The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

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ljadw
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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by ljadw » 03 Feb 2021 17:15

There was no alternative for Barbarossa :
1 War against Britain was a failure : BoB failed, the Blitz failed, the Submarines failed , victory in NA was a wast . In 1942 US would openly join Britain and than it was over .
2 The only hope to force Britain to give up BEFORE 1942 was a successful Barbarossa .
3 It is not correct to say that without Barbarossa the German industry could enable the LW and the KM to defeat Britain .
4 Already BEFORE June 22 the industrial Schwerpunkt was again on the KM and the LW ( Barbarossa had to be successful with the available forces ),because it was uncertain that Britain would give up because a successful Barbarossa .If the war against Britain continued after a success in the East, Germany would have to adopt a defensive strategic position : KM preventing the US to send forces to Britain and the LW preventing the RAF to attack Germany .
But even with this Schwerpunkt change, KM and LW would fail and Germany would lose .
The German position was hopeless on June 25 1940 and even more hopeless on June 22 1941 .Milch hoped to increase the LW production in plants in Russia far away from the allied air forces :that indicates the hopeless situation of Germany . Without or with a war against the USSR .
Already in December 1940 Germany was in a defensive position and the wallies could afford a long war,but Germany could not afford a long war .
If the WM was at the Wolga, this would not prevent the RAF/USAAF to destroy the German cities ,besides Germany was to weak to dominate Europe .

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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by Peter89 » 03 Feb 2021 18:05

ljadw wrote:
03 Feb 2021 17:15
There was no alternative for Barbarossa :
1 War against Britain was a failure : BoB failed, the Blitz failed, the Submarines failed , victory in NA was a wast . In 1942 US would openly join Britain and than it was over .
2 The only hope to force Britain to give up BEFORE 1942 was a successful Barbarossa .
3 It is not correct to say that without Barbarossa the German industry could enable the LW and the KM to defeat Britain .
4 Already BEFORE June 22 the industrial Schwerpunkt was again on the KM and the LW ( Barbarossa had to be successful with the available forces ),because it was uncertain that Britain would give up because a successful Barbarossa .If the war against Britain continued after a success in the East, Germany would have to adopt a defensive strategic position : KM preventing the US to send forces to Britain and the LW preventing the RAF to attack Germany .
But even with this Schwerpunkt change, KM and LW would fail and Germany would lose .
The German position was hopeless on June 25 1940 and even more hopeless on June 22 1941 .Milch hoped to increase the LW production in plants in Russia far away from the allied air forces :that indicates the hopeless situation of Germany . Without or with a war against the USSR .
Already in December 1940 Germany was in a defensive position and the wallies could afford a long war,but Germany could not afford a long war .
If the WM was at the Wolga, this would not prevent the RAF/USAAF to destroy the German cities ,besides Germany was to weak to dominate Europe .
1. The BEF (Back Every Friday) was beaten on the continent and then the British were beaten in Greece; the Brits also lost insane amount of merchant shipping and its colonies were insecure from both insurgency and Axis attacks
2. Kind of pointless to repeat
3. Who said that? I didn't, I said they stood more chance absent the eastern front
4. So the only hope was uncertain. I'd say it was improbable and unlikely, the Soviets were allies (or friendly neutrals) with Germany. Following this logic, Hitler should have given Molotov everything the Soviets wanted in November 1940 and then the British automatically give up. One doesn't even scratch the surface of international relations that the British did not consider Soviet participation of their war effort as a turning point: they stood firm for a year between mid-1940 and mid-1941 without any Soviet assistance. In fact the Soviets assisted the Germans with everything they lacked, including grain, oil and minerals.

You claim that the German situation was hopeless, but in fact it was simply untenable in mid-1940, not hopeless. They fought on for 5 more years, and there is no indication that they'd give up earlier absent the losses on the eastern front.

We agree on the rest.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by ljadw » 03 Feb 2021 21:10

1 Britain did not need the BEF to defeat Germany .
About the merchant shipping losses : these were lower in 1941 than in 1940 although there were more submarines in 1941 ,and, what a lot of people ignore : Til PH,British merchant shipping losses were outweighed by new production and by the help of the merchant fleets of the Netherlands, Norway, Greece ,and the capture of a lot of Axis merchant ships .
Besides ,what was important was not the loss of merchant shipping, but what was arriving in Liverpool and what was leaving Liverpool .
2 The aim of Barbarossa was to force Britain to give up before there would be a war with the US .The other ways to do this ,had failed . Only Barbarossa remained .
3 Later
4 The USSR was not very important for Germany, its importance for Britain was much higher .
Germany did not need the Soviet oil to fight against Britain, the importance of the food from the USSR was also minimal : some 10 % .In June 1941 the Soviet oil stopped, but still the war against Britain continued and the Ostheer arrived to the suburbs of Leningrad, Moscow and to Stalingrad .Germany had to eliminate the USSR as a potential ally of Britain . Neutrality was not enough,as a neutral USSR could easily become a hostile USSR ,and as the USSR refused to join Germany and to declare war n Britain , there remained only one solution : Barbarossa .
About Germany's hopeless situation : Germany needed peace, not conquests : it was to weak to occupy,exploit and colonize more conquests than its part of Poland . The more countries it invaded, the weaker it became .

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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 04 Feb 2021 18:02

KDF33 wrote:
02 Feb 2021 22:20
AFAIK, it was mostly directed against Britain. Germany was expanding capacity for both bomber and fighter production - it's just that in the case of fighters they wanted to transition out of what they perceived as their obsolete types. Except for the Ju 87, they didn't feel the same pressure with regards to bombers.
Really? I saw that plans were made in autumn 1940 to expand the German Army in light of plans for 1941 and had thought that with the LW having such a heavy focus on air support for the army that some (the majority?) of LW expansion would be related to the need to provide support to all those new mobile troops. More reading for me I guess. :thumbsup:
KDF33 wrote:
02 Feb 2021 22:20
We should be careful here. It's not clear at all that Germany had any unique difficulty "re-tooling" compared to other belligerents.
Oh, absolutely. I never meant to suggest that there was something specific to Germany that hindered such a "re-tooling". At least, not that I have seen yet. :D
KDF33 wrote:
02 Feb 2021 22:20
AFAIK, no one else ever attempted to do something similar during the war.
That's an interesting question, Britain must have re-tooled to some extent to go from say Wellingtons and Hampdens to Halifaxes and Lancasters and I don't think that all went terribly smoothly.

At the overall national military power level, I guess production is only one input - the output for aircraft would be increasing operational unit strength in terms of both numbers of units and their strength against establishment. That's a much harder number to track than pure production numbers perhaps overly biased by a perceived need to polish the ego of a Beaverbrook or a Speer.

Regards

Tom

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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 04 Feb 2021 20:25

Richard Anderson wrote:
02 Feb 2021 23:34
Probably. The organization dates for 18. and 20. Panzer were 26 and 15 October 1940 respectively. Only 19. Panzer (and 21., but that was a different matter since it was initially a different organization) was organized later, on 1 November 1940. However, 19. Panzer was formed essentially from the motorized parts of the 19. Infanterie-Division (less IR 59., which went to 20. Panzer, so the division was fairly cohesive and its 27. Panzer-Regiment seems to have organized quickly, so had some time to train with the rest of the division.

OTOH, 20. Panzer was a bit of a dogs breakfast, put together from bits and pieces of various divisions and with a Panzer regiment that was not fully organized and equipped until 3/4 April, so had little time to train with the other elements of the division. Worse, its wheeled vehicles were a hodge-podge of German, French, and Polish civilian and military types, which apparently give it no end of trouble.

18. Panzer was also put together with odds and sods, and its Panzer Regiment (built from two Tauchpanzer battalions and a battalion from PR 28.) was incomplete until 1 March. On top of that, the Tauchpanzer continued to train for its specialized river-crossing mission and had little chance to train with the rest of the division.
Richard,

Thanks as always.
Peter89 wrote:
03 Feb 2021 12:23
Exactly... this phenomenon was more like a hallmark than an exception of the German mechanized unit operations.

Too many types and variants, insane amount of tinkering.... In order to use captured equipment, the Germans needed captured spare parts, specialized or highly trained mechanics and whatnot. The number of ammunitions alone was insane in 1941. These different types and variants put an increased burden on the already overburdened logistical system. In the natural absence of these extras, the combat readiness fell as a result, and the net profit from a change or a few hundred extra vehicles soon diminished to zero or below.

It was just slightly better in case of aircraft operations, where the Germans paid little to no attention to the ground facilities, spare part supply, and to the employment of minimum types / variants in order to increase combat readiness, flight safety, etc.

If the Germans were able to produce more modern equipment in 1940/1941, what they should have done instead of creating new divisions is to re-equip existing ones, eliminating dangerously stupid ideas like the L/42 gun for the Pz III, and the large-scale employment of T-38 and Pz II, which types were unsuitable for the task already.
Peter,

Yes, I tend to agree although I suspect that many of the difficulties such issues led to would have been the same for the British Army through 1941 - 42. I fear what historians would have said about tanks such as the Covenantor if it had not been entirely confined to the training role. As for the early Churchill tanks with their two-pounder guns, I think we had better draw a (large) veil over those! :roll:

Regards

Tom

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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by Richard Anderson » 04 Feb 2021 21:30

Tom from Cornwall wrote:
04 Feb 2021 18:02
KDF33 wrote:
02 Feb 2021 22:20
We should be careful here. It's not clear at all that Germany had any unique difficulty "re-tooling" compared to other belligerents.
Oh, absolutely. I never meant to suggest that there was something specific to Germany that hindered such a "re-tooling". At least, not that I have seen yet. :D
KDF33 wrote:
02 Feb 2021 22:20
AFAIK, no one else ever attempted to do something similar during the war.
That's an interesting question, Britain must have re-tooled to some extent to go from say Wellingtons and Hampdens to Halifaxes and Lancasters and I don't think that all went terribly smoothly.
Yes, insofar as I can tell, the Allies didn't try something quite as ambitious as completely retooling factories to produce completely new models, mostly because they never had to do it that way, because they had a more robust and broader-based final assembly network, in aircraft and tanks especially, which was often expanded with entirely new factories or with existing factories expanded in order to meet the requirement.

For example, Grummans Bethpage Long Island NY plant was fully occupied expanding production of the F4F from 1 July 1940 through 30 June 1943, starting with 1, building up to a peak of 190 in November 1942, and then steadily decreasing as production of the F6F began in September 1942 and scaled up to a peak of 555 in December 1944. The overlap where production of the two fighter types dipped significantly was January-March 1942, three months, but was also when a significant portion of the lines were dedicated to the TBF. Basically, there was sufficient plant capacity to produce three types at the same time, while retooling one of the lines.

The major tank arsenals were the same. DTA began with three parallel lines (later expanded to five) producing the Medium Tank M3, which enabled them to introduce modifications in succession in each line and also allowed them to transition to production of the M4 with little interruption. The same happened when the T26E3 was produced.

However, the U.S. faced the same major bottlenecks as others, engines, transmissions, and some gun types were issues, as was prioritization of some steels and exotic metals, which tended to affect the tank industry more than aircraft.

Nor was the U.S. immune to production boondoggles, the Quad Cities Tank Arsenal was one, which was built with great expense, but produced exactly seven completed tanks that were never wanted or used. However, it was instrumental in depot work and rebuilding 976 early production Medium Tanks M4 in 1944 and 1945.
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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by Dwight Pruitt » 05 Feb 2021 04:49

Rich, OT but you mentioned the QCTA. I'm showing my advancing age, but what are the tanks shown here?

Image

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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by Richard Anderson » 05 Feb 2021 05:08

Dwight Pruitt wrote:
05 Feb 2021 04:49
Rich, OT but you mentioned the QCTA. I'm showing my advancing age, but what are the tanks shown here?

Image
Those are the Medium Tank M7, the only new tanks ever completed at QCTA.
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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by Peter89 » 05 Feb 2021 08:02

Tom from Cornwall wrote:
04 Feb 2021 20:25
Peter89 wrote:
03 Feb 2021 12:23
Exactly... this phenomenon was more like a hallmark than an exception of the German mechanized unit operations.

Too many types and variants, insane amount of tinkering.... In order to use captured equipment, the Germans needed captured spare parts, specialized or highly trained mechanics and whatnot. The number of ammunitions alone was insane in 1941. These different types and variants put an increased burden on the already overburdened logistical system. In the natural absence of these extras, the combat readiness fell as a result, and the net profit from a change or a few hundred extra vehicles soon diminished to zero or below.

It was just slightly better in case of aircraft operations, where the Germans paid little to no attention to the ground facilities, spare part supply, and to the employment of minimum types / variants in order to increase combat readiness, flight safety, etc.

If the Germans were able to produce more modern equipment in 1940/1941, what they should have done instead of creating new divisions is to re-equip existing ones, eliminating dangerously stupid ideas like the L/42 gun for the Pz III, and the large-scale employment of T-38 and Pz II, which types were unsuitable for the task already.
Peter,

Yes, I tend to agree although I suspect that many of the difficulties such issues led to would have been the same for the British Army through 1941 - 42. I fear what historians would have said about tanks such as the Covenantor if it had not been entirely confined to the training role. As for the early Churchill tanks with their two-pounder guns, I think we had better draw a (large) veil over those! :roll:

Regards

Tom
It might be so (I only have general knowledge about British / US AFV production), I am more familiar with the Soviet AFV production (something I had sources for), and I know for a fact that they were extremely effective in this regard, produced stellar numbers from limited types, and used mostly major upgrades instead of tinkering.

But in this thread, I tried to adress the issue of increased German production. Upthread it was mentioned both that the increased production would lead to new mechanized formations and also that the captured equipment could be used. I think the effects of these changes are not 100% at all.

From a broader perspective, in a region I know better, the British took a methodical approach. They started to build railroads, fuel dumps, airfields, and all kind of logistical foundations that mechanized warfare relies on.
A great source for this: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/U ... d-I-4.html
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by ljadw » 05 Feb 2021 11:00

A comment on the following excerpt from post 553 by Peter '
''My first thought is that the Germans should have reorganised their production and logistic systems from the start on,phase out outdated models,standardize and streamline production,supply and deployment and under no circumstances should they attack the SU .''
1 Why should they have done this,if they did not attack the SU ?
2 Why should they have done this if they planned to attack the SU ?
3 Why was all this needed ?
4 Was all this possible ?
On June 7 1940,Hitler ordered that after the end of the war with France, the Army should be reduced to 120
divisions .As this number ( which was impossible to sustain in peace time ) was to small to occupy the conquered territories and to guard the border with the SU, order was also given to double the number of PzD ,so that a smaller army with greater firepower and mobility could do the job .
But, as it was impossible to to double the number of tanks ,and also the number of motorized infantry and artillery units (20 PzD would mean 11000 tanks something with the existing tank production,would be reached only in 1947 ),it was decided to halve the number of tanks ( and also the number of motorized infantry/artillery ? ) per division : a good decision ,as the PzD of 1941 with half the number of tanks of those of May 1940,were still as efficient (and in a lot of cases more efficient ) as their predecessors .
On July 9 1940 the order was given to produce til the end of 1944 26700 tanks ( something which was of course impossible ) This order was corrected on September 28 to produce til April 1 1941 1490 tanks . A month later, the order was given for an army of 200 divisions :20 Pz, 10 mot, 10 mountain, 140 infantry and 20 occupation divisions .
But, it was obvious that this number could not be reached . And it was not reached .
The conclusions are
1 A ''sufficient '' increase of the tank production between the fall of France and June 1941 ,with standardized production, outphasing of old models, etc ...was not possible . If it was tried, it would hinder the war against Britain .
2 It was not needed if there was no war with the SU ,and also if there was a war with the SU .17 PzD with each 400 tanks would not have done better in the Summer of 1941 than the existing 17 PzD of each ssome 200 tanks; in fact the result would have been worse, much worse .

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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by Peter89 » 05 Feb 2021 11:59

ljadw wrote:
05 Feb 2021 11:00
A comment on the following excerpt from post 553 by Peter '
''My first thought is that the Germans should have reorganised their production and logistic systems from the start on,phase out outdated models,standardize and streamline production,supply and deployment and under no circumstances should they attack the SU .''
1 Why should they have done this,if they did not attack the SU ?
2 Why should they have done this if they planned to attack the SU ?
3 Why was all this needed ?
4 Was all this possible ?
On June 7 1940,Hitler ordered that after the end of the war with France, the Army should be reduced to 120
divisions .As this number ( which was impossible to sustain in peace time ) was to small to occupy the conquered territories and to guard the border with the SU, order was also given to double the number of PzD ,so that a smaller army with greater firepower and mobility could do the job .
But, as it was impossible to to double the number of tanks ,and also the number of motorized infantry and artillery units (20 PzD would mean 11000 tanks something with the existing tank production,would be reached only in 1947 ),it was decided to halve the number of tanks ( and also the number of motorized infantry/artillery ? ) per division : a good decision ,as the PzD of 1941 with half the number of tanks of those of May 1940,were still as efficient (and in a lot of cases more efficient ) as their predecessors .
On July 9 1940 the order was given to produce til the end of 1944 26700 tanks ( something which was of course impossible ) This order was corrected on September 28 to produce til April 1 1941 1490 tanks . A month later, the order was given for an army of 200 divisions :20 Pz, 10 mot, 10 mountain, 140 infantry and 20 occupation divisions .
But, it was obvious that this number could not be reached . And it was not reached .
The conclusions are
1 A ''sufficient '' increase of the tank production between the fall of France and June 1941 ,with standardized production, outphasing of old models, etc ...was not possible . If it was tried, it would hinder the war against Britain .
2 It was not needed if there was no war with the SU ,and also if there was a war with the SU .17 PzD with each 400 tanks would not have done better in the Summer of 1941 than the existing 17 PzD of each ssome 200 tanks; in fact the result would have been worse, much worse .
I'm not sure what we are arguing about here?

If Germany doesn't pump out more obsolete tanks, it will save them the resources, the crew, the training, etc. It would not hinder the war against Britain - on the contrary. It would free up resources badly needed for the LW and KM. The British and the Americans had no way to invade the continent before 1943, and absent the eastern front, before 1944. So first, the Germans had ample of time to phase out crappy models, and second, their tank production in 1940/1941 was rather irrelevant because they already had enough to defeat the British. The problem was how to bring battle to the British.

The proper size and complement of a PzD is questionable, I have no definitive stance on what was the best. Also in 1940-1941 there were never enough lorries let alone APCs. We are talking about production and related stuff here, and not how they should have organized the produced vehicles. All the problems I've mentioned above about maintenance do apply to a 200 tank division as well as to a 400 tank division.

Is the combat value of 10 PzDs with two models (one of Panzer III and one of Panzer IV), with the proper number and quality of APCs, Kradschützen, etc. higher or lower than the combat value of 17/20 hodgepodge PzDs with a dozen models and captured lorries? I don't know.

It is also questionable how much development would the Germans do if they don't face the Soviets.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by ljadw » 05 Feb 2021 14:56

The definition, even the existence of obsolete tanks is very questionable : a Pz II can be as efficient as a Pz IV .
The efficiency of a PzD did not depend on the number of tanks, the type of tanks, the number of lorries,artillery,etc,but on the resistance that was to be expected from the enemy : a PzD with 100 Pz III would do as better against a newly formed militia division as a PzD with 200 Pz IV against a regular Soviet tank division .
Tank divisions with 200 tanks would have less maintenance problems than tank divisions with 400 tanks :the Soviet tank divisions has too many tanks ( 400 or more ) and less manpower than the German ones ,with as result that a lot of these divisions collapsed during their advance to the border, before having seen one German .
On the other hand ,there was at least one Soviet PzD without tanks .
Whatever : much too importance has been given on the number and quality of tanks : a tank division is a combined arms unit .And the number of tanks is not decisive : the PzD of May 1940 had less tanks than those of September 1939 and those of June 1941 less tanks than those of May 1940 .
One example : PzD 1
May 1940 :
Pz1 :52
Pz2 :98
Pz3 :58
Pz4 :24
Pzbef :8
Total :260
June 1941 :
Pz2 :43
Pz 3 :71
Pz4 :20
Pz bef :11
Total : 145 ( Source : Jentz )
Did 1 PZD worse in the Summer of 1941 than in the Summer of 1940 ?

To phase out crappy models would mean less tanks ,and it was thus better to continue the production of the existing tanks,especially as it was not possible to equip 20 PzD with new tank models in 7 months of time .
About the Germans facing the Soviets : if there was no Ostheer guarding the border,the Soviets would attack, sooner or later. And if there were no German forces guarding the coasts from the Pyrenees to the North Cape, Britain would attack .
The problem was that with 120 divisions ,this was something impossible:Germany could do this only with a small army ,with less manpower ,but more fire power and more mobility . And, whatever the tank lobby may say, more tanks do not mean more mobility or fire power .
The number of tanks was limited for the reasons we know : production, but not only production :more tanks would need more trucks to supply them , more motorized infantry and artillery to protect them ,and Germany had not the means for more tanks,motorized artillery and infantry .

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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by Yoozername » 06 Feb 2021 20:48

A very interesting look at M3 production at DTA. Note the size of the cold riveting 'tool'. I imagine just riveting up the tank would be time consuming. Many of the parts are being made in the facility also. 30,000 parts to a tank. Of course, they would also have sub-contracted items also.

I imagine many plants were converted from industry. But this place was made from the ground up. All those machines needed to be acquired and even designed.


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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by Richard Anderson » 07 Feb 2021 01:36

Yoozername wrote:
06 Feb 2021 20:48
A very interesting look at M3 production at DTA. Note the size of the cold riveting 'tool'. I imagine just riveting up the tank would be time consuming. Many of the parts are being made in the facility also. 30,000 parts to a tank. Of course, they would also have sub-contracted items also.
Yep, it was time consuming. However, nevertheless, after completing just 7 of the first production M3 in July 1941, they completed 50 in August, 95 in September, 148 in October, 194 in November...peak was 424 in June 1942, just before they ramped down and prepared to turn out the M4.

Both Chrysler and GM subcontracted, outside and inside their corporate facilities. GM's Fisher Body Division was selected to lead tank assembly at the newly built Grand Blanc Tank Arsenal, but before it came on line Fisher Body Plant #1 produced the first "Fisher Body" Medium Tanks M4. Eventually, ten other existing GM plants were converted to act as subs for GBTA.
I imagine many plants were converted from industry. But this place was made from the ground up. All those machines needed to be acquired and even designed.
Well, three tank arsenals were built from the ground up, DTA, GBTA, and QCTA, but the last never really operated as an final assembly arsenal. The others were a mixed bag and somewhat parallel to German practice.

The Lima Tank Arsenal was originally funded by the UK as part of the Medium Tank M3 program and was built inside an existing, but derelict Lima Locomotive plant building. Pullman Standard, Pressed Steel, and Pacific Car were similar, as was Ford's initial Medium Tank M4 facility, but it was later turned over entirely to GA-series engine production. American Car, Baldwin Locomotive, and ALCO converted existing rail car or locomotive plant facilities. For the most part that was also the productivity curve...purpose-built arsenals were the most productive, followed by the assembly plants built inside defunct plant buildings, and the lowest output were those that used existing heavy machinery plant and station-assembly methods they were used to.

All had specialty machines built or converted...my favorite is the former V-4 Newton rotary mill designed for engine block milling that was converted to cut the turret ring on the front hull assemblies of four M4A4 simultaneously.
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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by Yoozername » 07 Feb 2021 06:42

i cut and paste from...

https://www.alternatewars.com/BBOW/Stat ... 940-45.pdf

This basically shows a side by side monthly comparison of a chassis type. Basically, The M3 37mm/75mm version, M4 75MM, m7 105MM versions, and the M10 TD.

I will let people draw their own conclusions
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