Chris et al,
"Waking up the trolls, is more like it" if it weren't so true my feelings might be hurt ...
There was some discussion going on at http://warships1discussionboards.yuku.c ... tml?page=1 but it seems to have died down for the moment as our principle opponent has some ongoing off-the-net issues happening in his real life ... I must admit that I was not very happy with the quality of that debate however. Far too much personal insult and far too little posting of sources to ferret out many new facts.
Wrt to a Pearl Harbor blockship I can only imagine the possibility of one being successful on the night of Dec.6-7'41. After that, the US defenders would have been far too strong/alert. And there was a 2x16" battery that could cover the PH entrance at point blank range (once manned) ... With 2x2x12" guns in close support backed up by 8x12" mortars, all also not regularly manned in peacetime.
Had the Japanese ordered their 5 minuisubs to ambush the USS Ward, the US DD on gateguard duty, instead of trying to penetrate into PH as they did historically, then I think that a fast Japanese cargoliner like the 17,000ton 20kt Tatsuta Maru could have crashed the 2 nets guarding the entrance channel into Pearl Harbor. Water depth at the nets was 72' but that shelved rapidly to only 40' within 1/2 mile upstream of the nets. After she scuttled herself in that entrance channel any Japanese minisubs still carrying torpedoes could have positioned themselves to ensure that no smaller USN vessels might slip past her and hence out of PH. A tight cork in the bottleneck indeed.
Historically the 45' deep nets had no sensors nor mines attached and were left wide open for about 5 hours that morning due to US ship traffic in and out (although there was no way that the Japanese could have known about nor counted on that) so such a rush would have proven to have been easy once (and if) Ward, stuck in her regular 2 mile by 2 mile 4 knot patrol box, was taken out of the equation. I've never been able to verify that USS Ward carried live torpedoes that morning so even her unsunken presence might not have stopped a ship the size/speed/bulk of the Tatsuta Maru with her rather small 3" main armament. Assuming of course that she would have actually opened fire on an unknown passengerliner in peacetime ? Historically, Kimmel's "shoot to kill" orders for the naval exclusion zone outside of the PH entrance applied only to submerged submarines, NOT to surface vessels as evidenced by Ward's historical sinking of a Japanese minisub AND by her interception of a wayward fishing sampan on that Dec.7'41 morning. The USGC was called out to escort that sampan back into Honolulu Harbor.
Ditto for ramming since 1,700 tons are not going to stop 17,000 tons moving at 20kts.
There was only one (2x3") examination gun battery manned (with another 2x6" battery on one hour standby) and overlooking the PH approaches that morning. Just two 3" guns were not going to stop a pre-dawn charging 17,000ton 20kt liner that WANTS to sink itself so as to block the PH shipping channel.
There were in fact, two unintended "bomb ships" inside of Honolulu Harbor that morning. The USS Vega - AK17 was already unloading some 130 tons of ammunition onto railway cars at Pier #31A for the USN. Please see http://www.ibiblio.net/hyperwar/USN/shi ... Pearl.html for the details if interested. The Dutch cargoliner Jagersfontain carried a load of beer for the USN at PH AND 1,300 tons of dynamite in her holds, destined for the British at Singapore. She tied up at about 0900, well after her own AA gunners had opened up on the Japanese attack planes overhead.
Historically, several improperly fused US AA shells fell and detonated around the wharf were Vega was unloading ... Just a few yards more and the Halifax detonation might indeed have been repeated at Honolulu.
The US had some 5,000 sea mines in storage at the West Loch ammunition depot beside PH that morning but none were in the sea. Command detonated minefields had been deployed off of both PH and Honolulu but these fields had been lifted in the late 1920s and were not replaced since they were considered too dangerous to peacetime shipping in general.
I haven't been able to even find any mention of same being deployed in Hawaiian waters post Dec.7'41 although many other Pacific island minefields are so detailed.
The invasion of Oahu, December 1941.
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ChristopherPerrien
- Member
- Posts: 7051
- Joined: 26 Dec 2002, 01:58
- Location: Mississippi
Yes they will, an unarmored ship or any ship smaller than a cruiser is quickly deadmeat if it comes in range of such guns. Wake is an example,3" guns there tore up an entire amphib assault.Just two 3" guns were not going to stop a pre-dawn charging 17,000ton 20kt liner that WANTS to sink itself so as to block the PH shipping channel.
Again you dismiss history, the Ward managed to sink one sub and run off another. The only thing that prevented all the Jap. mini-subs attacking the entrance was because that was their plan, however control and techno problems inherent with these tiny subs prevent anything better. There is no reason to expect these subs to do better (or worseHad the Japanese ordered their 5 minuisubs to ambush the USS Ward, the US DD on gateguard duty, instead of trying to penetrate into PH as they did historically,
) than they did historically just because the "mission" is slightly different; Therefore the Ward will be there too, plugging away at any fool-ass kamikaze blockship/scheme.
Last edited by ChristopherPerrien on 15 Feb 2008, 14:54, edited 1 time in total.
Some where else on this forum I read that Japan's fuel expenditure for the Midway operation was greater than they had made in any year of peace time operations. If this is accurate then, since they didn't have much more than a year or two of reserves going into the war and an invasion of Hawaii would have required an even greater fuel expenditure did they even have the fuel to try this?
Re: Invasion of Oahu, Dec.'41 - Blockship ?
Sorry for the delay in my reply. I didn't know that a board re-formating was planned. Looks nice so far but I don't yet know if there are any real improvements, or not ?
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LWD,
You asked, " ... did they even have the fuel to try this ?" to which the short answer is , yes. Japan really only had two choises: a.) fight like a trapped rat backed into a corner or b.) surrender to total US control of their economic future.
Not surprisingly, they chose to fight. With the benefit of 20/20 hindsight some 66 years later, this looks like a bad decision but at the time they thought that they could fight a short, intense war and then extract a ceasefire from the US before it's strategic production capability buried them completely. As it turned out, they couldn't.
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Chris,
I see that we are just one post into a renewed debate and you are already starting out with the personal insults. Was there really any need for the tone of your "any fool-ass kamikaze blockship/scheme" comment ?
You typed, " ...an unarmored ship or any ship smaller than a cruiser is quickly deadmeat if it comes in range of such guns. Wake is an example,3" guns there tore up an entire amphib assault." which is actually quite untrue.
The book "A Magnificent Fight" by Cressman is (mostly) available online and details that the 3" guns on Wake were used in the AA role, not as anti-shipping artillery pieces. Those were 5" and there were more than just a single pair of them.
On the day of the first Japanese attempted landing on Wake Island the defenders had known for several days that they were at war with Japan and thus were ON full alert. One could NOT say the same wrt any US coastal artillery defenders of the PH entrance channel on the night of Dec.6-7'41. That situation was a peacetime Saturday night, just like any other of the years of Saturday nights that had gone before.
Kimmels reaction at PH when told of USS Ward firing on a submarine just outside the ship channel entrance was to only request confirmation since he had received 5 such alarms over the last three months. He wasted almost an hour of potential US Pacific Fleet warning time even though his own orders were posted to warn that a submarine attack on that entrance might be a warning of a more general attack. I can see no reason why he would not have dithered in exactly the same way had he received any message about a 17,000ton cargoliner, which was expected.
At 20kts the Tatsuta Maru covers 20 nautical miles in that one hour. Night observation distances that night were recorded by Ward as being 3 nautical miles. No warning/thinking/communication time at all with those speeds. The blockship would be already well past any shore battery or gateguard destroyer if the US defenders awaited actual firing orders from Kimmel and/or Bloch. And, as I typed previously, Kimmel's orders ONLY specified live fire on submerged submarines in the maritime exclusion zone off of the PH entrance channel. Nothing was posted about surface shipping.
Would you, as a peacetime US destroyer Captain, actually open fire on a civilian passengerliner, possibly carrying 3,000 souls, WITHOUT a direct order to do so ? I don't think so.
Especially if that liner had recent US govrnment permission to be at Oahu that night ? Prange's book, "At Dawn We Slept" details the planned repatriation voyage of the Tatsuta Maru from Yokohamma to Honoulu to San Francisco to Yokahamma which historically was scheduled to arrive at Honolulu on Dec.9'41. She was the last of three Japanese trans-Pacific cargoliners which were to return US citizens from Japan to the US and then Japanese citizens from the US back to Japan.
Just another part of the Japanese ruse designed to keep America calm as the Kido Butai approached Hawaii. But a US government approved historical fact none-the-less. In the real timeline she departed Japan on schedule with several American families and busines travellers on board but turned around in mid-Pacific at midnight on Dec.6-7'41 so as to avoid being anywhere near the KB's attack on Oahu. Her crew were even issued with 20 new pistols just in case the Americans on board tried to rush the radio room to send out a message that she had turned around. The Japanese covered-all-the-bases on this one.
Had the Japanese been so inclined I can see no difficulties in their advancing Tatsuta Maru's Honolulu arrival date by two days such that USS Ward (if still afloat) and any other US defenders would NOT have been at all surprised to see her approaching the PH/Honolulu entrance channels at speed, in the dark. Even if miraculously spotted by (historically non-existant) USN long ranged air recon while still well out from Oahu, she would NOT have raised any US alarms because she WAS expected there, officially.
What possible reason could Ward's new Captain, who had just taken over comand of his ship the day before, have to fire on such a liner that his own government had just told him was carrying US citizens , with their blessings, back to Honolulu and later, to San Francisco ?
It's the PERFECT historical cover for a Japanese blockship attempt on PH. This AH only requires a two day timing advance from the historical early morning of Dec.9'41 to the early morning of Dec.7'41. Is this a "fool-ass kamikaze blockship/scheme" ? I don't think so at all. The attempt could be "fancied-up" by adding minelaying capability to the Tatsuta Maru for use as she entered the PH ship channel but the risk of those explosives being hit (and set off) by US coastal artillery fire would be too great for any additional benefits that could be gained. IMO. Better to send the 5 minisubs into that channel, all around her, to help keep US warships bottled up inside PH. Even better if a Combined Fleet battleship bombardment of PH or Hawaiian Island troop landings are planned.
Also, IIRC one Japanese destroyer at Wake #1 was sunk by a lucky gun hit on depthcharges which had carelessly not been turned to "safe" mode. I can't imagine there being any depthcharges present at all on an AH Japanese 17,000ton ex-civilian cargoliner blockship, can you ?
The goals of these two Japanese operations were totally different. At Wake #1 the Japanese shore bombardment force wished to stay afloat and turned away when the already alerted US coastal artillery opened up. You don't seem to realize that the objective of any blockship headed into Pearl Harbor IS TO SINK there ! 2x3" gunfire from the US coastal artillery defenders would just speed that process along. The only 3 Japanese modifications needed would be 1.) the addition of more seacocks and/or scuttling charges(not good if the Japanese wish to quickly raise her after they have successfully invaded), 2.) the addition of more anchors & chains to keep her in proper channel blocking position as she settled and 3.) the provision of additional steerage controls in case her bridge was taken out by sheelfire during the approach run. Quite simple and fast.
A kamikaze run for that blockship's crew ? Possibly but there were 5 minisubs close by that could have picked up survivors. And with nearly 40% of Oahu's population being of actual Japanese citizenship or familial descent, I wouldn't think it difficult for the Japanese Honolulu consulate to have established a "safe-house" or two ashore where the crewmen could await extraction by IJN submarine. Of course, if this AH scenario includes a Japanese invasion of Oahu then any blockship survivors need to merely "lie-low" until they could meet the Japanese landing troops. Or, conduct additional sabotge operations on Oahu.
I point out that the British Zeebrugee blockship effort in WW1 and the St. Nazaire mission in WW2, both planned against alerted German opposition, didn't seem to have a problem in finding volunteer crews. I can't imagine the IJN not being able to find enough "volunteers" willing to risk "life and limb" for their Emperor.
Wake #2 actually serves as a better example of what the Japanese might have done with an AH Pearl Harbor blockship attempt. There the Japanese ran two ex-destroyer patrol boats, loaded with JSNLF troops, ashore in the darkness well before the US defenders could blanket them with any effective coastal artillery fire.
Wrt your comment about the Japanese having "control and techno problems inherent with these tiny subs" as far as I know just one minisub had a gyroscope problem which meant that it could not navigate accurately while submerged. If all 5 were ordered after Ward instead of into PH then this one fault would not have mattered at all. All 5 would have known her daily, slow, 2mile x 2mile patrol box courtesy of their Honolulu Consulate spy and could easily have tracked/attacked by periscope, with no warning.
Btw it was first minesweeper Condor and then sometime later the US transport ship Antares which spotted the surfaced minisub's conning tower and called in Ward to attack. If still at periscope depth at night, I think it unlikely that peacetime Ward could have spotted any of those 5 periscopes before numerous "fish" were well on their way towards her.
And this Ward ambush plan doesn't even call at all apon the presence of the 5 other full-sized Japanese submarines which dropped off those minisubs outside of the PH entrance channnel. Do you really think that Ward could avoid the 40+ torpedo tubes of 10 different Japanese submarines, at night, if Yamamoto had ordered her sunk ? When she was tied to a known and fixed patrol track, as well ? ... Nah.
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LWD,
You asked, " ... did they even have the fuel to try this ?" to which the short answer is , yes. Japan really only had two choises: a.) fight like a trapped rat backed into a corner or b.) surrender to total US control of their economic future.
Not surprisingly, they chose to fight. With the benefit of 20/20 hindsight some 66 years later, this looks like a bad decision but at the time they thought that they could fight a short, intense war and then extract a ceasefire from the US before it's strategic production capability buried them completely. As it turned out, they couldn't.
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Chris,
I see that we are just one post into a renewed debate and you are already starting out with the personal insults. Was there really any need for the tone of your "any fool-ass kamikaze blockship/scheme" comment ?
You typed, " ...an unarmored ship or any ship smaller than a cruiser is quickly deadmeat if it comes in range of such guns. Wake is an example,3" guns there tore up an entire amphib assault." which is actually quite untrue.
The book "A Magnificent Fight" by Cressman is (mostly) available online and details that the 3" guns on Wake were used in the AA role, not as anti-shipping artillery pieces. Those were 5" and there were more than just a single pair of them.
On the day of the first Japanese attempted landing on Wake Island the defenders had known for several days that they were at war with Japan and thus were ON full alert. One could NOT say the same wrt any US coastal artillery defenders of the PH entrance channel on the night of Dec.6-7'41. That situation was a peacetime Saturday night, just like any other of the years of Saturday nights that had gone before.
Kimmels reaction at PH when told of USS Ward firing on a submarine just outside the ship channel entrance was to only request confirmation since he had received 5 such alarms over the last three months. He wasted almost an hour of potential US Pacific Fleet warning time even though his own orders were posted to warn that a submarine attack on that entrance might be a warning of a more general attack. I can see no reason why he would not have dithered in exactly the same way had he received any message about a 17,000ton cargoliner, which was expected.
At 20kts the Tatsuta Maru covers 20 nautical miles in that one hour. Night observation distances that night were recorded by Ward as being 3 nautical miles. No warning/thinking/communication time at all with those speeds. The blockship would be already well past any shore battery or gateguard destroyer if the US defenders awaited actual firing orders from Kimmel and/or Bloch. And, as I typed previously, Kimmel's orders ONLY specified live fire on submerged submarines in the maritime exclusion zone off of the PH entrance channel. Nothing was posted about surface shipping.
Would you, as a peacetime US destroyer Captain, actually open fire on a civilian passengerliner, possibly carrying 3,000 souls, WITHOUT a direct order to do so ? I don't think so.
Especially if that liner had recent US govrnment permission to be at Oahu that night ? Prange's book, "At Dawn We Slept" details the planned repatriation voyage of the Tatsuta Maru from Yokohamma to Honoulu to San Francisco to Yokahamma which historically was scheduled to arrive at Honolulu on Dec.9'41. She was the last of three Japanese trans-Pacific cargoliners which were to return US citizens from Japan to the US and then Japanese citizens from the US back to Japan.
Just another part of the Japanese ruse designed to keep America calm as the Kido Butai approached Hawaii. But a US government approved historical fact none-the-less. In the real timeline she departed Japan on schedule with several American families and busines travellers on board but turned around in mid-Pacific at midnight on Dec.6-7'41 so as to avoid being anywhere near the KB's attack on Oahu. Her crew were even issued with 20 new pistols just in case the Americans on board tried to rush the radio room to send out a message that she had turned around. The Japanese covered-all-the-bases on this one.
Had the Japanese been so inclined I can see no difficulties in their advancing Tatsuta Maru's Honolulu arrival date by two days such that USS Ward (if still afloat) and any other US defenders would NOT have been at all surprised to see her approaching the PH/Honolulu entrance channels at speed, in the dark. Even if miraculously spotted by (historically non-existant) USN long ranged air recon while still well out from Oahu, she would NOT have raised any US alarms because she WAS expected there, officially.
What possible reason could Ward's new Captain, who had just taken over comand of his ship the day before, have to fire on such a liner that his own government had just told him was carrying US citizens , with their blessings, back to Honolulu and later, to San Francisco ?
It's the PERFECT historical cover for a Japanese blockship attempt on PH. This AH only requires a two day timing advance from the historical early morning of Dec.9'41 to the early morning of Dec.7'41. Is this a "fool-ass kamikaze blockship/scheme" ? I don't think so at all. The attempt could be "fancied-up" by adding minelaying capability to the Tatsuta Maru for use as she entered the PH ship channel but the risk of those explosives being hit (and set off) by US coastal artillery fire would be too great for any additional benefits that could be gained. IMO. Better to send the 5 minisubs into that channel, all around her, to help keep US warships bottled up inside PH. Even better if a Combined Fleet battleship bombardment of PH or Hawaiian Island troop landings are planned.
Also, IIRC one Japanese destroyer at Wake #1 was sunk by a lucky gun hit on depthcharges which had carelessly not been turned to "safe" mode. I can't imagine there being any depthcharges present at all on an AH Japanese 17,000ton ex-civilian cargoliner blockship, can you ?
The goals of these two Japanese operations were totally different. At Wake #1 the Japanese shore bombardment force wished to stay afloat and turned away when the already alerted US coastal artillery opened up. You don't seem to realize that the objective of any blockship headed into Pearl Harbor IS TO SINK there ! 2x3" gunfire from the US coastal artillery defenders would just speed that process along. The only 3 Japanese modifications needed would be 1.) the addition of more seacocks and/or scuttling charges(not good if the Japanese wish to quickly raise her after they have successfully invaded), 2.) the addition of more anchors & chains to keep her in proper channel blocking position as she settled and 3.) the provision of additional steerage controls in case her bridge was taken out by sheelfire during the approach run. Quite simple and fast.
A kamikaze run for that blockship's crew ? Possibly but there were 5 minisubs close by that could have picked up survivors. And with nearly 40% of Oahu's population being of actual Japanese citizenship or familial descent, I wouldn't think it difficult for the Japanese Honolulu consulate to have established a "safe-house" or two ashore where the crewmen could await extraction by IJN submarine. Of course, if this AH scenario includes a Japanese invasion of Oahu then any blockship survivors need to merely "lie-low" until they could meet the Japanese landing troops. Or, conduct additional sabotge operations on Oahu.
I point out that the British Zeebrugee blockship effort in WW1 and the St. Nazaire mission in WW2, both planned against alerted German opposition, didn't seem to have a problem in finding volunteer crews. I can't imagine the IJN not being able to find enough "volunteers" willing to risk "life and limb" for their Emperor.
Wake #2 actually serves as a better example of what the Japanese might have done with an AH Pearl Harbor blockship attempt. There the Japanese ran two ex-destroyer patrol boats, loaded with JSNLF troops, ashore in the darkness well before the US defenders could blanket them with any effective coastal artillery fire.
Wrt your comment about the Japanese having "control and techno problems inherent with these tiny subs" as far as I know just one minisub had a gyroscope problem which meant that it could not navigate accurately while submerged. If all 5 were ordered after Ward instead of into PH then this one fault would not have mattered at all. All 5 would have known her daily, slow, 2mile x 2mile patrol box courtesy of their Honolulu Consulate spy and could easily have tracked/attacked by periscope, with no warning.
Btw it was first minesweeper Condor and then sometime later the US transport ship Antares which spotted the surfaced minisub's conning tower and called in Ward to attack. If still at periscope depth at night, I think it unlikely that peacetime Ward could have spotted any of those 5 periscopes before numerous "fish" were well on their way towards her.
And this Ward ambush plan doesn't even call at all apon the presence of the 5 other full-sized Japanese submarines which dropped off those minisubs outside of the PH entrance channnel. Do you really think that Ward could avoid the 40+ torpedo tubes of 10 different Japanese submarines, at night, if Yamamoto had ordered her sunk ? When she was tied to a known and fixed patrol track, as well ? ... Nah.
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ChristopherPerrien
- Member
- Posts: 7051
- Joined: 26 Dec 2002, 01:58
- Location: Mississippi
Re: The invasion of Oahu, December 1941.
My mistake on the 3in in comparision to 5in Wake guns , I tried to edit it but the forum was down. Perhaps I was thinking about Midway on 8 Dec.
As to my "fool-ass kamikaze blockship scheme", I stand by it, It was not meant as an insult, rather a sound appraisal of of the whole idea in general, and no tiny min-subs are going to be "picking up survivors" either. The USS Ward might though.
Fact is, no matter how many "pie in the sky schemes" are thought /brought up, they are easily murdered by the ACTUAL capabilities and limitations of the Japanese and US armed forces on 7 Dec. The Japanese simply could not have accomplished a "kamikaze block-ship scheme", neither could they have invaded OAHU or lauched a devastating/war-winning third strike on Pearl Harbor , with the equipment , men, and mind-set they had. All these ideas take extreme liberties and omissions of historical facts with degrading all things and actions American on Dec 7 and overating and changing all things Japanese to the point where it is pointless to debate futher. I'll leave it at that
Regards, Chris
As to my "fool-ass kamikaze blockship scheme", I stand by it, It was not meant as an insult, rather a sound appraisal of of the whole idea in general, and no tiny min-subs are going to be "picking up survivors" either. The USS Ward might though.
Fact is, no matter how many "pie in the sky schemes" are thought /brought up, they are easily murdered by the ACTUAL capabilities and limitations of the Japanese and US armed forces on 7 Dec. The Japanese simply could not have accomplished a "kamikaze block-ship scheme", neither could they have invaded OAHU or lauched a devastating/war-winning third strike on Pearl Harbor , with the equipment , men, and mind-set they had. All these ideas take extreme liberties and omissions of historical facts with degrading all things and actions American on Dec 7 and overating and changing all things Japanese to the point where it is pointless to debate futher. I'll leave it at that
Regards, Chris
Re: The invasion of Oahu, December 1941.
Chris,
I am greatly disappointed by your latest reply. In past board encounters I have always been able to count on you for a lively and well thought out debate.
If you had already decided that discussing an Oahu invasion AH was a pointless waste of your time then why did you bother to post to an otherwise hibernating thread dedicated to that very topic ? Just read the title shown above.
I believe rather that you can think of no counterpoints to my blockship scenario and rather than so admit, you prefer to run away and hide instead.
AFAIK I have presented an accurate description of US defensive resources, standing orders and historical reactions on the morning of Dec.7'41 near the entrance to the PH ship channel. For my AH Japanese, I have merely proposed (easier to carry out) order changes for the five minisubs historically sent in against PH and for the cargoliner historically believed by the US to be heading for Honolulu Harbor.
I fail to see how you have arrived at , "All these ideas take extreme liberties and omissions of historical facts with degrading all things and actions American on Dec 7 and overating and changing all things Japanese to the point where it is pointless to debate futher." from my few and minor AH blockship alterations to the historical timeline.
I am greatly disappointed by your latest reply. In past board encounters I have always been able to count on you for a lively and well thought out debate.
If you had already decided that discussing an Oahu invasion AH was a pointless waste of your time then why did you bother to post to an otherwise hibernating thread dedicated to that very topic ? Just read the title shown above.
I believe rather that you can think of no counterpoints to my blockship scenario and rather than so admit, you prefer to run away and hide instead.
AFAIK I have presented an accurate description of US defensive resources, standing orders and historical reactions on the morning of Dec.7'41 near the entrance to the PH ship channel. For my AH Japanese, I have merely proposed (easier to carry out) order changes for the five minisubs historically sent in against PH and for the cargoliner historically believed by the US to be heading for Honolulu Harbor.
I fail to see how you have arrived at , "All these ideas take extreme liberties and omissions of historical facts with degrading all things and actions American on Dec 7 and overating and changing all things Japanese to the point where it is pointless to debate futher." from my few and minor AH blockship alterations to the historical timeline.
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ChristopherPerrien
- Member
- Posts: 7051
- Joined: 26 Dec 2002, 01:58
- Location: Mississippi
Re: The invasion of Oahu, December 1941.
Hey Robdab,
Well I had a post , but the GDMFSOB'in login monster ate it. Here goes again
More or less , I see the chance of a 17000 ton ship blocking the channel as a "slim chance" , and the Japanese would have to have know IF the US fleet is there or not. Even if such an obstruction occurs , what does it accomplish? And the Americans will demolish any obstruction in days. So you propose sacraficing possibly 10 subs 5 minsubs, and only and surely one ship to block a channel, something that was/ has never been done. Certainly if something like this was an idea some NAVAL EXPERT , would have tried it . The naval raids of Zeebruge and Stnazaire are miniscule in scale, coordination, and sheer luck compare to this. The only time similar "operations" were done, were in the US Civil war and it literally took a fleet of ships to block an entrance/river(James River). I suppose you might be able to compare the blockships of Scapa Flow, which took many years to create a barrier . Perhaps the Mulberry blockships too, but again we are talking fleets of ships.
The ONE ship you want/can/possibly to use , is worth quite a bit to the Japanese, moreso when you think about what they were getting into, a naval war with the Supreme World and naval power at the time , and the Japanese being short 3 millions tons of shipping to start. Nothing like losing a new and highly needed 17000 ton troopship, on the first day and "for what ?"
So this whoel idea pre-supposes, a Japanese crystal ball, and a very slim chance of success ,yet even if it occurs would most likely be only a partial blocking , for a very small and short run return ( of some unknown value), and the certain loss of a very much needed ship.
Nope , the blockship idea is/was/remains, unrealistic, uneconomical, and most notably, impossible, given the pre-war/battle intelligence that would have been needed to make it feasible, precluded it being carried out. And don't forget the lack of "unk -unk" skill of how to do this, never been done before, job. Even WITH the Japanese having a crystal ball and pre-supposing they know some of the "unk-unks", I see no logic (Japanese or otherwise)to utilizing all these assets for a tiny chance of blocking the channel for a few days.
You might have a minor case of "Glennitis", as you seem to assume that the Japanese would have accepted and perfectly accomplished such an great/impossible scheme with no training investment/reservations at all ,if only you were there back then to think it up for those supermen. And the Americans would have been bottled up INDEFINITELY , as Americans couldn't even unstop a toilet until late 1944, and even then it was only after years of copying and learning from those masters of ruse , and war, and plumbing, the Japanese (most who never saw a toilet).
Chris
Well I had a post , but the GDMFSOB'in login monster ate it. Here goes again
More or less , I see the chance of a 17000 ton ship blocking the channel as a "slim chance" , and the Japanese would have to have know IF the US fleet is there or not. Even if such an obstruction occurs , what does it accomplish? And the Americans will demolish any obstruction in days. So you propose sacraficing possibly 10 subs 5 minsubs, and only and surely one ship to block a channel, something that was/ has never been done. Certainly if something like this was an idea some NAVAL EXPERT , would have tried it . The naval raids of Zeebruge and Stnazaire are miniscule in scale, coordination, and sheer luck compare to this. The only time similar "operations" were done, were in the US Civil war and it literally took a fleet of ships to block an entrance/river(James River). I suppose you might be able to compare the blockships of Scapa Flow, which took many years to create a barrier . Perhaps the Mulberry blockships too, but again we are talking fleets of ships.
The ONE ship you want/can/possibly to use , is worth quite a bit to the Japanese, moreso when you think about what they were getting into, a naval war with the Supreme World and naval power at the time , and the Japanese being short 3 millions tons of shipping to start. Nothing like losing a new and highly needed 17000 ton troopship, on the first day and "for what ?"
So this whoel idea pre-supposes, a Japanese crystal ball, and a very slim chance of success ,yet even if it occurs would most likely be only a partial blocking , for a very small and short run return ( of some unknown value), and the certain loss of a very much needed ship.
Nope , the blockship idea is/was/remains, unrealistic, uneconomical, and most notably, impossible, given the pre-war/battle intelligence that would have been needed to make it feasible, precluded it being carried out. And don't forget the lack of "unk -unk" skill of how to do this, never been done before, job. Even WITH the Japanese having a crystal ball and pre-supposing they know some of the "unk-unks", I see no logic (Japanese or otherwise)to utilizing all these assets for a tiny chance of blocking the channel for a few days.
You might have a minor case of "Glennitis", as you seem to assume that the Japanese would have accepted and perfectly accomplished such an great/impossible scheme with no training investment/reservations at all ,if only you were there back then to think it up for those supermen. And the Americans would have been bottled up INDEFINITELY , as Americans couldn't even unstop a toilet until late 1944, and even then it was only after years of copying and learning from those masters of ruse , and war, and plumbing, the Japanese (most who never saw a toilet).
Chris
Re: Invasion of Oahu, Dec.'41 - Blockship ?
That's a rather cavalier dismissal of a serious question. From my understanding the Japanese Navy had a year or twos suply of oil when the war started. If the Midway operation used more than a years worth of oil (peace time) then given that an invasion of Oahu would use a lot more it's not at all clear that they had enough or if they did have enough that they would have been able to do much after wards. The options you state are irrelevant to the question.robdab wrote:...
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You asked, " ... did they even have the fuel to try this ?" to which the short answer is , yes. Japan really only had two choises: a.) fight like a trapped rat backed into a corner or b.) surrender to total US control of their economic future.
Yes, I believe he would. Pretty much the SOP in a case like this is the liner would be ordered to stop. If it didn't stop a round would be fired across its bow. If it still didn't stop the engine room would be targeted. A 3" gun should be perfectly capable of stopping a liner. Range should be close enough that civilian casualties could be minimzed. Given the mood and warnings of the time I don't see that the capatain could have done much else. The liner certainly had no permission or rights to be anywhere near the entrance to Pearl....
Would you, as a peacetime US destroyer Captain, actually open fire on a civilian passengerliner, possibly carrying 3,000 souls, WITHOUT a direct order to do so ? I don't think so. ...
Re: The invasion of Oahu, December 1941.
Lets all hope that the forum upgrade is finally upgraded ?
Chris,
You wrote, "So you propose sacraficing possibly 10 subs 5 minsubs" Hardly. A peacetime torpedo ambush of USS WARD, in the dark of pre-dawn, when she wasn't expecting any attack at all would be unlikely to result in the loss of 10 Japanese submarines, of whatever size. Get serious.
"Certainly if something like this was an idea some NAVAL EXPERT , would have tried it." The use of blockships was hardly unusual. Ostend, Manila Bay, Subic Bay etc., etc., are just some examples. In fact Kimmel and Bloch were so woried about the concept that they both wrote memos to Washington on the subject, pre-war.
"Nothing like losing a new and highly needed 17000 ton troopship, on the first day and for what ?" Surley you know that Japan ordered the PH air raids with the expectation of loosing two full carriers and their entire air groups ? With that in mind why would they care about loosing a cargo-liner ? They had already been at war with China for years and were about to go to it with the Dutch, the entire British Empire and America. Don't you think that they expected to loose a ship or two ?
Your term, "unk -unk" skill " is one that is unfamiliar to me ? Please define it so that I might respond to whatever point it is that you are trying to make.
"And the Americans will demolish any obstruction in days." I think not. Fragile ship's rudders and propellers don't take well to being dragged thru steel plate. If sunk in the 40' deep PH ship channel, a blockship such as the Tatsuta Maru (72' fom keel to top deck) would have to be totally removed to allow the safe pasage of US battleships and aircraft carriers which all drew 32'-37' of depth. Blowing up such a blockship would just more widely scatter the steel wreckage that needed to be lifted out of the channel. Remember that SCUBA gear was not yet invented so all USN divers were of the airhose dragging, hardhat variety. And the few USN divers on Oahu were very busy for the first few days in rescuing the survivors trapped in sunken and overturned USN ships inside of PH. Would you as a diver want to drag your single airhose thru razor sharp steel shards of blown-up ship wreckage ? In PH water where visibuilty was recorded as being 4" (inches not feet) before all of that spilled ship fuel oil was added ? I'd suspect weeks or even months, rather than days.
In answer of your fundamental question "Even if such an obstruction occurs , what does it accomplish ?" such a blockship mission only makes sense if the Japanese intend to either/or A.) stay around Oahu for a few more days in order to cause more damage or B.) invade Oahu immediately.
In the case of A.) including a blockship in Nagumo's orders allows the KB to concentrate more on destroying USN and USAAF airpower based on Oahu and less on the Pacific Fleet's battleline. Without US aircraft posing any threat, the USN's ships bottled up inside of PH can be taken care of by air attack on the days following or better still, by Combined Fleet battleship bombardment. Much like "shooting-fish-in-a-barrel.
In the case of B.) a blockship stops USN survivors from inside of PH from rushing out to attack Japanese landing forces around Oahu. Their direct gunfire out of that landlocked harbor would be blocked by the high grounds to the west, north, east and southeast while Japanese air cover would prevent USN spotter planes from adjusting any indirect USN gunfire over that high ground.
Any USN warships at sea would be totally cut-off from PH's fuel supplies. Both the Enterprise and Lexington Task Forces, returning from aircraft ferry mission to Wake and Midway would have found themselves "out of gas" and adrift with the nearest USN tanker, the USS Neeches, being 1,200 nmiles to the east of Hawaii at the time.(Well, ok, some of the USN's smaller shallow draft vessels could have re-fuelled inside of Honolulu Harbor but it had no anti-submarine net defenses nor extensive AA gun installations at the time. And the oil tanks around that harbor were just as vulnerable to KB divebombers as were the tankfsarms scattered thru PH)
Of course this is all hindsight that the Japanese couldn't have known or counted on but just imagine the differences in the course of the entire Pacific War had the Japanese just decided to sacrifice the Tatsuta Maru ?
Chris,
You wrote, "So you propose sacraficing possibly 10 subs 5 minsubs" Hardly. A peacetime torpedo ambush of USS WARD, in the dark of pre-dawn, when she wasn't expecting any attack at all would be unlikely to result in the loss of 10 Japanese submarines, of whatever size. Get serious.
"Certainly if something like this was an idea some NAVAL EXPERT , would have tried it." The use of blockships was hardly unusual. Ostend, Manila Bay, Subic Bay etc., etc., are just some examples. In fact Kimmel and Bloch were so woried about the concept that they both wrote memos to Washington on the subject, pre-war.
"Nothing like losing a new and highly needed 17000 ton troopship, on the first day and for what ?" Surley you know that Japan ordered the PH air raids with the expectation of loosing two full carriers and their entire air groups ? With that in mind why would they care about loosing a cargo-liner ? They had already been at war with China for years and were about to go to it with the Dutch, the entire British Empire and America. Don't you think that they expected to loose a ship or two ?
Your term, "unk -unk" skill " is one that is unfamiliar to me ? Please define it so that I might respond to whatever point it is that you are trying to make.
"And the Americans will demolish any obstruction in days." I think not. Fragile ship's rudders and propellers don't take well to being dragged thru steel plate. If sunk in the 40' deep PH ship channel, a blockship such as the Tatsuta Maru (72' fom keel to top deck) would have to be totally removed to allow the safe pasage of US battleships and aircraft carriers which all drew 32'-37' of depth. Blowing up such a blockship would just more widely scatter the steel wreckage that needed to be lifted out of the channel. Remember that SCUBA gear was not yet invented so all USN divers were of the airhose dragging, hardhat variety. And the few USN divers on Oahu were very busy for the first few days in rescuing the survivors trapped in sunken and overturned USN ships inside of PH. Would you as a diver want to drag your single airhose thru razor sharp steel shards of blown-up ship wreckage ? In PH water where visibuilty was recorded as being 4" (inches not feet) before all of that spilled ship fuel oil was added ? I'd suspect weeks or even months, rather than days.
In answer of your fundamental question "Even if such an obstruction occurs , what does it accomplish ?" such a blockship mission only makes sense if the Japanese intend to either/or A.) stay around Oahu for a few more days in order to cause more damage or B.) invade Oahu immediately.
In the case of A.) including a blockship in Nagumo's orders allows the KB to concentrate more on destroying USN and USAAF airpower based on Oahu and less on the Pacific Fleet's battleline. Without US aircraft posing any threat, the USN's ships bottled up inside of PH can be taken care of by air attack on the days following or better still, by Combined Fleet battleship bombardment. Much like "shooting-fish-in-a-barrel.
In the case of B.) a blockship stops USN survivors from inside of PH from rushing out to attack Japanese landing forces around Oahu. Their direct gunfire out of that landlocked harbor would be blocked by the high grounds to the west, north, east and southeast while Japanese air cover would prevent USN spotter planes from adjusting any indirect USN gunfire over that high ground.
Any USN warships at sea would be totally cut-off from PH's fuel supplies. Both the Enterprise and Lexington Task Forces, returning from aircraft ferry mission to Wake and Midway would have found themselves "out of gas" and adrift with the nearest USN tanker, the USS Neeches, being 1,200 nmiles to the east of Hawaii at the time.(Well, ok, some of the USN's smaller shallow draft vessels could have re-fuelled inside of Honolulu Harbor but it had no anti-submarine net defenses nor extensive AA gun installations at the time. And the oil tanks around that harbor were just as vulnerable to KB divebombers as were the tankfsarms scattered thru PH)
Of course this is all hindsight that the Japanese couldn't have known or counted on but just imagine the differences in the course of the entire Pacific War had the Japanese just decided to sacrifice the Tatsuta Maru ?
Last edited by robdab on 01 Mar 2008, 06:50, edited 2 times in total.
Re: The invasion of Oahu, December 1941.
LWD,
Wrt my reply to your Japanese strategic oil supply question you wrote, "That's a rather cavalier dismissal of a serious question." I'm sorry that you feel that way. Such was not my intent. In the interest of saving my sleeping time, what I didn't type was that had the Japanese been successful in invading Hawaii then Midway (historically some 6 months later) and its massive IJN fuel use, would not have happened at all, would it ? A review of historical Pacific naval operations between Dec.7'41 and the Midway battle will show the IJN to have also wasting vast amounts of fuel in trying to counter American "pin-prick" carrier raids in the central Pacific. Had Oahu been taken then what remained of the US Pacific Fleet would have been forced back 2,500 nmiles east to bases on the US West Coast. Thus probably eliminating those Central Pacific "pin-prick" carrier raids that cost the IJN so much fuel for no return at all.
So Japan ends up with more fuel available and a better strategic position. And she holds the Hawaiian Islands and about 500,000 US citizens as bargaining chips for a peace conference. Would a cease fire have been possible ? With hindsight of the American mood after the sneak attacks of Dec.7'41 I'd say "not a chance in hell" but prior to Dec. 1941 the Japanese historically felt that a short war with the US was their only chance of national survival.
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Wrt my blockship scenario, please re-read it.
With only 4 mile night visiblity (less when the clouds historically obscured the moon that night) and no radar, the commander of that 2x3" cosatal artillery battery (probably a very young leut.) would have only minutes to decide what to do about a 20kt 17,000 ton repatriation liner that HE WAS EXPECTING. And had been previously approved by his own government. Assuming of course that his lookouts weren't asleep and actually spotted her.
I am reminded greatly of the other historical US officer on Oahu who, when told of the large inbound aircraft radar contact just assumed that it was the incoming B-17 flight that he was expecting and told his radar operators to "never mind". And then didn't report the radar contact any further up the chain of command. Other than the USS Ward's new captain who had only taken over command of his ship the day before, Oahu's defenders seemed to be lulled, to a man, into the belief that no one would dare to attack Hawaii. "Asleep at the wheel" in other words.
Granted, she would seem to be just a bit off course (the entrances to the PH entrance channel and Honolulu Harbor are about 3 miles apart) but merchant ships do so often get lost at night, don't they ? Countless shipwreckes prove that.
NO other civilian vessel had been fired on previously (and historically USS WARD intercepted one such on that very morning of Dec.7'41)and the only standing USN orders that I have seen specified ONLY that unknown submarines in the Restricted Area COULD be fired on. It was still peacetime remember. You mention SOP but do not provide any source to back-up such a bloodthirsty claim for the US defenders of Oahu, at that time. You guess, but you do not really KNOW (with proofs), do you ?
You state, "A 3" gun should be perfectly capable of stopping a liner." but I see no historical examples listed by you in support of that opinion. It is not one that I share in this case. Is your belief founded on relavent personal experience or ... ? I can direct you to the "last stand" fights of the converted British liner "Jervis Bay" against German 6x11" naval guns and several other examples of similar unarmoured ships that fought on heroically for hours before sinking, if you'd like ? Keeping in mind, of course, that in this case the Tatsuta Maru WANTS to sink as soon as she reaches the proper blocking position. 17,000 tons doing 20 kts has much momentum built up and ISN"T going to stop quickly even if her screws stopped driving her forward as is suggested by your assertion that the US 2x3" gunners could actually hit her (well below water level, and multiple) engine rooms.
I await your historical sources, in support of your somewhat cavalierly stated opinions. LOL
Wrt my reply to your Japanese strategic oil supply question you wrote, "That's a rather cavalier dismissal of a serious question." I'm sorry that you feel that way. Such was not my intent. In the interest of saving my sleeping time, what I didn't type was that had the Japanese been successful in invading Hawaii then Midway (historically some 6 months later) and its massive IJN fuel use, would not have happened at all, would it ? A review of historical Pacific naval operations between Dec.7'41 and the Midway battle will show the IJN to have also wasting vast amounts of fuel in trying to counter American "pin-prick" carrier raids in the central Pacific. Had Oahu been taken then what remained of the US Pacific Fleet would have been forced back 2,500 nmiles east to bases on the US West Coast. Thus probably eliminating those Central Pacific "pin-prick" carrier raids that cost the IJN so much fuel for no return at all.
So Japan ends up with more fuel available and a better strategic position. And she holds the Hawaiian Islands and about 500,000 US citizens as bargaining chips for a peace conference. Would a cease fire have been possible ? With hindsight of the American mood after the sneak attacks of Dec.7'41 I'd say "not a chance in hell" but prior to Dec. 1941 the Japanese historically felt that a short war with the US was their only chance of national survival.
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Wrt my blockship scenario, please re-read it.
With only 4 mile night visiblity (less when the clouds historically obscured the moon that night) and no radar, the commander of that 2x3" cosatal artillery battery (probably a very young leut.) would have only minutes to decide what to do about a 20kt 17,000 ton repatriation liner that HE WAS EXPECTING. And had been previously approved by his own government. Assuming of course that his lookouts weren't asleep and actually spotted her.
I am reminded greatly of the other historical US officer on Oahu who, when told of the large inbound aircraft radar contact just assumed that it was the incoming B-17 flight that he was expecting and told his radar operators to "never mind". And then didn't report the radar contact any further up the chain of command. Other than the USS Ward's new captain who had only taken over command of his ship the day before, Oahu's defenders seemed to be lulled, to a man, into the belief that no one would dare to attack Hawaii. "Asleep at the wheel" in other words.
Granted, she would seem to be just a bit off course (the entrances to the PH entrance channel and Honolulu Harbor are about 3 miles apart) but merchant ships do so often get lost at night, don't they ? Countless shipwreckes prove that.
NO other civilian vessel had been fired on previously (and historically USS WARD intercepted one such on that very morning of Dec.7'41)and the only standing USN orders that I have seen specified ONLY that unknown submarines in the Restricted Area COULD be fired on. It was still peacetime remember. You mention SOP but do not provide any source to back-up such a bloodthirsty claim for the US defenders of Oahu, at that time. You guess, but you do not really KNOW (with proofs), do you ?
You state, "A 3" gun should be perfectly capable of stopping a liner." but I see no historical examples listed by you in support of that opinion. It is not one that I share in this case. Is your belief founded on relavent personal experience or ... ? I can direct you to the "last stand" fights of the converted British liner "Jervis Bay" against German 6x11" naval guns and several other examples of similar unarmoured ships that fought on heroically for hours before sinking, if you'd like ? Keeping in mind, of course, that in this case the Tatsuta Maru WANTS to sink as soon as she reaches the proper blocking position. 17,000 tons doing 20 kts has much momentum built up and ISN"T going to stop quickly even if her screws stopped driving her forward as is suggested by your assertion that the US 2x3" gunners could actually hit her (well below water level, and multiple) engine rooms.
I await your historical sources, in support of your somewhat cavalierly stated opinions. LOL
Last edited by robdab on 01 Mar 2008, 06:47, edited 1 time in total.
Re: The invasion of Oahu, December 1941.
If they run out of oil in the middle or even right after the invasion of Oahu they are in worse shape than historical. Consider the following in comparing Midway to Oahu.robdab wrote:LWD,
Wrt my reply to your Japanese strategic oil supply question you wrote, "That's a rather cavalier dismissal of a serious question." I'm sorry that you feel that way. Such was not my intent. In the interest of saving my sleeping time, what I didn't type was that had the Japanese been successful in invading Hawaii then Midway (historically some 6 months later) and its massive IJN fuel use, would not have happened at all, would it ? A review of historical Pacific naval operations between Dec.7'41 and the Midway battle will show the IJN to have also wasting vast amounts of fuel in trying to counter American "pin-prick" carrier raids in the central Pacific. Had Oahu been taken then what remained of the US Pacific Fleet would have been forced back 2,500 nmiles east to bases on the US West Coast. Thus probably eliminating those Central Pacific "pin-prick" carrier raids that cost the IJN so much fuel for no return at all.
1) The invasion fleet will have to be bigger.
2) It will have to travel further.
3) It will be at sea longer.
It's still an open question do they have enough oil to even try it.
And did that craft continue sailing at full speed toward Pearl? If not it only proves that WARD would indeed intercept....NO other civilian vessel had been fired on previously (and historically USS WARD intercepted one such on that very morning of Dec.7'41)
That was pretty much the SOP in the age of sail and it's still pretty much the SOP today. Hardly blood thirsty as the engine room is not heavily manned.... You mention SOP but do not provide any source to back-up such a bloodthirsty claim for the US defenders of Oahu, at that time. You guess, but you do not really KNOW (with proofs), do you ?
Comercial ships were not built to sustain gunfire. Since DDs weren't proof vs 3" gun fire I don't see why a liner would be.You state, "A 3" gun should be perfectly capable of stopping a liner." but I see no historical examples listed by you in support of that opinion. It is not one that I share in this case. Is your belief founded on relavent personal experience or ... ?
Note that the 4" guns the Ward carried are credited here with being able to penetrate 3" of armor at ~2 miles.
http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_4-50_mk9.htm
Irrelevant. The Jervis Bay was armed. The Tatsuta Maru was not. If raiders could close on ships close enough to target the radio room targeting the engine room can't be all that different. Also the Ward doesn't have to sink or even want to sink the Tatsuta just stop her.I can direct you to the "last stand" fights of the converted British liner "Jervis Bay" against German 6x11" naval guns and several other examples of similar unarmoured ships that fought on heroically for hours before sinking, if you'd like ?
They just have to prevent her from reaching the shipping channel Also note that Ward had more than 2 3" guns. And if they can't take out the engine room there's always the pilot house. Since the Tatsuta isn't firing back they can close enough to make sure of their shots. Do you have a source that shows the engine room was well below sea level?Keeping in mind, of course, that in this case the Tatsuta Maru WANTS to sink as soon as she reaches the proper blocking position. 17,000 tons doing 20 kts has much momentum built up and ISN"T going to stop quickly even if her screws stopped driving her forward as is suggested by your assertion that the US 2x3" gunners could actually hit her (well below water level, and multiple) engine rooms.
You are the one proposing all this. I'm questioning whether some of it is possible or reasonable. By the board rules the burden of proof is on you.
Re: The invasion of Oahu, December 1941.
LWD,
You protest that, "It's still an open question do they have enough oil to even try it." but let me ask you one simple question. If Yamamoto's Midway Operation so exhausted Japan's fuel supply, how did the Japanese then continue on to fight a trans-Pacific war for three more years ?
Might I suggest that you go back to the very start of this thread where glenn239 deals in detail with the fuel issues as a part of his Operation Tinkerbell propsal ? This effort on your part will save much much time and bandwidth for the other readers of this thread since we won't have to cover the same ground all over again.
"And did that craft continue sailing at full speed toward Pearl? If not it only proves that WARD would indeed intercept. The reason that I previously asked you to re-read my blockship scenario was to remind you that my alternative history plan included the re-direction of the 5 Japanese minisubs AND their 5 full sized mothersubs to the ambush sinking of USS Ward, should that gateguard be in a position to interfere with the Tatsuta Maru's run up the PH entrance channel.
Also suggested was that any minisubs with torpedoes remaining after that little chore would take up position near the sunken blockship to further "discourage" any egress of USN warships from within Pearl Harbor. With further support from the 5 full sized mothersubs remaining further off-shore in deeper waters.
"That was pretty much the SOP in the age of sail and it's still pretty much the SOP today." Last time that I checked most military forces around the world follow their ORDERS, not whatever SOP that they (or you) may dream up. I await your source confirming that the US defenders of Oahu were indeed authorized to fire on civilian vessels in the Restricted Sea Zone at the entrance channel into Pearl Harbor. The USN order authorizing firing on unknown submarines is widely available on the internet and does NOT mention firing on surface vessels at all.
"Since DDs weren't proof vs 3" gun fire I don't see why a liner would be." Never have I claimed that she would have been 3" or 4" proof. Indeed those 2x3" guns would surely EVENTUALLY sink her, just as the Japanese wished anyway. My whole point is that just 2x3" guns couldn't possibly sink all 17,000 tons of her BEFORE she reached her desired channel blocking position at 20 kts. Ward's torpedoes MIGHT have been able to do so but I haven't yet been able to confirm that she was indeed live torpedo armed that December morning since many USN warships were in the habit of offloading the bulk of their munitions (for safety reasons) to the Lualualie or West Loch Munitions Depots when they were to be stationed within PH for long periods of time. And that would be further dependent on Ward surviving the ambush efforts of not just one, but a full 10 Japanese submarines positioned to sink her first, by surprise.
"Irrelevant. The Jervis Bay was armed." And what difference does that make ? With WW1 vintage popguns against an armoured German pocket battleship armed with 6x11" main guns and 5.9" secondary batterys ? The Jervis Bay was just of such large size that it took her a long time to fill with seawater flowing in thru the German shell holes. Tatsuta Maru would have been in a similiar situation except that seawater could NOT flow in thru 3" holes nearly as fast as it could flow in thru 11" holes. If your heart is really set on it making any difference then Tatsuta Maru could have easily had some old naval guns bolted to her decks. And hidden from casual sight under canvas too but I was just trying to keep the scenario as simple as possible.
"If raiders could close on ships close enough to target the radio room targeting the engine room can't be all that different." except that the radio shack is usually about 25' above the water line and the ship's engine rooms about 25'
below the waterline.
"And if they can't take out the engine room there's always the pilot house." ... which is why my scenario already contains the suggestion of the Japanese installing an auxilliary steering positon deep in the Tatsuta Maru. I also suggested the installation of extra anchor chains and anchors so as to be sure that the Japanese could indeed stop and hold her in the exact best blocking position as she slowly filled thru opened seacocks (plus whatever US shell holes were added) and settled. I had considered scuttling charges to blow her bottoms out and sink her very quickly but rejected that idea since if the Japanese succeeded in taking Oahu, they would want to re-open PH as quickly as was possible. A team of Japanese divers, already familiar with her internal layout and aware of what small explosive boobytraps had been positioned inside her, could fairly quickly close those seacocks so that she could be pumped out and refloated with some haste, after the shooting was over.
"Do you have a source that shows the engine room was well below sea level? Considering that she drew 28' of water and that every ship's engine room that I have ever seen is located at the bottom of the ship's hull, I didn't think a source was necessary to determine that her engine rooms were located well below her water line ? Do you ?
"By the board rules the burden of proof is on you." Nowhere is it written that I have to do any of your homework/research for you.
You protest that, "It's still an open question do they have enough oil to even try it." but let me ask you one simple question. If Yamamoto's Midway Operation so exhausted Japan's fuel supply, how did the Japanese then continue on to fight a trans-Pacific war for three more years ?
Might I suggest that you go back to the very start of this thread where glenn239 deals in detail with the fuel issues as a part of his Operation Tinkerbell propsal ? This effort on your part will save much much time and bandwidth for the other readers of this thread since we won't have to cover the same ground all over again.
"And did that craft continue sailing at full speed toward Pearl? If not it only proves that WARD would indeed intercept. The reason that I previously asked you to re-read my blockship scenario was to remind you that my alternative history plan included the re-direction of the 5 Japanese minisubs AND their 5 full sized mothersubs to the ambush sinking of USS Ward, should that gateguard be in a position to interfere with the Tatsuta Maru's run up the PH entrance channel.
Also suggested was that any minisubs with torpedoes remaining after that little chore would take up position near the sunken blockship to further "discourage" any egress of USN warships from within Pearl Harbor. With further support from the 5 full sized mothersubs remaining further off-shore in deeper waters.
"That was pretty much the SOP in the age of sail and it's still pretty much the SOP today." Last time that I checked most military forces around the world follow their ORDERS, not whatever SOP that they (or you) may dream up. I await your source confirming that the US defenders of Oahu were indeed authorized to fire on civilian vessels in the Restricted Sea Zone at the entrance channel into Pearl Harbor. The USN order authorizing firing on unknown submarines is widely available on the internet and does NOT mention firing on surface vessels at all.
"Since DDs weren't proof vs 3" gun fire I don't see why a liner would be." Never have I claimed that she would have been 3" or 4" proof. Indeed those 2x3" guns would surely EVENTUALLY sink her, just as the Japanese wished anyway. My whole point is that just 2x3" guns couldn't possibly sink all 17,000 tons of her BEFORE she reached her desired channel blocking position at 20 kts. Ward's torpedoes MIGHT have been able to do so but I haven't yet been able to confirm that she was indeed live torpedo armed that December morning since many USN warships were in the habit of offloading the bulk of their munitions (for safety reasons) to the Lualualie or West Loch Munitions Depots when they were to be stationed within PH for long periods of time. And that would be further dependent on Ward surviving the ambush efforts of not just one, but a full 10 Japanese submarines positioned to sink her first, by surprise.
"Irrelevant. The Jervis Bay was armed." And what difference does that make ? With WW1 vintage popguns against an armoured German pocket battleship armed with 6x11" main guns and 5.9" secondary batterys ? The Jervis Bay was just of such large size that it took her a long time to fill with seawater flowing in thru the German shell holes. Tatsuta Maru would have been in a similiar situation except that seawater could NOT flow in thru 3" holes nearly as fast as it could flow in thru 11" holes. If your heart is really set on it making any difference then Tatsuta Maru could have easily had some old naval guns bolted to her decks. And hidden from casual sight under canvas too but I was just trying to keep the scenario as simple as possible.
"If raiders could close on ships close enough to target the radio room targeting the engine room can't be all that different." except that the radio shack is usually about 25' above the water line and the ship's engine rooms about 25'
below the waterline.
"And if they can't take out the engine room there's always the pilot house." ... which is why my scenario already contains the suggestion of the Japanese installing an auxilliary steering positon deep in the Tatsuta Maru. I also suggested the installation of extra anchor chains and anchors so as to be sure that the Japanese could indeed stop and hold her in the exact best blocking position as she slowly filled thru opened seacocks (plus whatever US shell holes were added) and settled. I had considered scuttling charges to blow her bottoms out and sink her very quickly but rejected that idea since if the Japanese succeeded in taking Oahu, they would want to re-open PH as quickly as was possible. A team of Japanese divers, already familiar with her internal layout and aware of what small explosive boobytraps had been positioned inside her, could fairly quickly close those seacocks so that she could be pumped out and refloated with some haste, after the shooting was over.
"Do you have a source that shows the engine room was well below sea level? Considering that she drew 28' of water and that every ship's engine room that I have ever seen is located at the bottom of the ship's hull, I didn't think a source was necessary to determine that her engine rooms were located well below her water line ? Do you ?
"By the board rules the burden of proof is on you." Nowhere is it written that I have to do any of your homework/research for you.
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ChristopherPerrien
- Member
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- Joined: 26 Dec 2002, 01:58
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Re: The invasion of Oahu, December 1941.
Hindsight is, they( The Japanese) would be out a one 17000 ton troopship, on Dec 7, 1941 with no effect on the end result, or the date of the end of the war at all.robdab wrote: Of course this is all hindsight that the Japanese couldn't have known or counted on but just imagine the differences in the course of the entire Pacific War had the Japanese just decided to sacrifice the Tatsuta Maru ?
Re: The invasion of Oahu, December 1941.
Chris,
Your [b]"Hindsight is, they( The Japanese) would be out a one 17000 ton troopship, on Dec 7, 1941 with no effect on the end result, or the date of the end of the war at all."[/b] is truely a brilliant piece of analysis. If only the Japanese had known, in 1941, that the Americans were going to drop two atom bombs on them in 1945, they could have saved a whole lot of effort and suffering by just surrendering on Dec.6'41, couldn't they ?
Why did you waste the bandwidth ?
Your [b]"Hindsight is, they( The Japanese) would be out a one 17000 ton troopship, on Dec 7, 1941 with no effect on the end result, or the date of the end of the war at all."[/b] is truely a brilliant piece of analysis. If only the Japanese had known, in 1941, that the Americans were going to drop two atom bombs on them in 1945, they could have saved a whole lot of effort and suffering by just surrendering on Dec.6'41, couldn't they ?
Why did you waste the bandwidth ?
Just a bump ...
... to the top of the pile.