TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑
01 Nov 2020 18:50
Indeed I am preaching to the choir - non-AHF readers of this site and others who recite a chorus line. One of those chorus lines is the irredeemable pathology of German production systems. Not just AHF - I actually had a renowned historian tell me directly that additional German industrial manpower wouldn't have caused increased production due to German inefficiency. There's a strain of academic anti-Wehraboosim that - like all thoughts motivated only by opposition to another stupid thought - is a mirror image of the motivating stupidity.
Without knowing the details of the conversation I can't really comment other than to wonder if he was looking at the productivity differential?
Evaluation of USSBS is a big topic and I fear that, given your response to my statements about economists, full explanation would invoke degrees of subtlety undreamt of in your philosophy.
I'm sorry, and hesitate to say this in case it invokes the wrath of He Who Must Be Obeyed, but you might want to re-read that sentence and then ask yourself, "hm, I wonder why I've turned so many off in the myriads of threads I've started". You may in fact be a genius-level polymath that exceeds even Trumps abilities, but I suspect others than me are also tired of hearing what ignoramuses we all are compared to the Big Brain on Brad.
A short version is that USSBS isn't a unified product and is internally contradictory - just see Tooze's exposition of the productivity stats produced internally by USSBS versus the Wagenfuhr stats used in the summary report.
You forgot its also big.
The Aircraft Division's report alone contains many statements that modern scholarship has disproven or heavily modified. For example the report endorses the notions that (1) Hitler forced V-2 production (actually Hitler was initially resistant and Speer enthusiastic), (2) that the relative paucity of 2-shift work owed to laxness rather than to German supervisory labor shortage and other factors, (3) that cost-plus contracts dominated wartime aircraft procurement when RLM largely phased them out by 1939.
1) Well, they got that story from Speer, so it is hardly unexpected? I just don't see why its necessary to throw out the baby with the bathwater...and in any case, it doesn't say much as to whether or not the aircraft production statistics are correct, does it?
2) Try as I might, I don't seem able to find the USSBS analyst condemnation of this "laxness" in the report? Instead, it simply reports where, when, and why shifts and hours were added. You know, searching for answers as to why the German productivity was so low? You seem to be reading more into it than is actually there.
3) Yes, a shocking mistake, but since it apparently only led to the conclusion that it "did not contribute to efficient labor utilization", I am not sure why it is so critical?
You seem unable to believe that one can find scholarship serious/important despite seeing serious systemic errors in it, so I won't pursue the argument further in this post.
I am? No, I am actually not sure how you came to that conclusion? I can easily "believe scholarship serious/important despite seeing serious systemic errors in it". It's just that has nothing to do with what I was saying.
Again I'm inclined to trust Tooze's more recent scholarship and credit his relation of Zentralplanung's description of things. In any event, there's no contradiction between a surplus of some parts and a shortage of others.
That's fine, I still have trouble seeing how steel spar caps cause a widespread loss of aircraft production, but then I also have a problem with Tooze's blanket statement that "between July 1943 and March 1944 there were no further increase in the monthly output of aircraft.
4-E bomber production, for what it was worth, increased. 2-E bomber production decreased, but that was planned in order to divert resources to fighter production. The even less useful 1-E bomber production decreased, but then the Ju 87 was near obsolescent. Fighter production increased, albeit not at the desired pace.
Aside re USSBS: Before joining AHF early last year, my main WW2/MH reading was in adolescence and college. During college I checked out well-worn copies of USSBS reports from the Uni library and kept them in my room at the fraternity. Predictably, beer/whatever was spilled on them (the passive voice is necessary due to the haziness of that period). Afraid that I had damaged rare original documents, I didn't return them. When I accepted my "diploma" on stage in front of family and friends, the diploma folder was empty but for a several-hundred dollar bill from the library. They shortly got back their USSBS reports and didn't notice or raise a stink about the beer stink.
Ah, misspent youth, its wasted on the young! Although I must admit I avoid analysis through beer googles, I try to save that for posting here.
Not true. BMW, for instance, lost 18% of its workforce to Wehrmacht call ups in early 1943, including from aero-engine plants. Arming the Luftwaffe contains multiple such examples, as well anecdotes about skilled soldiers being "loaned" back to factories.
BMW was not an aircraft manufacturer, they were a component manufacturer, 18% of a total workforce is not the skilled workforce. These were the standard set of workforce disruptions the German economy went through, including the periodic labor furloughs, from summer-fall 1940 onward.
Thanks though for the reference to something I hadn't already read. We'll make a research assistant of you yet.
The reserved occupation system is a gross description of a policy aim; as with much in wartime Germany (and elsewhere) policy aims are not self-executing and rely on bureaucratic efficiency to turn goal into reality.
Um, substitute Britain, the US, the USSR, Italy, ad nauseum for "Germany" and it remains just as factual.
You quote the evidence yourself.
Sorry, but that is deflection. The report stated the "Russian women's" productivity, not how much or how little aviation firms "liked" them.
You're ignoring the Zombie Ostheer and the smaller Ersatzheer resulting from no Ostheer. Figures discussed in the post linked originally.
The "Zombie Ostheer" only functions in World War Z. Meanwhile, the real Ostheer began with a strength of 3.2-million, lost 1,211,275 in 1941 and 1,982,020 and ended 1942 with 2.5-million.
Anything to justify your "looks like?" As I've discussed elsewhere, citing works like Herbert's Hitler's Foreign Workers, Germany's ability to recruit/retain foreign labor diminished with her war fortunes. ATL she's winning and collaboration becomes a much more rational strategy.
1939 - "foreign workers and Jews" = 300,000 Total workforce = 39.4-million
1940 - foreign workers = 1.15-million Total workforce = 36.05-million
1941 - foreign workers and PW = 2.5-million Total workforce = 32.3-million
1943 - foreign workers = 6.5-million
1944 - foreign workers = 7.907-million
"ATL" victory is sometime undefined for some unknown reason in 1942, nicht war?
You're also ignoring that Germany occupies >100mil more Soviets in this ATL than in OTL 1944.
Oh, so they occupy the entire USSR?
Seriously you need to articulate a claim regarding the relationship between debt financing and war production. You're gesturing towards some financial limit additional to real resource limits but haven't spelled anything out. If you believe that Germany's debt position would have prevented the mobilization of resources for production, you should say so and justify the view. Instead you do these drive-by citings where identification of the arguments/logic is impossible.
Could it possibly be because I don't really care, having gone round the bend on this subject innumerable times? Alfred C. Mierzejewski, "Plundering Pensions" is the most recent paper I recall delving into the subject, while I already pointed you toward Ritschl and the prewar German financial mess.
So now you're just listing things that I didn't include in a sketch?
As any serious reader here will know, I've addressed these issues elsewhere.
You must not be a Monty Python fan. Anyway, did I mention fuel?
See this is where we revisit the territory of my having to ignore you. You know that a cut to Ju-88 production in '39-40 isn't a "cut out" - so you're consciously misrepresenting arguments. If you want to have a serious discussion we can do so; if you want to play games I have better uses of my time.
Sorry, but I'm trying to understand from walls of text and continual references to "other threads that explain it all" or "future threads I'll start in order to explain it all", just exactly how five pounds of sh!te get extracted from a one-pound bag?
What is a "cut to Ju-88 production in '39-40"? Elimination of investment in the Junkers complex in order to shift it to tank production? Where does the later investment in Junkers come from? The tank industry? Meanwhile, no Ju 88 affects Weserübung and the opening air plan for GELB, likely resulting in a much different campaigns. Ditto the opening air battles of BARBAROSSA, given if you cut the Ju 88 in 1939 and 1940 that implies - assuming you find the funding to reinstate the Junkers program - only 110 Ju 88 produced in 1941.
A cheap slogan that anybody capable of signing up for an account can make.
Well, yeah, but did I mention fuel? Is it cheap slogans or answering questions that you're trying to avoid?
Does anyone else doubt that LW production would have shifted towards more expensive and capable planes if the Germans had greater resources? It's almost too dumb a question to ask...
Must be a dumb question, since no one I can see raised the issue. Could it be another straw man? Say its not so! Meanwhile, in RL, the Germans did shift towards more expensive and capable planes, like the Ju 188, developed to replace the rapidly obsolescing Ju 88...oh, wait.