The original barbarossa plan

[Javier Acuña]

If you really fancy experimenting with "What ifs" of the Barbarossa campaign, I highly recommend "War in Russia - Matrix Edition"
http://www.matrixgames.com/insidemg/mod ... load&cid=4

It's completely free, and I've found it a lot of fun.

And I'd love to find someone in this Forum to actually play at it.

Gwynn

That link does not work Gwynn, could you please post another source?

[Gwynn Compton]

Go to http://www.matrixgames.com and go to their download section. War in Russia is very good for experimenting with "What if" scenarios. You can take Moscow by October 1941 if you're careful. Though it does require that the infantry never stray too far from the tanks, or else your supply does get cut off.

Then again, clearing those supply lines is fairly easy.

Gwynn

[ISU-152]

Don't you think that if Stalin had Panzers bearing down on Moscow he could have panicked and ordered diverting troops from the south and throw the reserves toward the defense of Moscow?.

Stalin was a match of Hitler in his idiocy. If he had pulled the forces of South-Western front (which by the way was much stronger than Western front) back from Kyiv to straighten the front line he would not have all his armies encircled and eventually eleminated. The germans captured 685000 POWs and huge piles of war materials to help their war effort. When Zhukov told him that these forces must be withdrawn he just yelled at him and let them die there. So, no, would not pull a single soldier towards Moscow.

Stalin initially seemed to have been as irrational as Hitler with him ordering attacks when the front line troops were getting encircled and chewed up by the Panzers.
It is said that if the USSR had a good road system then it would have lost.

He simply did not care about the men. For him they were all screws of one big mechanism called Soviet Union.
His orders to attack were poorly executed and sometimes were not even carried out because the command had no idea about the situation in retreating armies. Thousands of remains of unknown soldiers still rot in the ground all over Smolensk, Minsk and other regions. They all died in futile attacks.

[Gwynn Compton]

Troops wouldn't have been withdrawn from other fronts as you mention, but I believe all reinforcements from the east would have been directed to defend the direct line of approach from Army Group Centre, rather than trying to "pinch" the panzers given Stalin's idoicy.

Gwynn

[Sieger]

Okay so it Hitler should have diverted his Panzers south to wipe out all those troops since they were holding what increasinly looked like a southern bulge, lengthening the front making the northern bulge created by the northern armies very vulnerable.

Hitler should have planned on taking the USSR out in 2 years in 1942, which was much more realistic. Instead of case Blue aimed at the south he should have concentrated his forces at taking Moscow and wiping out more troops in the north, which was still achiveable.

Had Hitler done this do you think Hitler could have still won in the East?

[Gwynn Compton]

The case for taking Moscow in 1942 doesn't compell me. If I recall correctly, by Summer 1942, Russian Railways had increased, and Moscow was no longer quite the vital transport link that it had been during the fighting in 1941. Also, the defences around Moscow were far more prepared than they had been in 1941.

Thus, Hitler was perhaps right in launching the operation to cut off the supply of oil from the south. However, thats another topic all together.

A large part of the argument against the strike straight to Moscow is the threat to the flanks of the German advance. I'm still not convinced that the Russians could have threatened the flanks during this time. If the pace of the advance was controlled, and infanty not left too far behind, the Russians would have struggled to contain the German advance, in much the same manner as they had failed to stop the initial Barbarossa attacking in it's first few weeks. However, Guderian and his fellow Generals could not quite pull of the same feat again, and thus would have to slow the pace of their advance somewhat.

I still believe that applying pressure to Moscow in 1941 would have been key to preventing defeat.

Gwynn

[Sieger]

The case for taking Moscow in 1942 doesn't compell me. If I recall correctly, by Summer 1942, Russian Railways had increased, and Moscow was no longer quite the vital transport link that it had been during the fighting in 1941. Also, the defences around Moscow were far more prepared than they had been in 1941.

Thus, Hitler was perhaps right in launching the operation to cut off the supply of oil from the south. However, thats another topic all together.

A large part of the argument against the strike straight to Moscow is the threat to the flanks of the German advance. I'm still not convinced that the Russians could have threatened the flanks during this time. If the pace of the advance was controlled, and infanty not left too far behind, the Russians would have struggled to contain the German advance, in much the same manner as they had failed to stop the initial Barbarossa attacking in it's first few weeks. However, Guderian and his fellow Generals could not quite pull of the same feat again, and thus would have to slow the pace of their advance somewhat.

I still believe that applying pressure to Moscow in 1941 would have been key to preventing defeat.

Gwynn

I'm not quite sure about Moscow not being the critical rail link that it was in 1941 due to increase in railways. Such expansion of infrastructure would have taken several years.

I don't think Hitler was right on launching Case Blue because it extended the front, if he had gone after Moscow he could have taken it and then proceeded to go south without extending the front too much since Moscow
is a central location.

The advance would not have to have been as spectacular since the german armies were within 200 miles of Moscow, a distance that would have easily been covered over the duration of Case Blue. The only issue would have been how much further they would have advanced beyond Moscow so that the Red Army would not retake it in 1942/43 offensive.
The advance would definitely been slowed since they would have met a determined defense that unlike the early months of Case Blue would try not to give a inch of ground(and possibly lead to more Red Army troops being encircled and eliminated). Also the Red Army would have tried to turn Moscow into an urban death trap(a la Stalingrad). Also Hitler and Stalin would have both interfered heavily on their respective sides, plowing in troops blindly into Moscow if it came to that. A likelier scenario would have been a encirclement of Moscow.