The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

[Roddoss72]

Ok, now I'm confused. To quote your earlier post:

....
But this is my point, Germany had a credible surface fleet Four state of the art Battleships, one Aircraft Carrier and at least two or three battlecruisers, the problem was that Hitler forbade to expose these ships to any danger, ...

This implies that the above were opearational and available for use. Nothing is said about scrapping. Now you say:

....

Ok here are the Ships as of the 1st of May 1941

Battleships;
KM Tirpitz
KM Bismarck
KM Scharnhorst
KM Gneisenau
Z-Plan, Schlachtschiff H (Hindenburg) Laid down 15-07-1939 Scrapped 25-11-1941
Z-Plan, Schlachtschiff J (Friedrich der Groß) Laid down 01--09-1939 Scrapped 25-11-1941

Aircraft Carriers;
Graf Zeppelin 75% complete
Flugzeugträger B (Peter Stresser) Completed up to Main Armoured Deck 60% complete
....

These major Capital ships were at the time either in operation or at under varoius stages of construction, this equates to about 250,000 tonnes of steel that could have being used to produce more panzers, and i certainly would have scrapped those ships if it meant i would have a far stronger Panzer arm with tanks and support vehicles and the like.

What were you trying to say in the earlier post that this would be a reasonable response to?

I see where you are coming from i had confused the Panzerschiff's as Battleruisers at the time but i went and looked at the Panzerschiffs and discovered that the actual tonnage was on some ships some 60% above quoted tonnage this was to undermine the Washington Treaty, the scrapping dates are as they are, those ships that began and later scrapped the steel was redirected towards U-Boat production but not towards the production of Panzer and support vehicles and spare parts.

[brodeur]

If you would have had larger troops to supply then they would simply had to deliver more. It’s not like the Germans did a super job and spent 100 % of there transportation recourses on this.

But they could not deliver more. Physically.

I naturally assume that they would have cooped with the bigger task. This is a very good example of the meaning of stepping up in war footing. Less German civilian transportation via train available because of high priority east front duties.

That assumption is not backed by what happened in reality. Also, reducing train transports in Germany does diddly squat, since the rolling stock can not run on Russian gauge, and is in any case not fit for the climatic conditions.

The problems for the Germans were:

1) Assuming a much shorter war (which is why they did not go to full war footing)
2) Apparently assuming lower supply requirements than experienced in reality (that was just stupid, but it is connected to 1) )
3) Not capturing sufficient Soviet rolling stock (the Soviets did a good job at removing their rolling stock, and/or rendering it unuseable. (that was not their fault)

All the best

Andreas

That’s a very stiff and statically approach.

The principal as such, transfer recourses to the war effort in this case transportation capacity will give an effect. You can also reequip German normal wagons to wide gauge etc. There is a loot of possibilities available to increase the capacity.

[Lars]

Regarding the "stupid" planning of Barbarossa. Perhaps Hitler should not have ranted about how much Paulus was to blame for Stalingrad, but rather rant about how Paulus was to blame for the logistical planning failures of Barbarossa?

[Andreas]

That’s a very stiff and statically approach.

The principal as such, transfer recourses to the war effort in this case transportation capacity will give an effect. You can also reequip German normal wagons to wide gauge etc. There is a loot of possibilities available to increase the capacity.

You can assume all sorts of things. The point is that the original poster did not, he posed a what-if for increased tank production, not for increased tank production, increased railway equipment production, and increased equipment given to the Reichsbahn to convert equipment, as well as a realistic assessment of the logistical requirements, and a totally different campaign assessment prior to starting it. All of these you just assume by sleight of hand, without making them explicit. That is an impossible way to go about things - state your assumptions, otherwise it is a pointless discussion.

All the best

Andreas

[Roddoss72]

That’s a very stiff and statically approach.

The principal as such, transfer recourses to the war effort in this case transportation capacity will give an effect. You can also reequip German normal wagons to wide gauge etc. There is a loot of possibilities available to increase the capacity.

You can assume all sorts of things. The point is that the original poster did not, he posed a what-if for increased tank production, not for increased tank production, increased railway equipment production, and increased equipment given to the Reichsbahn to convert equipment, as well as a realistic assessment of the logistical requirements, and a totally different campaign assessment prior to starting it. All of these you just assume by sleight of hand, without making them explicit. That is an impossible way to go about things - state your assumptions, otherwise it is a pointless discussion.

All the best

Andreas

What i have tried to do is to assume the scrapping of all heavy units of the Kriegsmarine and use the estimated 250,000 tonnes of steel in the production of tanks and all the support vehicles need to increase the Panzer Armies effectiveness by having more Pz Mk III, IV and Tigers, that is all, maybe just maybe and extra Panzer Army contributing to Barbarossa may have swung it for Germany, but we'll never know.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Now I am wondering how fast the production rates for tanks could have been boosted in 1940-41?

[LWD]

Was steel even a limiting resource in that regard? Halting construction might free up some cash but scrapping is probably going to require a simlar number of workers and cash, it does save on maintenance though. From what I've read on these boards cash and ecomic constraints were probably more important than the availability of most minerals (tungsten being a counter example at least later in the war). I am however not an expert in this regard.

[Roddoss72]

Germanys main problem was of speed of development, it took years and not months to develop anything worthy of the battlefield, and when they built tanks they (Panther, Tiger and Royal Tiger) were complicated machines, not only to build but to maintain, unlike the Russian machines where simplicity ruled the day, easy to build and maintained, i have read where 3 T-34-76's could be built at the same time as 1 Pz Mk V Panther came off the production line and still be cheaper.

And the other main problem of the German arms production (Until Speer took over) was the extensive red tape producers had to go through, this lead to graft and corruption on a massive scale, Germany on the whole had the weapons to win the war but not enough of them.

Also when the Germans invaded any territory they made no attempt to rebuild damaged armament factories, again i have read the tank factories in Kiev for example while under German hands nothing was done to rebuild them and to bring them back on line as with many factories in the Byelorussian and Ukrainian industrial centres, little or no rebuilding of factories was commenced.

Also another factor in Tank production could be stemmed of the Failure of the Fuhrer himself, i mean can you imagine the senario of liberated Byelorussian and Ukrainians population being brought into as part of the Greater German Reich as citizens and encouraged to ramp up their factories to fight against communism and urged to destroy Stalin's regime.

Germany also failed as it never geared itself for a total war footing from the ouset of WWII, women were considered to be only good for one thing and that was to breed, unlike the western allies who brought in women in the auxilliary forces and armament production, Germany did not, Hitler saw German women as the mothers of Germany and not the backbone to industrial and agricultural production.

I could go on more but in the end Hitler had only one plan and that was world domination, but had no plans how to achieve that, and had no plans once he had achieved it.

[christopher nelson]

Without a doubt Hitler was his own worst enemy. If it was the Kaiser's forces invading Russia in 1941 then there would be a greater chance of the german's doing exactly what you have suggested.

[Roddoss72]

Without a doubt Hitler was his own worst enemy. If it was the Kaiser's forces invading Russia in 1941 then there would be a greater chance of the german's doing exactly what you have suggested.

Ironically Hitler was the best weapon the Allies had.

[Lars]

Without a doubt Hitler was his own worst enemy. If it was the Kaiser's forces invading Russia in 1941 then there would be a greater chance of the german's doing exactly what you have suggested.

Ironically Hitler was the best weapon the Allies had.

They wouldn´t have agreed with you pre Stalingrad.

[christopher nelson]

Actually more and more of the german military began to believe that Hitler was the problem that had to be dealt with. His decision to stop the panzers at Dunkirk,his actions regarding the campaign in russia in 1941 and his decision to declare war on the United States caused more and more doubts to arise regarding his judgement. His decision regarding no breakout of the 6th army confirmed that all was lost.

[Roddoss72]

Actually more and more of the german military began to believe that Hitler was the problem that had to be dealt with. His decision to stop the panzers at Dunkirk,his actions regarding the campaign in russia in 1941 and his decision to declare war on the United States caused more and more doubts to arise regarding his judgement. His decision regarding no breakout of the 6th army confirmed that all was lost.

But his biggest stuff up was not going after Moscow, as the political, ecconomic and military hub of the Soviet Union was a mistake Hitler and the third reich could not recover from.

[christopher nelson]

I concour that the failure to take Moscow in 1941 was the giant mistake that set Germany on the road to defeat.

[brodeur]

That’s a very stiff and statically approach.

The principal as such, transfer recourses to the war effort in this case transportation capacity will give an effect. You can also reequip German normal wagons to wide gauge etc. There is a loot of possibilities available to increase the capacity.

You can assume all sorts of things. The point is that the original poster did not, he posed a what-if for increased tank production, not for increased tank production, increased railway equipment production, and increased equipment given to the Reichsbahn to convert equipment, as well as a realistic assessment of the logistical requirements, and a totally different campaign assessment prior to starting it. All of these you just assume by sleight of hand, without making them explicit. That is an impossible way to go about things - state your assumptions, otherwise it is a pointless discussion.

All the best

Andreas

It’s all about doing Speers stuff a few years earlier. The “stiff” thinkers simply can’t grasp that.

Cheers