes for the Japanese who couldn't manage more than one poorly supplied infantry division at Nomohan for example.

Just as long as you ignore the relief force they prepared and lavishly provided with munitions. Can't forget those 1937 and 1938 engagements either, where the Soviets got their teeth kicked in. Nevermind the fact that 1939 saw an entire Soviet Corps literally stripping from the European USSR, still nearly failing, and still managing to take more casualties against the worst division in the Kwantung Army.
The Soviets could afford casualties. They have a far larger population base, and more industrial power. But, it was the Japanese that got stomped on in the end. Also, the 23rd Japanese ID was hardly "the worst" in the Kwantung Army. The attached 26th Infantry Regiment from the 7th Division was long term, IJA regulars, as were most of the supporting units like the 3rd and 4th Tank Regiments (more like battalions of about 40 vehicles split between mediums and lights on an about 2 to 1 basis).

If anything, the Nomohan incident showed clearly that the IJA had no real superiority over the Red Army in terms of combat capacity. The IJAAF, likewise, found out that even though their aircrews were better, the losses they sustained were unsustainable. They couldn't replace their lost pilots and aircraft while the Soviets could.

At very best, the Japanese taking a northern option against the Soviets would have found themselves in an untenable position the longer combat continued, just as history shows happened on a limited basis in 1939.

History Learner
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Re: Can Germany win Barbarossa in May 1942?

Post by History Learner » 12 Jan 2020 19:08

T. A. Gardner wrote:
09 Jan 2020 23:23
It's better than simply saying something is so an offering zero proof of it...
To what, exactly, do you need shown? In 1939, the Kwantung Army held eight divisions; by 1941 it held roughly 760,000 men, 30,000 trucks, 250,000 horses, 700 planes and 2,000 or more tanks.
You really need to look at a map... Cutting the line to Vladivostok from Khabarovsk at Hutou only leaves about 90% of the Trans-Siberian rail line intact...
It completely eliminates it as a viable inflow point of Lend Lease, which was the original point; you kinda need the port of Vladivostok to make it work.
For the most part, the Japanese can't operate in much of the territory they possess at all. They lack the logistical ability to move away from existing rail lines more than maybe 50 miles at most, usually less. They have little motor transport to bring supplies forward, and the ground in much of the areas along the border are unsuited to almost any movement by large military units.

You simply use some 'handwavium' and say it'd all be so easy for them to move forward and take this or that. I severely doubt it. Also, while the IJA did eventually raise over 100 divisions, over half of these were more like divisions in name only. They often lacked heavy weapons and artillery, were usually organized on a reduced scale.
The Kwantung Army in 1941 is just as motorized as the Wehrmacht and RKKA, with the 4th largest tank force in the world as well by 1939. The ratio of vehicles is also comparable to that of the Red Army in April of 1945. The IJA had no intention of rushing deep into Siberia, but instead to secure Primorsky Krai. Given the Soviets are even more constrained, logistically, by the fact they have a single railway and no interior lines....
Sour grapes one more time given that the Japanese tanks in 1939 are mostly just machinegun armed tankettes and even their "Medium" tanks are armed with low velocity 57mm guns or modest velocity 37mm pieces unsuited to fighting other tanks, that the crews are trained in just infantry support tactics and use the vehicles in unimaginative ways in small numbers.
Which ignores the fact that the IJA tankers slaughtered the Soviets at Nomanhan. Likewise, into 1942 a fourth of Soviet losses of T-34 was due to weapon calibres at or below 50mm; if you include the "long barrel" 50, it shoots up to 76.5% of all T-34 losses.
The Soviets could afford casualties. They have a far larger population base, and more industrial power. But, it was the Japanese that got stomped on in the end. Also, the 23rd Japanese ID was hardly "the worst" in the Kwantung Army. The attached 26th Infantry Regiment from the 7th Division was long term, IJA regulars, as were most of the supporting units like the 3rd and 4th Tank Regiments (more like battalions of about 40 vehicles split between mediums and lights on an about 2 to 1 basis).

If anything, the Nomohan incident showed clearly that the IJA had no real superiority over the Red Army in terms of combat capacity. The IJAAF, likewise, found out that even though their aircrews were better, the losses they sustained were unsustainable. They couldn't replace their lost pilots and aircraft while the Soviets could.

At very best, the Japanese taking a northern option against the Soviets would have found themselves in an untenable position the longer combat continued, just as history shows happened on a limited basis in 1939.
The Soviets can't take casualties when the Wehrmacht is rolling in on Moscow and the realities of their logistical situation mean they could never overwhelm the Japanese; the 55-60 division is a hard limit on their operating capacity.

The 23rd Division was indeed the worst in the Japanese Army, to quote Alvin Coox:
Numbers of weapons and equipment were up to authorized strength, but the quality was not satisfactory for desert operations; military evaluations varied from "not at all excellent" to "worst in the Japanese Army." Apart from weaknesses in mechanized strength, the division was cursed with "classic" old artillery, such as the unimproved Type 38 short-range 75-mm field piece of 1907, oldest in the entire army and in use by no other division. One 23rd Division staff officer remembers "weeping mentally" when he saw these antiques. Unit artillery commanders often visited division headquarters to ask the staff officers what they were supposed to do with the "old junk" that had been issued to them.

-- "Nomonhan: Japan against Russia 1939" p. 179
Likewise, most of the tanks were pulled out before the battle reached its conclusion. If the worst in the Kwantung Army can inflict more casualties than it took, that's very telling.

GAUM1983
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Re: Can Germany win Barbarossa in May 1942?

Post by GAUM1983 » 14 Jan 2020 13:51

No Germany could't win Barbarossa in May 1942. The Soviet Union would have had 5000 T-34 that were better than the Panzer III and IV instead of 1000 in 1941. Stalin didn't expect an attack when Germany was still facing Great-Britian (supplied by the USA). My source If the Allies had fallen.

In 1941 Soviet Union was updating its army and learning its mistakes of the Winter War. Stalin was ready for war in 1942. Just read Chris Bellamy Absolute War.

There an interesting book of historian James Ellaman whose main point for Germany is to get help from its partners Finland and Imperial Japan to occupy Mourmansk(Finland) and Vladivostok(Japan) and cut the lend lease supplies of the Anglo-American to the Soviets. Even master historian Gerhard L Weinberg in this book A world at Arms mentions that half of the leand lease material came to Valdivostok and that the germans asked the japeneeses to blockade it or take Valdivostok. The economy of the Soviet Union wasn't good to make the logistics of a world war(rails, wagons, medecine, boots, canned meat, radios etc). And according to Chris Bellamy lend lease was what tipped the balance between survival and collapse. In his recent book russian historian Boris Sokolov mentions that without lend lease Soviet Union would have collpased.

Other points to mention, the germans were fighting a multi fronts war. In 1942 the RAF was starting to level germans cities like Cologne and Essen(the thousand bombers raids of Bomber Harris).The Luftwaffe had to pull lots of its fighters and Flak(the excellent 88mm gun) againts the RAF heavies. Also Germany was fighting in the Atlantic building U-Boats against the US Navy, Royal navy, canadian navy and others allies. The Luftwaffe had to pull Luftflotte X from Ukraine to Sicily to neutralize Malta. The Axis had to supply theirs troops in Libya(most cargos were sunk by the Royal Navy) and garrison occupied territories from France to Rostov and from Libya to Norway.


Its easy to forget that the soviet vicotry at Stalingrad happened at the same time when Hitler poured troops in Tunisia(November -December 1942). Also the German non victory at Kursk happened at the same time as Operation Husky. I read the First Soldier of Stephen G Fritz to support this point of view.

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