How could the Germans have won the Battle of Stalingrad?

[Lkefct]

The point that I have been trying to make is that

1). Was Stalingrad even a real objective? 6th Army is detailed for flank protection while 4th Pz Army and 1st Pz Army drive onto the Oil. Do they have to capture the city? They don't need to and achieve their mission, although you might be able to argue the reverse.

2). Was the idea of taking the oil a valid one? Yes, even though the US could probably eventually send enough fuel to the Soviets, the soviet reserves are probably small and the short term would probably rob the Soviets of the fuel needed to run the war. The loss of mobility and combat effectiveness would be lethal to the war effort and lead to a collapse right when the Soviets are turning their war effort around and starting to get the confidence that they can destroy the Germans. So taking Baku is the one knock blow that would finish the Soviets off. It is not a bad thing that the oil would provide energy needed by the Nazis war effort.

3). Even if the Germans capture Baku, can they maintain their supply lines to take advantage of it? NO! The time needed to take advantage of the oil is very long indeed. It is not just getting the refineries back in action, but adding additional rail and sea transport to get the oil back to the rest of Europe. In the meantime, there is a huge extended front with second rate formations and no German reserves. Even if there where reserves, if the Soviets where to destroy the satellite armies (for lack of a better word), the Germans then will have lost the ability to maintain the front and will have to retreat anyway or soviet raiding parties and partisans will operate with impunity behind the front. As pointed out by bf109 Emil, the Soviets where moderately successful with this when they where behind a continuous front with a great many security troops. Removing all those allied formations from flank protection would mean that they cannot hold the Stalingrad/Caucuses flank and would have to retreat. I imagine that the soviets would use draconian measures to make sure that their intended counter attack would use what little reserves of fuel that could be scraped up.

[The_Enigma]

2). Was the idea of taking the oil a valid one? Yes, even though the US could probably eventually send enough fuel to the Soviets, the soviet reserves are probably small and the short term would probably rob the Soviets of the fuel needed to run the war. The loss of mobility and combat effectiveness would be lethal to the war effort and lead to a collapse right when the Soviets are turning their war effort around and starting to get the confidence that they can destroy the Germans. So taking Baku is the one knock blow that would finish the Soviets off. It is not a bad thing that the oil would provide energy needed by the Nazis war effort.

In simlar discussions i have read over the years i have seen people propose that if the Germans had of captured Moscow in 41 it would have cut practically all major Soviet supply lines and effectly win the war.
If that were the case prehaps the deathstroke was not needed heading for Baku and sidetracked to Stalingrad?

[bf109 emil]

the_ enigma wrote'
Moscow in 41 it would have cut practically all major Soviet supply lines and effectly win the war.

this could indeed be true, but i don't think there was a magic bullet, a specific target, or a captured piece of land which would have made Stalin capitulate. It is true the capture of Moscow would have hampered his ability to wage war, but is there any doubt he would have still waged it. Look at after Stalingrad came Tunisia, and later that summer Kursk, there was little doubt that the Wehrmacht would defeat Russia or win the war, but Hitler much like Stalin wasn't ready to fold, even in the Spring of '45 with the Allied army in the west meeting little resistance, and the power of the USSR having to first capture Berlin and even then it cost the Soviets dearly against a poorly equipped, numerically inferior and often against children with no more then a panzerfaust. Even then Hitler was ready to sacrifice his fellow Germans, would Stalin have had a change of heart if the shoe where reversed and agreed to surrender and admit defeat??? The wafr in Russia as Paulus had stated before Barbarossa to Hitler...

Later he carried out a strategic survey of Russia for the forthcoming operation Barbarossa. The main advice given by Paulus to Hitler was to make sure that after the invasion the Red Army was not to be allowed to retreat into the interior. For the campaign to be successful, he argued for battles of encirclement. He also suggested that the main thrust should be made north of the Pripyat Marshes, in order to capture Moscow at the earliest opportunity.

..at the time or in the summer of 1942, destroying large numbers of troops was still scene as the key to success, but by reducing Russia's ability to use tanks, air-craft etc. for lack of fuel would have tipped the advantages towards the Wehrmacht even if captured fields couldn't be logistically used by Germany, hence neither could they be used against by the Russians..

[Lkefct]

In both cases, the battle of Moscow and the Plan Blau, I don't think that the Soviets will surrender. It is just a case of that if they fell, then their ability to strike back and coordinate their armies and supply lines is so limited, I just don't think the Soviets can last very long with the Germans able to literally strike at will.

The problem is that while these are both excellent knock out blows for the Germans in terms of their ability to knock the Soviets out of the war, I don't think in either case they have the strength to carry them out. You can easily argue that Germany could have gotten to Moscow and possibly even Baku, but could they have taken and held them? Given the forces historically available, I think it is very questionable.

While it would not have given the Germans a chance to provide a knockout blow, maintaining a more defensive posture and launching more limited attacks to encircle and destroy smaller Soviet formations and shorten the front to make it easier to defend and build up the Panzer divisions again might well have been a more practical idea. The loss of the 6th Army and/or not sending replacements to Africa after El Alemein gives the Germans a tremendous amount of tanks, assault guns, heavy weapons and motor transport to equip the panzertruppen and probably allows them to start to even rebuild some of the infantry divisions in the east, while bleeding the Soviets some to weaken them in 1943. Eventually, a stronger defensive posture and more potential for counterattacks gives the Germans a slim chance at being able to win the war of attrition against the Soviets.

[Tim Smith]

So basically total victory on the Eastern Front was impossible right from the start.

A reasonable German leader would have tried to make peace with Stalin in November 1941, taking advantage of Stalin's fear that he might be forcibly deposed at any moment by other Communists unhappy with the way the war was going. Simply detaching the Baltic States, Byelorussia and Ukraine from the USSR and setting them up as independent countries under German protection would have been an acceptable victory for Germany.

But Hitler was far from reasonable.

[Baltasar]

Tim, the flaw in that plan was that Stalin wouldn't sit idly and watch the Germans stolling around basically next to Moskow. The Red Army would learn from their defeats as they did historically and evolve accordingly. Hitler, mad as he was, may have been well aware of that factor. Even though a 'peace' might have led to a break for his troops, he knew the war would only be really over once Stalin was gone. And even then...
Also, the Wehrmacht scored some tremendous victories, even if their forces would be almost depleted by winter '41. With such a series of victories under your belt, it'd be hard to convince the political leadership to negotiate for a ceasefire and an eventual peace.

BUT if the Germans really make peace with Stalin, then Churchill is in deep trouble in the long run. Even if the US entered the war as in OTL, the Wehrmacht would be able to use more forces against a possible landing operation and since the war in the east was over for now, they might put more recources into their fighter and AA production.

[Tim Smith]

Well, the Germans were geared for a short war when they launched Barbarossa. They could (with a bit of foresight) have potentially realised that the Barbarossa objectives weren't achievable as far back as September (when things were still going relatively well for the Wehrmacht) simply because of the logistical problems involved in maintaining the Wehrmacht in combat that far from Germany.

A ceasefire is the natural end to a short war. Granted, Stalin would use it to rebuild his shattered army. But the Germans would be doing the same thing with their own exhausted army. A ceasefire turns Germany from strategic attacker to strategic defender. And ceasefires usually benefit the defender more than the attacker, as defending is generally easier. (In most cases.)

Anyway, end of this discussion, as we've drifted off topic.

[Baltasar]

Well, the Wehrmacht didn't realize that the force they were up against was 3 times bigger than they thought. So much for German foresight

[Lkefct]

First, their plan was probably robust enough to get their armies to Moscow, but how to take it? That is a problem in urban warfare that has only been successfully (arguably) answered fairly recently. Taking a city like Moscow is virtually impossible for the German army at any point in WW2. The Germans MIGHT be able to do it, but they would certainly take very heavy losses and I would still put even money on the Soviets, even with a bunch of raw conscripts. Certainly if the Soviet military and Stalin decide to send the masses of their last reserves into German mg outside the city, then AGC has a chance to win. But it is a bit much to have a plan that will only work if you assume your enemy will committ suicide for you.

The second major issue was that the time schedule was fairly tight, so the sending the Panzer Armies off on other missions was a huge mistake. The Germans did not have much leeway to get to Moscow, so diverting your main effort away from the decisive action is a horrible mistake. At the point where they send Guderian south, they pretty much needed to admit that it was time to switch to the long war and start shoring up the front for the long haul.

Ironically, this is pretty much the same issue with Plan Blau. If the major effort was in getting to the oil around Baku, Hitler sidetracked his armies to get Stalingrad? This was a major loss of focus on his objective. Once he did that, calling off the main attack seems the only logical recourse. You can't win the war unless you drive straight on and capture it quickly. Once you get sidetracked, it is lost. Hitler did it 2x in the war in Russia.

[mescal]

Ironically, this is pretty much the same issue with Plan Blau. If the major effort was in getting to the oil around Baku, Hitler sidetracked his armies to get Stalingrad? This was a major loss of focus on his objective.

It was less a sidetrack than an overlooked preliminary.
in Blau III, 4th Pz Army was to reach the Volga, followed or in coopertion with the 6th Army, to protect the thrust towards the Caucasus, by establishing a blocking position on the land bridge between Don and Volga.
Only then was Army group A rush southwards.

But things began to go wrong as soon as the second step of Blau, and Hitler by Directive 45 (? not sure of the number, the one issued on 21 July) only worsened the thing by requesting a simultaneous attack by both Army groups A & B towards two divergent objectives.

[bf109 emil]

Strategically, the USSR loosing oil from the Caucasus would hinder there mobility and stall any major offenses from mounting before a reserve and abundance could be brought/secured to launch an offensive. Germany although perhaps lacking throughout the war in fuel/oil/gasoline had not suffered the likes of B-17 attacks on it's storage, supply as it would later in the war and handcuff them in a way the loss of these oilfields would have done likewise to the Soviets in 1942 had they succeeded.

[1jasonoz]

I actually think Operation Blau actually attacked in the wrong direction; south instead of north and up behind moscow and the forces protectng the capital. The Germnans should have attacked north through Vorzenha rolling up the soviet forces.

[Baltasar]

Actually, the battle of Stalingrad was a mistake in itself. The army couldn't affort a war of attrition and costly city captures like OTL Stalingrad were a certain way of getting a lot of your troops killed and rob you of the advantage of mobility. Rather skip the city, surround it and destroy relief forces and get the air force in to hammer the defenders. That'd be the way to do things.

[vszulc]

I definetly forgot that much, but the metal could still be used for buidling tanks correct?(Really, tell me.), If so, then the mobile reserves that were needed can be created, along with the metal from Sweden, this could be an advantage for motorizing at least the all-important army group south.

Ehm, yes and no. It's not merely as simple as throwing steel at the problem, and see Panzerdivisions sprout up. To use steel you need coal, which Europe was short of during the war.
Germanys tank-factories were also working at full capacity at the time, and Germany actually priotitized tank and aircraft production over ship production before Barbarossa, so discarding the German navy wouldn't have made any difference.

Your assertation that Weserubung could have been possible without a navy is also very dubious. How to protect troop and iron-convoys without a naval presence?
Britain could have raided the Norwegian coast at will, and protecting the Baltic from the British navy would have been very costly in terms of aircraft.

Sweden isn't a country that you can just roll over in a couple of weeks, conquering and pacifying Sweden would have taken a signficant deployment. But you just wanted to install a puppet-regime, right? Not that easy. The Norwegian government WAS a puppet-regime, and Denmark actually kept their government till 1943, but neither option exactly fostered friendly relations with Berlin, or prevented resistance movements.

Your idea of scrapping the navy would have made lend and lease convoys to the USSR a lot easier, since they could move at will. How would you suppose they should be tackled. From the air? Developing an effective fourengine bomber would have taken a while, and don't forget, that for every bomber, you lose four fighters. And the German aircraft factories were already working at full speed.

A line should have been formed by the Germans from Rostov to Grozny while the 4th panzerarmee cleans up the southern oil fields. Then once army group south is whole again, they could advance on the city without worrying about speedy encirclements and Stalingrad could be sorrounded with a crossing of the Volga river. This is perfectly possible with using the same units but a diversion of oil and mechanized parts, the offensive would not need huge amounts of reinforcements if encirclements and taking the oil is a priority.

Nope, sorry. Shipping supplies and spareparts that far away, with the Soviet infrastructure in the state that it was in, would be difficult at best, and keeping the troops 100% supplied would be impossible. Where would you take the oil from. A fuel truck would consume more fuel than it carried, before getting to the troops. Just get the oil from Maikop? Not that easy. The Germans estimated it would take a year to get oilwells and refineries up and running again. It's just not possible to hold a line that long, for such a long time.

The ability to encircle is what made the German army great, their Blitzkrieg tactics rely heavily on oil, and if they get those supplies then the Germans are at the top of their game and are able to fight the way they were meant to.

Their "Blitzkrieg tactics" weren't a calculated effort, it was just an ad-hoc solution invented after the fall of France. What kept German armsfactories humming and preparing for war in 1939. Panzers? Aircraft? No. Artillery shells and ammunition. That's what the highcommand expected them to win the war. Not fancy "Blitzkrieg tactics"

Also note that the Blitzkrieg worked in France and the Netherlands, because of the terrain and the distances. It just wasn't realistic to expect to defeat the Sovietunion with the same tactics. You can only keep the motorized forward columns in supply over a certain distance. If the front is a thousand kilometers away as in the USSR, it's simply not doable. Germany needed to prepare itself for a protracted war in the USSR, it didn't, and that's why they lost.

if they were able to repeat that success over and over again the Russians would lose many men and a lot of material to these encirclements.

The Sovietunion had more than double the population of the Third Reich, and they produced 10.000 tanks in a single year. TEN THOUSAND. That's a hell of a lot of encirclements for the German side

Last thing, the Germans could not gain air superiority over the channel because of the amount of AA from the ships and the RAF presence in the area, so the Channel was a horrible spot for aircraft, so the bombings would have to be long-range against Lend-Lease shipments before they get within range of the RN, and any British ships out of range from allied aircraft would definetly not stand a chance against naval bombers

Where would you get the naval bombers from? And how many tactical bombers and fighters would they cost to produce? Sure, it could have been done, it just wouldn't have been a good idea. First of all, because it would cost Germany it's Luftwaffe. Second of all they wouldn't be effective. Remember the German navy that you took out? Without them, what's there to prevent the RN from simply using carriers to protect the convoys?
The German navy had at least one very valuable role. The theory of fleet in being. Just by existing, whether it's sailing the North Atlantic, or in some fjord in Norway, the German navy kept significant British ships tied up.

[vszulc]

Actually, the battle of Stalingrad was a mistake in itself. The army couldn't affort a war of attrition and costly city captures like OTL Stalingrad were a certain way of getting a lot of your troops killed and rob you of the advantage of mobility. Rather skip the city, surround it and destroy relief forces and get the air force in to hammer the defenders. That'd be the way to do things.

Very true. But surrounding the city just wasn't possible in this case.

loosing oil from the Caucasus would hinder there mobility and stall any major offenses from mounting before a reserve and abundance could be brought/secured to launch an offensive

Partly true. It would have caused problems for the Soviets, no doubt. But they still had the option of getting pretty much endless supplies of oil from the British and the USA. IF the USSR had been cut off from Caucasus, you could expect the allied to ramp up oildeliveries, whether inland, or through Murmansk, Arkhangelsk and Vladivostok pretty drastically.