But this is my point, Germany had a credible surface fleet Four state of the art Battleships, one Aircraft Carrier and at least two or three battlecruisers, the problem was that Hitler forbade to expose these ships to any danger, the Tirpitz a tragic case in point, she was nothing short of the ultimate white elephant, going from one fjord to fjord just to hide from the RAF, i would have brought her home and scrapped her and used her estimate 45,000 tonnes of steel for panzer production, what i saying if you invest in ship production use them or lose them, they are a luxury, and speaking of Norway, you forget the price the Germans had to pay for that, at least three cruisers and at least 16 destroyers sunk plus many transports and supply ships.Jon G. wrote:Without a credible surface fleet it is not likely that the Germans would have invaded Norway, or that they would have been successful if they tried. Sealion would become a utopian proposal instead of just an unrealistic possibility, and with no German surface fleet to speak of the Royal Navy could have deployed more ships to the Mediterranean and/or Singapore, with possible consequences for other Axis powers. With Norway neutral the Murmansk convoy route would be much safer with possible consequences for the Germans on the eastern front.Roddoss72 wrote:You have given me a thought, Germany should haves scrapped it surface fleet and concentrated on subs and those ship scrapped could have been turned into tanks, releasing hundreds of thousands of tonnes of steel towards the production of tanks, at fifty tonnes a piece the Graf Zeppelin alone would have contributed to the construction of 380 tigers or 760 Panzer Mk IV, my point is the sheer folly of Germany keeping ships like the Bismarck, Tirpitz, Scharnhorst, Gniesanau, Graf Zepelin (Completed but never equipped)...
Also, if you want the expertise and the man-hours instead of just the steel, most of the German surface fleet would not have been constructed in the first place - in turn, that could have meant no German-British naval treaty of 1935 which, with German focus strictly on land and air rearmament, might have meant that Britain became antagonist to Hitler's plans earlier than the case was historically.
In other words, your suggestion that the Germans scrap their surface fleet would greatly increase Allied strategic possibilities while somewhat reducing German strategic options long before a German attack on the Soviet Union even got underway.
You also speak of distribution of the RN, true but one factor PQ transport (Iceland to Murmansk) were interdicted by U-Boats and Luftwaffe units as far as i have read they were never interdicted by the German surface fleets, PQ-17 in point it was planned to interdict this convoy with the Schannhorst and Gneisenau but was called of because Hitler did not want the ships to be exposed to the RN, and even thought PQ-17 had been torn to shreds and it reinforces my stance that Hitler refused to expose his naval units.
You have made my point with in regards to ship building, yes it takes expertise, but it is wasted if your ship building is continually being scaled down to oblivion, the Germans had reached a X-Roads, build the Z-Plan or U-Boats, they could not do both, one would have to suffer, but one thing did suffer, the construction of a very potent Panzer Arm, deficient of Panzers and replacement parts and and armoured vehicles, The hundreds of thousands of tonnes of steel was wasted on a surface fleet that Hitler had no decisive role for, this could have been directed towards panzer production, but having said that it is moot, you could have all the panzers in the world but without sufficient fuel they are worthless hunks of steel.
And yes i do suggest scrapping the German Surface Fleet, If Hitler was too scared to expose those ships to danger they area waste of space, then scrapping them is a viable option