The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by Richard Anderson » 23 Jan 2021 18:42

Tom from Cornwall wrote:
23 Jan 2021 10:41
I'm guessing we've probably read much the same texts about the development of German military thinking, but my view is slightly different to yours. In my opinion, the German military emphasis on operational manoeuvre was explicitly based on an understanding of Germany's central position in Europe and an awareness that this would likely lead her to face multiple enemies on multiple fronts, and to be over-matched economically. Hence the need to secure swift victories to prevent the historic outcomes of both World Wars. Where they seem to have erred is, as you point out, in their view of manoeuvre warfare as a "goal" rather than as the 'way/means' to achieve their ends. By concentrating excessively on the 'means' and 'ways' they failed, in my opinion, to sufficiently consider the bigger grand-strategic picture.
That is about as good a summary of the failure in German strategic thinking that cost them two world wars I have ever seen and is expressed much better than I ever have. It also parallels Trevor's analysis, which all those pooh-poohing his ideas regarding German combat effectiveness always seemed to ignore. :D
Lastly, and apologies for my ignorance, but did the Germans have a target for the size of the panzer reserves in each theatre? I know that in 1944 in NW Europe both the British and Americans had a target of building up a theatre reserve of [x]% of front-line tanks. (Richard has told me what it was before as well, but for the life of me I can't find the figures now. I think the British figure was more conservative though, and was one of the reasons 21 Army Group was able to provide Shermans to 12 Army Group in late 44.]
The American figure, nicely calculated with a formula and everything was 17% of the T/O&E strength of units present with the ETOUSA. The British made a WAG based upon their experience in the Western Desert and shot for 50% of WE strength of units. Guess what? The British WAG was closer to the mark. :lol:

The Germans for BARBAROSSA? The theater reserve was ZERO. Replacement planning was new tanks would be delivered form the factories or repair depots as required.
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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 23 Jan 2021 23:04

Tom from Cornwall wrote: Hence the need to secure swift victories to prevent the historic outcomes of both World Wars.
This has become a fashionable view thanks to Citino. Regardless of whether it accurately describes pre-WW2 Prussian/German practice (dubious), it's wrong on WW2 with the exception of Barbarossa. Hitler planned for a long campaign in France; the army's ordnance program was to peak in Fall '41 for that fight. He encouraged a daring operation that held the hope of quick victory did not base his grand strategy on assuming such a quick victory. Only in Barbarossa did a "quick victory" assumption carry into the logistical, economic, and replacement planning.
Tom from Cornwall wrote:By concentrating excessively on the 'means' and 'ways' they failed, in my opinion, to sufficiently consider the bigger grand-strategic picture.
This too is fashionable but it places too much responsibility for Grand Strategy on General Staff traditions. For all WW2 combatants, Grand Strategy ultimately fell to the political decision makers. In Germany's case, the Austrian corporal setting grand strategy was not - for better or worse - a representative of Prussian/German military tradition.

Citino is analytically weak. He came up with a neat-sounding theory of historical continuity but the counter-evidence outlined above derails the thesis, re WW2, with 15 seconds of thought.
Tom from Cornwall wrote:You haven't answered my question of what % of panzer strength was kept as a theatre reserve to replace losses during the historical campaign
Richard's answer is basically correct.

Let's cut to the chase: Do you believe the Germans, given a choice, would have chosen (1) to destroy Southwest Front in the Border Battles or (2) to hold a strategic reserve?

If your answer is (2), I'd prefer to note our disagreement and move on. It's why I've been avoiding your question.
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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by Yoozername » 24 Jan 2021 00:59

Well, at least some opinions have been solidified. Of course, I expect some substantiation on how these extra panzers (I guess that can include any type?), might suddenly appear from tank production assembly facilities from Summer 1940 onwards (and get and fit all the bits and pieces).

In any case, someone mentioned that German tank production did not use 'mass assembly lines' or words to that effect. That is incorrect. While that usually means 'bumper to bumper' throughput of the assembly under construction (Ford and all), that is not the only way. The Panzer IV, once it was started in large production numbers, used a very unique dolly-system to move the AFV down a line at a right angle. It would move to the next station for fitment of major items, or fitting out small interior batches of items. If there was an issue with a particular vehicle, then an over-head gantry would pluck it out the way. Time and Motion studies were done, and the process was optimized. Each station had a stock of items to fulfill it's shift needs.

I caution hand-wavers in thinking that pushing the Shiny-Magic-JIT-Scales-of-Industry button, and that assembling a WWII tank is like making a bayonet, or a MP40, or even an antitank gun. Even Nibelungenwerk, which made Panzer IV in great numbers, and also produced many of its own need of parts, relied on 'tubs' or lower hulls, and guns delivered, etc. (many from the Ruhr). While the flippant may just say deliver more of those, there are other considerations besides raw materials. To make those items, you need machinery, welding equipment, people, delivery and also...contracts. All these companies are being run as companies. This wasn't the Soviet Union.

Another concern is if ANY process that uses machining or welding equipment, etc. is run a 'double shift' or more, is going to make issues with that equipment wearing out or breaking down completely. So, it isn't about throwing more slave labor at a problem, capital equipment can stop production just like a 'bottle-neck'. I guess you either get it or you don't.

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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by KDF33 » 24 Jan 2021 03:01

Yoozername wrote:
24 Jan 2021 00:59
I caution hand-wavers in thinking that pushing the Shiny-Magic-JIT-Scales-of-Industry button, that assembling a WWII tank is like making a bayonet, or a MP40, or even an antitank gun. Even Nibelungenwerk, which made Panzer IV in great numbers, and also produced many of its own need of parts, relied on 'tubs' or lower hulls, and guns delivered, etc. (many from the Ruhr). While the flippant may just say deliver more of those, there are other considerations besides raw materials. To make those items, you need machinery, welding equipment, people, delivery and also...contracts. All these companies are being run as companies. This wasn't the Soviet Union.
Although everything you mention is true in a general sense, there is evidence that, once the German leadership made it the priority, AFV output was doubled in a single quarter-year. In effect, something akin to what TMP is arguing was in the realm of possibility in 1940-1 did in fact occur in early 1943.

The USSBS Tank Industry Report informs us:
d. Despite this insistence by their chief, the "Adolf Hitler Panzer Program" as formulated by Speer and his colleagues aimed at the production of only 1,200 Panzer vehicles per month, and that goal not to be reached until the end of 1944. On 17 January 1943, before the program had been officially approved but when it had already been unofficially announced, Speer and Saur were summoned by Hitler and informed that their program was completely inadequate and must be revised upward. They agreed, but explained that although immediate increases might be achieved in output of assault guns and Mark II and IV tanks, Tiger and Panther output could not possibly be expanded within five months. Dr. Rohland and other officials directly responsible for panzer production considered the new committment - a revised program aimed at 1,500 to 2,100 panzer vehicles by the end of the month - utterly fantastic. What impressed the experts most was the difficulty of expanding production capacity to the extent necessary; they believed that the program could be effected only at considerable expense to other armaments production.
And:
e. The need for fulfilling the Adolf Hitler Panzer Program was so urgent, however, that the required steps were taken. On 22 January 1943 Hitler issued a decree directing that all necessary measures be taken immediately to increase the production of panzer vehicles "even if by these measures other important branches of the armament industry are adversely affected for a time." Specifically, the decree authorized the Reichsminister for Armaments and War Production to provide plants producing panzer vehicles and their components with abundant supplies of technicians, raw materials, machinery and electric power, and for this purpose to draw upon the capacities of other was production industries. The decree also prohibited the drafting of men from the panzer industry and cancelled all drafts made after December 1942.
Bolding mine.

The increase looked like this. Data is metric tons, 1942/Q4, 1943/Q1 and 1943/Q2, quarter-on-quarter variation:

Panzer III: 14,973 / 5,221 (-65%) / 2,323 (-56%)
Panzer IV: 9,175 / 13,475 (+47%) / 18,450 (+37%)
Panther: 0 / 4,032 / 18,368 (+356%)
Tiger: 3,705 / 5,928 (+60%) / 8,892 (+50%)
StuG and StuH: 7,170 / 11,400 (+59%) / 20,841 (+83%)
Sturmpanzer: 0 / 0 / 1,692
Ferdinand: 0 / 0 / 5,850
Marder: 3,669 / 2,660 (-28%) / 1,899 (-29%)
Nashorn: 0 / 1,056 / 2,664 (+152%)

Total: 38,692 / 43,772 (+13%) / 80,979 (+85%)

The increase is driven by the Panther tanks (14,336 additional tons, 39% of the increase) and the StuG/StuH (9,441 additional tons, 25% of the increase). With the exception of MNH, the Panthers and StuG/StuH were produced by five of the six original German AFV producers: Alkett, Daimler-Benz, Henschel, MAN and MIAG. The Nashorn was also produced by Alkett.

Nibelungen and VOMAG, along with Krupp Gruson, had been expanding Pz. IV production at a steady pace since 1942 and show no comparable jump. So it's not primarily a story of new production facilities coming on line.

The second quarter of 1943 sees the "big break" in German AFV production, and the explanation does in fact appear to be that the Germans pushed on the "Shiny-Magic-JIT-Scales-of-Industry". That doesn't mean that it was "simple" or "easy", but ultimately, more workers, machine tools and raw materials almost doubled production in a matter of a few months.

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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by Richard Anderson » 24 Jan 2021 04:34

KDF33 wrote:
24 Jan 2021 03:01
Although everything you mention is true in a general sense, there is evidence that, once the German leadership made it the priority, AFV output was doubled in a single quarter-year. In effect, something akin to what TMP is arguing was in the realm of possibility in 1940-1 did in fact occur in early 1943.
In may be in the realm of possibility, but then so are flying pigs.
The increase looked like this. Data is metric tons, 1942/Q4, 1943/Q1 and 1943/Q2, quarter-on-quarter variation:
It is helpful of you look at it by numbers output and by plant.
Panzer III: 14,973 / 5,221 (-65%) / 2,323 (-56%)
Panzer IV: 9,175 / 13,475 (+47%) / 18,450 (+37%)
Panther: 0 / 4,032 / 18,368 (+356%)
Tiger: 3,705 / 5,928 (+60%) / 8,892 (+50%)
StuG and StuH: 7,170 / 11,400 (+59%) / 20,841 (+83%)
Sturmpanzer: 0 / 0 / 1,692
Ferdinand: 0 / 0 / 5,850
Marder: 3,669 / 2,660 (-28%) / 1,899 (-29%)
Nashorn: 0 / 1,056 / 2,664 (+152%)

Total: 38,692 / 43,772 (+13%) / 80,979 (+85%)

The increase is driven by the Panther tanks (14,336 additional tons, 39% of the increase) and the StuG/StuH (9,441 additional tons, 25% of the increase). With the exception of MNH, the Panthers and StuG/StuH were produced by five of the six original German AFV producers: Alkett, Daimler-Benz, Henschel, MAN and MIAG. The Nashorn was also produced by Alkett.
In Q4-42, Alkett was the only producer of the StuG. MIAG produced its firts StuG in February 1943, and was a major part of the StuG increase. In Q4-42 a total of 309 were produced by Alkett. In Q1-43 Alkett produced 407, so had a 24.1% increase. MIAG produced 60 as well, for a total of 467, so overall an increase of 33.8%. MIAG alone was responsible for 9.7% of the increase.

As you say, the increase overall was driven by Panther tanks - by weight, but that was achieved by the former producers of the Panzer III ending that production and beginning production of the Panther. In Q4-42, DB, MAN, Henschel, MIAG, and MNH, produced 587 Panzer III and 0 Panthers. In Q1-43, DB, MAN, Henschel, and MNH produced 90 Panthers, most of which had to be immediately rebuilt before they were accepted, and 115 Panzer III. The same producer set produced half the number of tanks they had the previous quarter, but at least those 90 Panthers weighed twice as much, so it looked better by weight.
Nibelungen and VOMAG, along with Krupp Gruson, had been expanding Pz. IV production at a steady pace since 1942 and show no comparable jump. So it's not primarily a story of new production facilities coming on line.
I'm afraid not. Nibelungen was busily tasked with producing suspension assemblies and other component parts for other assembly plants for most of the first year of its operation (it did also finish the Pz VI (7.5 cm) Fgst. (VK 30.01 (P)). It did not complete a Panzer IV until November 1941, when it turned out a single one. In its first year of operation it completed 112 Panzer IV, just over one-third of its planned monthly capacity of 320, which it never achieved. Krupp Gruson was never much interested in tank production and over the course of 18 months July 41-December 42 had averaged 46 per month...and completed 165 in Q4-42 and 218 in Q1-43. Krupp got out of the Panzer IV tank business in January 1944 and instead began assembling Flakpanzer IV and StuG IV, but at the same leisurely rates. From June 1941 through June 1944 they averaged just 64 Panzer IV-based vehicles per month, but it was December 1942 before they managed to complete 65 in a single month and from December 1942-June 1944 they only averaged 83 per month. Not a stellar performance. Vomag did not assemble a complete Panzer IV until August 1941. In 4Q-42 it completed 122 Panzer-IV based chassis and 170 in 1Q-43.
The second quarter of 1943 constitutes the "big break" in German AFV production, and the explanation does in fact appear to be that the Germans pushed on the "Shiny-Magic-JIT-Scales-of-Industry". That doesn't mean that it was "simple" or "easy", but ultimately, more workers, machine tools and raw materials almost doubled production in a matter of a few months.
Total Panzer production in 4Q-42 was 1,055. In 1Q-43 it was 857. 2Q-43 1,556, 3Q-43 1,591, 4Q-43 1,893. 1Q-44 2,023. It looks like a steady progression, tempered by the drop in 1Q-43 engendered by the changeover to the Panther and various other production adjustments.
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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by KDF33 » 24 Jan 2021 05:38

Richard Anderson wrote:
24 Jan 2021 04:34
In may be in the realm of possibility, but then so are flying pigs.
My point is that what TMP is claiming is in the realm of possibility in 1940-1 is what occurred in 1943.
Richard Anderson wrote:
24 Jan 2021 04:34
It is helpful of you look at it by numbers output and by plant.
Agreed.
Richard Anderson wrote:
24 Jan 2021 04:34
In Q4-42, Alkett was the only producer of the StuG. MIAG produced its firts StuG in February 1943, and was a major part of the StuG increase. In Q4-42 a total of 309 were produced by Alkett. In Q1-43 Alkett produced 407, so had a 24.1% increase. MIAG produced 60 as well, for a total of 467, so overall an increase of 33.8%. MIAG alone was responsible for 9.7% of the increase.
Yes. Over the three quarters we are discussing, SP gun production at Alkett / MIAG was:

1942/4: 304 StuG / -
1943/1: 404 StuG, 10 StuH, 44 Nashorn / 63 StuG
1943/2: 446 StuG, 109 StuH, 111 Nashorn / 317 StuG

Alkett also made Marders, but I don't have data for them by type and manufacturer.
Richard Anderson wrote:
24 Jan 2021 04:34
As you say, the increase overall was driven by Panther tanks - by weight, but that was achieved by the former producers of the Panzer III ending that production and beginning production of the Panther.
By Panthers and SP guns. And, yes, the four initial producers of the Panther used to manufacture Pz. IIIs.
Richard Anderson wrote:
24 Jan 2021 04:34
In Q4-42, DB, MAN, Henschel, MIAG, and MNH, produced 587 Panzer III and 0 Panthers. In Q1-43, DB, MAN, Henschel, and MNH produced 90 Panthers, most of which had to be immediately rebuilt before they were accepted, and 115 Panzer III. The same producer set produced half the number of tanks they had the previous quarter, but at least those 90 Panthers weighed twice as much, so it looked better by weight.
Indeed. Production then jumped to 410 Panthers in Q2, 456% the level of Q1. And this, despite Speer and Saur telling Hitler on 17 January that Panther production couldn't be expected to ramp-up quickly. Five days later, Hitler issued a decree "directing that all necessary measures be taken immediately to increase the production of panzer vehicles".
Richard Anderson wrote:
24 Jan 2021 04:34
I'm afraid not. Nibelungen was busily tasked with producing suspension assemblies and other component parts for other assembly plants for most of the first year of its operation (it did also finish the Pz VI (7.5 cm) Fgst. (VK 30.01 (P)). It did not complete a Panzer IV until November 1941, when it turned out a single one. In its first year of operation it completed 112 Panzer IV, just over one-third of its planned monthly capacity of 320, which it never achieved. Krupp Gruson was never much interested in tank production and over the course of 18 months July 41-December 42 had averaged 46 per month...and completed 165 in Q4-42 and 218 in Q1-43. Krupp got out of the Panzer IV tank business in January 1944 and instead began assembling Flakpanzer IV and StuG IV, but at the same leisurely rates. From June 1941 through June 1944 they averaged just 64 Panzer IV-based vehicles per month, but it was December 1942 before they managed to complete 65 in a single month and from December 1942-June 1944 they only averaged 83 per month. Not a stellar performance. Vomag did not assemble a complete Panzer IV until August 1941. In 4Q-42 it completed 122 Panzer-IV based chassis and 170 in 1Q-43.
Yes. My point is precisely that production ramped-up gradually at the factories producing Pz. IV, beginning in 1942. You've posted data illustrating that steady increase in Pz. IV production at those factories, starting in 1942. Therefore, we seem in agreement?

Panzer IV production by quarter (% increase, quarter-on-quarter):

1941/4: 164
1942/1: 125 (-24%, switch to Pz. IV lang)
1942/2: 237 (+90%, Pz. IV lang)
1942/3: 265 (+12%)
1942/4: 367 (+38%)
1943/1: 539 (+47%)
1943/2: 738 (+37%)

Nibelungen and VOMAG start to deliver significant numbers of Pz. IV in the second half of 1942 and then steadily increase output, ie. before the "jump" of 1943/Q2.
Richard Anderson wrote:
24 Jan 2021 04:34
Total Panzer production in 4Q-42 was 1,055. In 1Q-43 it was 857. 2Q-43 1,556, 3Q-43 1,591, 4Q-43 1,893. 1Q-44 2,023. It looks like a steady progression, tempered by the drop in 1Q-43 engendered by the changeover to the Panther and various other production adjustments.
It doesn't, though. Here's what it looks like in metric tons:

1942/4: 39,110
1943/1: 42,677 (+9%)
1943/2: 84,658 (+98%)
1943/3: 91,661 (+8%)
1943/4: 106,383 (+16%)
1944/1: 116,941 (+10%)

Source is USSBS.

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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by Yoozername » 24 Jan 2021 06:09

My point is that what TMP is claiming is in the realm of possibility in 1940-1 is what occurred in 1943.
Ok. Thanks but off topic. Thanks for playing. Probably good it isn't locked, OK? I still think it is a good thread.

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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by KDF33 » 24 Jan 2021 06:24

Yoozername wrote:
24 Jan 2021 06:09
Ok. Thanks but off topic. Thanks for playing. Probably good it isn't locked, OK? I still think it is a good thread.
How can it be off topic? The entire discussion for an innumerable number of pages has turned on whether or not the Germans can quickly increase Panzer production "simply" by allocating manufacturers more manpower/raw materials/machine tools. I provided evidence that, when they wanted to quickly increase AFV production in early 1943, that's what they did.

Your last post literally starts with this request:
Yoozername wrote:
24 Jan 2021 00:59
I expect some substantiation on how these extra panzers (I guess that can include any type?), might suddenly appear from tank production assembly facilities from Summer 1940 onwards (and get and fit all the bits and pieces).

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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by Yoozername » 24 Jan 2021 06:35

No. It is OBVIOUSLY about whether the Germans could do.... "The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940'

I guess you didn't read through thead 30 pages?
Last edited by Yoozername on 24 Jan 2021 06:41, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 24 Jan 2021 06:38

KDF33 wrote:The need for fulfilling the Adolf Hitler Panzer Program was so urgent, however, that the required steps were taken.
Good points. Besides implementation of AHPP when tanks received priority focus, we should the note some context of the period that wasn't present between France and Barbarossa:
  • The USA was in the war, mandating extra attention to to air/sea warfare. For example, Doenitz and Speer reached agreement on an expanded U-boat program during the time you've discussed. See Inside the Third Reich, p.272-273.
  • Britain had already launched a 1,000-bomber raid on Cologne. There was little room to shortchange LW programs to mount a maximal effort on the Eastern Front.
  • British bombing began to have significant impacts on overall German production from March 1943, when the Battle of the Ruhr began and inaugurated the "subcomponents crisis" (Zulieferenskrise) across German industry. See Tooze's Wages of Destruction**
  • Tank production switched - or was in the process of switching - dramatically during this period, as the Tiger/Panther entered service or spooled up.
By contrast, all that my ATL requires is that Germany increase production of existing models. It would do so in an environment basically unaffected by aerial bombing, absent a perceived need to increase air/sea warfare, and with latitude temporarily to cede primacy in aerial warfare against Britain, if necessary (IMO it wouldn't have been).

That Germany was later capable of doubling tank output (by weight) in six months suggests its capacity to do so earlier unless late 1942 introduced some technical or other factor beyond the simple realization that previously avoided steps (rationalization, mobilization, combing-out of labor, increased foreign labor) needed to be taken.


-----------------------------------------------

**Tooze's citation is as follows:
For the direct connection between the Battle of the Ruhr, shortfalls in steel supply and
the Zulieferungskrise, see BAL R3/1737, 10 June 1943, meeting at Ruhrstahl, 83; IWM
FD 3353/45, vol. 180, 29 July 1943, 44th meeting Zentrale Planung; BAL R3/1738,
15 September 1943, 145.
I haven't been able to locate those documents but am eager to do so.
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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by KDF33 » 24 Jan 2021 06:55

Yoozername wrote:
24 Jan 2021 06:35
No. It is OBVIOUSLY about whether the Germans could do.... "The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940'

I guess you didn't read through thead 30 pages?
Yes, and the ability shown then by the Germans to increase output by increasing basic inputs (labor, raw materials, machine tools) informs that conversation. It demonstrates that production could be substantially increased, despite extant bottlenecks, if the German leadership acted decisively.

In other words, the German experience of 1943 can help inform our understanding of the possibilities of 1940-1.

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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 24 Jan 2021 07:07

KDF33 wrote:How can it be off topic?
You're probably already aware but I'll suggest that attempting to convince someone of an obvious logical connection - when the target is pre-committed to not making that connection - ends up being a waste of time. Replace "identity" with "salary" in Sinclair's dictum that "It is difficult to get a man to understand something when his salary depends upon his not understanding it." Yoozername's identity, as played in this forum, is expressly opposed to your thesis.
yoozername wrote:Shiny-Magic-JIT-Scales-of-Industry button
Presumably "JIT" refers to "just in time" manufacturing. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Just-in-t ... ufacturing

The reader of this thread will search in vain for any reference by TMP to the concept.

The reader would better reference this post from yoozername for an explanation of why he's posting about JIT:
Yoozername wrote:
12 Dec 2020 04:34
You sound like a 'What-If' veteran. Oh yeah, I am a veteran of the United States Army Engineers.
...unfortunately any citizen of the internet will have to wade through this stuff to get to the good parts.
KDF33 wrote:It doesn't, though. Here's what it looks like in metric tons:

1942/4: 39,110
1943/1: 42,677 (+9%)
1943/2: 84,658 (+98%)
1943/3: 91,661 (+8%)
1943/4: 106,383 (+16%)
1944/1: 116,941 (+10%)
Just want to second the impression that "steady progression" and "different order of magnitude" (i.e. the second-derivative 2Q/1Q '43) are irreconcilable. Your characterization is based on the data, Richard's on his agenda.
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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by Richard Anderson » 24 Jan 2021 07:36

KDF33 wrote:
24 Jan 2021 05:38
My point is that what TMP is claiming is in the realm of possibility in 1940-1 is what occurred in 1943.
Agreed. You just need the workforce, plant, funding, and raw materials available in 1943 moved to 1940-1.
Yes. Over the three quarters we are discussing, SP gun production at Alkett / MIAG was:

1942/4: 304 StuG / -
1943/1: 404 StuG, 10 StuH, 44 Nashorn / 63 StuG
1943/2: 446 StuG, 109 StuH, 111 Nashorn / 317 StuG
Interesting discrepancies in figures. I have 309 StuG accepted by HWA, all from Alkett in 4-42. Then 407 produced by Alkett, plus the 10 StuH in 1Q-43...and I did forget about the Hornisse, MIAG produced 60 StuG then. For 2Q-43 I have Alkett 423 StuG and 109 StuH with 111 Hornisse. MIAG produced 340 StuG.
Alkett also made Marders, but I don't have data for them by type and manufacturer.[/quote}

The 150 Alkett SdKfz 132 were produced in April and May of 1942. Ursus and Famo produced the 531 SdKfz 131 from July 1942-June 1943. BMM produced all the others.
By Panthers and SP guns. And, yes, the four initial producers of the Panther used to manufacture Pz. IIIs.
Except the weight difference between the Panzer III and StuG/StuH were negligible and I was commenting on your weight counts.
Indeed. Production then jumped to 410 Panthers in Q2, 456% the level of Q1. And this, despite Speer and Saur telling Hitler on 17 January that Panther production couldn't be expected to ramp-up quickly. Five days later, Hitler issued a decree "directing that all necessary measures be taken immediately to increase the production of panzer vehicles".
Sure. And the monthly Panzer production increased from an average of 350 per month on 1942 to 491 per month in 1943. StuG production went from 67 to 270, which was the main numerical gain. However, given that the StuG was a primarily defensive weapon, albeit also an infantry support weapon, its increase would not do much to creating the additional Panzers required.
Yes. My point is precisely that production ramped-up gradually at the factories producing Pz. IV, beginning in 1942. You've posted data illustrating that steady increase in Pz. IV production at those factories, starting in 1942. Therefore, we seem in agreement?
Indeed, I agree, there was no sudden jump to production in 2Q-1943. Rather, there is the illusion of a sudden jump created by the switch in armament...which had the same retarding effect on Panzer III production in 1940-1941.
Nibelungen and VOMAG start to deliver significant numbers of Pz. IV in the second half of 1942 and then steadily increase output, ie. before the "jump" of 1943/Q2.
However, again, that "jump" is illusory.
It doesn't, though. Here's what it looks like in metric tons:
And here I thought you just agreed that it is better to look at output numbers rather than tonnage? :D Tonnage distorts the effect caused by the adoption of the Panther.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 24 Jan 2021 07:48

Richard Anderson wrote:Agreed. You just need the workforce, plant, funding, and raw materials available in 1943 moved to 1940-1.
Obvious nonsense but, this being the internet, the obvious must be stated:

In 2Q 1943 Germany produced 3,214 panzers of 84,658t.

In 2Q 1940 Germany produced 326 panzers of 6,770t.

https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id= ... up&seq=292

Richard's strawman proposal would imply 1350% increase in panzer production by weight prior to Barbarossa.

The actual ATL of ~500 more medium tanks requires ~30% more than OTL in the pre-Barbarossa period.

Does Richard know better than his strawman argument suggests? Probably. I assume most readers do as well.
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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 24 Jan 2021 12:25

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
23 Jan 2021 23:04
Richard's answer is basically correct.

Let's cut to the chase: Do you believe the Germans, given a choice, would have chosen (1) to destroy Southwest Front in the Border Battles or (2) to hold a strategic reserve?

If your answer is (2), I'd prefer to note our disagreement and move on. It's why I've been avoiding your question.
I see you are still completely ignoring my point and now talking about a "strategic reserve" which is nothing to do with the point I was making. Ho hum! I guess I shouldn't be surprised at that as this is the internet. :lol:
Richard Anderson wrote:
23 Jan 2021 18:42
The American figure, nicely calculated with a formula and everything was 17% of the T/O&E strength of units present with the ETOUSA. The British made a WAG based upon their experience in the Western Desert and shot for 50% of WE strength of units. Guess what? The British WAG was closer to the mark.

The Germans for BARBAROSSA? The theater reserve was ZERO. Replacement planning was new tanks would be delivered form the factories or repair depots as required.
So, prudent military planning for a campaign at this time seems to reflect a need for something like 25-50% tank replacements being fed forward continuously into the tank replacement pipeline to maintain a reasonable front line strength as the campaign progresses. This involves long-term planning and considerable resources in both manpower and spare tanks. Here is how 21 AG planned to do it in NW Europe:
21 AG Tank Replacement Organisation.JPG

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
23 Jan 2021 23:04
It's why I've been avoiding your question.
Obviously. :roll:
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
23 Jan 2021 23:04
For all WW2 combatants, Grand Strategy ultimately fell to the political decision makers.
Ultimately, yes. But in the case of the Western Allies the wildest fantasies of those political decision makers were constantly hemmed in by the persistent resistance of their military advisors. Churchill may have nagged and worried the chiefs of staff committee until their nerves were frayed and breaking but he knew he couldn't be seen to overrule them. Persuade, cajole, bully - yes. But overrule direct military advise, no.

Hence the value of prudent military advice at the grand strategic level.

Regards

Tom
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