U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

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HistoryGeek2019
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Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 12 Feb 2020 01:28

Thanks. I would say that the course of events you describe is plausible (even if unlikely). The key factor for your ATL is getting Stalin to agree to a peace that will allow Germany to leave a very small force guarding it's border with the Soviet Union. For Stalin to do that, I think two things are required: (1) Japan has to cut off lend-lease to Vladivostok, and (2) Russia has to be able to feed itself by demobilizing its military and devoting maximum manpower to agriculture.

For Japan to cut off lend-lease, the USSR needs to be so weak that Japan doesn't fear military conflict. I'm not sure how likely this would be, since Japan would want to focus everything on fighting the United States, but the possibility of restoring trade with Europe via the Trans-Siberian Railway might be enough of an incentive for Japan to gamble on Stalin capitulating if Vladivostok is blockaded.

As for the ability of the remnant Soviet state to feed itself by demobilizing its army, I think that will be crucial. If Stalin can't feed his people during peace, he will never agree to a deal. I don't think we can count on Hitler sending any food to Stalin - Europe was desperately short of food and Germany would have nothing to spare for the Soviets. But it probably is plausible the remnant Soviet state could feed itself, allowing Stalin to sign an armistice along the terms you've described.

The question then is how many divisions Germany has to leave on the border with the Soviet remnant state. Assuming the USSR is as weak as you suggest, it would seem that no more than 50 German divisions would be needed on the border itself, while perhaps 20-30 would be needed to garrison the occupied territory. Out of an overall Heer of approximately 200 divisions, approximately 150 of which were originally allocated to the Eastern Front, this frees up 70-80 divisions for deployment elsewhere, making the total of non-anti-Soviet divisions approximately 120-130. If we take 50 of these to garrison Norway and northwestern Europe, that leaves roughly 70-80 divisions free for offensives against Spain, Turkey and Persia in the first half of 1943. These would be Germany's best divisions, so they should be up to the task.

In comparison, Operation Torch was carried out by 7 divisions plus supporting regiments, and the British had 11 divisions at El Alamein, so it's fair to say that the Allies would not be able to stand up to Germany in Spain or Turkey in 1943. The question remains as to whether Hitler would have invaded these countries or allowed them to remain neutral. In any event, Germany's victory over Russia in this ATL happens too late to prevent Operation Torch, so we have to assume North Africa is lost in 1943. Given that Hitler would likely make the same blunder as in the OTL, we can assume that Tunisgrad plays out the same way as in the OTL (depending on events in Persia in the next paragraph).

That leaves Persia, where the Allies would be unable to field a significant force in time to stop a German invasion in the first half of 1943. The question is how far Germany can advance, how many forces the Allies choose to commit, and where the Allies are eventually able to stop the Germans - In Tehran, Baghdad, Kuwait, Suez, or not at all?

Does that sound like a reasonable exposition of the strategic situation as of mid-1943?

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Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 12 Feb 2020 02:37

HistoryGeek2019 wrote:
12 Feb 2020 01:28
...
For Japan to cut off lend-lease, the USSR needs to be so weak that Japan doesn't fear military conflict. I'm not sure how likely this would be, since Japan would want to focus everything on fighting the United States, but the possibility of restoring trade with Europe via the Trans-Siberian Railway might be enough of an incentive for Japan to gamble on Stalin capitulating if Vladivostok is blockaded. ...
Actually the Pacific route does not seem to have been critically important for the USSR in 1941-1942. This chart shows the number of cargo ships from the US docking in the Soviet Far Eastern & Arctic ports by month
LL to Vladivostock.png
Form this doc. pg 44 https://www.cnrs-scrn.org/northern_mari ... _31-58.pdf

The average seems to have been five or fewer ships from June 1941to August 1942, Not a lot relative to the arctic route at that time. Did a quick check and confirmed that in October 1941 the Soviet shipping bureau desired to cease traffic to Vladivostock from anywhere. The last cargo ship from the US departed late October & the Pacific cargo fleet was redirected to ports serving the Persian & Murmansk routes. A small amount of traffic was continued, but it looks like only 3-4 cargo ships per month. So in effect the Pacific route was 'cut' for two months in 1941 & a significant portion of 1942. In the summer of 1942 the avg. docked each month rises above 10 per month and continues that year to a avg of 20+ per month for the next 36 months.

For comparison here are numbers for the Persian route: http://talk.consimworld.com/WebX?233@70 ... =.1dd31859
LL Persian Route copy.jpg
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Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 12 Feb 2020 03:06

The question then is how many divisions Germany has to leave on the border with the Soviet remnant state. Assuming the USSR is as weak as you suggest, it would seem that no more than 50 German divisions would be needed on the border itself, while perhaps 20-30 would be needed to garrison the occupied territory. Out of an overall Heer of approximately 200 divisions, approximately 150 of which were originally allocated to the Eastern Front, this frees up 70-80 divisions for deployment elsewhere, making the total of non-anti-Soviet divisions approximately 120-130. If we take 50 of these to garrison Norway and northwestern Europe, that leaves roughly 70-80 divisions free for offensives against Spain, Turkey and Persia in the first half of 1943. These would be Germany's best divisions, so they should be up to the task.
Using ground combat divisions as the sole metric for comparison must distort analysis & comparison. Aside from qualitative differences, such as 10% static or security 'divisions' - 65% horse drawn - & 25% motor/mechanized vs 95% motor/mech, the massive air force flown by the Western Allies needs to be considered. Referring to Ellis 'Brute Force' gross German aircraft production 1942 & 1944 was approx 140,000 airframes. During the same months front line operating strength for all fronts including the Reich defense fluctuated between 4,500 & 6,000 aircraft. If my memories correct Brit production was 80,000 & US production 150,000 for 1943-44. Their operating strength for the MTO/ETO started at some 5,000 aircraft & ended at over 15,000 in those two years. Again there is a qualitative difference as the ongoing unfavorable attrition of veteran Axis pilots meant only tactical victories and ongoing operational and strategic failure.
Last edited by Carl Schwamberger on 12 Feb 2020 03:29, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 12 Feb 2020 03:07

HistoryGeek2019 wrote:As for the ability of the remnant Soviet state to feed itself by demobilizing its army, I think that will be crucial. If Stalin can't feed his people during peace, he will never agree to a deal.
While it's probably true that Stalin doesn't agree a peace once mass famine is unavoidable, it seems more true that he'd seek a peace well before mass famine threatened. I.e. he'd be clamoring for peace once the Germans broke through into the Volga basin and North Caucasus in Spring '42. So in weighing the likelihood of this ATL, I think we have to consider that it might be conservative. Like once the field armies are shattered by the opening '42 offensive (as in OTL but much worse due to force ratios), there's no realistic chance of stopping the Ostheer before winter.

I haven't added the factor of morale collapse after Moscow/Leningrad fall, the possibility of earlier Japanese intervention as well. Once I can unstick myself from watching primary returns (Go Bernie! Thank god his father/mother got out of Europe in time), I might post some excerpts from "Why Stalin's Soldiers Fought" and other sources. It's pretty clear that during bad times (summers '41/'42) there was widespread evasion of drafts and that many soldiers simply walked home (nearly a million were re-enrolled from liberated territory). How much more common is that in this ATL?
the possibility of restoring trade with Europe via the Trans-Siberian Railway might be enough of an incentive for Japan to gamble on Stalin capitulating if Vladivostok is blockaded.
Japan was extremely eager for SU/Germany to come to peace. I think DRZW VI discusses their efforts to make it happen. They understood the strategic value of Germany turning its attention West... Once Archangelsk and the Caucasus supply route are cut, it would seem obvious that Vladivostok supplies are the sine qua non of continued Soviet resistance.
Assuming the USSR is as weak as you suggest, it would seem that no more than 50 German divisions would be needed on the border itself
50 seems implausibly excessive to me. What's your rationale?

First, Germany has immense strategic flexibility between a Perm-Ufa-Orenburg line and the Volga. Heck even all the way back to the Don. Its strategically important assets in the East would be Ukraine (where they'd focus their industrial/ag efforts), Leningrad (shipbuilding revived there), and Moscow (some industry revived there). So they could afford a screening force that could be reinforced on a grand-strategic timeline before losing anything significant.

Second, 50 German divisions defending are a match for 100 Russian divisions. Can't imagine the Russians raising such a force and moving it to the border without the Germans getting wind and responding.

Third, Germany could keep the entire Romanian/Hungarian/Finnish/Italian armies on Bolshevik-watch, as well as the anti-communist volunteer Waffen-SS. That's already a substantial force (~1mil) that would be more than sufficient, IMO, if backed up by 20 good German divisions.
while perhaps 20-30 would be needed to garrison the occupied territory.
Germany would switch good Ostheer divisions to the West, moving garrison divisions East for occupation duties. It would also have Ukrainian/Baltic collaborationist forces. OTL these were quite numerous; ATL with German victory they're even more numerous (I can provide a cite re these collaborationist forces if you're unfamiliar).
that leaves roughly 70-80 divisions free for offensives against Spain, Turkey and Persia in the first half of 1943. These would be Germany's best divisions, so they should be up to the task.
Agreed. The only difference regarding our differential estimate of occupation Ostheer strength is that Germany would demobilize hundreds of thousands of soldiers, bumping up production. Plus they take, by late-43, over a million fewer permanent losses in the East, meaning further economic gains.
The question remains as to whether Hitler would have invaded these countries or allowed them to remain neutral.
That leaves Persia, where the Allies would be unable to field a significant force in time to stop a German invasion in the first half of 1943. The question is how far Germany can advance, how many forces the Allies choose to commit, and where the Allies are eventually able to stop the Germans - In Tehran, Baghdad, Kuwait, Suez, or not at all?

Does that sound like a reasonable exposition of the strategic situation as of mid-1943?
Very reasonable, thanks, except that the open question of indefinite Turkish neutrality or - I would argue - Axis alignment, can blow up the strategic picture.

If Turkey remains neutral (not invaded) through '42, then I think you're right re Torch and North Africa. Beating the SU doesn't suddenly give Hitler the maritime strength to hold Tunisia.

If Turkey joins the Axis as Russia crumbles, however - say in September '42 - then everything is up in the air. 8th Army's rear is now threatened, as are the Allied forces in Iraq. Germany can probably spare a half-dozen or so mobile divisions from the Ostheer after June '42; moving four of them to Antakya and two near Mosul with Turkish cooperation presents a real nightmare for Auchinleck if it happens in September '42.

Can the Allies afford to lose Palestine/Levant, Cyprus, and Iraq? Probably, but will they let those go? UK would have a fit, Churchill probably falls. If they try to defend those territories then Alamein certainly can't happen IMO. No Alamein and the Torch-Tunisgrad route is less certain. Do they win a Mid-East campaign in '42 or suffer a defeat so bad the war effort is wobbly?

To a lesser extent, the same dynamic might play out if Hitler/Mussolini invade a recalcitrant Turkey. Britain would have a moral/political, if not treaty/legal, obligation to help Turkey and any significant help again rules out Alamein.

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Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 12 Feb 2020 03:10

Carl Schwamberger wrote:Actually the Pacific route does not seem to have been critically important for the USSR in 1941-1942. This chart shows the number of cargo ships from the US docking in the Soviet Far Eastern & Arctic ports by month
The point isn't to deny OTL supplies; it's to deny any hope of Russia surviving the loss of its agricultural lands and oil resources. Unless the U.S. can ship millions of tons of food/oil from late '42 the SU can't continue the war.

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Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 12 Feb 2020 03:31

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
12 Feb 2020 03:10
...
The point isn't to deny OTL supplies; it's to deny any hope of Russia surviving the loss of its agricultural lands and oil resources. Unless the U.S. can ship millions of tons of food/oil from late '42 the SU can't continue the war.
Reading through your proposals its not clear how you are getting there.

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Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 12 Feb 2020 03:50

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
12 Feb 2020 03:31
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
12 Feb 2020 03:10
...
The point isn't to deny OTL supplies; it's to deny any hope of Russia surviving the loss of its agricultural lands and oil resources. Unless the U.S. can ship millions of tons of food/oil from late '42 the SU can't continue the war.
Reading through your proposals its not clear how you are getting there.
I abbreviated the explication by referring to other threads in which I've discussed Soviet food supply and the importance of early-Barbarossa moves (encirclement of Southwest front during the '41 Border Battles). More explanation in those threads, though mine is still a distinctly minority position on this board and in general.

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Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 12 Feb 2020 04:15

@HistoryGeek2019 I should also specify the economic background to this ATL, at least its broad outlines.

As I laid out in the linked ATL, and as I think we agree, Germany was excessively focused on bomber production during '38-'44. The baseline PoD for my ATL is better focus on the Heer, motivated by better strategic thinking that incorporates a more accurate appreciation of Soviet strength. The ATL assumes that 1-2% of GDP shifts from bombers to Heer weapons/transport during '38-'41.

In addition, the ATL specifies earlier recruitment of foreign labor in early war years. German xenophobia and expectation of a short war prevented this mobilization during '40-'41; the ATL corrects that error based on Hitler's understanding that Barbarossa would be the opening act of a planned two-summer campaign. viewtopic.php?f=11&t=243557&p=2216965&h ... t#p2216965

Stemming also from the revised strategic plan for Barbarossa would be maintenance of Heer production during '40 and '41, rather than cuts following France's fall and the launch of Barbarossa. So basically between June '40 and September '42 we'd see Heer production on a slight upward slope during the period, with the extra steel coming from exports during '40 (when Germany sent 8mil tons abroad). Because Heer weapons production was ~10% of OTL armaments budget (as you know), the necessary delta for 20% more Heer weapons is ~2% of the armaments budget or ~1% of GDP for the relevant period. Because this ATL involves far lower German equipment losses (these were particularly heavy in '41-42 winter retreats), the stock of Heer weapons for '42 should be easily 50% higher than OTL.

Given the relatively small delta to Heer weapons production, but the large production delta starting from mid-'40 from earlier use of foreign labor, by late '41 or so the economic growth over OTL is sufficient to meet the expanded army programs *and* to expand LW production over OTL. Basically the army programs would retain first priority to ensure resolution of the eastern campaign, but its proportional claim on total resources would be smaller during '42 than OTL. Assuming, say, 20% greater armaments production in '42 - of which 2% delta over OTL to the Heer - gives us 18% delta over OTL towards the LW. Given that LW was ~40% of armaments spending in '42, that's a 45% increase in LW's '42 budget.

...another corollary of the ATL's strategic orientation away from bombers is greater emphasis on strategic defense for the LW. If we apportion all the LW's production delta in '42 to fighters, and fix OTL fighter production at 15% of total armaments budget, then our 18% budget delta can more than double '42 fighter production. Or "merely" double OTL fighter production plus a >10% delta to OTL bomber production.

Moving beyond '42, it's easy to see how the LW's fighter resources rapidly become sufficient to build tens of thousands of fighters annually - especially after '42 when the absolute level of Heer spending would start to decline.

This has important strategic consequences. As documented in the OP, aerial attrition disfavored the Allies until well into '44. Doubling (at least) fighter production from '42 means the process of destroying the LW never gets going and the Allies run out of bombers before Germany runs out of much cheaper fighters.

Germany planned to build 80,000 aircraft in 1945. Double the resources available for fighters in every post-'41 period and it's obvious to me that conventional strategic bombing would be unsustainable and establishing air dominance over landing sites unlikely.

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Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 12 Feb 2020 05:05

It would help if you gave an overview of what you think the strategic situation would be in the fist half of 1943:

1. How many divisions does the Heer have? How does this compare to the maximum the Heer had during the invasion of Russia (in your ATL)?
2. Where are Germany's divisions deployed (rough estimates by theater)?
3. What naval assets does Germany have, and how are they deployed?
4. How many fighters/bombers etc. does Germany have in service and where are they deployed?
5. What % of GDP is Germany devoting to its military and how is this allocated among Heer, LW and KM?
6. What is the state of raw materials utilization from occupied territories (e.g., Ukraine wheat, Donbass metals, Maikop/Grozny/Baku oil)?
7. What is the state of Germany's allies and countries that were neutral in the OTL?
8. What do you think the Allies are doing in response to this situation?

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Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 12 Feb 2020 05:30

HistoryGeek2019 wrote:
12 Feb 2020 05:05
It would help if you gave an overview of what you think the strategic situation would be in the fist half of 1943:

1. How many divisions does the Heer have? How does this compare to the maximum the Heer had during the invasion of Russia (in your ATL)?
2. Where are Germany's divisions deployed (rough estimates by theater)?
3. What naval assets does Germany have, and how are they deployed?
4. How many fighters/bombers etc. does Germany have in service and where are they deployed?
5. What % of GDP is Germany devoting to its military and how is this allocated among Heer, LW and KM?
6. What is the state of raw materials utilization from occupied territories (e.g., Ukraine wheat, Donbass metals, Maikop/Grozny/Baku oil)?
7. What is the state of Germany's allies and countries that were neutral in the OTL?
8. What do you think the Allies are doing in response to this situation?
Will do but first with Turkey joining the Axis in September '42. I'll explain why I think that's likely.

Re what the Allies are doing, I'll propose their likely course but IMO there's nothing significant to be done. If you can't stop the German army anywhere on land and can't bomb Germany into surrender, there's nothing to do but hunker down in England. "Doing something" means losing armies in the Middle East and/or Iberia.

Which is why Eisenhower and the JCS intended strategic defensive in ETO and a pivot to Asia if Russia fell in '42.

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Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by Terry Duncan » 13 Feb 2020 12:44

A post from Aida1 was removed by this moderator because it contained remarks that could be seen as derogatory towards another member and their chosen user name. Please avoid this sort of thing in the future.

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Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 13 Feb 2020 14:56

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
12 Feb 2020 03:50
Carl Schwamberger wrote:
12 Feb 2020 03:31
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
12 Feb 2020 03:10
...
The point isn't to deny OTL supplies; it's to deny any hope of Russia surviving the loss of its agricultural lands and oil resources. Unless the U.S. can ship millions of tons of food/oil from late '42 the SU can't continue the war.
Reading through your proposals its not clear how you are getting there.
I abbreviated the explication by referring to other threads in which I've discussed Soviet food supply and the importance of early-Barbarossa moves (encirclement of Southwest front during the '41 Border Battles). More explanation in those threads, though mine is still a distinctly minority position on this board and in general.
The more I look at all that the more difficult it is to see the connections and proposals. My opinion still is it would be better to approach this by examining the contributions & allocations or actions of OTL & present alternatives from that context. John Ellis went a long ways to to outlining the contribution and results in his book of tables 'Brute Force'. Theres lots of other literature examining narrower aspects of this subject, the Soviet contribution in manpower & industry, the US, British empire, ect... to build out on Ellis. A good summary of the overall contributions would provide some sort of foundation & frame for building up alternatives.

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Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 13 Feb 2020 20:17

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
13 Feb 2020 14:56
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
12 Feb 2020 03:50
Carl Schwamberger wrote:
12 Feb 2020 03:31
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
12 Feb 2020 03:10
...
The point isn't to deny OTL supplies; it's to deny any hope of Russia surviving the loss of its agricultural lands and oil resources. Unless the U.S. can ship millions of tons of food/oil from late '42 the SU can't continue the war.
Reading through your proposals its not clear how you are getting there.
I abbreviated the explication by referring to other threads in which I've discussed Soviet food supply and the importance of early-Barbarossa moves (encirclement of Southwest front during the '41 Border Battles). More explanation in those threads, though mine is still a distinctly minority position on this board and in general.
The more I look at all that the more difficult it is to see the connections and proposals. My opinion still is it would be better to approach this by examining the contributions & allocations or actions of OTL & present alternatives from that context. John Ellis went a long ways to to outlining the contribution and results in his book of tables 'Brute Force'. Theres lots of other literature examining narrower aspects of this subject, the Soviet contribution in manpower & industry, the US, British empire, ect... to build out on Ellis. A good summary of the overall contributions would provide some sort of foundation & frame for building up alternatives.
I don't understand what you're requesting. If you mean I should do a full explication the Eastern Front campaign, I'll have to politely decline. I've already done a ton of that work and the utility of this setup is to examine the post-Ostheer war. I am happy to address any of your specific questions about Ostheer ATL's. If it's going to be a more involved discussion I'd suggest we move it to another thread such as: viewtopic.php?f=11&t=243557.

If you're requesting something like an overview of the manpower and industrial resources of both sides in this ATL, that's a good idea and I'll get to that within the next few days or so.

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Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by Avalancheon » 14 Feb 2020 07:39

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
09 Feb 2020 17:05
My Conclusion SO FAR

Given that the Wallies would have had - at best - an insignificant economic advantage over the Axis (Japan included) and at most a ~30% advantage over a German-controlled Europe, a strategy that relied on conventional strategic bombing would have failed.

...which raises the issue of land invasion.

Here there are at least two issues:

(1) Would the Wallies have been willing to raise a sufficiently large army, and would they have had the appetite for the millions of dead necessary to drive on Berlin against the entire German (and Axis-allied) army?

(2) Had they raised an enormous army, would they have won?

I have serious doubts about (1), slightly less-serious doubts about (2).

As VP41 attests, the Wallies would have had difficulty fielding an enormous army while also producing sufficient arms for the struggle. As the historical record attests, the UK was reluctant to risk bloody land war even against the dramatically weaker Westheer of '43-'44 (i.e. Churchill preferred peripheral ops to the invasion of France). The US was more willing to bleed on the battlefield but the likely cost of an invasion in this scenario is at least an order of magnitude greater than OTL. And we know that the U.S. agreed a peace on the Korean peninsula that left an evil regime in control, rather than accept long-term and large-scale land warfare.

Had the Wallies resolved to accept millions of dead, it's more likely they would have won but still interesting to discuss. The U.S., UK, and Dominions had a population of ~200mil from which to draft soldiers; Germany had ~90mil if one includes the Volksdeutche and other Waffen-SS troops. In a long-term war of attrition, Germany probably would have run out of men before the Wallies did. (attrition to Italian/Romanian forces should be figured too, though their exchange ratios would have been atrocious).

...but such a war of attrition might have cost 10mil dead for the Wallies, given Germany's higher combat effectiveness. Which is unimaginable to me but maybe there's a narrative in which it's feasible (widespread publication of the Holocaust, for example, leading to unshakeable will to destroy Nazism).

Finally, for the purposes of discussing this VP41 ATL, I'm not addressing the A-bomb for now. I want to focus on the plan's universe, on the general issue of "how do we win" from the viewpoint of the Wallies when it looked like Russia was going under.
If Germany were to achieve victory over the Soviet Union sometime in 1942, then their strategic position would be indomitable. They and their Allies would be in control of a vast territory stretching from the coasts of France to the Urals of Russia. There would be no continental opponent who could meaningfully challenge them. They would have control over a huge number of people, infrastructure, and resources. Even if the Reich doesn't exploit these to their full potential, they would still be a truly formidable opponent.

Since the Wehrmacht is no longer actively engaged in a total war against the Soviet Union which forced them to field 3-4 Luftflottes and 150-180 divisions in the East (on a multi year basis), they would be able to completely change their strategic posture. Adolf Hitler had planned to demobilise something like 80 divisions after Barbarossa. These men would be put back into the work force, alongside forced labourers from the USSR. Germany would then rebuild the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe. More resources would be available for the Atlantic wall and the Wunderwaffe.

In these circumstance, the combined strength of Britain and America would not be sufficient to defeat the Reich. They would not be able to sustain a bombing campaign above their air space, nor would they be able to succesfully invade them. The Victory program was a ludicrous proposal that was completely unfeasible, and had no chance of ever being adopted in the United States

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Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 14 Feb 2020 16:41

Avalancheon wrote:
14 Feb 2020 07:39

Since the Wehrmacht is no longer actively engaged in a total war against the Soviet Union which forced them to field 3-4 Luftflottes and 150-180 divisions in the East (on a multi year basis), they would be able to completely change their strategic posture. Adolf Hitler had planned to demobilise something like 80 divisions after Barbarossa. These men would be put back into the work force, alongside forced labourers from the USSR. Germany would then rebuild the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe. More resources would be available for the Atlantic wall and the Wunderwaffe.

In these circumstance, the combined strength of Britain and America would not be sufficient to defeat the Reich. They would not be able to sustain a bombing campaign above their air space, nor would they be able to succesfully invade them. The Victory program was a ludicrous proposal that was completely unfeasible, and had no chance of ever being adopted in the United States
Germany would have achieved temporary security on land, for maybe 5-10 years. But in the long-run they would remain a landlocked, blockaded country trying to occupy millions of starving people with growing resistance, and technological inferiority to the Allies in almost every area except ICBMs (which the Allies could easily surpass them in if they chose). Japan will still ultimately fall to the United States, and when it does lend-lease will rearm the Soviet Union and Germany will be back to needing 150 divisions on its eastern border, which would be impossible to maintain while simultaneously attempting to defend the entire circumference of continental Europe.

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