The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

[phylo_roadking]

Acutally - I doubt the Germans would do this; right at the heart of the equation it would STRICTLY curtail their ability to operate in the Baltic in 1941!

[BDV]

Acutally - I doubt the Germans would do this; right at the heart of the equation it would STRICTLY curtail their ability to operate in the Baltic in 1941!

But they did try (or actually sold?) an unfinished manowar to the Soviets.

In either case, germans would eagerly trade freedom of movement in Baltic for freedom of movement in the general Voronezh-Tula area.

[phylo_roadking]

Yes - but that's very different from selling the expected heart of her naval superiority as of 1941

Selling the 42,000-ton Bismarck, the 18,000-ton Prinz Eugen & the 30,000-ton Graf Zeppelin to the USSR

Germany could "afford" to trade one as long as she could still outfight it on the day

[BDV]

Germany could "afford" to trade one as long as she could still outfight it on the day

This is whatif, after all. It would not be a huge change to assume Nazis getting mesmerized by say a Nippon demonstration of anti-shipping efficacy of air assets (see Fallschirmjager) and decide that they can sink their own creations later - as long as they have the gasoline to do it!

[phylo_roadking]

Then again - by "the summer of 1940" they ALSO have the example of Norway....when the LW's antishipping performance wasn't that great!!!

The really good examples of the efficacy of antishipping operations all date from AFTER the POD in this what-if...

[LWD]

Well if they can "sell" it and take delivery of at least some of whatever the payment is and hold off delivery of the vessels to say July of 41 .....

[Entschuldigung]

It has been documented that as early as 1938, the German general staff advised Hitler that the German Army would not be ready for war until 1944.

This raises a number of concerning questions.If Hitler had considered a plan B in terms of Russia, He would have had the foresight (or at least be open to his technical advisors regarding the nature of up-gunning tanks, making them dual purpose, whether to go all out on armour, or even the production of the Panzerwaffen with SPA, SPAA, and the most egregious error on the vast plains of Russia; the gaps left open by the panzer forces and the marching infantry, which allowed many Soviet forces to escape, which negated the ultimate goal of Barbarossa: defeating the Red army west of the Dnieper.

I'm not suggesting that the entire Army Groups need be mechanised or even motorised, but the shortfall was obviously at the operational level whereby the Germans hadn't considered the considerably more mobile forces and in greater diversity in order to punch through the Red Army lines and prevent their soldiers not only from escaping but what was to prove more troublesome was the ability of the industrial plants (just under 2,000) to migrate east, beyond the Luftwaffe's reach.

If we posit a ruthless German national policy of total war production - then standardisation would have needed to be incorporated, and every machine needed to encircle, hold and reduce a trapped force would have been needed to be produced in sufficient numbers in order to produce a high probability of destroying and capturing Soviet assets far quicker than they did.

Wiser still would have been planning Barbarossa in stages, meaning fortifying for winter, whilst simultaneously using that time to re-equip, refit and replenish lost materiel.

I do agree, however, that between France and Russia, Germany ought to have been pushing herself to the limit to ensure the odds were stacked in her favour as much was in her power to do so rather than the half-hearted, arrogant, complacency that pervaded that time.

[Kingfish]

Then again - by "the summer of 1940" they ALSO have the example of Norway....when the LW's antishipping performance wasn't that great!!!

Not great?
It forced the RN to abandon naval operations in the southern Norwegian waters, and later the direct attack on Trondheim

[Erwinn]

Well I only respond to first page posts.

Having more tanks particularly helps Army Group South after Brody tank battle. Army Group South could accomplish it's objectives without the help of Guderian, so that means AGC could continue it's push rather than waiting for Guderian's swing to south.

This would create a very different timeline, as they wasted nearly 1.5 months on Central front. By this time Russian's build up defences, moved divisions from Siberia and practically turned Moscow into a very well fortified city.

[tramonte]

The share of all combat armored vehicles (AFV, including self propelled guns too) of German munition production was relatively low during the war compared what most of mainstream historians are still believing.

1940: 1.9%
1941: 3.4%
1942: 3.7%
1943: 6.4%
1944: 8.4% (you produce more panzers when you are loosing the war while Allied produced relatively less when winning)

(Note: AFV without its weaponry)

Just take a look at share of produced aircraft (without its weaponry too)

[tramonte]

And then there was also that basic fact that one just can't produce more if not having enough allocated raw materials like in case of AFV or ammo produced the steel.

[Richard Anderson]

Just take a look at share of produced aircraft (without its weaponry too)

You have to be careful drawing conclusions from that table, which is actually D-3 from the USSBS Report The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German War Economy, given it is a monetarily-based change in index numbers. It is a "value series (at constant prices) from which were computed the indices of German finished munitions output". Aircraft were and are expensive. The monetary cost of a B-17 was roughly four times that of a Medium Tank M4. The manpower cost of aircraft was also high. In Germany, about 935,000 were involved in end-use manufacture of airframes, engines, and avionic equipment in 1943, but only about 179,000 for AFV's. Furthermore, capitol investment in the aircraft industry was much higher throughout the 1930s, while that for tanks was much lower. To rebalance in order to generate increased "Panzer production in the Summer of 1940" likely requires a major shift in investment policy from the aircraft to the Panzer industry c. 1936-1937 at about the latest. That in turn requires a major shift in Nazi government planning policy away from the Luftwaffe to the Heer, which in turn requires a shift in the fundamental Nazi leadership and its attitudes to the Luftwaffe versus the Heer.

[Peter89]

Furthermore, the German system of operating both aircrafts and AFVs was kind of bad. Production meant not as much as maintenence, crew training, supplies, etc.

Production itself had its own problems, the usual German AFV in 1939-1940 was a work of a craftsman instead of a mass product. No wonder they had too many varieties, too few spare parts, high noncombat losses and whatnot.

Like Richard said, fundamentally raising the production numbers, shifting the output towards the more competitive types and reach higher level of cost efficiency would have required a much, much earlier shift in policies and resource allocation.

[tramonte]

The German state-sponsored histories of World War II, published in English translation as "Germany and the Second World War", are remarkable achievements of scholarship. Fair-minded and detailed. They present a through picture of Germany at war. In one of the sections on war production the authors seemed surprised that Germany's economic effort was geared much more towards aircraft production than land armaments. They then pose a question:

"If it is true that the Second World War was ultimately decided on the battlefields of eastern Europe, by the clash of German and Soviet tank armies, the question arises why the share of firepower and mobility of land forces was so conspicuously small in Germany."

(Germany and the Second World War, vol. V/VII (Oxford, 2003) page 597)

[Carl Schwamberger]

The German state-sponsored histories of World War II, published in English translation as "Germany and the Second World War", are remarkable achievements of scholarship. Fair-minded and detailed. They present a through picture of Germany at war. In one of the sections on war production the authors seemed surprised that Germany's economic effort was geared much more towards aircraft production than land armaments. They then pose a question:

"If it is true that the Second World War was ultimately decided on the battlefields of eastern Europe, by the clash of German and Soviet tank armies, the question arises why the share of firepower and mobility of land forces was so conspicuously small in Germany."

Did these writers present a answer?