Not that I recall.Carl Schwamberger wrote: ↑24 Oct 2020 22:18Did these writers present a answer?tramonte wrote: ↑23 Oct 2020 19:30The German state-sponsored histories of World War II, published in English translation as "Germany and the Second World War", are remarkable achievements of scholarship. Fair-minded and detailed. They present a through picture of Germany at war. In one of the sections on war production the authors seemed surprised that Germany's economic effort was geared much more towards aircraft production than land armaments. They then pose a question:
"If it is true that the Second World War was ultimately decided on the battlefields of eastern Europe, by the clash of German and Soviet tank armies, the question arises why the share of firepower and mobility of land forces was so conspicuously small in Germany."
However, it seems they are making the same mistake that many others have made, which is assuming that decisions made after the sudden onset of world war in September 1939 would have enough effect 21 months later. It simply doesn't work that way. Prewar, the German government elected to dump oodles of money they didn't actually have into the aviation and auto industry, which when the Nazi's came to power was essentially non-existent, roads infrastructure, and rebuilding the modicum of a navy, which was de rigueur for "great power" players. The other thing they built up, based on analysis of the great war, was large stocks of ammunition, which then appeared to be a liability after the quick campaigns of 1939 and 1940.
Then, because of lack of industrial capacity and investment capitol, on the onset of war they continued to rob Peter to pay Paul. Prewar mobilization envisaged the conversion of much of the auto industry to aircraft component manufacture, and so on.
The real changes need to start early in the 1930s if you want an increased Panzer production in the summer of 1940.