The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

[Tim Smith]

So my figure of 7000 stated above would nearly double the effective tank arm, if the Wehrmacht could man and fuel them.

Therein as they say lies the rub.

To build, man and fuel those tanks the Germans would have to give up expanding or even replenishing their navy. There's no steel to build more U-boats since it's all gone into tank production, no men to man them since they've been drafted into the infantry (since the infantry had to give up some of their men to man the extra panzers) and there's no fuel to run the U-boats either. After 1943 the German Navy practically ceases to exist.

[BDV]

35 panzer divisions would also require additional 100,000 trucks pluys the paraphernalia associated with the 2 motorized infantry regiments of each, and the other auxilliary units. Maybe more realistic is to project the extra effort as turning 50 vanilla infantry divisons into 50 panzergrenadier divisons.

OTOH, the 40,000 volunteers of the UBoot arm (by necessity both able and willing) would have helped a long way in manning those additional panzers.

[nebelwerferXXX]

Not 35 Panzer divisions but 36 Panzer divisions would require 7,992 Panzer III tanks, 90,000 trucks/jeeps and 4,320 armored half-tracks. Not included were Artillery pieces and small arms.

source:
German Tanks and Fighting vehicles of World War II

[LWD]

The Germans didn't have jeeps. There's also the problem of where to find the fuel for training and operation of these units.

[BDV]

Well, they had Kubelwagens. Although for one, I'm mesmerized by the precision ("Nicht 35 panzerdivisionen, 36 panzerdivisionen du [bleep-bleepity-bleep]!")

[nebelwerferXXX]

This is my last conversion estimate.

Sorry to the KM ships, and forgive give me if I made a silly solution in my personal point of view, if someone ask me here about increasing the Panzer production in the summer of 1940. Granting for instance, that the OKW High Command converted these useless ships into useful land weapons? My computed solution is given below...Constructive positive criticisms/reactions are most welcome. Thanks!

The 42,000-ton Bismarck = about 933 Panzer Mark V 'Panther' tanks. Investing the money spend in building the Bismarck, Tirpitz, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Graf Spee and the Prinz Eugen, with a sum total of RM 853.5-million, and would buy another...7,288 Panzer Mark V 'Panther' tanks for the offensive/defensive operations for 1942, 1943, 1944 and 1945.

For the Admiral Scheer, Deutschland, Admiral Hipper, Blucher, Seydlitz, Lutzow, Konigsberg, Karlsruhe, Koln, Leipzig and Nurnberg, have a combined total of 699.3-million RM for the 11 ships. Using the money and invest it to another set of land-based weapons can produced the following, as a OKW Standing General Reserve.

5,000 Panzer Mark IV tanks
500 Panzer Mark III tanks
1,000 Self-propelled 75-mm PAK 40 (ex-Czech 38 tank)
1,000 Self-propelled 75-mm PAK 40 (ex-French Renault tank and ex-French Hotchkiss tank)
75 heavy howitzers
278,400 rifles

[Tim Smith]

Sorry, but scrapping ships doesn't produce more tanks quickly. Scrapping ships and melting them down is a very time-consuming business, and it's labour-intensive as well. It could easily take 2-3 years to recover the steel in peacetime, longer under wartime conditions.

The only way for Germany to build more tanks by having fewer ships is to never build the ships in the first place. And the decision to build the big warships was made in 1934-36. So you have to go that far back to change the historical German building programme.

Hitler would have to foresee that he wouldn't have enough tanks in 1935. Five years before the war started! By 1940 it's already way too late to make major changes to Germany's production priorities.

And the extra tanks produced would be Panzer III's and IV's, not Panthers and Tigers, since they hadn't been invented in the late 1930's.

[phylo_roadking]

And let's not forget the ghost of Alfred Thayer Mahan! Even if they never sailed - those ships cost the RN time, effort, trained crews and capital ships sitting in Scapa Flow that couldn't be released for use elsewhere...!

[magicdragon]

One of the other issues is what would you do do with the extra tanks? I would have not created any more panzer divisions but I would replaced as ,many Panzer I/II as possible and tried to give all the Motorised and as many of the infantry divisions their own organic STUG Units.

My belief is that more STUGs would have reduced infantry casualties particularly in the interminable encirclement engagements which were a constant feature of early eastern front campaign and would have given the infantry divisions a viable weapon against the Soviet counter-offensives. Logistically they could have been a big drain but better in my opinion than having extra divisions?

[berrek]

In view of an intended invasion of the USSR more tanks would certainly have helped.The Stugs are not the first priority as tank and motorised divisions are a higher priority.

[magicdragon]

berrek

More tanks would have better but Stugs are cheaper to make so you can make more of them.

The German infantry divisions were involved in cracking line after line of Soviet field fortifications - using Stugs to support the infantry in these operations would have been greatly valued - as this is what the Stugs were designed to do

As I understand it Motorised Div in 1941 had no organic armoured element - so a couple of Stug companies each would have vastly increased their firepower.

[Guaporense]

Please note my wording of "supplies" and "output". I was referring to generally better equipped Allied formations, not just tanks. Sinking most of the Allies ships would have made any Overlord invasion impossible, tanks or not.AFVs do not operate in a vacuum. The Western tanks were actually not as good as late war German examples but prevailed. Not just by force of numbers, but by better air support and artillery concentrations to disrupt German atacks.

These advantages also would be negated without the eastern front. In may 1944 the Germans had 600 operational aircraft in the western front and over 3000 operational aircraft in the eastern front, in Normandy the Germans used 37 divisions, in the eastern front the Germans had 150 divisions. In normandy a single 17 division army consumed 480 tons of ammunition per day, in the eastern front the 150 divisions consumed about 5,000 tons of ammunition per day. The 37 divisions that fought in Normandy should have consumed 1,100 - 1,200 tons of ammunition per day, in proportion to their numbers.

For comparison, the American forces in july consumed 1,500 tons artillery ammunition per day. Considering that they consisted of about 55% of the Allied forces, the entire allied artillery ammunition consumption would be 2,750 tons per day, or about 3,500 tons including small arms ammunition. Over 3 times the German consumption. But smaller than the German consumption in the eastern front.

Without the eastern front, the western allies wouldn't have numerical advantage in men, artillery and tanks, and only a small superiority in their numbers of tactical aircraft (historically they had a 10 to 1 superiority in numbers of tactical aircraft, but without the eastern front, the German air-support strength would increase 6 fold).

Therefore, the allied superiority in the number of tanks would be negated for the same reason that it existed in the first place: reflecting the overall availability of resources.

[RichTO90]

I'm mildly curious; do they actually teach you to use bogus figures that you make up as you go along in Brazilian university? Or is that just your habit?

These advantages also would be negated without the eastern front.

Thesis. Check.

In may 1944 the Germans had 600 operational aircraft in the western front and over 3000 operational aircraft in the eastern front,

Made up figures as "proof" for the thesis. Check.

As of 31 May 1944 Luftflotte 3 had 867 aircraft on hand and 494 operational in the west. Luftflotte Reich, tasked with defending the Reich from air attack in the west, had 1,857 aircraft on hand and 1,035 operational. Luftflotte 2, in Italy, had 413 aircraft on hand and 202 operational. In the East, Luftflotte 1, 4, 5, and 6 had 2,059 aircraft on hand and 1,641 operational, while Luftwaffenkommando Südost in the Balkans had 255 aircraft on hand and 218 operational.

Just in case you are as mathamatically challenged as you are truth challenged, the totals comes to 3,137 on hand and 1,731 operational primarily versus the west, while there were 2,314 on hand and 1,859 operational in the east, although LF 5 and LK Südost also were forced to defend aganist attacks from the west. Note also those figures do not include Fliegerkorps XIV with 409 aircraft on hand and 310 operational.

in Normandy the Germans used 37 divisions, in the eastern front the Germans had 150 divisions. In normandy a single 17 division army consumed 480 tons of ammunition per day, in the eastern front the 150 divisions consumed about 5,000 tons of ammunition per day. The 37 divisions that fought in Normandy should have consumed 1,100 - 1,200 tons of ammunition per day, in proportion to their numbers.

Do you ever bother to even attempt to tell the truth or even get your "facts" in the ballpark? Since you have been corrected on these figures numerous times you have no excuse that I can see, other than the most likely one, which is that you are a pathological and serial liar.

"Used" and "had" are nicely sly usages, but why not employ the more common "deployed" or "committed"? There were actually 91 divisions deployed in the West as of 1 June 1944: 53 in France and Belgium, 6 in Holland, 5 in Denmark, and 27 in Italy. There were 142 actually on the Eastern Front, plus 12 in Norway, 7 in Finland, 20 in the Balkans, 1 in Crete/Greece, 1 in Hungary, 2 in Poland, and 4 in Germany. Eventually all or parts of 40 divisions were committed to "Normandy" (i.e. west of the Seine prior to about 25 August 1944). The actual consumption and receipt figures for Normandy are available for most of June and for an average as of 3 July, but otherwise are missing. Consumption on 6 June was 1,000 tons, for the parts of five divisions that were engaged. The average consumption recorded on 3 July was 658 tons and the average receipts were 450 tons. Mind, you, the German forces in June were not a "single 17 division army", but elements of at least 23 divisions were in action under effectively two armies by 30 June.

Note how random figures pulled out of ass are used to draw conclusions about what should have been consumed.

For comparison, the American forces in july consumed 1,500 tons artillery ammunition per day. Considering that they consisted of about 55% of the Allied forces, the entire allied artillery ammunition consumption would be 2,750 tons per day, or about 3,500 tons including small arms ammunition. Over 3 times the German consumption. But smaller than the German consumption in the eastern front.

Notice that "ammunition" is now measured as "artillery ammunition" and "compared". And yet another bogus extrpolation from bogus figures.

Without the eastern front, the western allies wouldn't have numerical advantage in men, artillery and tanks, and only a small superiority in their numbers of tactical aircraft (historically they had a 10 to 1 superiority in numbers of tactical aircraft, but without the eastern front, the German air-support strength would increase 6 fold).

Your thesis may well be true, but you can't prove it by making up meaningless numbers. Note that the USAAF alone as of 1 June 1944 had 11,522 first line and another 922 second line combat aircraft in theaters versus Germany compared to the German total of 5,860 on hand. Meanwhile the RAF in Britain (not including the Med) had another 6,284 on hand and 5,256 operational. All in all, it would be difficult for the Germans to muster much better than a 1:4 inferiority if they managed to throw everything at the Western Allies.

Therefore, the allied superiority in the number of tanks would be negated for the same reason that it existed in the first place: reflecting the overall availability of resources.

So bogus numbers and extrapolations of aircraft, divisions, and ammunition consumptions equates to a "therefore" about numbers of tanks?

[maltesefalcon]

Please note my wording of "supplies" and "output". I was referring to generally better equipped Allied formations, not just tanks. Sinking most of the Allies ships would have made any Overlord invasion impossible, tanks or not.AFVs do not operate in a vacuum. The Western tanks were actually not as good as late war German examples but prevailed. Not just by force of numbers, but by better air support and artillery concentrations to disrupt German atacks.

These advantages also would be negated without the eastern front. In may 1944 the Germans had 600 operational aircraft in the western front and over 3000 operational aircraft in the eastern front, in Normandy the Germans used 37 divisions, in the eastern front the Germans had 150 divisions. In normandy a single 17 division army consumed 480 tons of ammunition per day, in the eastern front the 150 divisions consumed about 5,000 tons of ammunition per day. The 37 divisions that fought in Normandy should have consumed 1,100 - 1,200 tons of ammunition per day, in proportion to their numbers.

For comparison, the American forces in july consumed 1,500 tons artillery ammunition per day. Considering that they consisted of about 55% of the Allied forces, the entire allied artillery ammunition consumption would be 2,750 tons per day, or about 3,500 tons including small arms ammunition. Over 3 times the German consumption. But smaller than the German consumption in the eastern front.

Without the eastern front, the western allies wouldn't have numerical advantage in men, artillery and tanks, and only a small superiority in their numbers of tactical aircraft (historically they had a 10 to 1 superiority in numbers of tactical aircraft, but without the eastern front, the German air-support strength would increase 6 fold).

Therefore, the allied superiority in the number of tanks would be negated for the same reason that it existed in the first place: reflecting the overall availability of resources.

I am not going to dispute your figures. There is no need.
They are not relevant to the main premise of the post ie the tank situation as it developed in 1940 not 1944.

If the Germans were still fighting in 1944 despite an increase in production then what is the difference historically?

It is true that the Russians bore the brunt of the land fighting-I'm not disputing that. But that does not change the fact that the Western and Eastern Allies fought much differently. The West's biggest advantages of better mobility, more air cover and superior artillery concentration made up for their deficiencies in tanks. In fact the Germans gave the West a bloody nose in tank encounters several time after DDay. More and better tanks alone simply would not have turned the tide for Hitler-on either front.

[JungleJim]

For increased tank production to have a viable impact, it would have
to start when Hitler took power.

By 1940... it is to late