http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/Mag ... #ComInt-19Details of the formation, training, and assembling of each of these Japanese naval elements (except for the Pearl harbor Attack Force),as well as the supporting Japanese air elements involved in the Southern operations, were reported by the COMINT centers in Hawaii and Corregidor. Specifically, they observed Japanese air and naval forces gathering in the vicinity of Takao and Keeling on Formosa and Mako in the Pescadores, a group of islands between Formosa and China. They also noted Japanese assault forces gathering on Amami O Shima north of Okinawa and in the Palau Islands in the Mandates. Air support for the Philippine assaults was also seen assembling in the Palaus and on Formosa.
Now with this "attack plan", y'all are proposing to use these other forces ( whose locations and general intentions were known) to attack Hawaii. It follows that these other pieces of the puzzle will point toward an attack on Hawaii when you move them that way. The one missing piece(1st airfleet) which allowed the 'raid" to be a suprise, doesn't preclude that moving all these other pieces will go "un-noticed" or that this "new picture" will not become readily apparent even if the one piece of the puzzle (1st airfleet) is still missing. In a past job, I have constructed such pictures, with limited/partial pieces, from them you can both see the whole picture and even, eventually, the shape of missing pieces.
The first page of this threadChris - can you post a link to the thread to which you are referring?
okay a 1.8 million ton elephant + the weigh of the IJN.The size of the IJN fleet train is provided in post 2, with a breakdown by type. Note that what you are describing as "infinitesimal" was in actual fact a massive 1.8 million tons of shipping. Do recall that the entire Japanese economy could get by with 3 million tons.
You're using blanket figures of the Japanese merchant marine. That does not nearly compare to the same size and specialization of the US fleet train that supported the USN/ Saipan amphious attack force. It took years of hard work and thinking and experience for us to mount this size of landing/assault on Saipan. And the assets of AMERICA. The Japanese had none of this in 1941, neither did they ever mobilize or purposely build remotely this much shipping to mount an amphibious attack. Throughout the war they had problems merely making amphibious landings and their attacks/assaults on defended beaches number (2), Corredigor and Wake. Both of which were near-run/ slip-slod operations of an insignant size compared to this Pearl harbor assault (about 1:30to40 in troop size IIAC).
Even the Midway invasion force numbered only 4500 men. I think this is the upper limit to how big an amphibious ATTACK the Japanese COULD mount for the war. Look at the problems they had just landing troops/supplies/equipment on Guadacanal. This gives a fair indication of the actual ability and capabilities of the IJN/IJA to land and support troops and their Guadacanal ops were a war-year later.
I'm a bad historian, as I don't know about these 27 SaipanOTL/HawaiiATL Invasion sized amphi attacks. Please list them and exclude landings of less than a division(for simplicity) and the ones where the opposition was a few Chinese peasants/militia armed with hoes and rice-threshers.Hardly. If you would devote some time to reading (other than sigint) about the China/Japan war ongoing before WW2 you would note that Japan succeeded at some 27 over-the-beach combat landings there.
Note there is a huge difference between an Amphious attack/assault and merely debarking/landing from a ship.
They did find them. see above. and previous posts and topics.As I have typed before, the US couldn't find invasion fleets that it WASN'T even searching for.
No , a 775' AKA , probably a few more miles. Here is a picture of the ship I was on for 14 months. We were based at Saipan/Guam and steamed all over the Western Pacific. Plus I flew the US/Hawaii/Saipan route a few times.I can claim 35,000 regional sea miles logged in a 48' sailing bark. Can you ?
http://www.hazegray.org/shipbuilding/qu ... /mps46.jpg 48' bark? pretty brave. I'm no sailor.
I see no conspiracy, I just see not being able to track the 1st airfleet for a couple weeks, and a lack of belief by some higher ups about the possibility of an air attack on Pearl Harbor. The US was dam sure aware of and capable of defending Oahu from a NAVAL attack; Otherwise, How do you explain all those coastal defence guns and beach defenses and army units? However I do have a real problem with letting your enemy, "fire the first shot". Especially when that first shot is aimed at people much like me when I was in the Army. Politicians should stand in front of that gun when they think up such great ideas/conspiracies., because its all part of the grand conspiracy, right ?)
Ha-ha. Hell Yes. They would have faced an attrition battle and losses which would have made Guadacanal look like bargain by comparision. An Unsupported base, with a supply line 1000's of miles long, Sitting right at the end of the "front yard" of the US west coast. Who needs oil tankers when you have oil wells to directly fuel up from. And US subs would have had alot of fun.but I would point out that, had Japan grabbed Hawaii in December'41 a dfferent reality would have prevailed for the next 2-3 years.
Of course it would never go this far, as the Japanese could never take Oahu. This plan on the first page says the Japanese will not invade Oahu till a few days after the first attack. If you give the US Army even a few hours to man the coast defences and the beaches you'll probably never land anything . Or at best, the light armed Japanese soldier will never make headway off the beach. The IJA never had the firepower to blast through dug-in defenses. Perhaps you can starve them out in 6 months like what happened in PI , but I REALLY don't think the IJN can hang out that long. What happens to any Japanese ships off of, or heading toward HI after about March 42, I leave to the imagination, as that was when the US broke the Operational code.
When you make a war-game/what-if you need to play or look at it from both sides, i.e. neutrally, otherwise you will never see the problems with perfect plans or stratetgies.
And don't underestimate the capabilities or adaptability of the US on ,or even long before, Dec 7 1941.
Even before Dec 7 1941 US SIGINT, was excellent, so was our HUMINT, and our COMINT got excellent once it was sufficently staffed(Feb-Mar1942). The exception of the Pearl Harbor raid proves the rule of the effectiveness/decisiveness of US intelligence in the Pacific War. Change Plan Z into anything other than a mere raid by a small force and you run smack into the generalization that makes this true. And you will probably make it a "quick war" , which if I recall, correctly was the hope of the Japanese in the first place.