Would the 'Small Solution' Wacht am Rhein have worked?

[stg 44]

By midday 8 December, however, the Regiment had concentrated in Brunssum under 34 Tank Brigade, which now formed the nucleus of XXX Corps reserve, which was to be prepared to take up defensive positions on the right flank to hold bank any enemy penetrations down the Wurm Valley – the Corps front being held by 43 Division on the right with 8 Armoured Brigade under command and the Guards Armoured Division on the left.

Are you having trouble understanding that your source is talking about the situation on December 8th and we're talking about the situation on December 16th when this alternate offensive would start?

147 RAC relieved a regiment of the 8 Armoured Brigade [under command XII Corps] after a couple of days and on the eighth the Battalion moved forward into Germany to take their place, while 156 Brigade [52 Division] came under command 43 Division and relieved 129 Brigade.

Source got the 52nd division brigade wrong, it was the 157th. And it shows that 43rd division was relieved from the line and moved into reserve. Exactly what I said.

On December 10th, the CO attended an “O” Group at 214 Brigade, 43 Division. Operation “Shears” was outlined whereby the enemy divisions disposed west of the River Roer between Roermond K 7990 and Gilenkerchen K 8664 were to be destroyed. 34 Tank Brigade with 43 Division were to do the break-out and 52 Division with 8 Armoured Brigade and Guards Armoured Division the mopping up. 9 R Tanks in support 214 Brigade were to complete the first phase of the break-out.

Following heavy and continual rain the ground provided poor tank going and frequent reports showed no improvements. Nevertheless, thousands of air photos and maps were issued and every plan was complete when the news came that the operation was cancelled.

The Regiment remained in its position with its role unchanged. On December 16th news was received of the German counter-offensive against the American First Army front, attacking with the 6th and 5th Panzer Armies."

Again, none of this is different from what I said. The 34th tank brigade was there, not the 31st. 8th armored was also moved into reserve since it was replaced by the 34th and was to fill an exploitation role for Shears before it was cancelled and then moved into the Netherlands for Veritable before the Ardennes offensive delayed the British offensive. So what is your disconnect? Just trying to cover up for your mistakes in placing additional tank or armoured brigades where they weren't? Just like how you claimed the 3rd AGRA was there too without a single shred of evidence?

I'll repeat what I stated before and is shown on the 12th AG situation maps for this entire period that fits with all the memoirs that have been quoted so far:
7AD was holding the Meuse to Sittard, at least the 157th brigade held part of the line between Sittard and wherever the GAD left flank was along with 34th tank brigade. There is no source yet that claims that even a single brigade from 43rd division was holding a position on the front lines in the area by the morning of the 16th of December as it had passed into reserve to prepare for Op. Shears.

[Richard Anderson]

Are you having trouble understanding that your source is talking about the situation on December 8th and we're talking about the situation on December 16th when this alternate offensive would start?

Are you having trouble understanding that the war diary is talking about the situation from 1 to 16 December and we're talking about the situation on December 16th when your alternate world fantasy would start?

Source got the 52nd division brigade wrong, it was the 157th. And it shows that 43rd division was relieved from the line and moved into reserve. Exactly what I said.

Oh dear, they mixed up the brigades. Yes, 157 Brigade of 52 Division was attached to the 43 Division. Meanwhile, 43 Division, 52 Division, and 34 Tank Brigade were all there.

Again, none of this is different from what I said. The 34th tank brigade was there, not the 31st. 8th armored was also moved into reserve since it was replaced by the 34th and was to fill an exploitation role for Shears before it was cancelled and then moved into the Netherlands for Veritable before the Ardennes offensive delayed the British offensive. So what is your disconnect?

I don't see a disconnect. Why do you have such a jones about 31 Tank Brigade? It and its two regiments were attached to 79 Armoured Division and were in the area. So what?

So in addition to British units lining up with their backs to the enemy when executing a relief, now when an armoured brigade is relieved it simply disappears like a counter removed from your game board?

Just trying to cover up for your mistakes in placing additional tank or armoured brigades where they weren't? Just like how you claimed the 3rd AGRA was there too without a single shred of evidence?

Was where? I think you are starting to lose the thread. 3 AGRA was deployed from the corps left, south to Grotenrath-Brunssum, where the artillery line was picked up by 5 and 9 AGRA.

I'll repeat what I stated before and is shown on the 12th AG situation maps for this entire period that fits with all the memoirs that have been quoted so far:
7AD was holding the Meuse to Sittard, at least the 157th brigade held part of the line between Sittard and wherever the GAD left flank was along with 34th tank brigade. There is no source yet that claims that even a single brigade from 43rd division was holding a position on the front lines in the area by the morning of the 16th of December as it had passed into reserve to prepare for Op. Shears.

Madness. Okay, onto ignore you go. Buh-bye!

[Richard Anderson]

From 59 Atk Regt RA, 43 Division War Diary:

1 December 1944: 233 Battery relieved 235 Battery area NEDERHEIDE and N of GEILENKIRCHEN.

5 December 1944: C.O. received proliminary briefing for operation "SHEARS". Recce parties from 214/54 A Tk Regt 52 Lowland Div arrived to take over sector from 233 Battery. GEILENKIRCHEN area.

6 December 1944: 233 Bty relieved by 214/54 Bty less key pesonnel of two tps i/c of Nos. 1,2 & 3 owing to inexperience of relieving Bty on 17pr eqpts 233 Bty concentrated area SW of RUMPEN. 235 Battery relieed 236 Battery less one det. This dxt blown up on mine en route resulting in three fatal casualties and eight wounded. Remainder 236 Battery conc area SW of RUMPEN. 29 Rfts arrived at RHQ and were interposted to Batteries.

8 December 1944: 235 Battery relieved by "Z"/ 21 A Tk Battery (Gds Armd Div). One gun abandoned owing to being under enemy observation and impossible to get out of action. 235 Battery conc area SW of RUMPEN.

9 December 1944: One Tp (3) Valentines 47pr eqpt arrived at 333 Battery after reorg at G.R.O.A.T. One Tp 6pr (333 Battery) left for BOURG LEOPOLD to reorg. 233, 235 & 236 Batteries remain conc.

13 December 1944: Lt. A.S.H. TELFER RA joined Regt interposted to 236 Battery.

14 December 1944: C.O. held an 'Officers' afternoon. 27 offrs being present.

15 December 1944: Div being relieed by 52 'Mountain' Div - recce parties leave to recce area for Regt., NAGELBEEK, HOEVE.

16 December 1944: 333 Battery relieved by Battery of 54 A tk Regt (52 'Mountain" Div) move to conc area NAGELBEEK. 235 Battery to area HOEVE. 233 Battery to area N of STEIN. RHQ and 236 Battery remain RUMPEN.

17 December 1944: 'G' Tp 333 Battery returned form G.R.O.A.T. equipped with S.P. Valentines. L.A.D. proceeded to G.R.O.A.T. for reorg.

18 December 1944: Regt Harbour parties left to recce new area at TILBURG.

19 December 1944: Regt move in Div convoy to area DIEPENBEEK ordered to hold there is cade of having to go into action against German counter offensive. Arrive DIEPENBEEK. RHQ, 235 & 236 Batteries conc in village. 233 Battery area HASSELT. 333 Battery (less one Tp at G.R.O.A.T.) conc at BEVE RST.

20 December 1944: 233 & 236 Batteries places u/c 130 & 214 Bdes resectively. Two S.P. Tps 333 Batteries placed u/c 43 Recce Regt with orders to deploy in Belgium.

[Richard Anderson]

From 54 Atk Regt RA, 52 Division War Diary:

5 December 1944: Div relieved by 4 Cdn Armd Div and task of Todforce is taken over by 5 Cdn A/Tk Regt at 05.00hrs. RHQ, 214, 215, 304 Batteries move to new Div area NE of Maastricht, staging the night 5/6 December at Boxtel en route. 295 Battery receive orders to move to new area under 155 Bde.

6 December 1944: RHQ, 215 and 304 Batteries move from Boxtel to Spaubeek.

7 December 1944: 295 Battery move from East of Den Bosch to Spaubeek and revert to Regt command.

14 December 1944: Information received that Div is to be re-equipped as for normal Inf Div and Regt to be reorganized, 4 Batteries consisting of 1 Tp 4x 6 pndrs towed by carriers, 1 Tp 3x 17 pdr towed and 1 Tp 17pdr SP Valentines.

17 December 1944: RHQ moved from Spaubeek to area Landgraaf, 304 Battery now under command 155 Bde and deploy in Germany.

19 December 1944: 214 Battery moved to Germany.

[Gooner1]

That is about the Worcestershire regiment, which was off the line as of December 16th:
http://www.worcestershireregiment.com/T ... d_Time.php

On the 6th December 1944 the Worcesters were relieved by 4th Wiltshires and, preceded by the usual recce party (the Second-in-Command, all Company seconds-in-commands, and representatives of all specialist platoons) crept back down the village streets. Unfortunately a 17-pounder anti-tank gun took the wrong turning at the church leaving Birgden and drove towards Schierwaldenrath, which was still in enemy hands. It ran into a minefield, blew itself and its crew sky-high causing an almighty explosion. The Worcesters eventually arrived once more at Brunssum at 23.30 hours and debussed at the air-raid shelters of the coalmine.

So they were in reserve and planning, not on the line. Brunssum is southeast of Sittard, which itself was behind the front lines.

The 4th Wilts were also in 43rd Division, though usually in a different brigade. So one battalion of 43rd Division being relieved by another (or perhaps one brigade by another), routine.

The primary formations holding a more than 15 miles long front were two armored divisions, at least one of which was overstretched holding 7 miles of front by itself.

Nope, the primary formations were on the left 7th Armoured Division with Guards Armoured Division behind and around them. On the right 43rd Division with 34th Tank Brigade and behind 52nd Division with 8th Armoured Brigade.

War Diary 3rd Battalion Irish Guards
3 December 1944
In the morning we received orders to take over a part of the line from VINTELEN to HASTENRATH from 1st Battalion GRENADIER GUARDS. The C.O. spent the day in recce & during the evening orders were issued for a move on the following afternoon.
<>
7 December 1944
At about 0800 hrs four deserters from 159 trg Bn gave themselves up to our coy at HASTENRATH 7669. They had been engaged on a patrol designed to cut telephone wires on the rd GANGLET- SITTARD. Their infm served in the main to confirm what we already knew & it is apparent that there is still little or no Regtl organisation in the 176 Div. The Bn handed over the sector to the 9 DLI during the night 7/8 & moved to a rest area at RAATH 7464. The relief was complete without incident & the last coy had changed over by 2200 hrs.
<>
11 - 16 December 1944
Trg continued in the area RAATH. Owing to unfavourable weather conditions the projected operation was cancelled & on the 16th Dec the Bn received a warning order to reoccupy a sector of the front between VINTELEN & HASTENRATH.

War Diary 5th Coldstreams:
4th December 1944
The Bn is to be relieved on the 7th or 8th by the 1/5 Queens Royal Regiment of 7 Armd Division.
<>
7th Decemeber 1944
The 1/5 Queens Royal Regt started to arrive at 0815 hrs and the relief was completed without incident by 1200 hrs.

However GAD still had one battalion, supported by one squadron in the forward line on the 16th.

War Dairy 1st Battalion Welsh Guards:
1944 December 7
In the morning the Commanding Officer attended the Division Commander’s Conference at Divisional H.Q. at 1030 hours on future operations.
After lunch the 2nd Battalion DEVONS started to come in and by 1600 hours the handover was complete, the whole thing for once having been an entirely simple transaction uninterfered with by any unwelcome attentions from the enemy.
The 2nd Battalion DEVONS have only just joined 7th ARMOURED DIVISION from 50th DIVISION, and had in the Battalion no less than 29 representatives of various regiments which seems to show that there is still something in being a comparatively uninterfered with Guardsman.
The new area at GELEEN is already full of troops and Companies are as a result either very crowded or spread down several streets, with 2 or 3 men in each house.
However, everybody seemed to get dug in even quicker than usual.
<>
1944 December 10
Battalion ‘O’ Group was held at 1000 hours and the Commanding Officer gave out his orders for the next operation which is far from being simple.
However, owing to the state of the ground it has already been postponed 48 hours and there seems no reason not to expect a further postponement.
In the afternoon a slight bombshell arrived which was the news that the Battalion was to take over from 1st Motor Battalion GRENADIER GUARDS in GANGELT tomorrow.
Nothing passes the time quicker than taking over part of the Line and preparing for a major Operation simultaneously.

1944 December 11
The Second-in-Command, Major G.G. FOWKE, gave out orders for the take over at 0900 hours and Company recce parties went off immediately after to look at the GRENADIER Company areas, and by 1030 hours their recce parties under Major Henry ILLINGWORTH had begun to arrive at Battalion H.Q.
H.Q. Company and Support Company moved off after lunch, Support Company and Command Post being in STAHE and H.Q. Company in SCHINVELD with ‘A’ Echelon nearby.
Rifle Companies could not move in until after dark as a large number of their positions are completely overlooked by the enemy.
Prince of Wales Company were on the Battalion Left flank in the village of KREUZRATH and No.s 4 and X Companies were in BIRGDEN with No. 3 Company slightly in reserve.
The enemy are apt to come into all these villages at night and it is a case of a Battalion trying to hold a Brigade front and there is every opportunity for enemy infiltration on both flanks and in the gap between Prince of Wales and No. 4 Company.
A Battalion of DURHAM LIGHT INFANTRY is on the Battalion’s Left flank while the Right flank is held by a 30 CORPS Services Battalion of 2 ROYAL ARMY SERVICE CORPS Companies and 2 ROYAL ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL ENGINEERS Companies so the whole front is a somewhat Harry Tate affair.
<>
1944 December 14
A large counter-battery programme was fired today and quite a number of people thought that someone had forgotten to tell the Gunners that Operation ‘SHEARS’ was off.
Surprisingly enough there was no enemy retaliation but, no doubt, it may arrive any minute now.
Companies had a thoroughly peaceful night with just a very occasional ‘stonk’, but there are good cellars in all Company areas and no one has been hurt so far.
<>
1944 December 16
The Squadron in support of the Battalion here is now 2 Squadron of 2nd Armoured Battalion GRENADIER GUARDS.
At 1500 hours recce parties of 4th Battalion K.O.S.B. of 155th BRIGADE of 52nd LOWLAND DIVISION began to arrive. <>

[Carl Schwamberger]

Precisely how or why Patton came to the conclusion he did about a pending German attack is not clear to me. I've never seen a analysis of where that came from. The little I know from secondary sources is there was criticism of Hodges G2 for over reliance on ULTRA, and dismissive of reports from the corps G2. Patton was initially the opposite, being originally skeptical of ULTRA as a useful source. He gradually warmed up to it, but I've not seen the same criticism of the 3rd Army G2 as not properly examining the intel collected by the corps. Another item is a claim 1st Army G2 rejected any assistance from the OSS. Peruses 'Penetrating the Reich' describes a OSS liaison team reporting to 1st Army in October 1944. They were told their services were not required & invited to depart. Perish describes boy Patton and Patch of the 7th Army, & Devers of 6th AG as making use of the OSS. What use 3rd Army made of the OSS is not described. A number of deep penetration ops in 6th AG sector are described.

Perhaps all that contributed towards Pattons prescience. Perhaps not.

[Richard Anderson]

Perhaps all that contributed towards Pattons prescience. Perhaps not.

The Third Army G-2 Report for 13 December stated:

"(2) Overall Reserves

(a) German reserves of Armor and Infantry in the Northern sector of the WESTERN front continue to be the biggest question mark in enemy dispositions. There are now out of contact eight Panzer divisions (1 SS, 2 SS, 9 SS, 10 SS, 12 SS, 2, 116, 130, three Para divisions (2, 3, 8), and three infantry divisions (59, 85, 331).

(b) Indications continue that the enemy is planning an operation that would employ the four divisions of Sixth SS [sic] Panzer Army (1 SS. 2 SS, 9 SS, 12 SS) to spearhead a counteroffensive, apparently in the Aachen-Duren sector...

(c) Another German reserve appears concentrated N of the MOSELLE, close to the First and Third US Army boundary, where 2 Pz and 130 Pz Divs have been reported.

On 14 December it reported a PW interrogation stating a counteroffensive was momentary.

On 15 December it noted the accumulation of US vehicles by the Germans for sabotage missions.

[Richard Anderson]

Updated 9 AGRA location statement;

9 AGRA HQ was at Munstergeleen. Technically, 9 AGRA was attached to XXX Corps at this time, but XXX Corps was in reserve preparing for SHEARS, which was aborted due to the German counteroffensive breaking out. (The History of 9 Army Group Royal Artillery, ND:NP [1945]). 9 AGRA consisted of:
9th Medium Regiment RA – at Grotenrath c. 5 December, attached to 5 AGRA (History of the 9th Medium Regiment (8th Buffs), NP:ND [1945].
11th Medium Regiment RA – 2 miles NE of Brunssum, attached to 5 AGRA
107th Medium Regiment RA – at Geelen
165th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA – at Geelen with 421st HAA Btry, 108th HAA Regt RA under command, by 22 December moved to vic. between Grotenrath-Brunssum
51st Heavy Regiment RA – vic. between Grotenrath-Brunssum
3rd Super Heavy Regiment RA – at Amstenrade; 9 December 1944 moved to new position east of Maas. RHQ in Melihof, 4 Battery in Sweikhuizen, 5 Battery in Gracht and 15 Battery in Kling (Limburg)
Joined by 67th Medium Regiment RA on 22 December from 3 AGRA (see next)
9 AGRA War Diary “…at 10.30hrs on the 26th of November the HQ moved to Koningslust Klooster with the gun areas west and south of Maasbree with a view to supporting the attack to clear up the small pocket of enemy on this side of the river opposite Venlo. The 107 Medium Regiment found themselves in the unfortunate position of having their position was bombed and shelled. The 11 Medium Regiment also suffered in this raid, two of their men becoming casualties.
On the 8th of December the HQ moved to Munstergeleen. The 107 Medium Regiment being in Geleen with the 165 Heavy Anti Aircraft Regiment next door to them, having the 421 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Battery of the 108 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment under command. The 3rd Super Heavy Regiment came under command for this operation, whilst 9th and 11th Medium Regiment were sent to be under operational control of the 5th AGRA since the gun positions they had been allotted made this arrangement more satisfactory.
All the regiments were to be engaged in supporting the Corps operation "Shears". The 3rd Super heavy regiment were given the particular job of breaking up re-enforced concrete shelters which formed part of the Siegfried line.
On the 21st of December 1944 HQ 9 AGRA moved to Rumpen to be in a more central positions in relation to the gun areas.”

[Richard Anderson]

Updated 3 AGRA location statement:

3 AGRA was attached to XII Corps and consisted of:
6th Field Regiment RA – at Grathem (https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ww2people ... 7220.shtml)
59th Medium Regiment RA – (detached from 3 AGRA until 10 January) 30 November 1944 moved to area near Maasbree (Limburg); 9 December 1944 moved to Heythuizen (Limburg); 21 December 1944 moved to Belgium.
67th Medium Regiment RA (until 22 December) – vic. between Grotenrath-Brunssum
72nd Medium Regiment RA – vic. Helden

[Richard Anderson]

Unfortunately, the locations of many of the regiments attached to 5 AGRA remain a mystery, but since 5 AGRA was attached to XII Corps throughout the period it may be assumed they were in the corps area and prepared to fire in support of the corps units.

5 AGRA was also attached to XII Corps and consisted of:
7th Medium Regiment RA - 4 December 1944 27/28 Battery moved from Geleen to Susterseel (Germany); 5 December 1944 25/26 Battery moved from Kwabeek to new position at Brunssum; 6 December 1944 27/28 Battery moved their guns from their exposed position to a leaguer area at Kwabeek where they are to remain out of action until required to shoot again. In the meantime work proceeds with gun pits; 17 December 1944: Regiment moved to area Beringen.
64th Medium Regiment RA - unk
69th Medium Regiment RA - unk
84th Medium Regiment RA - unk
121st Medium Regiment RA - 7 November 1944 took position near Schinveld (Limburg), the batteries were deployed south and east of Schinveld, RHQ put itself in and around the monastery at Kling. B echelon settled down in Brunssum, a mining town two miles away to the south; 20 November 1944 moved to Germany; 19 December 1944 moved to Tilburg,
52d Heavy Regiment RA - unk

[Carl Schwamberger]

Thanks Rich.

I was not school trained, but did spend several years holding down a -2 staff position and a few more directly using the -2 product. From that slice experience a couple things jump out at me.

The Third Army G-2 Report for 13 December stated:

"(2) Overall Reserves

(a) German reserves of Armor and Infantry in the Northern sector of the WESTERN front continue to be the biggest question mark in enemy dispositions. There are now out of contact eight Panzer divisions (1 SS, 2 SS, 9 SS, 10 SS, 12 SS, 2, 116, 130, three Para divisions (2, 3, 8), and three infantry divisions (59, 85, 331).

(b) Indications continue that the enemy is planning an operation that would employ the four divisions of Sixth SS [sic] Panzer Army (1 SS. 2 SS, 9 SS, 12 SS) to spearhead a counteroffensive, apparently in the Aachen-Duren sector...

(c) Another German reserve appears concentrated N of the MOSELLE, close to the First and Third US Army boundary, where 2 Pz and 130 Pz Divs have been reported.

This covers territory outside the 3d Armys area of influence or anticipated area of operations. Which is normal, it also covers the Area of Interest with a wider than usual net. It looks as it the G-2 were taking a complete look at the entire western front. This causes me to wonder who else might have been. Was the 21 AG intel staff noting the same things, or the 9th Army G-2?

On 15 December it noted the accumulation of US vehicles by the Germans for sabotage missions.

How TF did they find this one out? Its one thing to spot a vehicle park and note peculiarities of type, tho that was supposed to be difficult given the German secrecy. But its another ti divine actual enemy intent. Was this a logical guess or was the G2 obtaining this specific information on intent to use the capture vehicles. And if so how was that intent found out?

The last thing to note is the failure of 1st Army G-2 to not the same general trends here. The assembly of enemy units was not only directly in their AI, but very much in their operational area. Directly in the path of the intended 1st Army attacks.

[Richard Anderson]

Thanks Rich.

I was not school trained, but did spend several years holding down a -2 staff position and a few more directly using the -2 product. From that slice experience a couple things jump out at me.

Neither was I, but I did spend some seven or eight years in the IC and I agree, a couple of things jump out at me too.

This covers territory outside the 3d Armys area of influence or anticipated area of operations. Which is normal, it also covers the Area of Interest with a wider than usual net. It looks as it the G-2 were taking a complete look at the entire western front. This causes me to wonder who else might have been. Was the 21 AG intel staff noting the same things, or the 9th Army G-2?

Yep. It seems at army-level the G-2 staff could include in their report whatever items of interest they thought pertinent and relevant to the intelligence argument they were making. In the modern IC remarks straying outside their AOR would be excised and they would be sternly told they were outside their lane.

The Third Army report is in direct contrast to the 12th Army Group weekly summary of 9 December. In its specifics it also contrasts with FUSA G-2, which remained unconcerned about the possible commitments of the units out of the line. I have not run across the 21 Army Group or NUSA reports for the period.

What is most interesting with the 12th Army Group 9 December report is they assign strengths to the German divisions that are off significantly from reality. The four SS divisions of 6. Panzerarmee supposedly totaled 32,000 with 320 tanks and AFV. The lack of detailed strength assesment is glaring.

How TF did they find this one out? Its one thing to spot a vehicle park and note peculiarities of type, tho that was supposed to be difficult given the German secrecy. But its another ti divine actual enemy intent. Was this a logical guess or was the G2 obtaining this specific information on intent to use the capture vehicles. And if so how was that intent found out?

IIRC they happened to capture a written copy of the order from November.

The last thing to note is the failure of 1st Army G-2 to not the same general trends here. The assembly of enemy units was not only directly in their AI, but very much in their operational area. Directly in the path of the intended 1st Army attacks.

Yep.

[Carl Schwamberger]

... The Third Army report is in direct contrast to the 12th Army Group weekly summary of 9 December. In its specifics it also contrasts with FUSA G-2, which remained unconcerned about the possible commitments of the units out of the line. I have not run across the 21 Army Group or NUSA reports for the period.

What is most interesting with the 12th Army Group 9 December report is they assign strengths to the German divisions that are off significantly from reality. The four SS divisions of 6. Panzerarmee supposedly totaled 32,000 with 320 tanks and AFV. The lack of detailed strength assesment is glaring. ...

The views of the 21 AG, 9th Army, ect are needed to understand what level of surprise there would have been wi Plan Martin. Even being caught with pants down the 1st Army got its reserves redirected and rolling with decent speed. Does anyone else here think those in 21 AG will be paralyzed into inaction while the forward defense zone is picked apart? What the Brits might have done with 72 or 24 hours warning of this attack I cant say. Would a wild guess of 'proactive' be accurate?

Did a quick look at the maps & it appears the successful portion of the OTL offensive occurred where the defense density was some 30km per division. The less successful - no breakthrough portion occurred where the density averaged ten km or less per division or less.

[stg 44]

Precisely how or why Patton came to the conclusion he did about a pending German attack is not clear to me. I've never seen a analysis of where that came from. The little I know from secondary sources is there was criticism of Hodges G2 for over reliance on ULTRA, and dismissive of reports from the corps G2. Patton was initially the opposite, being originally skeptical of ULTRA as a useful source. He gradually warmed up to it, but I've not seen the same criticism of the 3rd Army G2 as not properly examining the intel collected by the corps. Another item is a claim 1st Army G2 rejected any assistance from the OSS. Peruses 'Penetrating the Reich' describes a OSS liaison team reporting to 1st Army in October 1944. They were told their services were not required & invited to depart. Perish describes boy Patton and Patch of the 7th Army, & Devers of 6th AG as making use of the OSS. What use 3rd Army made of the OSS is not described. A number of deep penetration ops in 6th AG sector are described.

Perhaps all that contributed towards Pattons prescience. Perhaps not.

Have you read "Patton's Oracle"?
https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/176 ... n-s-oracle
His G-2 was arguably the best in the US army in Europe and the book covers his warnings about the Bulge build up.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Yeah, Hays is laudatory.