What if, Battle of Britain without Georing

[JGHOAKER]

Well as Andy posted to me I need to start a new topic so I’m going to give it a try, to win the Battle of Britain:
[b]There is only one way Germany would have a chance. Georing would have to die in late 38 or early 39. But my Question is who would take his place as commander of the Luftwaffe?[/b]
Plus with another person other then Hitler In command of Luftwaffe would there be a possible different out come to the BoB.

[Robert Rojas]

Greetings to both brother J.G. Hoaker and the community as a whole. Well sir, in reference to your introductory posting of Saturday - September 23, 2006 - 4:33am, old Uncle Bob would like to recommend the following thread for your perusal. The thread in question is entitled as GERMANY ENDS THE WAR WITH BRITAIN UNILATERALLY and it is also located within the WHAT IF section of the forum. The thread's author goes by the nom de plume of Polynikes and its creation date is Friday - October 28, 2005 - 7:54pm. Citizen Polynikes thread will provide you with an alternative perspective upon the Fatherland's potential course OR courses of action with the British Isles after the nominal defeat of the Luftwaffe in October of 1940. Contrary to your stated assertion that Germany would only have one chance to neutralize England, the Fatherland did have theoretical alternatives available to itself in order to deal with a militarily undefeated Great Britain without necessarily resorting to a protracted siege of the greater British Isles. The presence OR the lack of a presence of Hermann Goering before, during and after the Battle of Britain would be incidental to this alternative process. It's just some friendly food for thought. Well, that's my initial two cents, pence or pfennigs worth on this hypothetical topic - for now anyway. In anycase, I would like to bid you a copacetic day up in the Evergreen State.

Best Regards,
Uncle Bob

[Roddoss72]

It depends on the tatics used, remember the big failing of the Luftwaffe during the BoB was two things

1, failure to destroy the early warning radar stations and
2, Göring forbade attacks on airstrips two days in a row, allowing repairs to be carried out.

Any victory would depend on the neutralization of the two topics mentioned.

Also the Luftwaffe need not had to achieve total air superiorority over all of Britain, the Luftwaffe need only gain local air superiorority over the Kent area.

Also any person taking over the Luftwaffe would have to convince Hitler it would be a waste of time to commit so much air power without an ironclad garauntee from the Fuhrer of a land invasion.

[LWD]

I think the problems are deeper and earlier. The LW needed to be stronger and have more planes and pilots both operationally and in the pipe line. It is probable that Germany couldn't support this without significant cuts elsewhere to offset them. So you need someone who can convince Hitler to give mroe support to the LW in the late 30s but if they take it from the wrong place they may be in even worse shape.

[Lkefct]

It is also possible for the luftwaffe to be stronger through better utilization of the facilities at hand. There was a great deal of waste in terms of the production of aircraft. Cleaning that up, and gearing for greater production would help if nothing else.

A firm set of objectives and better technical understanding of the problems facing the Germans and RAF units might have lead to a betterdirection from the top.

[Roddoss72]

I have read several books on the BoB and many indicate that the LW had a total pool of between 12,500 to 15,000 pilots and aircrew during the BoB, this figure to me seems quite high but be that as it may the LW did not lack aircraft or the aircrew to conduct Operation Alder, the main failure was squarely at Görings lack of leadership and his lack of comprehension of modern tatical airwar tatics.

Göring never wanted to understand the importance of the RAF's early warning radar stations, he could not be convinced to the elimination of these vital defense installations, Göring was ver sedentry about follow-up attacks on airfields, forward airfields should have been hit time and time again, thus eliminating out of the picture, but he forbade follow-up attacks thus allowing damaged airfields not only to be repaired but to brought up to full strengh with arriving aircrews and aircraft.

Another reason the LW lost the advantage was that they never targeted industrial centres mainly that was in the production of aircraft.

If i had my way i would have targeted these in order of priority

1, Early warning radar installations. This would have the effect of blinding the RAF and allow deep penetration of Britain with little next to no time to react.

2, The elimination of forward airfields within 11 Group. This would have the effect of having the RAF fly further and use more fuel, also the extra time in the air makes the pilots more tired.

3, Aircraft production and repair facilities. This would have the effect of strangling the capacity of Fighter Command to conduct the defence of Britain.

And onto a replacement for Göring i would have thought that General der Flieger Erhardt Milch would have been an obvious replacement.

[Lkefct]

It is my understanding that Milch never had a combat command? Why is he the obvious replacement? Any commander of the Luftwaffe woudl be better served giving his jounior commanders the lattitude to run the battle as they see fit. A supreme commander is to far removed from the action and tactical situation to be dictating tactics. Kesselring and Sperrele should have been making the decisions, although a single commander to ensure consistency is not a bad idea. Clealry Kesselring was far more quanified then any of the higher ups to make those sort of decisions.

Given teh whole lack of willingness of the German military to make a landing across the channel, the entire idea of a battle of britan has to be called into question.

[Gooner1]

Kesselring and Sperrele should have been making the decisions, although a single commander to ensure consistency is not a bad idea. Clealry Kesselring was far more quanified then any of the higher ups to make those sort of decisions.

Well Kesselring wanted to get on with the job by bombing London from the start. It wasn't Goering who made that decision verboten.

[Polynikes]

Roddoss72

I have read several books on the BoB and many indicate that the LW had a total pool of between 12,500 to 15,000 pilots and aircrew during the BoB, this figure to me seems quite high but be that as it may the LW did not lack aircraft or the aircrew to conduct Operation Alder, the main failure was squarely at Görings lack of leadership and his lack of comprehension of modern tatical airwar tatics.

I think the Luftwaffe most definitely lacked aircraft generally - German production was slow and the losses in the BoB are credited to damaging the Luftwaffe's effectiveness in the war on the Eastern front.

At the end of the BoB the RAF had more aircraft than when it started - the same cannot be said of the Luftwaffe.

Göring never wanted to understand the importance of the RAF's early warning radar stations, he could not be convinced to the elimination of these vital defense installations, Göring was ver sedentry about follow-up attacks on airfields, forward airfields should have been hit time and time again, thus eliminating out of the picture...

The RADAR stations proved very difficult to knock out but if the Germans had possessd 20:20 hindsight - they might have made a stronger effort.

However RADAR didn't shoot down German aircraft and ultimately wasn't significant in winning the BoB.


Another reason the LW lost the advantage was that they never targeted industrial centres mainly that was in the production of aircraft.

Actually they did but it was a wasted effort - if you believe that the BoB was part of a plan to invade Britain it made no sense at all as aircraft production is a strategic target not a short term tactical one.

Contrast this is Overlord - prior to D-Day allied air forces were diverted from their strategic bombing role to tactical targets to aid the invasion.

If i had my way i would have targeted these in order of priority

1, Early warning radar installations. This would have the effect of blinding the RAF and allow deep penetration of Britain with little next to no time to react.

2, The elimination of forward airfields within 11 Group. This would have the effect of having the RAF fly further and use more fuel, also the extra time in the air makes the pilots more tired.

3, Aircraft production and repair facilities. This would have the effect of strangling the capacity of Fighter Command to conduct the defence of Britain.

1. Sure destroying the RADAR sites would "blind" the RAF but that was not easy to do - and it would have to be done repeatedly.
Secondly it would not allow deep penetration of British airspace because German fighters were not capable of flying very far.

2. Airfields are impossible to eliminate - at least in the pre-nuclear age.
The best the Luftwaffe could do would be to force RAF Fighter Command to withdraw North of London & that achieves nothing.

3. As I said earlier aircraft production facilities are a waste of effort in a tactical battle.

In reality the task of the Luftwaffe was an impossible one given the timeframe, the tools and the opposition,

And onto a replacement for Göring i would have thought that General der Flieger Erhardt Milch would have been an obvious replacement.

Why not Kesselring?

The Luftwaffe didn't need a brilliant flyer but a brilliant administrator.

The Luftwaffe suffered from duplication of effort - especially in production.
Identifying the tasks and designing the tools to achieve them would be the priority for the new chief.

Telling Hitler that the Luftwaffe was unprepared to take on the invasion of Russia would be paramount.

[Hop]

I have read several books on the BoB and many indicate that the LW had a total pool of between 12,500 to 15,000 pilots and aircrew during the BoB,

Whilst that may be accurate for total aircrew, the pilot situation was not comfortable for the Luftwaffe. At the end of June they had 1,126 single engined fighter pilots, of whom 906 were fit for operations. By the end of September, that had dropped to 676 single engined fighter pilots fit for service.

Williamson Murray, Strategy for Defeat:

Not only had the
Germans lost many of their most experienced combat crews but by September
1940, the percentage of operational ready crews against authorized aircraft had
dropped to an unacceptable level. On September 14, Luftwaffe Bf 109 squadrons
possessed only 67 percent operational ready crews against authorized aircraft. For
Bf 110 squadrons, the figure was 46 percent ; and for bombers, it was 59 percent .
One week later, the figures were 64 percent, 52 percent, and 52 percent,
respectively.

Göring was ver sedentry about follow-up attacks on airfields, forward airfields should have been hit time and time again, thus eliminating out of the picture, but he forbade follow-up attacks thus allowing damaged airfields not only to be repaired but to brought up to full strengh with arriving aircrews and aircraft.

The problem is the Luftwaffe simply didn't have the strength for this. Because of RAF opposition, bombers required 3 escorting fighters each. With around 700 operational fighters, that meant a maximum strength morning would see only about 200 - 250 bomber sorties, with a similar number in the afternoon if the fighter pilots fly 2 sorties per day. That's just not enough to allow a significant number of airfields to be repeatedly targetted.

In fact, the poisition was even worse than this. The busiest week for the German fighters was the last week of August, where they flew a total of about 4,500 fighter (and fighter bomber) sorties, which is an average of about 650 a day. That means only 200 - 250 bomber sorties a day.

Another reason the LW lost the advantage was that they never targeted industrial centres mainly that was in the production of aircraft.

They did. They simply lacked the aircraft to do so in any strength in daylight, and the night attacks were not very accurate. They did score some successes, such as shutting down production of Spitfires at Supermarine for a time, but most British industry had extensive "shadow" schemes, and Spitfires were still built at Castle Bromwich.

Actually they did but it was a wasted effort - if you believe that the BoB was part of a plan to invade Britain it made no sense at all as aircraft production is a strategic target not a short term tactical one.

I'd disagree strongly with this. For example, the RAF had a total of about 420 Spitfires in storage and in squadron service in early July 1940. They lost just under 400 to all causes during the BoB, with many more damaged. In other words, without new production they would have run out of aircraft before the end of the battle, and run dangerously low quite early on.

Spitfire The History lists the serial number of every Spitfire produced, when it was built, when it was sent to squadron, etc. Looking at the timeframe of the BoB, there are a great many Spitfires sent to squadrons within weeks of their completion.

[Polynikes]

Hop

I'd disagree strongly with this. For example, the RAF had a total of about 420 Spitfires in storage and in squadron service in early July 1940. They lost just under 400 to all causes during the BoB, with many more damaged. In other words, without new production they would have run out of aircraft before the end of the battle, and run dangerously low quite early on.

Spitfire The History lists the serial number of every Spitfire produced, when it was built, when it was sent to squadron, etc. Looking at the timeframe of the BoB, there are a great many Spitfires sent to squadrons within weeks of their completion.

Well if you can assure me that the Luftwaffe could, with a few bombing raids, destroy British fighter production beyond repair - I would agree with you.

Bombing fighter factories to win the BoB was as useful as bombing tank factories in December 1944 to win the Battle of the Bulge.

Then again the Luftwaffe wasn't sure what it was doing in the BoB or even what it wanted to do.

[Cantankerous]

If Hermann Göring had been shot down and killed in World War I, then Ernst Udet (who was also a WW1-era fighter pilot) would have capitalized on his advocacy of dive bombing by having the Luftwaffe use Junkers Ju 87s to bomb British fighter and bomber bases as well as the Chain Home radar networks during the Battle of Britain so that the Royal Air Force would not stand up to the Luftwaffe.

[Terry Duncan]

Thread Necromancy from 2006 brought to people by Cantankerous. Topic locked.

Terry