The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

[Richard Anderson]

The German state-sponsored histories of World War II, published in English translation as "Germany and the Second World War", are remarkable achievements of scholarship. Fair-minded and detailed. They present a through picture of Germany at war. In one of the sections on war production the authors seemed surprised that Germany's economic effort was geared much more towards aircraft production than land armaments. They then pose a question:

"If it is true that the Second World War was ultimately decided on the battlefields of eastern Europe, by the clash of German and Soviet tank armies, the question arises why the share of firepower and mobility of land forces was so conspicuously small in Germany."

Did these writers present a answer?

Not that I recall.

However, it seems they are making the same mistake that many others have made, which is assuming that decisions made after the sudden onset of world war in September 1939 would have enough effect 21 months later. It simply doesn't work that way. Prewar, the German government elected to dump oodles of money they didn't actually have into the aviation and auto industry, which when the Nazi's came to power was essentially non-existent, roads infrastructure, and rebuilding the modicum of a navy, which was de rigueur for "great power" players. The other thing they built up, based on analysis of the great war, was large stocks of ammunition, which then appeared to be a liability after the quick campaigns of 1939 and 1940.

Then, because of lack of industrial capacity and investment capitol, on the onset of war they continued to rob Peter to pay Paul. Prewar mobilization envisaged the conversion of much of the auto industry to aircraft component manufacture, and so on.

The real changes need to start early in the 1930s if you want an increased Panzer production in the summer of 1940.

[tramonte]

I'm not even thinking was German decision makers right or wrong. It's not the point. It tells the same story with UK, U.S and Japanese: all they valued air power a lot. It was the highest preference (with U.S and Japan Navy close behind). And Germans really didn't make exception on that rule. Their limits and shortcomings are of course another thing. And when their air cover was gone fast increased AFV production didn't help them much at all. The irony here is that at the same time both U.S and UK brutally cut budgets of AFV production. This all might suggest that perhaps AFV production wasn't at all as decisive factor as most mainstream historians are still thinking.

[Peter89]

To operate AFVs and aircrafts is one thing; to produce them is another.

German noncombat losses for both aircrafts and heavy tank battalions were at 40-50%. In commission rates sometimes hit as low as 20% of the authorized strength.

If anything could help realistically, it was a better maintenance system aand realistic operational approach.

[Richard Anderson]

The irony here is that at the same time both U.S and UK brutally cut budgets of AFV production. This all might suggest that perhaps AFV production wasn't at all as decisive factor as most mainstream historians are still thinking.

That has nothing to do with whether or not they were a decisive factor. British AFV production schedules were cut because they had a simpler alternative, which was the stream of American Lend-Lease AFV. It took a strain off British industry, which was struggling to produce tanks. The American decision to cut back AFV production in 1944 was because they perceived they had won the war, which was true. However, the decision had serious consequences for Americaan forces in Europe in 1944 and 1945.

[Carl Schwamberger]

... If anything could help realistically, it was a better maintenance system aand realistic operational approach.

Amen

[T. A. Gardner]

To operate AFVs and aircrafts is one thing; to produce them is another.

German noncombat losses for both aircrafts and heavy tank battalions were at 40-50%. In commission rates sometimes hit as low as 20% of the authorized strength.

If anything could help realistically, it was a better maintenance system aand realistic operational approach.

The problem there is getting more technicians and equipment to do that. Both were in short supply for the Germans.

As for production, one of the biggest problems was the continual injection of modifications to production. Yes, many of these were small in nature but they should have been introduced in batches at convenient points rather than continuously as production proceeded. This was largely the fault of the way the military interfaced with industry. Industry didn't need to be particularly efficient on its own. The military putting what were combat officers in charge of being the liaisons that gave industry the wanted modifications from the field weren't the sort, generally, to worry about the cumulative effect on production either. The result was that production remained below where it could have been.

[TheMarcksPlan]

The German state-sponsored histories of World War II, published in English translation as "Germany and the Second World War", are remarkable achievements of scholarship. Fair-minded and detailed. They present a through picture of Germany at war. In one of the sections on war production the authors seemed surprised that Germany's economic effort was geared much more towards aircraft production than land armaments. They then pose a question:

"If it is true that the Second World War was ultimately decided on the battlefields of eastern Europe, by the clash of German and Soviet tank armies, the question arises why the share of firepower and mobility of land forces was so conspicuously small in Germany."

(Germany and the Second World War, vol. V/VII (Oxford, 2003) page 597)

GSWW volume 5, which deals most deeply with economics, suffers from a massive flaw: it has military historians doing economic history.

As a result, it gives exhaustive and exhausting detail on bureaucrats and policies that impacted war economy but is frustratingly light on quantitative details or analysis.

The word "productivity" occurs 25 times in vol. 5/1 but no mention of "factor productivity," "labor productivity," "capital productivity," or other terms that any decent economic history would include.

The failings of GSWW are being exposed by contemporary economic historians like Jonas Scherner and Adam Tooze, whose work explodes some myths propagated in GSWW. As I've remarked at greater length in another post, however, we're only beginning to apply real econometric analysis to the German war economy and many things described only narratively by GSWW require further quantitative analysis. viewtopic.php?f=66&t=252374

[TheMarcksPlan]

Re the OP topic, an easy route to higher German tank production would have been to avoid the cuts in the panzer program that occurred in mid-'39. From Tooze's WoD:

Perhaps
most dramatically in light of later events, the tank programme, which
aimed for the production of 1,200 medium battle tanks and command
vehicles between October 1939 and October 1940, was now to be cut
in half.63

Germany made these cuts while maintaining funding for Ju-88's and the Z-plan.

While few Z-plan ships were actually laid down, Germany spent significant sums building guns and turrets for the H-class battleships and building a giant dock intended for them.

I don't, however, see any great impact from having even a few thousand more panzers in 1941. Tanks alone weren't sufficient, Germany needed a few more mobile divisions in Barbarossa.

[Peter89]

To operate AFVs and aircrafts is one thing; to produce them is another.

German noncombat losses for both aircrafts and heavy tank battalions were at 40-50%. In commission rates sometimes hit as low as 20% of the authorized strength.

If anything could help realistically, it was a better maintenance system aand realistic operational approach.

The problem there is getting more technicians and equipment to do that. Both were in short supply for the Germans.

As for production, one of the biggest problems was the continual injection of modifications to production. Yes, many of these were small in nature but they should have been introduced in batches at convenient points rather than continuously as production proceeded. This was largely the fault of the way the military interfaced with industry. Industry didn't need to be particularly efficient on its own. The military putting what were combat officers in charge of being the liaisons that gave industry the wanted modifications from the field weren't the sort, generally, to worry about the cumulative effect on production either. The result was that production remained below where it could have been.

Yes.

Most of this analysis is still true.

https://history.army.mil/html/books/104 ... _104-7.pdf

[Richard Anderson]

As for production, one of the biggest problems was the continual injection of modifications to production. Yes, many of these were small in nature but they should have been introduced in batches at convenient points rather than continuously as production proceeded. This was largely the fault of the way the military interfaced with industry. Industry didn't need to be particularly efficient on its own. The military putting what were combat officers in charge of being the liaisons that gave industry the wanted modifications from the field weren't the sort, generally, to worry about the cumulative effect on production either. The result was that production remained below where it could have been.

I'm not so sure that was actually a factor. The U.S. Army experienced the same problem with both tanks and aircraft. Production design changes were found desirable/necessary as service use of new models brought up problems not found in engineering and service tests.

In tank production the major ones were introduced during production runs, facilitated by most tank plants having multiple parallel production lines (DTA ended with five), so they could be introduced in each line in succession without entirely halting production. Some changes were also made at the depots, where the vehicle was prepared for shipment overseas.

In aircraft production, most of those mods were done at the Z/I depot-level, simply because most were detail changes not easily introduced into production runs. I believe the OMPUS notes address the issue specifically with regards to aircraft in the notes section.

However, I don't think the Germans did it much differently? Certainly the "interface" of the American military with industry was not much smoother than in Germany, AFAICS? The U.S. Army also put "combat officers" in charge of industrial liaison...I'm not sure how else they could have done liaison?

[Avalancheon]

As for production, one of the biggest problems was the continual injection of modifications to production. Yes, many of these were small in nature but they should have been introduced in batches at convenient points rather than continuously as production proceeded. This was largely the fault of the way the military interfaced with industry. Industry didn't need to be particularly efficient on its own. The military putting what were combat officers in charge of being the liaisons that gave industry the wanted modifications from the field weren't the sort, generally, to worry about the cumulative effect on production either. The result was that production remained below where it could have been.

I'm not so sure that was actually a factor. The U.S. Army experienced the same problem with both tanks and aircraft. Production design changes were found desirable/necessary as service use of new models brought up problems not found in engineering and service tests.

In tank production the major ones were introduced during production runs, facilitated by most tank plants having multiple parallel production lines (DTA ended with five), so they could be introduced in each line in succession without entirely halting production. Some changes were also made at the depots, where the vehicle was prepared for shipment overseas.

In aircraft production, most of those mods were done at the Z/I depot-level, simply because most were detail changes not easily introduced into production runs. I believe the OMPUS notes address the issue specifically with regards to aircraft in the notes section.

However, I don't think the Germans did it much differently? Certainly the "interface" of the American military with industry was not much smoother than in Germany, AFAICS? The U.S. Army also put "combat officers" in charge of industrial liaison...I'm not sure how else they could have done liaison?

It actually has been documented that the flow of production was interrupted by these continual modifications. John Parshall noted how prevalent this phenomenon was in the tank plants. Specifically, in the Kassel factory that produced Tiger tanks. Production lines were often held up because managers insisted on spur of the moment modifications on an nearly completed tank. The Kassel factory had the capacity to theoretically produce from 240-360 tanks per month: In practise, its highest ever production was just 106 tanks in a month. The lack of throughput is attibutable to the Germans own peculiar management style.

2013 International Conference on WWII - Kursk The Epic Armored Engagement
https://youtu.be/N6xLMUifbxQ?t=1581

[Peter89]

. Specifically, in the Kassel factory that produced Tiger tanks. Production lines were often held up because managers insisted on spur of the moment modifications on an nearly completed tank. The Kassel factory had the capacity to theoretically produce from 240-360 tanks per month: In practise, its highest ever production was just 106 tanks in a month. The lack of throughput is attibutable to the Germans own peculiar management style.

It was rather attributable to the flawed concept of the German heavies, and to the constant interference in development and production.

[Carl Schwamberger]

As for production, one of the biggest problems was the continual injection of modifications to production. Yes, many of these were small in nature but they should have been introduced in batches at convenient points rather than continuously as production proceeded. This was largely the fault of the way the military interfaced with industry. Industry didn't need to be particularly efficient on its own. The military putting what were combat officers in charge of being the liaisons that gave industry the wanted modifications from the field weren't the sort, generally, to worry about the cumulative effect on production either. The result was that production remained below where it could have been.

I'm not so sure that was actually a factor. The U.S. Army experienced the same problem with both tanks and aircraft. Production design changes were found desirable/necessary as service use of new models brought up problems not found in engineering and service tests.

In tank production the major ones were introduced during production runs, facilitated by most tank plants having multiple parallel production lines (DTA ended with five), so they could be introduced in each line in succession without entirely halting production. Some changes were also made at the depots, where the vehicle was prepared for shipment overseas.

n aircraft production, most of those mods were done at the Z/I depot-level, simply because most were detail changes not easily introduced into production runs. I believe the OMPUS notes address the issue specifically with regards to aircraft in the notes section.


However, I don't think the Germans did it much differently? Certainly the "interface" of the American military with industry was not much smoother than in Germany, AFAICS? The U.S. Army also put "combat officers" in charge of industrial liaison...I'm not sure how else they could have done liaison?

Post production alterations became common. By 1943 teams making changes in the factory staging lots were normal. In the context it was more efficient to install the unwanted parts, then change them out later vs halt the assembly sequence for each change. When a critical mass of changes built up the assembly line would be disrupted. The local Subaru factory uses this technique today. With factory and contracted teams running through minor alterations out in the shipping preparation lots.

[Richard Anderson]

. Specifically, in the Kassel factory that produced Tiger tanks. Production lines were often held up because managers insisted on spur of the moment modifications on an nearly completed tank. The Kassel factory had the capacity to theoretically produce from 240-360 tanks per month: In practise, its highest ever production was just 106 tanks in a month. The lack of throughput is attibutable to the Germans own peculiar management style.

It was rather attributable to the flawed concept of the German heavies, and to the constant interference in development and production.

Exactly. Tiger production in some ways was unique in its search for perfection over quantity. Notably also, Henschel und Sohn GmbH, Werk III Mittelfeld, Kassel used classic heavy industry station manufacturing techniques, as was usual for locomotives and similar items, rather than the assembly line technique mostly used for the Sherman and Panther. Station manufacturing was less suitable for introducing detail modifications into a production run. The lack of throughput is more a characteristic of the two different manufacturing methods - the same lack of throughput was experienced at different times by American tank manufacturers such as Baldwin, which were more used to station manufacturing techniques.

It was also not how it was done with the Panther, which is notable for its "Sherman-like" succession of modifications introduced into the production line. Earlier production tanks simply did not acquire such modifications, unless they were introduced through a depot modification or when a tank was remanufactured.

[Richard Anderson]

Total German aircraft airframe weight produced in 1941 was 67,996,000 lbs. In 1944 it was 174,939,000 lbs, an increase of 2.57 times. Single engine fighters made up 11.2 percent of the total in 1941. In 1944, it was 43.6 percent. Approximately 291,000 employees, including direct contractors, were in the German aircraft assembly industry in July 1941, increasing to 460,000 in July 1944. Production in 1941 pound/employee was c. 233.7 and in 1944 was c. 380.3, an increase of 1.63.

Total US aircraft airframe weight produced in 1941 was 90,482,000. In 1944 it was 1,101,116,000, more than a twelve-fold increase. Single engine fighters were 18.9 percent of the total in 1941. in 1944, it was 18.8 percent. Approximately 203,000 were employed July 1941 and 1,063,000 in July 1944. Production in 1941 was c. 445.7 lbs/employee and in 1944 was c. 1,035.9, an increase of 2.32.

Part of the German problem was, of course, the bombing campaign, but its significant effects were not felt on the industry until 1944, while the rate of increase 1941-1944 versus the US remained low. Quite possibly more important was the simple lack of infrastructure. In 1944, virtually the same set of assembly plants were turning out aircraft, while in the US, about half the plants operating in 1944 did not exist in 1941.