D-Day November 1942

[Carl Schwamberger]

re: British divsions. Approx 12 of the 23 were ready for combat. The others were in various states of training and equipment. While not directly usefull in this scenario part of the unready would be indirectly invaluable as replacement pools for combat casualtys. A couple others would probablly be made ready were Sledgehammer seriously contemplated, bringing the total above 14. Several others would likely be fit for combat as reinforcements within a month or so.

In simple terms this scenario sends to forces used in the Torch operation to Brittiany. For the initial Torch landings there were six divsions in the assualt, including two US Armored divsions. Three more were landed imeadiatly following the assualt, making a total of six US and three British plus miscl brigades and corps artillery. Thats nine divsions (three armored) plus all the corps baggage in the three amphib fleets for Torch. With the shorter distance and effciencys of a concentrated landing area three corps with nine divsions seems practical for the intial landing, the same as with Torch. The total available would be the 12+ British and at least the six US divsions used for Torch.

Ports.
Quiberon Bay has its attractions as a anchorage and off loading site. One of the forgotten items of WWII is that Quiberon Bay was to be site of a third prefabricated Mulberry type port. The equipment & material was set aside and the personnel assembled. This project was blackballed by the USN in late July 1944 as the Allied armys were still stuck in Normandy, and was cancelled in early August. Another lesser know item is that much of the planning and design/testing for the artifical harbors had been accomplished in 1942. The need for Mulberry type installations was forseen by Montbattens organization in 1941, and at his direction the preperatory work had begun. Parts of this preperatory work was used by the Allied armys for the landings in Africa, Sicilly, and Salerno.

Brest is the likely candadate for a existing port. It is large enough to supply a small army group of 10-15 divsions, it had a all weather airfield, and would be deep in the rear of the enclave. It would have to be captured quickly, before any last second reinforcement attempt or significant sabatoge to the facilities.

The Dieppe Factor
Several of the most important leassons of Dieppe had been asorbed quickly. Actually they had long been known, since Roman times if not since the Sumerians. Why the planners of the Dieppe fiasco choose to ignore a couple centuries of British experince at amphibious operations I dont understand. Perhaps the same people would be plannning Sledgehammer, but since few of them were allowed to touch the Tourch planning I doubt it. the other question is the exact nature of the defenses around Quiberon Bay, or any of the other suitable beaches on the French coast. Through 1943 the Germans concentrated their defense cosntruction at or very near the ports. They were not given the resources to think about doing much else. In 1942 defense construction consisted of improving the existing French defenses and adding some adjacent installations. The possibility of commando raids on critical port facilities helped focus attention there. So, while it is unlikely much would be in place it would be usefull to confirm this. It would also be usefull to know exactly what defended this section of coast.

[Roddoss72]

Salutations All

If it was so simple and easy then why was it not done during the 1942 winter.

T.A Gardner can you supply the daily weather (such as temperature, wind direction, speed, intensity, cloud coverage and average daily rain, plus localised flooding) reports during the winter of 1942/43 (from 1st November to 28th February 1943), including currents, swell heights and wave patterns within the Brittany and Normandy areas (out to a distance of say 300 nautical miles at sea) and then can you give us a comparison to the weather and ocean condition of North Africa and Western Italy.

Plus i would like to know the strength of the 8th, 12th and 15th USAAF, plus the numbers of speciallised ground attack aircraft for anti tank warfare are available to the allies, i want to know how many paratroop transports the Allies had at the time in England and how many gliders capable of delivering heavy artillery and armoured vehicles like the Locust Tank. Also i would like to know when the American began to deploy Airborne troops in England, plus i want to know what preparations have been made such as concentrated attacks on German defenses and communications impeding the flow of German forces into the area, which bridges would have been destroyed, major roads damaged, airfields attacked, ports that can act as anti-invasion interdiction attacked and destroyed.

I also would like a chronological time scale on you proposed allied invasion, including the initial softening attacks by whom, when and where. During the attack and securing the beacheads and post invasion, like follow up troops and the like. But i also want a fair and ballanced appraisal of what German units response would be.

Regards

Roddoss72

[peteratwar]

I believe one of the German commanders looking at certain SeaLion plans remarked 'We might as well put our troops through a meat grinder'

I get the same feeling here.

How are the troops to get there, how are they to be maintained, how is air cover to be provided ?

All the above were arguments against the landing in France in 1942.

It might be germane to consider why Normandy was chosen for the landings.

[The_Enigma]

One would assume Normandy one of the main reasons Normandy was chosen was like other landings throughout the war because it was within decent range of fighter cover. One would also assume to it being less defended then the Pas De Calais and somewhat cut off from the rest of France thanks to the interdiction work carried out prior to the landings. Am not too sure but the little devil horns of Cherbourg and Le Harve had something to do with the decission to. One ponders why the Brittany area wasnt choose instead to gain Atlantic port access quicker?

Prior to the landings the Luftwaffe was effectivly ground down and the above mentioned inderdiction along with aerial recon was carried out. Where the resources there at this time to do this? Where they needed? Would massive reinforcments be able to be transferred to France quick enough to deal with the invasion with the raillines reltivly intact? What about Pluto? Would the Luftwaffe provide effective support with all its commitments? Would the RAF and USSAF be able to? What about the weather (its crap most of the time here in the UK but during Fall and Winter its worse)? The German army in 1939 fought to not launch an attack agaisnt France in the fall and winter of 1939/1940 , one of the reasons being the weather. Would it be wise to launch a landing at this crappy time of year?

[Tim Smith]

Here's a political angle....

With the Battle of El Alamein lost and the Battle of Stalingrad turning into a major disaster, Hitler badly needs a victory somewhere.

A fresh Allied invasion on the coast of France would be like manna from heaven to Hitler - given the outcome of the Dieppe Raid. Hitler might be overjoyed that a fresh Allied force had landed in France - here's an opportunity for a great propaganda triumph if the Wehrmacht kicks the Allies back into the sea for a second time! This would divert public attention in Germany away from the depressing news coming from Africa and Russia, and offset the drop in morale on the home front.

Chances are high that Hitler would (temporarily) forget all about poor Rommel and frozen von Paulus, and channel all available reserves to France, to give the Englanders and Amis a good kicking!

Politically, a German victory in Brittany would be worth a great deal to Hitler. Something to boast about in Berlin again!

[sallyg]

Given our proposal of November, 1942 would Dieppe have happened in August?

[Robert Rojas]

Greetings to both citizen Peter-At-War and the community as a whole. Well sir, in respect to your installment of Wednesday - August 27, 2008 - 10:10am, old Uncle Bob would also like to interject the following POLITICAL arguement against a potential Anglo-American landing in France in the autumn of 1942. As much as I am personally in favor of such an audicious plan, one must also take into consideration both the not so predictable mood of the grass roots citizenry of the United States of America and the timing of such a plan. A potential Anglo-American debacle on the Brittany peninsula of France following so closely to the epic American catastrophe on the Bataan peninsula in the Commonwealth of the Philippines could have lethal electoral consequences for the Roosevelt Administration. Another Stalingrad type disaster for American arms just might sweep the Roosevelt Administration from power during the next presidential election scheduled for 1944. A successor Republican Administration just might seek a negotiated end to the United States of America's participation in the European Theatre of Operations. The Roosevelt Administration's subsequent decision to invade North Africa was the militarily astute AND politically shrewder bet in terms of success or failure. It's just some sobering food for thought. Well, that's my latest two cents, pence or pfennigs worth on this hypothetical topic of interest - for now anyway. In anycase, I would like to bid you a copacetic day over in merry old England. GOD SAVE THE QUEEN - not to mention everybody else.

Best Regards From The Upstart Colonies!
Uncle Bob

[peteratwar]

Being technically accurate, the North African landings was a British idea.

Roosevelt went along with it for two reasons. First the US favaoured approach of an immediate landing in France was shown to be impracticable. Second (political) The US couldn't be seen with a large army around doing nothing. Stalin was pushing hard enough anyway

[Carl Schwamberger]

I believe one of the German commanders looking at certain SeaLion plans remarked 'We might as well put our troops through a meat grinder'

I get the same feeling here.

How are the troops to get there, how are they to be maintained, how is air cover to be provided ?

Getting the ground forces there and maintaining them would be through the use of the same resources as used for the Torch operation. Specifically the amphibious carft, cargo ships, and warships for landing three corps of nine divsions and support units. Plus the follow on cargo ships and escourts that brought in the supplies and ancilliary equipment for further ground operations, the support of a initial air component of 600+ aircraft and naval support for servicing intially some 150 cargo and warships using the captured ports. That was for the first two months following the Torch landings, and it was done some 1,200 miles from the nearest Allied bases in Britian. Gardner implied this in his original post, tho he could have made it clearer. Note that this same army landing in NW France is less that 200 miles from the same British bases, which reduces the transit time for cargo and maintiance burden on the escourting warships. It is also possible to fly all the aircraft directly from Britian to any capture bases in France, rather than packing hem into cargo ships or using scarce aircraft carriers to ferry them.

I'll address air cover further on.

Here's a political angle....

With the Battle of El Alamein lost and the Battle of Stalingrad turning into a major disaster, Hitler badly needs a victory somewhere.

A fresh Allied invasion on the coast of France would be like manna from heaven to Hitler - given the outcome of the Dieppe Raid. Hitler might be overjoyed that a fresh Allied force had landed in France - here's an opportunity for a great propaganda triumph if the Wehrmacht kicks the Allies back into the sea for a second time! This would divert public attention in Germany away from the depressing news coming from Africa and Russia, and offset the drop in morale on the home front.

Chances are high that Hitler would (temporarily) forget all about poor Rommel and frozen von Paulus, and channel all available reserves to France, to give the Englanders and Amis a good kicking!

This was not characterisic of Hitler. He responded to other emergencys with stratigic half measures. Operationally he tried to be decisive, but in broad terms he tried to address all emergencys simultaneously, regardless of the realative danger of each. ie: Tunisia was a stratigic dead end at the end of 1942, yet he sent armored divsions, combat aircraft, and transport aircraft there rather than to Army Group South which was fighting a much more important battle.

The other half of this is exactly what resources would there be to make a decisive attack on this Allied bridgehead?

Given our proposal of November, 1942 would Dieppe have happened in August?

Depends on exactly when the decision was made and what the folks in charge of this saw as the logical supporting operations. Operation Gymnast was being planned at the same time as Jubiliee if that indicates anything. Personally I would cancel it if possible as part of a deception plan to make the Germans think nothing like Sledgehammer was planned.

One would assume Normandy one of the main reasons Normandy was chosen was like other landings throughout the war because it was within decent range of fighter cover. One would also assume to it being less defended then the Pas De Calais and somewhat cut off from the rest of France thanks to the interdiction work carried out prior to the landings. Am not too sure but the little devil horns of Cherbourg and Le Harve had something to do with the decission to. One ponders why the Brittany area wasnt choose instead to gain Atlantic port access quicker?

The choice of Normandy was a long and complex path. The Overlord plan was based on the idea that the Brittiany Penesulla would be captured during late June or very early July. Since 1941 it had been assumed by the British that a major port could not be siezed intact quickly and that cross beach supply and some sort of artifical "port" aids would be needed. Quiberon Bay with its excellent anchorage had been a priority target in the Overlord plan, and a third artifical harbor unit had been prepared for it. The difference between the Overlord plan & Gardners plan is that Quiberon Bay was to be secured via attack from the north from Normandy rather than directly.

Prior to the landings the Luftwaffe was effectivly ground down and the above mentioned inderdiction along with aerial recon was carried out. Where the resources there at this time to do this? Where they needed? Would massive reinforcments be able to be transferred to France quick enough to deal with the invasion with the raillines reltivly intact? What about Pluto? Would the Luftwaffe provide effective support with all its commitments? Would the RAF and USSAF be able to? What about the weather (its crap most of the time here in the UK but during Fall and Winter its worse)? The German army in 1939 fought to not launch an attack agaisnt France in the fall and winter of 1939/1940 , one of the reasons being the weather. Would it be wise to launch a landing at this crappy time of year?

Air Strength. In short; The Luftwaffe had a bit under 300 combat worthy aircraft in NW Europe, Another 200-250 day fighters were in Germany along with some bomber training units. In Norway were a bit under 300 aircraft. Note that Hitler never allowed significant numbers of these in Norway to be withdrawn for emergencys elsewhere. As many as 450 combat worthy aircraft in the Mediterranian. A large part of those were involved in the operations against Malta and it is not impossible that Hitler would allow them to be sent to France. In the USSR were just over 3000 aircraft of all types, tho I dont know how many were combat worthy in November.

At this point I'm estimating the Allies had between 5000 & 6000 aircraft in Britian, mostly British. Roughly half were capable of supporting the Sledgehammer operation; the balance being units preparing for use in Africa or the Far East (Burma), or were half formed units and training foirmations, belonged to Bomber Command, or were ASW patrol aircraft. Perhaps with a bit of planning and preperation the Sledgehammer aircraft support could have been expanded to 3500 or 4000 aircraft. The Allies had over 1500 aircraft spread across the Med & Middle East. In the East the USSR had more planes in flying condition than Germany, but I'm too lazy to cross the room and look that up.

This operation is at the limits of Allied fighter cover based in Britian. Once the all weather airfield at Brest is secured and others are establsihed then fighter superiority can be had.

Bad weather hinders Allied air support thru the winter, tho it makes German offensive operations problematic. While the ground in the Brittiany does freeze most of the winter it is thin frozen crust over wet dirt or is muddy. If the Allied strategy is to simply capture some ports and establish a enclave to defend until the slate spring of 1943 then the winter weather favors them.

Crossing the Beach in Crappy Weather
In general yes you dont want to do that. Pattons experince landing on the Morrocan Atlantic coast illustrates the problems. However Gardner presents Quiberon Bay as the landing site. I'd want to know exactly what the wind and surf conditions were inside this bay in October & November 1942. As I mentioned before it was planned for use as a anchorage and harbor of Overlord . I also know the French navy in the sail era routinely used it as shelter from the Atlantic storms, and the British and French fleets fought a battle there during stormy weather in the 1700s.

If it was so simple and easy then why was it not done during the 1942 winter.

I dont see anything in Gardners post indicating this woulod be simple or easy. Few amphibious operations of WWII were thought to be simple of easy by the folks involved, tho folks in venues like this tend to trivialize the problems when it suits them. Operation Neptune was thought a high risk gamble. Ike even had his 'failure speech' written. I certainly dont think Gardners proposal would be easy either.

Sledgehammer and Roundup were not choosen because many British leaders wished to avoid a bloody campaign on the continent. Brooke was one of these and he used his position to argue against both of these proposals. The British leaders hoped less risky and less bloody methods could be used to defeat Germany. Unfortunatly they were wrong it took a lot of blood of the people of the USSR to bring down Germany, and several risky looking amphibious operations along with a extended land campaign by Britian & the US. The US leaders were a bit naive in their expectations in 1942, but those in combat in Africa and Italy lost that and learned fast. I'd think they would learn just as fast wherever they fought.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Deleted for redundancy

[Carl Schwamberger]

Anyone noticed trouble in posting messages, moving from page to page, or with other functions on the Axis Hist Forum the past couple weeks?

[Carl Schwamberger]

Changing the line of thought a bit, who would be the likely Allied commanders for Sledgehammer? Stillwell who was selected to playa major role in Gymnast had already been switched to China, Montbatten & Montgomery were also already departed fro Britian. Anderson the 1st Army commander for Torch, Ferhendall, and the other corps commanders of Torch would be present in Britian for this operation. The British and US air commanders were also available to fill the same roles. So, who would be the probable picks for overall commander and the senior commander for the air forces and naval forces?

[nota]

in near winter weather I would favor a landing in the south of France
advantage nicer weather and all most no shore defense at all at least few heavy guns or tanks
I can't see a determined defense against USA troops by the local troops [ Vichy ]
and there should be time to take and repair airbases for local fighters and get a good ways inland

[Carl Schwamberger]

in near winter weather I would favor a landing in the south of France

The largest downside is a longer sea route, leading past Axis air and naval bases in Italy. While not nearly as vulnerable as the straits between Sicilly & Tunisia (re: Pedistal Convoy) it would be dangerous. As the Axis react in the subsequent weeks convoys with reinforcement and supply will be hit hard by Axis air and Italian naval raids. If the US can persuade the Vichy French government to cooperate theres no need for any assualt. The Allied army can use the ports imeadiately, and the airfields too. Worst case is the Vichy government refuses to cooperate with the Allies in any fashion. Then I would not try this. If they go over to the Allied side imeadiately the Germans can still overrun most of the Vichy territory. The French army was too weak to defend the territory, and the best thing it could do is retreat to the extreme south where the survivors could join with the US/Brit enclave.

If the Vichy government allys its self with the US/Britian then a wide spread popular revolt against the Germans will develop across France fairly quickly. This of course complcates the German occupation problem and represents a large drain on resources. ie: French factories are no longer meeting contract obligations to Germany. The German response would no doubt be nasty with the French suffering increasing. If the Vichy government attempts to meet its armistice obligations with the Axis then anti German activities by the French will develop much more slowly, perhaps along the historical line.

The Allies will also have to look to their rear either way the Vichy government goes. The Axis will probablly try to secure the usefull airfields and ports in Tunisia, both to protect Lybia and to further threaten Allied sea routes in the Western Med. This would require Allied ground, air, and naval forces be sent to Africa to counter any Axis move to Tunisia and beyond.

[phylo_roadking]

Carl - regarding Mountbatten - he'll only "be departed" IF Dieppe goes ahead

Regarding

The Allies will also have to look to their rear either way the Vichy government goes. The Axis will probablly try to secure the usefull airfields and ports in Tunisia, both to protect Lybia and to further threaten Allied sea routes in the Western Med. This would require Allied ground, air, and naval forces be sent to Africa to counter any Axis move to Tunisia and beyond.

Not unless the Axis can put together SOME sort of airborne action VERY quickly - there's certainly no spare Axis ground forces in North Africa in NOVEMBER to mount any sort of large thrust into Vichy territory...it hasn't got back from the east yet LOL

Here's the BUT - don't underestimate the stiff resistance Vichy forces DID put up for some time against the US. AND they regarded their airfields as VERY vital strategic commodities to be defended. The Germans/Italians would have to count the cost of the losses they would take attempting this against stiff resistance....against the cost of such an action IMMEDIATELY loosing them ALL of Vichy as you mention! NOW they'd be in a 1942 OTL position for options....BUT IN THIS CASE the forces that went into Metropolitan Vichy historically - would be heading for Brittany!!!

I can't see a LIMITED operation being mounted to take possession of Vichy airfields - against the 99% risk of loosing ALL of Vichy to the Allies...AND at a point, admittedly a narrow window - of the Allies being able to rush assistance to Metropolian Vichy! Not in return for a questionable operation against a few airfields....they risk TWO fronts being opened in Western Europe! And of course the instant cutting-off of North Africa.

And they certainly in November 1942 can't mount a LARGESCALE invasion of French North African possessions!!!

As per OTL - ANY movement against Vichy possessions ANYWHERE by the Axis needs to be simultaneous with the wholesale occupation of Metroploitan France. In November 1942 - this can't happen, they don't have the resources. Any PIECEMEAL operation gives Darlan time to issue NEW orders to the Fleet in Toulon With Germany abrogating the Armistice - and NOT occupying Metropolitan France quickly, I'd guess the Fleet wouldn't be scuttled. If Vichy becomes a de facto Ally after offensive military action against Vichy territory...then the addition of the French Fleet in the Med is enough to close off Rommel in North Africa TOTALLY.