TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑03 Dec 2020, 04:55
Sorry but that's an entirely specious response - assumption/fact distinctions often are. It's the kind of thing that sounds good at a glance until you think about it for a second.
Any ATL involves changing facts; you're making unjustifiable assumptions about what is feasible to change in an ATL. To wit, you're assuming that any ATL involving a stronger Panzerwaffe has to rely on Pz3 to the same extent as OTL.
It's an unjustifiable assumption because Germany improvised Panzer division TOE's throughout the war and, if confronted with insoluble obstacles to greater Pz3 production, would have similarly improvised. They could have increased PzIV or Pz38 production if really committed to fielding 25 instead of 20 panzer divisions.
Sorry, but the only "unjustifiable assumption" I seem to see is the one that says "Germany improvised Panzer division TOE's throughout the war and, if confronted with insoluble obstacles to greater Pz3 production, would have similarly improvised".
The first part of the problem with that is that we know what the Panzer division T/O&E were and how they changed over time. We also know how the Panzer division T/O&E developed and why. We also know that the tanks were developed to fit into the T/O&E according to what the Germans believed, based on their prewar experimentation and early wartime experience, the tactical and doctrinal requirements were for those tanks. In other words, the two were interdependent and were not created in a vacuum.
So, as of 1 September 1939, the organization of the leichte (KSTN 1171) and mittlere (KSTN 1175) Kompanie was essentially exactly the same as the organization of 1 February 1941 and remained to all intents and purposes the same when reissued 1 November 1941. In fact, not assumption, that organization remained the same until the issue of the first substantial changes, first KSTN 1175a on 25 January 1943, which was the mittlere Panzerkompanie a. equipped entirely with the Panzer IV lang, and then the complete reorganization of the division on 1 November 1943 and then its reissue under the frei gleiderung organization beginning in March 1944.
These were not improvisational changes, but systematic changes based on combat experience. The only improvisational change I can see is the use of the Panzer 35 (t) and 38 (t) as substitutes for the Panzer III in 1940-1941.
Otherwise, the introduction of the 5cm kurz and 5cm lang Panzer III was into the existing organizational structure of the leichte kompanie as was the same for the introduction of the Panzer IV lang.
The second part of the problem is your assumption that the Germans "could have increased PzIV or Pz38 production if really committed to fielding 25 instead of 20 panzer divisions". The proof, as they say, is in the pudding. In fact, not assumption, the Germans were unable to generate sufficient Pz III or Pz 38 production to fully outfit all the existing 20 divisions (plus one leichte division) requiring them in spring 1941. Significantly, all the Panzer regiments in those divisions were intended to have eight kompanien, rather than the six normally found. Only seven of the Abteilungen organized had its full four kompanien.
How do you increase Panzer IV production sufficiently short-term to make up when production plans up to this POD were based upon it only being something like one-in-three of the total production?
Expanding Panzer 38 (t) production is even more of a non-starter. The Germans did not invest in the facilities at BMM and production remained at 25-40 tanks per month through early 1943. At that point investment for production expansion did occur, but the resulting expanded output was not experienced until early 1944.
Anyway, if the Germans were unable to field 20+1 fully equipped Panzer divisions by spring of 1941, despite being "fully committed to it", how are they supposed to field 25?
Ok so you disavow the idea that Germany could not have increased 1940 panzer production.
What then is your argument?
Specifically, why was it impossible for Germany to have produced the ~350 more Pz3's necessary to equip 5 more panzer divisions?
Since I don't believe I've ever said that, I'm not sure why I need to disavow anything? I thought my argument was clear? I don't see a way the Germans could increase the production of the Panzer they need, the Panzer III, to the level they require, unless they start its design about a year earlier.
...you're arguing with yourself or somebody else. Where have I said anything like that?
I have been clear for over a year now that Germany could have won had it fielded 5 more panzer divisions (plus other factors discussed in my ATL's).
5 more panzer divisions is ~500 more medium tanks, not the thousands resulting from your later period.
So what's your argument about the tanks for 5 more panzer divisions?
Okay, so get to 20+1 divisions on 1 June 1941 with an inventory of 2,381 Panzer III/35/38 at what was effectively two-thirds desired strength, required the production of 1,689 Panzer III and c. 1,310 38 (t), and the seizure of 218 completed 35 (t) and 9 38 (t). So 3,226 required to generate 2,381, plus 411 losses, or 2,792. In other words, an overage of 431 was required to achieve that strength.
An additional 768 Panzer III were required for your five extra divisions, not 500. Plus of course the additional Panzer IV. At least there should be sufficient Panzer II.
You're using aggregate plant-level numbers for firms that began with only a fraction of workforce devoted to panzer production. So it's not a good metric. As the USSBS reports attest, at each of these plants the share of turnover attributable to panzer production increased dramatically as the war progressed. USSBS does not break down firm/plant-level employment by program activity but it's obvious that more of the workers were shifted to panzer production.
Sorry, but no, you are assuming that the figures are aggregates. The figures for MAN are for it tank assembly plant at Nurnberg. The figures for D-B are for its Werk 40, its tank assembly plant at Berlin Marienfelde, not for the other non-tank plant operated by D-B at Marienfelde. Similar figures are available for Krupp's Grusonwerke, which was also dedicated to tank final assembly. It employed 7,397 in 1939 and 10,814 by 1944. Perhaps significantly, we do know the total number of PW employed by Krupp as a whole in June 1944 was c. 22,000, but only 778 of the total of 10,724 workers at Grusonwerke in 1944 were PW. We also have figures for MIAG's Ammenwerke, which was its tank assembly plant. During 1939, the Ammewerk employed an average of 4,872 workers. In 1940 that increased to 6,657, shrank slightly to 6,530 in 1941, then began to increase again to 6,681 in 1942, 7,342 in 1943, and then dropped again to 6,808 in 1944, and 5,791 in 1945. Of those, about 2,800 to 3,200 were actual production workers, while 1,800 to 2,600 were “non-productive” maintenance and service workers and the rest were involved in office work. We also know what Henschel's Werk III, its tank (and until late 1942 truck) production facility at Mittelfeld was like, it employed an average of 6,000 workers in 1944. Ditto the employment at VOMAG's "Panzerhalle" at Plauen. In 1940, VOMAG employed 4,096 workers, of which 1,884 were directly involved in production. The workforce expanded to 4,825 (2,244 in production), including 144 foreigners, in 1941. When the Panzerhalle expansion was completed in 1942, the workforce increased to 6,381 (2,999 in production) and increased slightly in 1943 to 6,584 (3,062 in production). At the end of 1944, the workforce was 6,530 (3,036 in production), including 1,978 foreigners, and then contracted in the first three months of 1945, ending with 4,550 on 31 March.
Something less than half were actual "production workers", but that does not mean the others were unnecessary workers.
First, what's to stop Germany from manning and tooling NW earlier if committed to fielding 5 more panzer divisions?
It was manned and tooled. The Nibelungenwerk was the largest and most advanced tank assembly plant of the German Reich. The plant, which was run by Steyr-Daimler-Puch AG, manufactured over half of all Panzer IV tanks produced by Germany during World War II. After the annexation of Austria in 1938, the Heereswaffenamt planned the construction of an armaments center near Linz. It would include manufacture of armor plate at Eisenwerke Oberdonau and a plant for final assembly of tanks near Sankt Valentin. Initially, 65 million Reichsmarks were earmarked for the new Sankt Valentin plant. On 23 February 1940, the Oberkommando des Heeres ordered construction of the plant at Thurnsdorf near St. Valentin and formally named it the Nibelungenwerk. The order allocated up to 78,288,000 Reichsmarks for its construction. By September 1940 enough of the plant was complete that it began rebuilding damaged Panzer III tanks, but the official opening took place in 1942. When completed, the monthly production capacity was intended to be 320 tanks, but it was never achieved. By fall 1941, about 4,800 workers were at the Nibeungenwerk. By the end of 1944 there were 8,500, including prisoners of war and forced labor from France, Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia, and the USSR. About 600 to 1,500 of the workers were from the Mauthausen concentration camp.
So initial planning began in late 1938, planning completed and funding was allocated in 1939, construction began in February 1940, and it was staffed and began operations in September 1940. The first new Panzer IV produced was in November 1941.
Second, whether NW ever reaches planned production is irrelevant to whether it produces sufficient PzIV's (~100) to equip 5 more panzer divisions.
Five more Panzer divisions required 140 Panzer IV. It was difficult for Nibelungenwerk to produce those if it was not producing Panzer IV. Given it took them 13 months November 1941 through November 1942 to produce 144, despite the crying need for such tanks on the Ostfront IRL, is a pretty solid indicator of how much earlier its dates need to be to achieve that by June 1941.
Okay but why is that relevant to whether, after 1938, Germany can equip 5 more panzer divisions?
Because the German tactical and doctrinal organization developed for the Panzer division from 1935-1943 required large numbers of Panzer III, but were delayed in getting them by roughly a year. It is also relevant that through June 1940, the Germans were planning on ten Panzer divisions with brigades of two regiments. That was revised due to experience in Poland and France and the anticipated requirement for 20+ divisions in 1941. In 1938, any planning for 25 Panzer divisions would perforce envisage a requirement for 50 Panzer regiments rather than 20.
All of which is a bit moot, since in 1938, the Germans were not monolithically fixated on an untried unit type, but were still divided between the merits of the Panzer Division and leichte Division, which issues also were not resolved until the experience of September 1939.
However, the only way that the Germans can base their planning in 1938 on experience gained in 1939 is via prescience.
Thank you for the reference. Jentz's detailed work is really extraordinary; I especially appreciate his explicit admission of needed corrections to earlier work.
You're welcome. The
Panzer Tracts are excellent for technical design and production issues. For the tactical and organizational issues you need to refer to his two-volume
Panzertruppen.
That said, I see nothing in the book that discusses whether planned panzer production was cut in 1939. What specifically do you think supports your argument?
Well, given that you keep bringing up this supposed "50% cut to Panzer production in 1939", I think it is upon you to support your argument? I am simply stating that I can find no such evidence for such a "cut", but instead see issues with finalizing design, over-expansion of production outside of the prime contractors, and such that affected actual output, but otherwise I see contracted production authorizations from 8 October 1936 that were extended 11 July 1938, but still falling short on actual deliveries as of 1 April 1940.
Elsewhere you've consistently expressed the viewpoint that a change in contracts is needed to substantiate a change in production plans. This is a naive and incomplete view of contract, which is never the same thing as a self-evident promise even when drafted to be so. In this specific context, it's even less clear that contract and planned production coincide.
Um, having worked with government contracting over the course of 28 years, no, I don't think I have a naive or incomplete view of it.
In any case, since I never expressed that viewpoint, I don't think I need defend it. I simply pointed out that the contracts were placed, the Heer planned for deliveries so they could outfit their units, and that shortfalls to planned production existed into early 1940 and beyond.
Jentz provides some more insight into the procurement process:
Inspektorat 6 in the Allgemeines Heeresamt (general army office) - not the Heeres Waffenamt (army ordnance department) - actually controlled the procurement process. Restrained by their share of the annual army budget, In 6 authorized the procurement of Panzers by specific Auftragen (authorizations) to the Waffenamt. The Waffenamt then awarded contracts to the assembly plants to produce a specific number of each panzer type authorized by In 6.
What you consistently assume is that Allgemeines Heeresamt wouldn't have authorized Heeres Waffenamt to award more contracts had the procurement budget for panzers been higher.
Well, yes, but was there a budgetary cut solely to Panzer production in 1939 of 50%? That seems to be what you are alleging, but since you are so sensitive to me assuming what you mean, would you please clarify that is in fact what you mean? And then provide some proof for it? I do know the Wehrmacht budget, like that of the Reich, was a mess in FY 1937-1938 and only marginally recovered in FY 1938-1939, but still haven't seen proof of a 50% cut specifically to the Panzerwaffe production. I know the Luftwaffe defense budget share decreased from 39.4% in 1937 to 34.9% in 1938 and then 33.1% in 1939, but have not seen particulars on specific programs such as tank production. Steel in FY 1938 was also a problem, concerning the AHA, but with regards to ammunition production shortfalls.
It's an obviously nonsensical assumption but has the merit of allowing you to point to OTL contracts and say they didn't change, while strategically ignoring the obvious point that more contracts for more panzers would have been issued had there been more funding for them (pre-war) or more other allocation (steel, labor) during the war.
Given that I was put out of work for six months following Katrina due to DOD budgetary shortfalls to pay contracts when monies were sequestered for relief efforts, I think I am well aware of how budget and contracts work.
I am asking you for some evidence that "panzer production was cut by 50% in 1939", either contractual or budgetary cuts.
I do know that the Heer ordered a new ordnance production plan 28 August 1940, incorporating the wartime experience to date, which replaced the prewar Rüstungsprogramme A (replaced by Plan B, how imaginative
), but again no real evidence of anything like a 50% production cut in 1939 has surfaced in my search.
The distinction between Allgemeines Heeresamt and Heeres Waffenamt instantiates the high-level distinction between particular total funding pool and specific contracts, respectively, that you'd like to pretend doesn't exist.
Assumptions on your part again. I know the distinction very well, I'm just asking for some evidence of anything that indicates there was a 50% cut in the contracts or budget.
Had funding for the panzer program not been cut by 50% in 1939, Allgemeines Heeresamt would have authorized twice as much panzer procurement, after which Heeres Waffenamt would have executed contracts for twice as many panzers. Whether H.Wa.A would have double specified quantities in existing contracts or issued further contracts to exhaust its greater funding pool is immaterial.
See, you just said it again...
Also note tJentz's table for total Pz3 production. We might be losing the forest for the trees in concentrating on firm-level production hiccups. Total program output followed a fairly even and consistent ramp.
Why yes, but when you include the trees you might notice that adding firm-level producers did not increase production. In that table the producers actually assigned to produce the Panzer III were:
January-February 1939 - D-B as prime contractor
March-July 1939 - MAN added as sub
August 1940 - Alkett added as sub
September 1939 - FAMO added as sub
April 1940 - MNH added as sub
March 1941 - Alkett and FAMO withdrawn from production pool (Alkett to StuG III production)
Then through April 1943 the pool consisted of just D-B, MAN, and MNH
So what was the effect on output of adding and subtracting resources in terms of additional production facilities and workers?
Oh, and BTW, if the budget was cut by 50% in 1939, what were they thinking adding additional subcontractors? Were they deliberately spreading the butter thinner and thinner? If so, why?
Oh, also BTW, if the budget was cut by 50% in 1939, what were they thinking funding Nibelungenwerk in 1939?
Sure but the overall pattern still reflects a basic rationality of developmental production at 1/2 firms for the early batches then expansion beyond them: Production started with 2 firms then moved to 6. Probably (I haven't checked) development delays meant that the development phase extended into the 6-firm period.
Sorry, but no that is incorrect. D-B was entirely responsible for the development series. MAN began production of the Ausf E in February 1939 and completed its first one in April 1939, as did D-B.
I appreciate that you're sometimes being affably humorous and I sometimes don't give you appropriate credit for that.
But remarks like this are what sometimes make it impossible to tell.
Specifically, I can't tell whether this is an expression of your general contempt for counterfactual reasoning.
No, just affably humorous, which is how I find the presentation of most counterfactual reasoning. It usually starts with "this is what I want my desired end state to be" and then works backwards from there tweaking events as required to get to it, then established a POD and claims everthing working forward from it is now guaranteed to follow.
My general contempt is held back for other things.
That's how the full-blown ATL ends. Germany captures Kiwis who reveal the Bob Semple, Germany mass-produces them and improvises floats for its invasion of North America and, ultimately, New Zealand.
Luckily the earlier improvisation regards division TOE's instead of tanks.
Yeah, the problem is the Germans did not improvise divisional T/O&E.