You say Lanai, and I say lenai:Richard Anderson wrote: ↑02 May 2021 22:49Like the 8,000-odd landing craft it was expected a three (or was it four) division assault would require when calculated in 1942? The doctrine matured as did the TTPs.daveshoup2MD wrote: ↑02 May 2021 21:41Fair response; thank you. Given the significance of the reality that an Allied army group-sized force could be sustained over the beach in the summer of 1943, however, I'd say it's not a stretch, especially compared to some of the concepts various and sundry boffins thought were necessary...
Lanai...sorry, couldn't resist after your correction of my year typo. I'm waiting to do much the same, except we just got back from the Pacific beaches, so I am back to staring at the inlet and Olympics.Given I'm not writing something for Proceedings or Parameters at the moment, I'll plead it really is too nice a day. Waves are breaking, palm trees are swaying, and there's a cold frosty one with my name on it on the lenai...
Take my advice, retire, or don't worry about it. If you start getting deliverables in on time they'll simply cut the time of delivery on the next one.But let's continue the conversation. It's more entertaining than spending the morning trying to get ahead of Monday's deliverables.
Patio: https://4lifeoutdoor.com/outdoor-rooms- ... h-veranda/
Bottom line in all this is the Allies successfully created a lot of operational amphibious lift in 1942-44, more than any other coalition before or since; the types varied, but the capacity is undeniable, given the historical record of successful amphibious operations, from IRONCLAD and WATCHTOWER in 1942 to NEPTUNE and DRAGOON in 1944 - which is the proof, as opposed to theory about "Operation X was impossible without Gadget Y," which is simply a technical excuse for avoiding questions about policy decisions.
Obviously, there is a difference between capacity and strategy (means and ends), but from the perspective of historical, leadership, and policy-making, that's where it gets interesting in terms of competing aims, goals, and desired end states - but the capacity argument is often used to try and obscure the more important questions.
Alternative history is fantasy; but historical alternatives are worthy of analysis - and the question then is not "what if?" by "why not?"... that's the fascinating part.
My .2 sentimos