Order of Battle for Operation Roundup, 1943?

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daveshoup2MarDiv
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Re: Order of Battle for Operation Roundup, 1943?

Post by daveshoup2MarDiv » 28 Feb 2024 06:35

Richard Anderson wrote:
28 Feb 2024 03:57
daveshoup2MarDiv wrote:
28 Feb 2024 01:42
A. Here's your original statement: "Although roundly criticized by DePuy and others, I am not sure given the shear lack of experience in mobilization in the U.S. Army that anything else could have sufficed."
i. Yep, my original statement. Where do you see anything in it about "moving an expeditionary force"? I am talking about the first step in mobilization - having units activated, organized, and equipped to move as "and expeditionary force" overseas.
What other combatant in WW II had any more experience mobilizing an army group-sized expeditionary force - including the air element and the supporting USN element - across the Atlantic to Europe and sustaining it? Canada? Talk about moving the goalposts...
ii. Nope. You are not talking about mobilizing the force, but rather moving the mobilized force overseas. It is the cart before the horse/
B. A "shitshow"? Really? The US forces (Army and Navy) put an amphibious corps ashore and into action across the Atlantic in Q41942, built it up to field army- and supporting air force(s) - plural - and had them in action by Q31943, at the same time the Army supported multiple division+ to corps+ offensives on various islands from the North Pacific to the Southwest Pacific in 1942-43, while supporting major non-combat but deployed (at trans-oceanic distances, via the USN and USMM/MS/WSA) logistics efforts from the North Pacific to South Asia to Southwest Asia to Africa, while providing defense forces (jointly with the USN) in the Western Hemisphere in theaters from the North Pacific to the Central Pacific to the Caribbean and back to the western Atlantic. Please explain what combatant - successfully - deployed more combat power at greater distances in the same period?
iii. Again, not what I am talking about. The "amphibious corps" put ashore in November 1942 consisted of units that had been in existence for years in most cases and decades in some.
C. Given the ~30 divisions presumably in question all mobilized in 1940-41 (with the exception of the 82nd Airborne, which was not mobilized or converted to airborne status until 1942), the actual time frame from M-Day to Q31943 is - at least - 18 months, significantly longer in most cases. Pretty sure GCM had a better sense of the possible than anyone, then or now, really.
iv. Yeah, except that a 30-division force was not ready and not in the UK. Most, for many reasons, were still in the Z/I and unready to go to the UK.
D. Yep, pretty interesting. Trying to get to the point that a post on such is doable, given the demands of real life ... and the gallery. ;)
v. Then stop responding to the gallery. Or do what I do and just ignore real life as much as possible. :lol:
E. GCM, DDE, McNarney, Gerow, and Handy all seemed pretty convinced, at the time.
vi. It is astonishing how quickly Eisenhower pivoted from everything was about the defense of the Philippines to "We've got to go to Europe and fight". It only took about 24 hours and a move from the office of Deputy Chief to that of the Chief of WPD. :D

BTW, while I agree in theory with the sentiment, I also understand the agreement is based on hindsight and also that it probably was not feasible given the ineptness of the U.S. Army at preparing divisions for POM.
i. With respect, you're taking a very limited perspective. Mobilization was a continuum, from organization of the forces in the US (including activation, manning, equipping, training), then movement to the forward theater, deployment into the AOR, etc.) This was the pattern in 1917-18 (although some elements of the AEF were able to train in the UK and France because, after all, the French had held in 1914); not so much in 1940-45, but the basic pattern was the same. What became - for example - the 5th and 7th armies and the 9th and 12th air forces - in the MTO by Q31943, had to be raised and trained in the US in 1940-43, and then be deployed to the eastern hemisphere in 1942-43, before they could proceed to fight in northern Africa and then Italy in 1942-43.

ii. Nope; see above. The US was not planning to defeat the Axis (or the Central Powers, 20 years earlier) by keeping the US Army in North America.

iii. According to Stanton, I Armored Corps was activated in July, 1940; it was converted to an amphibious corps (GSP was given the WTF command on July 30, 1942, and didn't meet Hewitt until August) and the corps landed in Morocco in November. The only reason it could be used as such for TORCH was the Atlantic Fleet's amphibious force, but even that had only existed as such from the middle of 1940 - at best. 3rd Infantry Division had existed as such - at vastly varying levels of strength - since 1917, but only began even limited amphibious training in 1940-41 (Fort Ord) and then again in 1942, and left for Virginia and in September. Anderson (an Army officer who was a USNA graduate) had only been in command since March, 1942; the 2nd Armored Division was activated in July, 1940, and the 9th Infantry Division in August; it got some amphibious training in 1941-42, before leaving the US for TORCH in November. Hardly "decades" ... barely "years" - more like "months," in most cases. See: https://history.army.mil/html/books/006 ... _6-1-1.pdf

iv. Historically? Not in the UK? Yes. Not ready? Unproven. In a 1943 where different historical alternatives are considered/chosen at 2nd Washington in June, 1942? Unknown.

v. DoD gets first dibs.

vi. Eisenhower's quotes all date from January and February, 1942. Hardly hindsight.

Footnote: please provide a link to any analysis that found the US Army was "inept" at preparing its divisions for deployment during WW II. Thanks in advance.

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Re: Order of Battle for Operation Roundup, 1943?

Post by ljadw » 28 Feb 2024 06:54

What people here are calling mobilization ,is in reality rearmament, but there is a big quantitative and qualitative difference between both .
Britain,France and Germany spent before the war a bigger part of their GDP on defense than the US:France 8 %, Germany 16 % ,Britain 3,75 % in 1938 (British rearmament started in 1932 /1933 ) ,but no one said that they were mobilizing .
In 1950 Britain spent 6 % of its GDP on defense, during the Korean War 11 % .This was a rearmament, not a mobilization .
US military spending was going up from 1 % in 1940 to 5 % in 1941 :rearmament, but not mobilization .If 5 % in 1941 was mobilization, so was 8 % in 1958 .

Aber
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Re: Order of Battle for Operation Roundup, 1943?

Post by Aber » 28 Feb 2024 09:05

daveshoup2MarDiv wrote:
28 Feb 2024 06:35
vi. Eisenhower's quotes all date from January and February, 1942. Hardly hindsight.
A reasonable strategic analysis; however lacking in an assessment of what was possible.
If we're to keep Russia in, save the Middle East, India and Burma; we've got to begin slugging with air at West Europe; to be followed by a land attack as soon as possible.
Well the slugging started with 6 bombers attacking the Netherlands almost 6 months later, and we're trying to work out what as soon as possible means for a land attack, and struggling to see if anything could be done by mid 1943 even with hindsight.

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Re: Order of Battle for Operation Roundup, 1943?

Post by Richard Anderson » 29 Feb 2024 00:17

daveshoup2MarDiv wrote:
28 Feb 2024 06:35
i. With respect, you're taking a very limited perspective. Mobilization was a continuum, from organization of the forces in the US (including activation, manning, equipping, training), then movement to the forward theater, deployment into the AOR, etc.) This was the pattern in 1917-18 (although some elements of the AEF were able to train in the UK and France because, after all, the French had held in 1914); not so much in 1940-45, but the basic pattern was the same. What became - for example - the 5th and 7th armies and the 9th and 12th air forces - in the MTO by Q31943, had to be raised and trained in the US in 1940-43, and then be deployed to the eastern hemisphere in 1942-43, before they could proceed to fight in northern Africa and then Italy in 1942-43.
With respect, I am looking at the base of the problem, which was the actual time required for the mobilization of divisions and how manpower was utilized. In 1917-1918, divisions were sent rapidly to Europe, but they were untrained and nearly unequipped masses of manpower. In 1941-1945, the training and equipping was handled much better, but the time to get the divisions overseas increased.
ii. Nope; see above. The US was not planning to defeat the Axis (or the Central Powers, 20 years earlier) by keeping the US Army in North America.
Not what I said. I am addressing your idea of getting 30 divisions to Britain by spring 1943. If they are untrained and unequipped and do not have cantonments in Britain, then they are simply repeating the Great War mess.
iii. According to Stanton, I Armored Corps was activated in July, 1940; it was converted to an amphibious corps (GSP was given the WTF command on July 30, 1942, and didn't meet Hewitt until August) and the corps landed in Morocco in November. The only reason it could be used as such for TORCH was the Atlantic Fleet's amphibious force, but even that had only existed as such from the middle of 1940 - at best. 3rd Infantry Division had existed as such - at vastly varying levels of strength - since 1917, but only began even limited amphibious training in 1940-41 (Fort Ord) and then again in 1942, and left for Virginia and in September. Anderson (an Army officer who was a USNA graduate) had only been in command since March, 1942; the 2nd Armored Division was activated in July, 1940, and the 9th Infantry Division in August; it got some amphibious training in 1941-42, before leaving the US for TORCH in November. Hardly "decades" ... barely "years" - more like "months," in most cases. See: https://history.army.mil/html/books/006 ... _6-1-1.pdf
Talking about divisions, not corps, talking about training, not amphibious training.

The 3d Division was in existence since 1917 and was wholly active prewar, except for parts of the 9th FA Regt and the 3d Med Regt, albeit it served on widely scattered garrisons, was at peacetime strength, and did not assemble as a division until April 1937 until all but one battalion assembled at Fort Lewis for maneuvers. It was reorganized as a triangular division in October 1939, following the 2d Division, which was proof of concept. It began expanding to wartime strength in September 1939. So, when it deployed to North Africa, it had been in existence for 25 years, had been active throughout, and had been training as a division 5 years. It began training in amphibious warfare in November 1941, with the first tactical landing exercise by the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry on 1 December and each infantry battalion then taking turns. Exercise in loading and landing from actual AP began the first week of January 1942 and continued until it moved to Camp Pickett on 14 September 1942.

Yes, the 2d Armored Division was activated 15 July 1940, from the Provisional Armored Brigade organized earlier that year for the Louisiana Maneuvers. It was comprised of the 66th Armor (Medium) and the 67th and 68th Armor (Light), with the 41st Infantry (Armored). The 66th had been active (minus the 2d Bn RAI) since 16 September 1931. The other regiments were mostly RAI until activated in July 1940. So 1/6 had been active since 1931 and all had been active with RA and OR personnel for the summer maneuver season since 1926.

The third TORCH division, the 34th Infantry was federally recognized on 14 July 1924. It first maneuvered as a division in August 1937. It was inducted into federal service on 10 February 1941.

For the 9th Infantry Division, the 39th, 47th, and 60th Infantry had been organized as RAI since 25 February 1927 and were reactivated and reorganized 9 August 1940.

So, yes, years to decades.
iv. Historically? Not in the UK? Yes. Not ready? Unproven. In a 1943 where different historical alternatives are considered/chosen at 2nd Washington in June, 1942? Unknown.
The problem is the "different historical alternatives" that need to be chosen to have 30 divisions POMmed to the UK by summer 1943, is a major shift to the mobilization procedure for divisions - specifically infantry divisions - that was gained from the experience of organizing them.
v. DoD gets first dibs.
:thumbsup: As it should.
vi. Eisenhower's quotes all date from January and February, 1942. Hardly hindsight.
I didn't say he was operating with hindsight, did I? He was operating from the POV of a new office and under a new hat. His promotion significantly widened his horizons. :lol:
Footnote: please provide a link to any analysis that found the US Army was "inept" at preparing its divisions for deployment during WW II. Thanks in advance.
The analysis is in this thread, from me, via McNair's memo. Is it not "inept", i.e., showing no skill or clumsy, that the readiness of U.S. infantry divisions took nearly twice as long as planned? 21 to 22 months rather than 12? And that is with a number of divisions, all nine prewar regular divisions and about half the NG divisions getting a standing start, with months of existence prior to 7 December 1941.
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daveshoup2MarDiv
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Re: Order of Battle for Operation Roundup, 1943?

Post by daveshoup2MarDiv » 29 Feb 2024 05:47

Aber wrote:
28 Feb 2024 09:05
daveshoup2MarDiv wrote:
28 Feb 2024 06:35
vi. Eisenhower's quotes all date from January and February, 1942. Hardly hindsight.
1) A reasonable strategic analysis; however lacking in an assessment of what was possible.
If we're to keep Russia in, save the Middle East, India and Burma; we've got to begin slugging with air at West Europe; to be followed by a land attack as soon as possible.
2) Well the slugging started with 6 bombers attacking the Netherlands almost 6 months later, and we're trying to work out what as soon as possible means for a land attack, and struggling to see if anything could be done by mid 1943 even with hindsight.

1. What was possible - if one really looks at what and when the US deployed historically in theaters as distant and austere as Alaska, the South Pacific, the Southwest Pacific, the CBI, and SW Asia, and in combination with what was deployed in North Africa, the MTO, and the ETO, by the middle of 1943 - it's actually pretty interesting. Stand by.

2. Yes, and the AEF started off with one division, more or less, in June, 1917, and by November, 1918, - 18 months later, essentially - it amounted to an army group with an air force (even though it wasn't designated as such) in support. The US began full mobilization for WW II with the passage by Congress of conscription in September, 1940; by July, 1943, the mobilization had been underway for 33 months.

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Re: Order of Battle for Operation Roundup, 1943?

Post by ljadw » 29 Feb 2024 10:53

Is 1 (What was possible ) not a hindsight argument ? Could Eisenhower know in 1942 what the US could do in 1943 ?
I don't see why air attacks and land attacks would be needed to keep Russia in as Russia had already stopped the German attack before the start of the air attacks on Western Europe followed by a land attack and as a new Brest-Litovsk treaty was out of the question .
And why would it be necessary to start air attacks and a landing in Western Europe to save the Middle East,India and Burma :the ME was not in danger and what happened in Western Europe had no influence on the Japanese strategy and possibilities .

Aber
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Re: Order of Battle for Operation Roundup, 1943?

Post by Aber » 29 Feb 2024 13:19

daveshoup2MarDiv wrote:
29 Feb 2024 05:47
1. What was possible - if one really looks at what and when the US deployed historically in theaters as distant and austere as Alaska, the South Pacific, the Southwest Pacific, the CBI, and SW Asia, and in combination with what was deployed in North Africa, the MTO, and the ETO, by the middle of 1943 - it's actually pretty interesting.
Of course it is interesting.

The key element for me is the change from Marshall in April 1942 telling the President 30 divisions in the UK by April 1943 for Roundup, to the actual deployments post the Torch decision.

At some point the realities of divisional preparation, equipment availability, shipping availability and infrastructure in the UK hit. Unfortunately existing histories don't address this in a coherent way, and the shortfall in overseas deployments seems to mostly be blamed on Torch, rather than the complex dependencies eg forming new divisions delays deployment of existing ones, engineers should be deployed to build infrastructure before units deploy etc.

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Re: Order of Battle for Operation Roundup, 1943?

Post by daveshoup2MarDiv » 29 Feb 2024 16:38

Aber wrote:
29 Feb 2024 13:19
daveshoup2MarDiv wrote:
29 Feb 2024 05:47
1. What was possible - if one really looks at what and when the US deployed historically in theaters as distant and austere as Alaska, the South Pacific, the Southwest Pacific, the CBI, and SW Asia, and in combination with what was deployed in North Africa, the MTO, and the ETO, by the middle of 1943 - it's actually pretty interesting.
Of course it is interesting.

The key element for me is the change from Marshall in April 1942 telling the President 30 divisions in the UK by April 1943 for Roundup, to the actual deployments post the Torch decision.

At some point the realities of divisional preparation, equipment availability, shipping availability and infrastructure in the UK hit. Unfortunately existing histories don't address this in a coherent way, and the shortfall in overseas deployments seems to mostly be blamed on Torch, rather than the complex dependencies eg forming new divisions delays deployment of existing ones, engineers should be deployed to build infrastructure before units deploy etc.
Except the focus on North Africa/Med vs. UK/ETO misses (or at least obscures) the issues that are at least as significant in other theaters. Intent is to have a post by this weekend going through some of that, but it's really an interesting set of questions about what was accomplished in the period Q31942-Q21944, based on decisions that were made - essentially - at the 2nd Washington Conference, which was a more significant event than (for example) ARCADIA, ANFA, etc.

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Re: Order of Battle for Operation Roundup, 1943?

Post by daveshoup2MarDiv » 29 Feb 2024 16:44

ljadw wrote:
29 Feb 2024 10:53
Is 1 (What was possible ) not a hindsight argument ? Could Eisenhower know in 1942 what the US could do in 1943 ?
I don't see why air attacks and land attacks would be needed to keep Russia in as Russia had already stopped the German attack before the start of the air attacks on Western Europe followed by a land attack and as a new Brest-Litovsk treaty was out of the question .
And why would it be necessary to start air attacks and a landing in Western Europe to save the Middle East,India and Burma :the ME was not in danger and what happened in Western Europe had no influence on the Japanese strategy and possibilities .
No, it's not a hindsight argument. Marshall, King, McNarney, Eisenhower, Handy, etc were the US officers who were considering exactly "what" the US could do in 1943, when the forces raised in 1940-41, and being raised in 1942, would be available. That was their job, and they certainly had a better understanding of what was possible via the US war effort - in 1942 and 1943 and afterwards - then their British counterparts did.

In January-February, 1942, when the statements by Eisenhower quoted above were made, the Soviets had barely stopped the Germans, due largely to geography and weather; given how far the Germans got in the east in 1942, whether the Soviet government could survive a second year of defeat was very much an open question.

The statement about the Middle East, India, and Burma was simply that once those fronts were stabilized, the Western Allies needed to go on the offensive against the Germans in Europe. No reason to read it in any other way.

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Re: Order of Battle for Operation Roundup, 1943?

Post by Richard Anderson » 29 Feb 2024 18:41

daveshoup2MarDiv wrote:
29 Feb 2024 16:38
Except the focus on North Africa/Med vs. UK/ETO misses (or at least obscures) the issues that are at least as significant in other theaters. Intent is to have a post by this weekend going through some of that, but it's really an interesting set of questions about what was accomplished in the period Q31942-Q21944, based on decisions that were made - essentially - at the 2nd Washington Conference, which was a more significant event than (for example) ARCADIA, ANFA, etc.
The problem is there is very little you can do about the "issues that are at least as significant in other theaters". In terms of the Pacific, only four divisions had been committed there in addition to the 24th and 25th. The 27th moved to Hawaii to reinforce the 24th and 25th, the 32d and 41st, sent to reinforce Australia, and the 37th sent to Fiji. You can also count the disparate units that became Americal. So about Five divisions, reinforcing Allied - not American - positions in the Pacific.

What can be changed in terms of commitment at that point is the decision to deploy the 40th and 43d in August and September 1942. Did the 40th really need to go to the Hawaiian Territory? Possibly not, but it did free up the 25th for offensive operations, so you would have to argue that the American political-military leadership could be convinced that a lesser garrison was okay. Did the 43d really need to got to New Zealand? Possibly not, but it would be hard to convince the New Zealand government of that, especially when they had decided to allow their 2nd Division to remain in the Med rather than recalling it, as had the Australian government done with their divisions.

After that there is nothing really possible to change until February-March 1943, when it was decided to send the 7th Infantry Division to retake the Alaskan territories lost.

Basically, you are looking at changing the actions of two divisions in the 3Q1942...out of 47 divisions active 30 June 1942, with 26 1/2 more activated by the end of the year. Note also that as of 30 June 1942, just 10 of those 47 divisions active were outside the Z/I, the 1st Armored, 5th, 24th, 25th, 27th, 32d, 34th, 37th, 41st, and Americal.
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Re: Order of Battle for Operation Roundup, 1943?

Post by ljadw » 29 Feb 2024 21:19

daveshoup2MarDiv wrote:
29 Feb 2024 16:44
ljadw wrote:
29 Feb 2024 10:53
Is 1 (What was possible ) not a hindsight argument ? Could Eisenhower know in 1942 what the US could do in 1943 ?
I don't see why air attacks and land attacks would be needed to keep Russia in as Russia had already stopped the German attack before the start of the air attacks on Western Europe followed by a land attack and as a new Brest-Litovsk treaty was out of the question .
And why would it be necessary to start air attacks and a landing in Western Europe to save the Middle East,India and Burma :the ME was not in danger and what happened in Western Europe had no influence on the Japanese strategy and possibilities .
No, it's not a hindsight argument. Marshall, King, McNarney, Eisenhower, Handy, etc were the US officers who were considering exactly "what" the US could do in 1943, when the forces raised in 1940-41, and being raised in 1942, would be available. That was their job, and they certainly had a better understanding of what was possible via the US war effort - in 1942 and 1943 and afterwards - then their British counterparts did.

In January-February, 1942, when the statements by Eisenhower quoted above were made, the Soviets had barely stopped the Germans, due largely to geography and weather; given how far the Germans got in the east in 1942, whether the Soviet government could survive a second year of defeat was very much an open question.

The statement about the Middle East, India, and Burma was simply that once those fronts were stabilized, the Western Allies needed to go on the offensive against the Germans in Europe. No reason to read it in any other way.
Marshall, King, Eisenhower,etc could not know if and when, where ans how much the US forces raised before and after PH could/would be available , because they did not know how the war in the Atlantic Ocean would evolve .
That the Soviet government could /would maybe not survive a second war year (not a second year of defeat as in 1941 and 1942 it were the Germans that failed, not the Soviets ) is not an open question, but an old myth spread by the Marxist lobby in the US and the UK (Second Front now ) and also spread and fortified by the adherents of the claim that US saved the Soviets, something that was also claimed by the defeated German generals ) and how much the Germans advanced in 1942 ( much less than in 1941 ) was totally meaningless and not relevant .
There was also no need for the Western Allies to go on the offensive against the Germans in Europe if/after the fronts in NA ( not the Middle East), India (a small part of India ) and Burma ( not important ) were stabilized .Besides :the front in NA was not stabilized.
US air attacks against Germany started in 1943 ,not because of what happened in NA,India and Burma ,but because the USAAF was not ready earlier .
Husky and Avalanche started in July and September 1943, also because the US were not ready .
Without Torch the war in NA would be over in February 1943,but that does not mean that Husky and Avalanche would happen earlier than they did, because Britain could not do it on its own and the US were not ready .

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Re: Order of Battle for Operation Roundup, 1943?

Post by daveshoup2MarDiv » 29 Feb 2024 22:52

Richard Anderson wrote:
29 Feb 2024 00:17
daveshoup2MarDiv wrote:
28 Feb 2024 06:35
i. With respect, you're taking a very limited perspective. Mobilization was a continuum, from organization of the forces in the US (including activation, manning, equipping, training), then movement to the forward theater, deployment into the AOR, etc.) This was the pattern in 1917-18 (although some elements of the AEF were able to train in the UK and France because, after all, the French had held in 1914); not so much in 1940-45, but the basic pattern was the same. What became - for example - the 5th and 7th armies and the 9th and 12th air forces - in the MTO by Q31943, had to be raised and trained in the US in 1940-43, and then be deployed to the eastern hemisphere in 1942-43, before they could proceed to fight in northern Africa and then Italy in 1942-43.
With respect, I am looking at the base of the problem, which was the actual time required for the mobilization of divisions and how manpower was utilized. In 1917-1918, divisions were sent rapidly to Europe, but they were untrained and nearly unequipped masses of manpower. In 1941-1945, the training and equipping was handled much better, but the time to get the divisions overseas increased.
ii. Nope; see above. The US was not planning to defeat the Axis (or the Central Powers, 20 years earlier) by keeping the US Army in North America.
Not what I said. I am addressing your idea of getting 30 divisions to Britain by spring 1943. If they are untrained and unequipped and do not have cantonments in Britain, then they are simply repeating the Great War mess.
iii. According to Stanton, I Armored Corps was activated in July, 1940; it was converted to an amphibious corps (GSP was given the WTF command on July 30, 1942, and didn't meet Hewitt until August) and the corps landed in Morocco in November. The only reason it could be used as such for TORCH was the Atlantic Fleet's amphibious force, but even that had only existed as such from the middle of 1940 - at best. 3rd Infantry Division had existed as such - at vastly varying levels of strength - since 1917, but only began even limited amphibious training in 1940-41 (Fort Ord) and then again in 1942, and left for Virginia and in September. Anderson (an Army officer who was a USNA graduate) had only been in command since March, 1942; the 2nd Armored Division was activated in July, 1940, and the 9th Infantry Division in August; it got some amphibious training in 1941-42, before leaving the US for TORCH in November. Hardly "decades" ... barely "years" - more like "months," in most cases. See: https://history.army.mil/html/books/006 ... _6-1-1.pdf
Talking about divisions, not corps, talking about training, not amphibious training.

The 3d Division was in existence since 1917 and was wholly active prewar, except for parts of the 9th FA Regt and the 3d Med Regt, albeit it served on widely scattered garrisons, was at peacetime strength, and did not assemble as a division until April 1937 until all but one battalion assembled at Fort Lewis for maneuvers. It was reorganized as a triangular division in October 1939, following the 2d Division, which was proof of concept. It began expanding to wartime strength in September 1939. So, when it deployed to North Africa, it had been in existence for 25 years, had been active throughout, and had been training as a division 5 years. It began training in amphibious warfare in November 1941, with the first tactical landing exercise by the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry on 1 December and each infantry battalion then taking turns. Exercise in loading and landing from actual AP began the first week of January 1942 and continued until it moved to Camp Pickett on 14 September 1942.

Yes, the 2d Armored Division was activated 15 July 1940, from the Provisional Armored Brigade organized earlier that year for the Louisiana Maneuvers. It was comprised of the 66th Armor (Medium) and the 67th and 68th Armor (Light), with the 41st Infantry (Armored). The 66th had been active (minus the 2d Bn RAI) since 16 September 1931. The other regiments were mostly RAI until activated in July 1940. So 1/6 had been active since 1931 and all had been active with RA and OR personnel for the summer maneuver season since 1926.

The third TORCH division, the 34th Infantry was federally recognized on 14 July 1924. It first maneuvered as a division in August 1937. It was inducted into federal service on 10 February 1941.

For the 9th Infantry Division, the 39th, 47th, and 60th Infantry had been organized as RAI since 25 February 1927 and were reactivated and reorganized 9 August 1940.

So, yes, years to decades.
iv. Historically? Not in the UK? Yes. Not ready? Unproven. In a 1943 where different historical alternatives are considered/chosen at 2nd Washington in June, 1942? Unknown.
The problem is the "different historical alternatives" that need to be chosen to have 30 divisions POMmed to the UK by summer 1943, is a major shift to the mobilization procedure for divisions - specifically infantry divisions - that was gained from the experience of organizing them.
v. DoD gets first dibs.
:thumbsup: As it should.
vi. Eisenhower's quotes all date from January and February, 1942. Hardly hindsight.
I didn't say he was operating with hindsight, did I? He was operating from the POV of a new office and under a new hat. His promotion significantly widened his horizons. :lol:
Footnote: please provide a link to any analysis that found the US Army was "inept" at preparing its divisions for deployment during WW II. Thanks in advance.
The analysis is in this thread, from me, via McNair's memo. Is it not "inept", i.e., showing no skill or clumsy, that the readiness of U.S. infantry divisions took nearly twice as long as planned? 21 to 22 months rather than 12? And that is with a number of divisions, all nine prewar regular divisions and about half the NG divisions getting a standing start, with months of existence prior to 7 December 1941.
No, it's not "inept" - in whose eyes? Compared to what other nation's military establishment at the time? ... Japan? Germany? The UK? Please ...

In comparison to a) EVERY OTHER COMBATANT in the conflict, the US mobilization and deployment record was exemplary; and b) compared to the US record in 1917-18, which all the US decision-makers, from FDR on down, were well aware of, since they'd all lived through, been a decision-maker, and/or witnessed it, it's equally impressive.

In a world where technology like steam trains and coal-burning merchantmen and telegrams and hand-written records was still a factor, much less the human factors, the US mobilization record in 1940-45 is fucking amazing.

Mobilization, by definition, is a real world exercise, and the appropriate comparisons are with the real world equivalents - or at least as close to approximations otherwise, and subject to all the friction and human factors and black swans inherent in such. Anyone who thinks it can be reduced to a spread sheet is ... ahistorical, at the very least.

daveshoup2MarDiv
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Re: Order of Battle for Operation Roundup, 1943?

Post by daveshoup2MarDiv » 29 Feb 2024 23:13

Richard Anderson wrote:
29 Feb 2024 18:41
daveshoup2MarDiv wrote:
29 Feb 2024 16:38
Except the focus on North Africa/Med vs. UK/ETO misses (or at least obscures) the issues that are at least as significant in other theaters. Intent is to have a post by this weekend going through some of that, but it's really an interesting set of questions about what was accomplished in the period Q31942-Q21944, based on decisions that were made - essentially - at the 2nd Washington Conference, which was a more significant event than (for example) ARCADIA, ANFA, etc.
The problem is there is very little you can do about the "issues that are at least as significant in other theaters". In terms of the Pacific, only four divisions had been committed there in addition to the 24th and 25th. The 27th moved to Hawaii to reinforce the 24th and 25th, the 32d and 41st, sent to reinforce Australia, and the 37th sent to Fiji. You can also count the disparate units that became Americal. So about Five divisions, reinforcing Allied - not American - positions in the Pacific.

What can be changed in terms of commitment at that point is the decision to deploy the 40th and 43d in August and September 1942. Did the 40th really need to go to the Hawaiian Territory? Possibly not, but it did free up the 25th for offensive operations, so you would have to argue that the American political-military leadership could be convinced that a lesser garrison was okay. Did the 43d really need to got to New Zealand? Possibly not, but it would be hard to convince the New Zealand government of that, especially when they had decided to allow their 2nd Division to remain in the Med rather than recalling it, as had the Australian government done with their divisions.

After that there is nothing really possible to change until February-March 1943, when it was decided to send the 7th Infantry Division to retake the Alaskan territories lost.

Basically, you are looking at changing the actions of two divisions in the 3Q1942...out of 47 divisions active 30 June 1942, with 26 1/2 more activated by the end of the year. Note also that as of 30 June 1942, just 10 of those 47 divisions active were outside the Z/I, the 1st Armored, 5th, 24th, 25th, 27th, 32d, 34th, 37th, 41st, and Americal.
Lot more Allied troop movements by sea in 1942-43 than what you have listed here, of course - including several where an Allied division already in theater - the 1st Marine Division in New Zealand, for example - got moved from one point to another in the same theater. Then there are the cases - the British 5th Infantry Division or the 5th Indian Division, for example - that had already deployed overseas from the UK to a distant theater, got moved to yet another theater.

Then there's the obvious issue that moving a battalion to the SWPA or South Pacific from the San Francisco POE, unloading it, and getting the empty ship back to the US, took two-to-three times doing the same from one of the east coast POEs to Greenock and back; moving the same battalion from the NYPOE or NOPOE to Basra or Bushire to three-to-four times as long.

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Re: Order of Battle for Operation Roundup, 1943?

Post by daveshoup2MarDiv » 29 Feb 2024 23:31

ljadw wrote:
29 Feb 2024 21:19
daveshoup2MarDiv wrote:
29 Feb 2024 16:44
ljadw wrote:
29 Feb 2024 10:53
Is 1 (What was possible ) not a hindsight argument ? Could Eisenhower know in 1942 what the US could do in 1943 ?
I don't see why air attacks and land attacks would be needed to keep Russia in as Russia had already stopped the German attack before the start of the air attacks on Western Europe followed by a land attack and as a new Brest-Litovsk treaty was out of the question .
And why would it be necessary to start air attacks and a landing in Western Europe to save the Middle East,India and Burma :the ME was not in danger and what happened in Western Europe had no influence on the Japanese strategy and possibilities .
No, it's not a hindsight argument. Marshall, King, McNarney, Eisenhower, Handy, etc were the US officers who were considering exactly "what" the US could do in 1943, when the forces raised in 1940-41, and being raised in 1942, would be available. That was their job, and they certainly had a better understanding of what was possible via the US war effort - in 1942 and 1943 and afterwards - then their British counterparts did.

In January-February, 1942, when the statements by Eisenhower quoted above were made, the Soviets had barely stopped the Germans, due largely to geography and weather; given how far the Germans got in the east in 1942, whether the Soviet government could survive a second year of defeat was very much an open question.

The statement about the Middle East, India, and Burma was simply that once those fronts were stabilized, the Western Allies needed to go on the offensive against the Germans in Europe. No reason to read it in any other way.
Marshall, King, Eisenhower,etc could not know if and when, where ans how much the US forces raised before and after PH could/would be available , because they did not know how the war in the Atlantic Ocean would evolve .
That the Soviet government could /would maybe not survive a second war year (not a second year of defeat as in 1941 and 1942 it were the Germans that failed, not the Soviets ) is not an open question, but an old myth spread by the Marxist lobby in the US and the UK (Second Front now ) and also spread and fortified by the adherents of the claim that US saved the Soviets, something that was also claimed by the defeated German generals ) and how much the Germans advanced in 1942 ( much less than in 1941 ) was totally meaningless and not relevant .
There was also no need for the Western Allies to go on the offensive against the Germans in Europe if/after the fronts in NA ( not the Middle East), India (a small part of India ) and Burma ( not important ) were stabilized .Besides :the front in NA was not stabilized.
US air attacks against Germany started in 1943 ,not because of what happened in NA,India and Burma ,but because the USAAF was not ready earlier .
Husky and Avalanche started in July and September 1943, also because the US were not ready .
Without Torch the war in NA would be over in February 1943,but that does not mean that Husky and Avalanche would happen earlier than they did, because Britain could not do it on its own and the US were not ready .
Your understanding of the role of the US JCS and the joint and combined planning staffs is incorrect. Here's some reading:

https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Organiza ... 2-2022.pdf

The section on WW II in the above source is 10 pages long. Beyond that, see:

https://history.army.mil/html/books/001 ... ub_1-2.pdf

[urlhttps://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/Admin-Hist ... min-3.html[/url]

Beyond that, considering the Axis advanced from Kharkiv to Stalingrad, and then south to Maikop, in 1942 would suggest that no, the Soviets weren't exactly masters of the battlefield that year.

As far as the British 8th Army goes, they won a defensive victory in Egypt in October, 1942 (thanks to a lot of US L-L, of course, and a fairly substantial USAAF detachment); but on the offensive, they didn't make it to Benghazi until Nov. 20, 1942; 12 days after the TORCH landings. Given they'd captured and then lost it twice before in the desert war, there's no guarantee they could have held Cyrenaica without TORCH, much less advance into Tripolitania.

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Re: Order of Battle for Operation Roundup, 1943?

Post by Richard Anderson » 01 Mar 2024 00:06

daveshoup2MarDiv wrote:
29 Feb 2024 22:52
No, it's not "inept" - in whose eyes? Compared to what other nation's military establishment at the time? ... Japan? Germany? The UK? Please ...
No, inept in its own right. However, if you would like to compare it to other nations, the UK had similar problems activating, organizing, and fielding divisions, but then they operated with tighter manpower constraints than the U.S. and actually mobilized its manpower more.

Germany?

How about 331. Infanterie-Division? Its remnants arrived in Wahn Germany on 16 March 1944 from the Ostfront to reorganize, although the infantry regiments and III./Artl.-Regt. 331 stayed in the east where they were incorporated into the 87. Inf.-Div. By 1 June, the strength was 10,543 and 1,366 HiWi and it was considered ready for action by the middle of July. It was ordered to Normandy on 28 July and began to arrive in the vicinity of L’Aigle-Gacé on 11 August, attached to LXXXI A.K., and was in combat within a few days. Just four and a half months from complete reorganization, manning, equipping, and training, as opposed to the average of 21 to 22 months for American infantry divisions.

Want an all new division? 89. Infanterie-Division began forming on 15 January 1944 in Germany and then moved to Norway. It was ordered to Normandy in late June and began arriving on 3 July and was in combat a few days later. Five months and 22 days.

Overall, the Germans took typically less than six months to field a new division. Much of it was because they had so much greater experience at mobilizing divisions...it was something they practiced regularly between 1860 and 1918 and then again after the hiatus of 1919-1934. They also had a much larger infrastructure for doing so, the Ersatzheer, which for most of the war was typically 1.2 to 1.6 million strong, and amounted to about 20% of the force. That included recruits and convalescents, but a larger proportion were permanent training staffs and organizations in the Wehrkreis. In comparison, the U.S. Army, including the USAAF, had about 700,000 O&EM in the Replacement Training Command, about 10% of the force.
In comparison to a) EVERY OTHER COMBATANT in the conflict, the US mobilization and deployment record was exemplary; and b) compared to the US record in 1917-18, which all the US decision-makers, from FDR on down, were well aware of, since they'd all lived through, been a decision-maker, and/or witnessed it, it's equally impressive.
Exemplary to every other combatant except Germany and probably the Soviet Union in terms of the time it took to prepare a division for combat? Perhaps, but then I have not looked closely at Japan or Italy. Exemplary in terms of manufacturing arms, munitions, and equipment? Sure. Exemplary in terms of mobilization of manpower? No.
In a world where technology like steam trains and coal-burning merchantmen and telegrams and hand-written records was still a factor, much less the human factors, the US mobilization record in 1940-45 is fucking amazing.
Oh, I absolutely agree, but so was the German and Soviet mobilization and they did it faster. Yes, mostly because of the greater experience in mobilization, but that does not change the simple fact that it took the U.S. longer to mobilize divisions than it did the Germans and Soviets.
Mobilization, by definition, is a real world exercise, and the appropriate comparisons are with the real world equivalents - or at least as close to approximations otherwise, and subject to all the friction and human factors and black swans inherent in such. Anyone who thinks it can be reduced to a spread sheet is ... ahistorical, at the very least.
Well, yeah, of course. That is why I keep giving you the real world times to constitute, organize, train, and deploy divisions...and I'm happy to give you the real world equivalent comparisons with the other combatant nations, like Germany, as I just have.
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