Germans Capture Malta

[davethelight]

If Germany had invaded and captured Malta first before taking Crete, would this have given them a significant advantage in the North African campaign?

[Sam H.]

The elimination of Malta would have greatly eased Rommel's supply difficulties. Not sure how the Axis could have done so while still engaged in the Balkans. Than again, with hind sight, the airborne troops got pretty mauled at Crete. They would not have been able to pull off another invasion for a few months at least.

[davethelight]

Well, if the Germans decided to occupy Malta before taking Crete, then it would probably depend on the standard of Malta's defences at the time.

Not knowing anything about this, I will stick my neck out and say that I reckon the German paratroopers could have done it, having not yet been wasted on Crete.

Then the Medeteranian/North African campaign could have gotten alot worse for the Britts than it actually did.

[Tim Smith]

If Malta had been invaded in late 1940 or early 1941, then I think a paratroop assault would have succeeded, although with heavy casualties.

Taking Malta would not by itself ensure an Axis victory in North Africa because Rommel wasn't a great general, as he tended to gamble whenever he was short of accurate intelligence. Also he was reluctant to admit defeat when he was beaten, and sometimes wasted men and tanks to no purpose.

Hitler would have called off the invasion of Crete afterwards, so that island would be left in Allied hands - but aircraft from Crete would be out of range of Axis convoys to Tripoli.

Holding Crete would only make an Allied invasion of Greece easier, if the Allies decided to do that instead of invading Italy. Also Crete would make a good bomber base from which to raid the Ploesti oilfields in Rumania.

[davethelight]

I wonder if it would have been some how possible for the Germans to capture both Malta and Crete?

[Tim Smith]

To do that the Axis need to either attack Crete first, or neutralise most of the British Mediterranean fleet so that a seaborne invasion of Crete is possible, escorted by the Italian battle fleet.

I wonder if it would have been some how possible for the Germans to capture both Malta and Crete?

[Sam H.]

Its hard to picture Hitler allowing Crete to remain in Allied hands, just because of the reason you gave ... allied bombers threatening Romanina oil fields.

But I disagree with your assertions re: Rommel. While he, at times, lacked a clear strategic picture, he was the one of the finest tacticians of his time. If anyone could have driven the Afrika Korp to Suez it was Rommel.

Who else do you think could have done a better job?

[Javier Acuña]

If germans invaded Malta that would mean that Hitler has increased his interest in the North Afrika so I guess he will send some more reinforcements to Rommel, or the italians will having less trouble with the britishs. In one letter in "Rise and Fall of the Third Reich" of Shirer, italian prime minister Ciano stated that once of 10 ships sent from Italy, 10 were sink by the british fleet.

I guess that something interesting might happend, having the Axis the Mediterraneum as a Mare Nostrum the italians will want to get more participation and command instead of having Rommel and the germans getting all the glory, I think that some kind of dispute will arise there.

[Tim Smith]

You said it yourself - Rommel was a good battlefield tactician (although not the best in the German Army), but a poor strategist.

He refused to accept OKH orders that North Africa was a minor theatre for Germany, launched premature offensives against the British in defiance of OKH instructions, and went over OKH direct to Hitler whenever he couldn't get his own way. Also he persuaded Hitler to call off a 1942 invasion of Malta so that he could concentrate on his own hasty drive into Egypt - a massive strategic error, as he later found out when the Italians couldn't keep him supplied with fuel because of British ships and aircraft operating from Malta.

In fact the only thing which made Rommel's final drive on Alamein possible, was the capture of vast supplies, including fuel, from the British in Tobruk - due entirely to British incompetence.

In my view British incompetence had a large part in the Rommel legend. Rommel wasn't the best of the German generals by a long way, but he was better than most of the British generals who opposed him, and that made him look better than he was.

But I disagree with your assertions re: Rommel. While he, at times, lacked a clear strategic picture, he was the one of the finest tacticians of his time. If anyone could have driven the Afrika Korp to Suez it was Rommel.

Who else do you think could have done a better job?

[Sam H.]

I agree that the decision to call of the Malta invasion was an error. A strategic error. But how can you fault a general who circumvents orders given by the likes of Kietel? I'd do my best to get around those orders as well.

His premptive strikes were ingenius and proved effective.

Africa may have been a back water campaign, but it kept the British occupied for two years. Not bad for a force that was orginally tasked to defend Tripoli.

As you said, he was better than his competition. Isn't that the ultimate measuring stick?

And who amond the German commanders would have done a better job in Africa?

[regertz]

I have to say I think the later downgrading of Rommel is not quite correct. If one reads his memoirs and accounts of his actions from objective sources during and just after the war, it seems he had a far better grasp of strategy and logistics than he's often given credit for. His bid to make the African theater important to Hitler was sound as with a relatively minor effort the Axis could have broken through to the Middle East and he was very much aware of Arab stirrings to nationalism against England and the allies. Such a breakthrough would like have not only won Arab and Egyptian support but would have left the Saudis able to declare neutrality or even join the Axis and it would have greatly increased pressure on Turkey to join the Axis which did in fact seem likely in the summer of 1942. He supported the Malta attack but according to his version feared it would never be carried out given Hitler's and OKH's hesitance, despite Kesselring's support. He understood the desperate logistical situation but believed momentum along with captured British supplies could get him to the Suez Canal with a little luck and strong support from Hitler. Some claims that for example Manstein would have been more sparing of resources and less willing to gamble provoke the question of what that would have produced. The British would have been able to hold or even drive the Axis out of Libya early and at best the game would be over when Torch was launched. Rommel believed Germany's best hope to win was to capture the Middle East and given the situation he had a chance to do so. Lee's gambles are still praised despite the fact they did not succeed in the end. Rommel's equally offered an opportunity to win strategically that would not have existed if he'd not pursued them.

[Peter89]

1. Thread necromancy without new insight is not really helpful.
2. Could you please name your sources regarding the views of the said generals?
3. The relationship between the Arab nationalists and in a wider sense, the Islam and Hitler / the Nazi leadership is a deeply researched subject, but as far as I know, there were two branches of German foreign policy regarding the Arab nationalists / Islamists, and Hitler was not really interested in the topic beyond broad generalizations.
4. Saudi Arabia was neutral.
5. What makes you think that Turkey would join the Axis in the summer of 1942?
6. What makes you think that "breaking through" to the Middle East in the summer of 1942 would require little effort and that it would inspire Arab nationalism? In the past 3 years, how many Arab nationalist rebellions were crushed exactly?

And most importantly, where would Rommel's breakthrough arrive in 1942? The Middle East was firmly in Allied hands from Iran to Suez, so "breaking through" would mean another 1000 km of hopeless march to nowhere.

[T. A. Gardner]

While capturing Malta would have helped ensure more of what was shipped to N. Africa arrived for the Axis, the problems of moving those supplies once they arrived would remain. Rommel's (and the Italians) main problem was moving those supplies from the available ports to the front. Tripoli and Benghazi are the two main ports supplies would be going to. Tobruk was a wreck as a port clogged with sunken ships and having heavily damaged infrastructure. This was all something neither the Germans nor Italians were prepared to deal with.

So, by the time the Axis reaches the Alamein position, they are moving supplies about 1000 miles by truck. There aren't enough trucks. Then, each truck burns something like 5 gallons of gasoline to deliver 1 gallon to the front. Worse, you are burning huge amounts more to deliver food, ammunition, and everything else along with that.

What the Germans and Italians really needed was a rail line from Tripoli to the Egyptian border. If that existed pre-war and was reasonably stocked with coal as fuel, it would have solved most of the supply problems on its own. But it didn't and neither country was going to build such a railroad in the timeframe of the operational war.

[Peter89]

While capturing Malta would have helped ensure more of what was shipped to N. Africa arrived for the Axis, the problems of moving those supplies once they arrived would remain. Rommel's (and the Italians) main problem was moving those supplies from the available ports to the front. Tripoli and Benghazi are the two main ports supplies would be going to. Tobruk was a wreck as a port clogged with sunken ships and having heavily damaged infrastructure. This was all something neither the Germans nor Italians were prepared to deal with.

So, by the time the Axis reaches the Alamein position, they are moving supplies about 1000 miles by truck. There aren't enough trucks. Then, each truck burns something like 5 gallons of gasoline to deliver 1 gallon to the front. Worse, you are burning huge amounts more to deliver food, ammunition, and everything else along with that.

What the Germans and Italians really needed was a rail line from Tripoli to the Egyptian border. If that existed pre-war and was reasonably stocked with coal as fuel, it would have solved most of the supply problems on its own. But it didn't and neither country was going to build such a railroad in the timeframe of the operational war.

Even that couldn't have cracked the Allies in the Suez base. Taking Malta didn't mean more naval forces, air power and ground equipment, thus the force balance would not shift automatically in Axis favor.

Besides, after August 1941 there was no end goal of such campaign. The irrelevant oil production of British Egypt didn't worth the hassle.

Those liters of motor fuel burned in Africa or sunk on the sea were complete waste. In 1941 Germany hoped to defeat the SU and it might, I repeat, might make sense to maintain a striking position in Africa, but those illusions were over by the time the attack on Malta was considered (spring 1942).

The only positive alternate outcome for the Axis in Africa would be a timely evacuation or a full commitment early on. Neither of those happened for well known reasons...