D-Day November 1942

[Von Schadewald]

With the Battle of the Atlantic still far from won, the Germans are going to send every U boat they can to sink the invasion resupply ships.

One of the primary selection requirements for the D-day site is that it had to be within range of the RAF's British-based single-engined fighters so they could provide air cover. Even in 1944, Normandy was the furthest West they could manage. In 1942, in the pre-drop tank era, do the existing Allied fighters have the range?

In November, is there enough daylight for fighter cover? The killer is that the longer night during winter allow the Germans more freedom to move at night, and the poor weather, and persistent cloudiness would limit air operations, and favor the Nazis.

[Roddoss72]

With the Battle of the Atlantic still far from won, the Germans are going to send every U boat they can to sink the invasion resupply ships.

One of the primary selection requirements for the D-day site is that it had to be within range of the RAF's British-based single-engined fighters so they could provide air cover. Even in 1944, Normandy was the furthest West they could manage. In 1942, in the pre-drop tank era, do the existing Allied fighters have the range?

In November, is there enough daylight for fighter cover? The killer is that the longer night during winter allow the Germans more freedom to move at night, and the poor weather, and persistent cloudiness would limit air operations, and favor the Nazis.

Salutations Von Schadewald

I am sorry you are wasting your breath on this thread, the anti-German coalition have already have the six division that land at Quiberon Bay defeating the German 1st, 7th and 15th Armies and any other support troops which would be most likely around 1 million troops or more in France, and not only that they have the 12 divisions that make up the British 8th Army defeating not only the DAK but the Italians as well in North Africa, but then to actually go on to invade Italy and the Balkan and defeating all Axis units as well approx 60+ divisions.

It has been pointed out to the anti German coalition that the weather in that area as pertaining to winter storms of 1942/43 was the worse in living memory and that the U-Boat strength at the time was approx 100+ and that there in the area was 4 or 5 U-Boat bases. I have also pointed out that during even somewhat mild winter almost all ports along that part of Atlantic France virtually shuts down, even large trawlers rarely venture out.

No the problem is that is that the main argument is that it is the Allied Supermen v German weaklings, they assume that the Germans are not going to put up any resistance, none, three German Armies are goint to capitulate without a fight, total surrender of over 1 million troops to 6 allied divisions.

But if this was on the other foot and the defenders were British and American then i can assure you that the usual suspect would claim that it wouls be absolutely impossible for the Germans to carry out a successful invasion with the same resources.

Regards

Roddoss72

[Simon K]

This is a great little thread.
I think we can work to an (unbiased ) conclusion as to its outcome if we stick to what (and was not) available in terms of units etc from the historical timeline.
Do the Russians attack the 6th Armee in this scenario?

[Simon K]

The best analogy for this what if - is arguably the intervention in Napoleonic Spain, or more depressingly, Salonika in WW1.
An open wound, debilitating if not actually fatal.
I dont think anyone is claiming that France would have been retaken in 100 days, a la 1944.

[Tim Smith]

The best analogy for this what if - is arguably the intervention in Napoleonic Spain, or more depressingly, Salonika in WW1.
An open wound, debilitating if not actually fatal.

I have to disagree.

I think this operation would be a disaster for the Allies. At best (for the Allies), a bit like Gallipoli - the Allies take the beach area and establish a small bridgehead, but then can't break out of it, suffer very heavy losses, and then have to evacuate. At worst, it would a total failure in that the Allies fail to even get off the beach - Dieppe on a much larger scale.

The only plus points for the Allies is that the Germans may have to occupy Vichy France, and also Rommel only gets minimal German reinforcements in Libya after the defeat at El Alamein (but even Rommel would still get Italian reinforcements). Still, it was Operation Torch that really doomed the Axis cause in North Africa - without it, Rommel might manage to delay the 8th Army for several months longer than historically.

[The_Enigma]

I dont think anyone is claiming that France would have been retaken in 100 days, a la 1944.

Agreed, no one was claiming the Germans would roll over.
Niether did anyone mention the possible destruction of three German armies by 6 allied divisions.
No one was also claiming the 8th Army on there own could invade mainland Italy, infact no one mentioned the invasion of mainland Italy other than a certain Aussie.

[phylo_roadking]

Carl - to go back to your ideas on Vichy - I certainly wouldn't advocate ANYONE contact Vichy BEFORE the invasion; but immediately afterwards there's a window for very intense negotiations by ALL sides. Here's a question- was there an actual American Ambassdaor to Vichy in 1942???

Regarding submarines threatening the invasion fleet....this was something I was actually chatting about to a Feldgrau member last week, regarding the planned and much-vaunted "uboat interdiction" of the Royal Navy during Sealion...

Actually....there WAS an example of submarines being massed in the Channel and Western Approaches to interdict a naval flotilla...

The Channel Dash!

One of the often-forgotten factors in the British plans for dealing with the KM running the Channel...was the mustering of the grand total of THIRTY-ONE submarines of all classes in the Western Approaches and Channel, exactly the area where the Invasion fleet would be...

How many KM ships were sunk...damaged...or even ENGAGED by these THIRTY-ONE submarines???

[Jon G.]

...was there an actual American Ambassdaor to Vichy in 1942???

Admiral Leahy was ambassador to Vichy until May 1942 when he was recalled upon Laval's second appointment as Vichy PM. The Americans saw Laval as more openly collaborationist than Darlan, whom Leahy respected.

There was still an American chargé d'affaires after Leahy was recalled, but I don't know the name.

[phylo_roadking]

Recalled....but why not replaced? Did Vichy let it be known that a full ambassador wasn't favoured, or what??? It's odd to leave a nation like VICHY without a diplomatic-level "in"...if not for it's own position in Europe, then Vichy's Atlantic facing possessions in Africa....?

Was the absence of an ambassador the US' way of showing disapproval for Laval's appointment?

[Von Schadewald]

In this thread
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 1&p=679490
I suggested a Biscay Bay D-Day, which was promptly shot down!

Judging by this footage
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L3_zahTaLag
of the zealous Nov 1942 invasion of Vichy France, with an intact French rail system, the Germans are not going to rest: "The Hun is always either at your throat or your feet!" (Churchill).

[Roddoss72]

Salutations All

For some infromation on the U-Boat bases in France at the time.

Lorient (2nd and 10th Unterseebootsflottilen) [50 to 60 kilometres from Quiberon Bay] aka (Festung Lorient) which was fortified with one of the heaviest concentrations of Flak batteries in France.

Brest (1st and 9th Unterseebootsflottilen) [Approx 200 to 210 Kilometres from Quiberon Bay]

Saint Nazier (6th and 7th Unterseebootsflottilen) [aprrox 50 to 60 kilometres from Quiberon Bay)

La Rochelle (3rd Unterseebootsflottilen) [Apporx 200 to 210 kilometres from Quiberon Bay]

Regards

Roddoss72

[Jon G.]

Recalled....but why not replaced? Did Vichy let it be known that a full ambassador wasn't favoured, or what??? It's odd to leave a nation like VICHY without a diplomatic-level "in"...if not for it's own position in Europe, then Vichy's Atlantic facing possessions in Africa....?

US-Vichy diplomatic relations didn't cease completely with Leahy's recall, but they were cut back - i.e. enough to handle practical matters, but no more than that.

Was the absence of an ambassador the US' way of showing disapproval for Laval's appointment?

Yes, that's how it's usually seen. IIRC Laval at one time had put forth the idea of Vichy joining the war against the US on the Axis side, but neither Darlan nor Petain would have any of it, and apparently the Germans weren't very interested.

Laval was also PM for a few months in 1940 after the initial formation of Vichy.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Carl - to go back to your ideas on Vichy - I certainly wouldn't advocate ANYONE contact Vichy BEFORE the invasion; but immediately afterwards there's a window for very intense negotiations by ALL sides. Here's a question- was there an actual American Ambassdaor to Vichy in 1942???

Might be a good idea. Aside from folks like Laval the Germans had been regularly penetrating and nuetralizing the French and British efforts to create a underground army and a large scale spy network. What was not rolled up was often renferd ineffective via agents of the Gestapo joining as members (facisist Frenchmen working for the Gestapo.) The Communist run networks were a little better, but not much under any Allied control in 1942.

Regarding submarines threatening the invasion fleet....this was something I was actually chatting about to a Feldgrau member last week, regarding the planned and much-vaunted "uboat interdiction" of the Royal Navy during Sealion...

Actually....there WAS an example of submarines being massed in the Channel and Western Approaches to interdict a naval flotilla...

The Channel Dash!

One of the often-forgotten factors in the British plans for dealing with the KM running the Channel...was the mustering of the grand total of THIRTY-ONE submarines of all classes in the Western Approaches and Channel, exactly the area where the Invasion fleet would be...

How many KM ships were sunk...damaged...or even ENGAGED by these THIRTY-ONE submarines???

I've done a bit more research on the submarine threat, but work prevents me from completing it for our purposes here. Can you provide a link to the Feldgrau discussion? For the moment I'll repeat my remarks from earlier. First the largest part of the Torch invasion fleet went all the way from British ports to Gibraltar before German intellgence figured out it was at sea and that it might comprise a 'invasion fleet'. Second, Doneitz did order as many submarines as possible to interfere with the Torch landings, specifically with the fleet landing Pattons Corps in the Atlantic coast of Morroco. This submarine attack failed to disrupt the landing or cut it off.

Third the Bay of Biscay and British waters including the Channel had become a dangerous place for the Uboats in 1942. The Luftwaffe was unable to provide effective fighter cover against the Brit ASW aircraft. This area was also in range of the small short ranged Brit ASW ships. And, the waters of the possible invasion areas and the approaches, all the way back to Britian, are realatively shallow making it more difficult for the subs to operate.

The latter half of 1942 was a time when the British were reading the German naval codes, and a period when the Germans were not reading the British convoy codes. This situation changes in 1943, but for the 'invasion' window of November 1942 the advantage was with the British. With a bit of preperation the Brit ASW leaders could turn the approaches to the invasion area into a killing ground for the Uboats for several weeks. They suceeded in that several times earlier and later in the war. So with dense ASW ships and aircraft, somewhat restricted waters, penetration of the German communications... it is possible (nothing of course is certain here) the "massacre" could be of the Uboats rather than the Allied fleet.

Perhaps this weekend I can provide some usefull numbers. Not nearly enough of those circulating here. Be nice to have:

Numbers and types of Allied aircraft available in Britian to supplement those I gave earlier.

Actual number of Allied ground combat units avaialble to follow up the intial landing. That would include US units still in the US, like Pattons I Armored Corps which participated in Torch.

The quantity of supply and combat units, air and ground, sent from the US to Tunisia and Britian after 6 November to reinforce Torch and to restart the buildup in Britian.

Similar data for the Germans...

All those items affect the ability of this Sledgehammer variant to stick, and are more usefull to a analysis.

[phylo_roadking]

Carl - I can't give you a link - David "von salza" and I were discussing the Channel Dash by PM I read them over a few times then had to make space!

IIRC, the RN put 29 submarines into the area - and two further on a specific "rotating watch" on Brest....literally, everything the could, including a number of Free French boats. When you look at the order, you got the idea that they were being recalled from patrol, or being tasked immediately on return from same, a new group every couple of days.

But agree 100% on the RN's...AND Coastal Command's...ability to close the area to U-Boats...or trap and kill them to the longer-term profit of the Atlantic convoys as well! Roddoss' post above of course ALSO brings into account that Sledehammer would also deny the Germans at least a third of their Atlantic-facing U-Boat pens at that point in the war!!! NO "Second Happy Time"...that in itself would have an inestimable impact in the course of the rest of the war...

[Michael Emrys]

On the other hand, if the U-boats had caught the convoys coming from the US (entirely possible since they would presumably be taking a more northerly route this time), the consequences might have been devastating. Not only the losses at sea, but it would have thrown what was a very iffy operation in France into great jeopardy. That too could have had very long-reaching effects on the whole war and especially that part of it fought in the West.

Michael