OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

[Sheldrake]

Indeed. It's worth remembering that when Wedemeyer and company were trying to figure out (in 1941) what would be needed (in 1943), the basic concept was the Japanese would stay out of the war; based on that, the target for 1943 in the 1941 VICTORY plan (which laid out a variety of potential roles and missions, and the forces required to achieve them) was total Army manpower of 8.8 million men; not exactly what as mobilized, but quite close.

How closely that tracked with actual combat forces (eventually) deployed overseas – ground and air – was less exact; the VICTORY plan envisioned several separate expeditionary forces to be ready for active service by July, 1943; in total, they came out to 39 infantry (straightleg and motorized), 11 specialized infantry (seven airborne and four mountain), eight armored, and two cavalry, for a total of 60 Army ground force divisions, organized and equipped for expeditionary warfare.

It’s worth noting the above was envisioned in terms of a conflict with the Axis in Europe and Africa; the strategic assessment for the Pacific was Japan would remain a non-belligerent.

Frederick Morgan (COSSAC) in Prelude to Overlord mentions that he has been entrusted with planning the largest operation ever planned by a British Officer. He references the Victory plan of 100 divisions with 25 of those assigned to the Pacific and the deficit to be made up from British and Commonwealth formations. By March 1945 there were around 90 division equivalents in North West Europe and another 20 in Italy.

These are the numbers that need to be considered in the debate over Op Market Garden or a 1942 or 1943 cross channel invasion. The idea that a 20-40 division force could overcome the Germany was a little fanciful without a collapse of German morale.

[Carl Schwamberger]

It’s worth noting the above was envisioned in terms of a conflict with the Axis in Europe and Africa; the strategic assessment for the Pacific was Japan would remain a non-belligerent.

Beyond that a prediction that Japan would sink a third of the US battle fleet, overrun Luzon, capture Singapore, capture all of the Dutch East Indies, and threaten Australia in four months. Would have been accused of writing bad science fiction. Sometimes we lose sight of just how unanticipated the Japanese conquests in the first quarter of 1942 were.

[daveshoup2MD]

Indeed. It's worth remembering that when Wedemeyer and company were trying to figure out (in 1941) what would be needed (in 1943), the basic concept was the Japanese would stay out of the war; based on that, the target for 1943 in the 1941 VICTORY plan (which laid out a variety of potential roles and missions, and the forces required to achieve them) was total Army manpower of 8.8 million men; not exactly what as mobilized, but quite close.

How closely that tracked with actual combat forces (eventually) deployed overseas – ground and air – was less exact; the VICTORY plan envisioned several separate expeditionary forces to be ready for active service by July, 1943; in total, they came out to 39 infantry (straightleg and motorized), 11 specialized infantry (seven airborne and four mountain), eight armored, and two cavalry, for a total of 60 Army ground force divisions, organized and equipped for expeditionary warfare.

It’s worth noting the above was envisioned in terms of a conflict with the Axis in Europe and Africa; the strategic assessment for the Pacific was Japan would remain a non-belligerent.

Frederick Morgan (COSSAC) in Prelude to Overlord mentions that he has been entrusted with planning the largest operation ever planned by a British Officer. He references the Victory plan of 100 divisions with 25 of those assigned to the Pacific and the deficit to be made up from British and Commonwealth formations. By March 1945 there were around 90 division equivalents in North West Europe and another 20 in Italy.

These are the numbers that need to be considered in the debate over Op Market Garden or a 1942 or 1943 cross channel invasion. The idea that a 20-40 division force could overcome the Germany was a little fanciful without a collapse of German morale.

The VIctory Plan version laid out above expected the British (and Commonwealth, Empire, Allied, etc.,) to remain in the war, and so the numbers are solely for US Army formations to be ready for expeditionary service in Europe/Africa by the end of Q2, 1943; given that, it's pretty close to what the US Army ended up deploying in the ETO/MTO, historically.

The above "60 division" force include three divisions earmarked for an early expeditionary force for use in Latin America, but there's also an expectation in the report that those three divisions would likely be available for Europe and/or Africa in mid-1943 as well, since the Axis threat to the Western Hemisphere (if it ever existed) would be minimal by then...

The July, 1943 target date also includes the equivalent of three divisions (essentially, those already deployed) for the Pacific; they are not included in the "60 Division" numbers outlined above. This version does not address USMC divisions, or the PA, if mobilized.

The numbers envisioned in the aftermath of a British collapse were very different; that scenario is addressed in the Victory Plan, but very much as a "Plan B," in the sense that the plan also includes an additional category of ground force divisions, which is where the really large numbers – an additional 53 armored divisions, 51 infantry, six mountain, three airborne and two cavalry, for a total of 115 over and above the 60 mentioned above as to be ready for overseas service by Q3, 1943 come in; these organizations, however, are categorized as a “strategic reserve” for which equipment is to be procured, but “activation, location, and training of these units will depend upon the international situation.”

Those caveats seem to be missed in a lot of discussions of the Victory Plan.

[daveshoup2MD]

It’s worth noting the above was envisioned in terms of a conflict with the Axis in Europe and Africa; the strategic assessment for the Pacific was Japan would remain a non-belligerent.

Beyond that a prediction that Japan would sink a third of the US battle fleet, overrun Luzon, capture Singapore, capture all of the Dutch East Indies, and threaten Australia in four months. Would have been accused of writing bad science fiction. Sometimes we lose sight of just how unanticipated the Japanese conquests in the first quarter of 1942 were.

Bywater kind of was, in fact...

One caveat - the US battlefleet in 1941 amounted to 17 ships in commission as such; of those, "only" two were really CTLs after Pearl Harbor. Given that Maryland, Tennessee, and Pennsylvania were all in commission and at sea, looking for trouble in 1942, I'd say - maybe - one can credit the IJN with CTLs on Arizona and Oklahoma and "out of action" on West Virginia, California, and Nevada, so five out of 17, total, so I'd make that less than one-third.

Even after Pearl Harbor, the USN had 12 pre-war battleships, including North Carolina and Washington, in commission by (arguably) the end of February, 1942, with four more to commission in 1943, one in Q1, two in Q2, and the last in Q3.

[Richard Anderson]

The VIctory Plan version laid out above expected the British (and Commonwealth, Empire, Allied, etc.,) to remain in the war, and so the numbers are solely for US Army formations to be ready for expeditionary service in Europe/Africa by the end of Q2, 1943; given that, it's pretty close to what the US Army ended up deploying in the ETO/MTO, historically.

...

Those caveats seem to be missed in a lot of discussions of the Victory Plan.

The other thing that keeps getting missed about the "Victory Plan" is that it wasn't a manpower or organizational mobilization "plan", it was a strategic estimate created as a basis for industrial mobilization planning, given that the industrial planning - such as it was - in the prewar PMP was already proving inadequate in early 1941.

[daveshoup2MD]

The VIctory Plan version laid out above expected the British (and Commonwealth, Empire, Allied, etc.,) to remain in the war, and so the numbers are solely for US Army formations to be ready for expeditionary service in Europe/Africa by the end of Q2, 1943; given that, it's pretty close to what the US Army ended up deploying in the ETO/MTO, historically.

...

Those caveats seem to be missed in a lot of discussions of the Victory Plan.

The other thing that keeps getting missed about the "Victory Plan" is that it wasn't a manpower or organizational mobilization "plan", it was a strategic estimate created as a basis for industrial mobilization planning, given that the industrial planning - such as it was - in the prewar PMP was already proving inadequate in early 1941.

Yeah, but I was trying to keep it simple. Wedemeyer's team's estimates for the operational US forces needed for an ETO offensive in the absence of a Pacific war are pretty good; and, as a snapshot of where strategic thinking was, generally, in Washington in 1941, it actually shows pretty impressive foresight and a good grasp of what would be necessary to defeat Germany in Europe.

It also makes clear - as Carl makes clear - the impact of the Pacific War on US capabilities; what's really remarkable, in terms of an assessment of the US war effort, is how close to the desired end state in 1943 the US came historically, even with the extra burdens of the Pacific War and the Mediterranean Theater.

[Richard Anderson]

Yeah, but I was trying to keep it simple.

I understand, but sometimes too much simplification obscures various issues. Wedemeyer's team under Gerow had little input that I can find on actual Troop Basis decisions made, and other agencies within the War Department made different estimates on divisional requirements. McNair as Chief of Staff, General Headquarters estimated 200 on 6 December 1941, similar to Wedemeyer's WDGS figure, but a year latter the JCS estimated 334 would eventually be organized. All foundered on the reality of differing manpower requirements.

Wedemeyer's team's estimates for the operational US forces needed for an ETO offensive in the absence of a Pacific war are pretty good; and, as a snapshot of where strategic thinking was, generally, in Washington in 1941, it actually shows pretty impressive foresight and a good grasp of what would be necessary to defeat Germany in Europe.

I agree 100 percent.

It also makes clear - as Carl makes clear - the impact of the Pacific War on US capabilities; what's really remarkable, in terms of an assessment of the US war effort, is how close to the desired end state in 1943 the US came historically, even with the extra burdens of the Pacific War and the Mediterranean Theater.

Yep, among other things the Pacific War knocked the well-ordered mobilization planning into a cocked hat, since deployed divisions could not be a useful source of cadre for new divisions and simultaneously became a drain on manpower as divisions not deployed were stripped of manpower as replacements. Rebalancing manpower in AGF in 1942-1943 as AAA was reduced (with the AAF following in 1944-1945) helped, but otherwise the sources of manpower for the AGF were reducing ASF manpower, reducing deferments, and expanding the draft.

[daveshoup2MD]

Yeah, but I was trying to keep it simple.

I understand, but sometimes too much simplification obscures various issues. Wedemeyer's team under Gerow had little input that I can find on actual Troop Basis decisions made, and other agencies within the War Department made different estimates on divisional requirements. McNair as Chief of Staff, General Headquarters estimated 200 on 6 December 1941, similar to Wedemeyer's WDGS figure, but a year latter the JCS estimated 334 would eventually be organized. All foundered on the reality of differing manpower requirements.

Wedemeyer's team's estimates for the operational US forces needed for an ETO offensive in the absence of a Pacific war are pretty good; and, as a snapshot of where strategic thinking was, generally, in Washington in 1941, it actually shows pretty impressive foresight and a good grasp of what would be necessary to defeat Germany in Europe.

I agree 100 percent.

It also makes clear - as Carl makes clear - the impact of the Pacific War on US capabilities; what's really remarkable, in terms of an assessment of the US war effort, is how close to the desired end state in 1943 the US came historically, even with the extra burdens of the Pacific War and the Mediterranean Theater.

Yep, among other things the Pacific War knocked the well-ordered mobilization planning into a cocked hat, since deployed divisions could not be a useful source of cadre for new divisions and simultaneously became a drain on manpower as divisions not deployed were stripped of manpower as replacements. Rebalancing manpower in AGF in 1942-1943 as AAA was reduced (with the AAF following in 1944-1945) helped, but otherwise the sources of manpower for the AGF were reducing ASF manpower, reducing deferments, and expanding the draft.

Fair enough. I'd need more background on the thinking on the larger figures, especially in terms of the strategic situation those estimates were envisioned as being in response to ...

But I think the takeaway is that Marshall et al actually had a pretty solid concept of what would be needed, as long as the British were still in the fight. It also speaks, very clearly, to the dispersion that the multiple theaters (North Africa-then MTO, South Pacific/Southwest Pacific/North Pacific/Central Pacific/CBI) forced, in terms of combat units and service and support, much less shipping and logistics organizations. The three routes to try and supply the Soviets had an impact as well.

Setting aside one of more of the Cinderella theaters could have significantly expedited the US counteroffensives that mattered.

[Richard Anderson]

Fair enough. I'd need more background on the thinking on the larger figures, especially in terms of the strategic situation those estimates were envisioned as being in response to ...

That is where it gets difficult. Basically, the White House, advised by the JCS, made decisions regarding how the Selective Service would intake personel, IIRC by assigning quarterly draft numbers. They then allocated X number to the Navy and Y number to the Army, plus an additional Z number to the Army Air Forces. The War Department General Staff then allocated the Army numbers by Branch, based on the current Troop Basis goals, to AGF and ASF, but with some pre-allocated, again according to WH or JCS desires, to specific categories, such as Roosevelt's instance that huge numbers be assigned to the AAA. For much if the war, AGF actually had limited control over the assignment of "its" personnel, and nearly lost control of unit activations to the WDGS (so much for the Machiavellian actions of McNair).

But I think the takeaway is that Marshall et al actually had a pretty solid concept of what would be needed, as long as the British were still in the fight. It also speaks, very clearly, to the dispersion that the multiple theaters (North Africa-then MTO, South Pacific/Southwest Pacific/North Pacific/Central Pacific/CBI) forced, in terms of combat units and service and support, much less shipping and logistics organizations. The three routes to try and supply the Soviets had an impact as well.

Setting aside one of more of the Cinderella theaters could have significantly expedited the US counteroffensives that mattered.

Yep, but the emergency reinforcement of the Pacific was more or less preordained by Pearl Harbor. It may have been a knee-jerk reaction, but it is difficult to see how else the knee could have jerked at the time. North Africa was also unlikely to change, which leaves the soft underbelly decisions. That might accelerate the readiness of divisions in the Z/I, but that would not increase the cantonment areas and covered depot space construction in England, which was a crucial bottleneck to a Continental invasion.

[Carl Schwamberger]

... But I think the takeaway is that Marshall et al actually had a pretty solid concept of what would be needed, as long as the British were still in the fight. It also speaks, very clearly, to the dispersion that the multiple theaters (North Africa-then MTO, South Pacific/Southwest Pacific/North Pacific/Central Pacific/CBI) forced, in terms of combat units and service and support, much less shipping and logistics organizations. The three routes to try and supply the Soviets had an impact as well.

Setting aside one of more of the Cinderella theaters could have significantly expedited the US counteroffensives that mattered.

& that brings it back round to the question of if: The strategic options of 1942-44 were preordained by decisions the players made 1939-1941. Or were there still viable options in 1943? That is, would reduction of resources to one of those Cinderella theaters allowed significant changes to strategy elsewhere? I wont say theres two schools of thought as I define there, but the discussions on alternative strategies seem to coalesce around those two ideas.

[daveshoup2MD]

Fair enough. I'd need more background on the thinking on the larger figures, especially in terms of the strategic situation those estimates were envisioned as being in response to ...

That is where it gets difficult. Basically, the White House, advised by the JCS, made decisions regarding how the Selective Service would intake personel, IIRC by assigning quarterly draft numbers. They then allocated X number to the Navy and Y number to the Army, plus an additional Z number to the Army Air Forces. The War Department General Staff then allocated the Army numbers by Branch, based on the current Troop Basis goals, to AGF and ASF, but with some pre-allocated, again according to WH or JCS desires, to specific categories, such as Roosevelt's instance that huge numbers be assigned to the AAA. For much if the war, AGF actually had limited control over the assignment of "its" personnel, and nearly lost control of unit activations to the WDGS (so much for the Machiavellian actions of McNair).

But I think the takeaway is that Marshall et al actually had a pretty solid concept of what would be needed, as long as the British were still in the fight. It also speaks, very clearly, to the dispersion that the multiple theaters (North Africa-then MTO, South Pacific/Southwest Pacific/North Pacific/Central Pacific/CBI) forced, in terms of combat units and service and support, much less shipping and logistics organizations. The three routes to try and supply the Soviets had an impact as well.

Setting aside one of more of the Cinderella theaters could have significantly expedited the US counteroffensives that mattered.

Yep, but the emergency reinforcement of the Pacific was more or less preordained by Pearl Harbor. It may have been a knee-jerk reaction, but it is difficult to see how else the knee could have jerked at the time. North Africa was also unlikely to change, which leaves the soft underbelly decisions. That might accelerate the readiness of divisions in the Z/I, but that would not increase the cantonment areas and covered depot space construction in England, which was a crucial bottleneck to a Continental invasion.

One point I'd make is there were three pretty obvious "phases" to the US Army (including AAF) Pacific deployments, once the balloon went up; the deployments in the first six months of 1942; those in the second six months; and those in 1943 and afterwards.

I'd agree the 1942 Q1 and Q2 deployments were an "emergency" response to the Japanese offensive; however, that offensive was dead and buried as of June 4-5, 1942. After that, shipping anything beyond replacements and various corps and army level forces to the Pacific was gilding the lily, at least until the summer of 1943 and the availability of the fast carrier force - and even then, given the expansion of the Fleet Marine Force and the naval organizations that provided the FMF its army-level expeditionary capabilities, even then it's an open question how large an Army deployment was warranted in the Pacific.

The point being, after Midway, a defensive strategy in the Pacific and Asia in 1942 would have paid real dividends for the Allied war effort elsewhere.

As far as construction forces made available for the ETO, presumably every Army engineer and/or NCF regiment NOT deployed to the Southwest, South, North, and Central Pacific - much less to the CBI and the Persian Gulf Service Command - could have been active in the ETO, and, frankly, likely on the ground and functional at an earlier point in the ETO than anywhere else (but CONUS and/or the CDC).

One thing about going through Stanton, unit by unit; awful lot of good personnel and useful material was being sent to - generally - marginal theaters in 1942-43.

[daveshoup2MD]

... But I think the takeaway is that Marshall et al actually had a pretty solid concept of what would be needed, as long as the British were still in the fight. It also speaks, very clearly, to the dispersion that the multiple theaters (North Africa-then MTO, South Pacific/Southwest Pacific/North Pacific/Central Pacific/CBI) forced, in terms of combat units and service and support, much less shipping and logistics organizations. The three routes to try and supply the Soviets had an impact as well.

Setting aside one of more of the Cinderella theaters could have significantly expedited the US counteroffensives that mattered.

& that brings it back round to the question of if: 1) The strategic options of 1942-44 were preordained by decisions the players made 1939-1941. Or 2) were there still viable options in 1943? That is, would reduction of resources to one of those Cinderella theaters allowed significant changes to strategy elsewhere? I wont say theres two schools of thought as I define there, but the discussions on alternative strategies seem to coalesce around those two ideas.

I would say "No" to Question 1 and "Yes" to Question 2.

[Carl Schwamberger]

... That might accelerate the readiness of divisions in the Z/I, but that would not increase the cantonment areas and covered depot space construction in England, which was a crucial bottleneck to a Continental invasion.

...As far as construction forces made available for the ETO, presumably every Army engineer and/or NCF regiment NOT deployed to the Southwest, South, North, and Central Pacific - much less to the CBI and the Persian Gulf Service Command - could have been active in the ETO, and, frankly, likely on the ground and functional at an earlier point in the ETO than anywhere else (but CONUS and/or the CDC). ...

Was this infrastructure bottleneck in England from to few engineer battalions, or to few cargo ships delivering the material?

[Aber]

Was this infrastructure bottleneck in England from to few engineer battalions, or to few cargo ships delivering the material?

Both I think from Ruppenthaal - the post Torch changes in troop numbers and shipments to the UK was fairly dramatic.

[Sheldrake]

... That might accelerate the readiness of divisions in the Z/I, but that would not increase the cantonment areas and covered depot space construction in England, which was a crucial bottleneck to a Continental invasion.

...As far as construction forces made available for the ETO, presumably every Army engineer and/or NCF regiment NOT deployed to the Southwest, South, North, and Central Pacific - much less to the CBI and the Persian Gulf Service Command - could have been active in the ETO, and, frankly, likely on the ground and functional at an earlier point in the ETO than anywhere else (but CONUS and/or the CDC). ...

Was this infrastructure bottleneck in England from to few engineer battalions, or to few cargo ships delivering the material?

It is both and more. Not only was there a shortage of cargo ships, but also an acute shortage of troop transports. And as is often overlooked, the U Boats were eroding cargo capacity and the convoy system was an inefficient way of using ports. Britain 's rail system was creaking at the joints too. There were limited training facilities in the UK. Delaying the entry of troops to the ETO may have allowed for better training. Ruppenthal also mentions the need to marry up soldiers with all the equipment they needed to fight. Key shortages of e.g. radios or cables might render a unit ineffective.

Ruppenthal mentions some 30 port battalions and a similar number of engineer battalions plus locomotives to improve port handling capacity. This specific request for American military engineers is unusual. It may have been push back to demonstrate the scale of resources needed to make the desired improvements in handling capacity. Were they supplied? What did they do?

There is a tendency to ignore what was going on in Britain and what the British were doing about it. This paper is a study of the UK Construction industry during WW2. https://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/B07MHXD6D2/ ... TF8&btkr=1 This made use of American lease lend construction equipment - which also needed shipping space. Bolero required a major construction programme for depots, barracks and hospitals and the worlds largest ever airfield construction programme.

Almost all was undertaken by British civil engineers using labour hired from neutral Ireland. Much depended on the construction battalions of Macalpine's Fusiliers. No war diaries or green book official history, but they do have a regimental march.