Are these two "What If" theories overly simplistic?

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Jon G.
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Re: Are these two "What If" theories overly simplistic?

#136

Post by Jon G. » 02 Jun 2009, 20:18

phylo_roadking wrote:Jon, I've come across Budden before, exerpted in various locations. The interesting thing to take out of all that is that Churchill inherited an established policy of under-investment in the islands' defences in favour of retiring to either end of the Med on the outbreak of war. Against that hower - is the speed with which the British THEN began to invest in Malta when they could, with the ferry convoys discussed previously over the summer ...
Actually, I don't care much for Budden. My first attempt at posting the above scans crashed, and I couldn't be bothered to type in my objections to him a second time.

Regardless, my point with posting his scans were to convey the generally very pessimistic view which the CID took on Malta's defenses before the war and during the early war. The RAF considered the island wholly indefensible, based on some shaky maths on how many bombs the RA would dispose on Malta upon the outbreak of war; the Royal Navy was more optimistic, however, both services were agreed that the Med fleet should withdraw to Alexandria the moment Italy entered the war.

As Budden writes, it was seriously contemplated to abandon Malta altogether - IIRC (but I would have to check with Playfair), that decision was revised in September 1940. For this scenario, however, with increased German activity in the central Mediterranean from mid-1940 (the Germans don't have to wait for France to fall, just for Mussolini to enter the war and granting Sicilian bases for the LW), I'd suggest that the British may well have decided to abandon the island altogether.

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Re: Are these two "What If" theories overly simplistic?

#137

Post by phylo_roadking » 02 Jun 2009, 20:40

the Royal Navy was more optimistic, however, both services were agreed that the Med fleet should withdraw to Alexandria the moment Italy entered the war.
I wonder if this is really "agreed" - or both sets of planning staff reported the same opinions :wink:
I'd suggest that the British may well have decided to abandon the island altogether.
Conversely, I'd be inclined to the opinion, as you know, that...
with increased German activity in the central Mediterranean from mid-1940 (the Germans don't have to wait for France to fall, just for Mussolini to enter the war and granting Sicilian bases for the LW),
..the British would be more likely to stay, for those very reasons. At minimum, the requirement to take Malta in Axis' eyes to counter any perceived British ability or desire to interdict the North African transit route...provides Britain with an invaluable delaying action and way of attriting German and Italian naval and air forces that cannot be rapidly replaced.

One thing to factor BACK into this - the corollory of "the Royal Navy was more optimistic" - is that halfway through May 1940 a First Sea Lord with a mania about the Med and the Aegean ended up as Prime Minister/Minister for War :wink:


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Re: Are these two "What If" theories overly simplistic?

#138

Post by phylo_roadking » 02 Jun 2009, 21:01

Sid,

*I* expressed the opinion that taking Malta would cause the LW ju52 losses that would impact the LW's overall transport abilit for the Desert War; as I was more interested in the Axis' ability to make a landing on Malta successfully. *You* on the other hand used it's overall transport ability and gross aircraft numbers in an attempt to show that an attack on Malta would be successful...despite the fact that the FJ would only be able to use a part of that total capacity.

I see you haven't picked up on the Axis' actual abilty to LAND on Malta. In the summer of 1940 there was ONE airfield, and IIRC one emergency landing ground; by mid-war when the threat of attack was historically at it's highest, there were TWO airfields in full use, a third airfield/runway completed, and several diversionary strips...

Therefore, in 1940 the Axis can only consider airlanding a fraction of what it planned later in traffic terms; and this on a defended airfield. In 1940 the ability of heavily-laden Ju52s to even physically land on Malta would be questionable; in 1941, Maleme and to a lesser extent the other two airfields on Crete were regarded as dangerous, the hard uneven surface led to burst tyres and broken undercarriages. By the time of the May 1941 invasion of Crete, the boneyard at Maleme was filled with written-off British aircraft....soon to be added to by the LW. And in 1940 Malta's landing grounds weren't significantly better...

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Re: Are these two "What If" theories overly simplistic?

#139

Post by Jon G. » 03 Jun 2009, 09:34

phylo_roadking wrote:
the Royal Navy was more optimistic, however, both services were agreed that the Med fleet should withdraw to Alexandria the moment Italy entered the war.
I wonder if this is really "agreed" - or both sets of planning staff reported the same opinions :wink:
Well, in this case there is no need to speculate. The RN Mediterranean fleet was withdrawn from Malta when Italy entered the war.
... I'd be inclined to the opinion, as you know, that...
with increased German activity in the central Mediterranean from mid-1940 (the Germans don't have to wait for France to fall, just for Mussolini to enter the war and granting Sicilian bases for the LW),
..the British would be more likely to stay, for those very reasons.
Well, in this scenario, the earlier arrival of the Luftwaffe in the Med makes Malta an appreciably more dangerous place, while not offering the RN a corresponding increase in sea targets to destroy. The RN surface units in Malta got absolutely plastered when the Luftwaffe entered the scene in January 1941; how can it be an incentive for the RN to stay if the Germans enter the picture earlier?
At minimum, the requirement to take Malta in Axis' eyes to 1) counter any perceived British ability or desire to interdict the North African transit route...provides Britain with an invaluable delaying action and way of attriting 2) German and Italian naval and air forces that cannot be rapidly replaced.
1) Well, the OTL shows that the British in fact did not interdict the Libyan convoy routes when the DAK was transferred there first, and 2) the Axis would have a much easier time replacing units lost near Malta than the British would, which is also borne out by the OTL where the island was under virtual siege for more than two years.
One thing to factor BACK into this - the corollory of "the Royal Navy was more optimistic" - is that halfway through May 1940 a First Sea Lord with a mania about the Med and the Aegean ended up as Prime Minister/Minister for War :wink:
IIRC Dudley Pound was a strong advocate for withdrawing the Med fleet to Gibraltar.

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Re: Are these two "What If" theories overly simplistic?

#140

Post by Sid Guttridge » 03 Jun 2009, 11:24

Hi Phylo,

Indeed, you did "express the opinion that taking Malta would cause the LW ju52 losses that would impact the LW's overall transport ability for the Desert War." I agreed because it is blindingly obvious.

My original point was simply that the majority of assets used against Crete were available for an assault on Malta in 1940. You disagreed only so far as to say "except transport aircraft". It turns out that even on your own figures, there was some 60% availability. On others I extracted it may have been as high as 80%. However, you cut it, 60% and 80% count as "most". And this is before we address the availability of Italian types with similar characteristics to the Ju52 to make up numbers.

You write, "In 1940 the ability of heavily-laden Ju52s to even physically land on Malta would be questionable". Why?

Maleme wasn't a "British" airfield, but Greek. What leads you to believe that conditions at Malta's landing grounds weren't significantly better?

And why would this matter if they were as bad? The Germans successfully landed on Crete from the air.

I can't detect any substantive objection in your post. Your point seems to be that the Germans would suffer losses. Well, yes, losses of all sorts are the currency one pays in war to gain tactical and strategic advantages. That is taken as read.

Cheers,

Sid.

P.S. What is "IIRC" in English?

P.P.S. According to the Air Battle for Malta "The Gladiators operated from Hal Far airfield at the south-east corner of the island. When the Hurricanes arrived they were accommodated at Luqa, on high ground a mile or so inland, commanding the Grand Harbour and the Three Cities. The third important airfield is at Takali, upon the cultivated plain which lies between Rabat, the ancient Maltese capital, and Valetta. These airfields were already well known to the Italians, who had used them for commercial flying before the war."

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Re: Are these two "What If" theories overly simplistic?

#141

Post by bf109 emil » 03 Jun 2009, 22:55

The problem with "what if's" is it's hard to argue facts or out comes over something that never took place...could The Italian Navy had captured Malta...perhaps...then again one can argue that they'd have suffered huge losses and negated them as a maritime threat and any supply to Africa hence after would have been nil, thus defeating the Italian Army and DAK from ever having competed in Africa...maybe the losses to the Luftwaffe transports would have been so great there wouldn't be sufficient available for a Crete invasion the next year with the role of Barbarossa playing key in OKH minds, or the RN trying to defend Malta would have sustained huge losses from lack of air support and basically the Med would have become an Axis Lake? who knows...the Axis almost shored up a defeat of Malta with the exception of a convoy from Alexandria in August of 42 the island might have forced to surrender due to starvation, or had the Luftwaffe not been lulled into a sense of victory, and planes diverted to fight in other theatres the arrival of 61 spitfires might not have taken place...all in all Malta was a piece of Land, sure it was key or Vital but to say the British where defeated if it fell rings on the same tone as saying the capture of Moscow would have ended the eastern front rather then change what was to come next, something which historian as well as foroum members will forever argue or challenge others

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Re: Are these two "What If" theories overly simplistic?

#142

Post by Jon G. » 04 Jun 2009, 03:45

Sid Guttridge wrote:...What is "IIRC" in English?
If I Recall/Remember Correctly.

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Re: Are these two "What If" theories overly simplistic?

#143

Post by phylo_roadking » 04 Jun 2009, 04:34

Well, in this case there is no need to speculate
Jon - not speculation; I'm wondering exactly where in the development process did the two separate arm's various contingency plans become congruent...
how can it be an incentive for the RN to stay if the Germans enter the picture earlier?
Because the arrival of LW interdiction in-theatre for Malta...confirms any idea the British have gained up to that point that the war is moving down into Africa, and that there WILL be business for the RN moving between italy and Libya in quantity. Moving bomber forces away from Western France and action in the UK...a resource needed to carry out the destruction of Fighter Command and the UK industrial home base supporting the RAF as part of the air supremacy batle prior to an invasion...and remember, in the summer of 1940 the LW had taken major losses in Poland and France, and didn't have enough to be REALLY convincing in Britain AND really efective in the Med at the same time...is one of the unmistakable indicators that the attention of Berlin is swinging south.
1) Well, the OTL shows that the British in fact did not interdict the Libyan convoy routes when the DAK was transferred there first
AS discussed before - when the DAK initially transferred...the RN didn't have anything at Malta to do so. WHEN they did - Force K - they were effective until Force K took its major losses at one blow and virtually ceased to exist....and not courtesy of the LW :wink: ATL...if the British work out what's afoot in North Africa, an ATL equivalent of Force K will be moved to Malta. As noted before - in the summer of 1940 they did have the destroyers/light cruisers to redeploy from the UK.
Dudley Pound was a strong advocate for withdrawing the Med fleet to Gibraltar.
The Dudley Pound that Winston found it easy to dominate? :wink:
___________________________________________________________________________________________________
Maleme wasn't a "British" airfield, but Greek.
...and the RAF had seven months to try and improve it - and it was still "dangerous".
And why would this matter if they were as bad? The Germans successfully landed on Crete from the air.
And were on the cusp of loosing the battle UNTIL reinforcements/supplies/heavyier equipment were put into Maleme by Ju52's LANDING.
I can't detect any substantive objection in your post. Your point seems to be that the Germans would suffer losses.
No - my point is that in 1940 there's only a certain traffic rate even a sucessful taking of the island's airfields can accomodate - and only a certain number of airlanded troops can be ferried in with a first wave.

And of course - there's the MAJOR sticker that after the major losses and "phyrric victories" of the airfield seizures in Norway and Holland...Student wouldn't get approval for another airfield seizure operation in 1940. It took
1/ VERY major lobbying for months for operations;
2/ the apparent chaos of a British evacuation from Greece;
3/ the success of the airborne ops that were part of MARITA - seizing the Corinth bridges etc. - rebuilding the FJ's reputation...
...that put him in a position to "offer" the Crete operation to Hitler with any degree of confidence in it on Hitler's part.

Thank you for the airfields details; I remembered at least two, and only faintly a third; this was because Ti'Qali wasn't in use for most of 1940. Hal Far was only paved after the main weight of Axis bombing was over, in the spring of 1943 IIRC; until then it was cleared local hard surface. Ti'Qali wasn't used by the RAF until November 1940; until then, from the outbreak of war with Italy in June, the runway and flat ground around was made unsuitable for landing. After that it was for a time only a dispersal field from Luqa, holding No. 261 Sqn from there until May 1941, when No. 249 Sqn arrived from the UK as its permanent complement. Luqa itself was still under development for larger aircraft in the middle of 1940, with it's NW-SE runway still being extended for multi-engined aircraft.

Later in the war satellite fields at Safi and Qrendi were added, and on Gozo.

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Re: Are these two "What If" theories overly simplistic?

#144

Post by Jon G. » 04 Jun 2009, 09:58

phylo_roadking wrote:
Well, in this case there is no need to speculate
Jon - not speculation; I'm wondering exactly where in the development process did the two separate arm's various contingency plans become congruent...
But surely we can put that to rest by looking at what actually happened - i.e. the threat of air attack from the RA was cause for the RN to withdraw its major units from Malta; I contend that the threat of RA plus LW attack would also be cause for the RN to withdraw from Malta.
how can it be an incentive for the RN to stay if the Germans enter the picture earlier?
Because the arrival of LW interdiction in-theatre for Malta...confirms any idea the British have gained up to that point that the war is moving down into Africa, and that there WILL be business for the RN moving between italy and Libya in quantity.
Yes. and the course of action which you are suggesting the RN would take in that event is in direct contradiction to what the RN in actual fact did.
Moving bomber forces away from Western France and action in the UK...a resource needed to carry out the destruction of Fighter Command and the UK industrial home base supporting the RAF as part of the air supremacy batle prior to an invasion...and remember, in the summer of 1940 the LW had taken major losses in Poland and France, and didn't have enough to be REALLY convincing in Britain AND really efective in the Med at the same time...is one of the unmistakable indicators that the attention of Berlin is swinging south.
You will note from the scans I posted, above, how little attention had actually been given to that possibility. As for 'convincing' and 'really effective' could you perhaps try and establish some more measurable parameters for what the Royal Navy and Luftwaffe (and RAF and RA, for that matter) would have considered 'really effective'?
1) Well, the OTL shows that the British in fact did not interdict the Libyan convoy routes when the DAK was transferred there first
AS discussed before - when the DAK initially transferred...the RN didn't have anything at Malta to do so...
Yes. The reason for the non-availablity of sizeable RN elements at Malta being the offensive which Fliegerkorps X had initiated against the island the month before.
WHEN they did - Force K - they were effective until Force K took its major losses at one blow and virtually ceased to exist....and not courtesy of the LW :wink: ATL...if the British work out what's afoot in North Africa, an ATL equivalent of Force K will be moved to Malta...
That is your contention. No-one else's. I remain unconvinced.
Dudley Pound was a strong advocate for withdrawing the Med fleet to Gibraltar.
The Dudley Pound that Winston found it easy to dominate?
This supports your contention how?

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Re: Are these two "What If" theories overly simplistic?

#145

Post by bf109 emil » 04 Jun 2009, 18:48

WHEN they did - Force K - they were effective until Force K took its major losses at one blow and virtually ceased to exist....and not courtesy of the LW :wink: ATL...if the British work out what's afoot in North Africa, an ATL equivalent of Force K will be moved to Malta...
That is your contention. No-one else's. I remain unconvinced.
was this blow not from a mine field in december of 1941? which sank one cruiser, damaged another and sank a destroyer...the remaining ships being withdrawn after a revising or resurgence of air bombing? and not being wiped out by air power in one blow meaning a mine field not from aerial attacks? Once the ships where withdrawn and why subject them to air attacks in a harbour, what was shown for the continual wasting of planes, resources, pilots, fuel for the Axis besides perhaps an easier voyage to Africa...again valuable resources which could have been used by units of the LW in Russia where tied up in the Med. as the Latin saying goes "Divide et impera" (divide and conquer)

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Re: Are these two "What If" theories overly simplistic?

#146

Post by phylo_roadking » 04 Jun 2009, 20:59

But surely we can put that to rest by looking at what actually happened - i.e. the threat of air attack from the RA was cause for the RN to withdraw its major units from Malta; I contend that the threat of RA plus LW attack would also be cause for the RN to withdraw from Malta.
Jon, you're missing what I mean entirely; I'm wondering at what point the joint decision was presented to the CIDS, or did it go up to that level to have "policy" established?
Yes. and the course of action which you are suggesting the RN would take in that event is in direct contradiction to what the RN in actual fact did
.

Yes, Jon - historically, when the British had to fear a possible invasion and associated air supremacy battle for the next 3-4 months after the Fall of France. Here - that threat is removed BY the German re-focusing on the Med/North Africa instead.
Yes. The reason for the non-availablity of sizeable RN elements at Malta being the offensive which Fliegerkorps X had initiated against the island the month before.
Really? You've just spent several pages telling us the reason historically the RN withdrew major surface elements was the ITALIANS....seven months before...; can't be BOTH :wink:
Dudley Pound was a strong advocate for withdrawing the Med fleet to Gibraltar.
The Dudley Pound that Winston found it easy to dominate?
This supports your contention how?
Means when the focus of the war swings to the Med/North Africa over the summer rather than the autumn - he's going to say yes to whatever Churchill pushes hard enough for...
That is your contention. No-one else's. I remain unconvinced.
...thus removing one major obstacle to putting an RN interdiction force into Malta.

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Re: Are these two "What If" theories overly simplistic?

#147

Post by Jon G. » 05 Jun 2009, 06:49

phylo_roadking wrote:
But surely we can put that to rest by looking at what actually happened - i.e. the threat of air attack from the RA was cause for the RN to withdraw its major units from Malta; I contend that the threat of RA plus LW attack would also be cause for the RN to withdraw from Malta.
Jon, you're missing what I mean entirely; I'm wondering at what point the joint decision was presented to the CIDS, or did it go up to that level to have "policy" established?
By the time Malta's air defenses were reviewed, the withdrawal of the Mediterranean fleet was not on the agenda - both services were in agreement that it should be withdrawn if Italy entered the war, which indeed is exactly was what happened. Disagreement was at a lower level: the RN wanted to keep Malta as a base, whereas the airmen thought that Malta would be useless as a base of any kind, based on calculations on how many bombs the RA would be able to drop on the island.
Yes. and the course of action which you are suggesting the RN would take in that event is in direct contradiction to what the RN in actual fact did
.

Yes, Jon - historically, when the British had to fear a possible invasion and associated air supremacy battle for the next 3-4 months after the Fall of France. Here - that threat is removed BY the German re-focusing on the Med/North Africa instead.
Yes, and that will free up ressources. However, it does not follow that those ressources would be deployed at Malta.
Yes. The reason for the non-availablity of sizeable RN elements at Malta being the offensive which Fliegerkorps X had initiated against the island the month before.
Really? You've just spent several pages telling us the reason historically the RN withdrew major surface elements was the ITALIANS....seven months before...; can't be BOTH :wink:
That's because you're missing the distinction between withdrawing major surface units (i.e. the Med fleet) and having any surface units on the island at all. Incidentally, the surface units at (or rather, near) Malta in Jan 1941 were there as part of the Excess convoy - a convoy which I doubt the RN would have tried pushing through if Cyrenaica had not been on British hands at the time (which it won't, in this scenario)

The net effect of the Luftwaffe's arrival on the scene in January 1941 was that the central Mediterranean was closed off to British shipping, plans to capture Pantelleria were shelved, and while only pessimists were suggesting that Malta be abandoned altogether, re-deploying the Mediterranean fleet there certainly wasn't in the cards.

Before you begin comparing the short-lived Force K with the Med fleet, it should be pointed out that this assembly of units would have had a harder time operating from Malta than they did historically because 1/ there will be no Balkan & Soviet distractions pulling the Luftwaffe east, nor 2/ will Taranto have happened in this scenario.
This supports your contention how?
Means when the focus of the war swings to the Med/North Africa over the summer rather than the autumn - he's going to say yes to whatever Churchill pushes hard enough for...
Yes. Now you just need to demonstrate that Churchill indeed would have pressed hard for the re-deployment of the Royal Navy's Mediterranean fleet to Malta in the event of the Germans shifting their attention south earlier than they did historically.

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Re: Are these two "What If" theories overly simplistic?

#148

Post by Sid Guttridge » 05 Jun 2009, 11:32

Hi Phylo,

You can quibble all you want about the supposed condition of Maleme airfield, but the fact remains it was successully seized by the Germans from the air and supported, in your own words, the arrival of "reinforcements/supplies/heavyier equipment..... by Ju52's LANDING" (Your emphasis). What is your evidence that the condition of the airfields on Malta (all of which had apparently been used by Italian commercial aircraft before the war) was worse?

I am sure, as, no doubt, is everyone else, that "there's only a certain traffic rate even a sucessful taking of the island's airfields can accomodate - and only a certain number of airlanded troops can be ferried in with a first wave". Presumably you have information on both these subjects so, what was this "certain rate traffic" and what was the "certain number of airlanded troops"?

In so far as it goes it is absolutely true that: "Student wouldn't get approval for another airfield seizure operation in 1940." However, it doesn't go very far, as you well know. The fact that Student didn't get approval does not mean (1) that he did not try to, (2) that one wasn't planned, or (3) that the resources weren't there to launch one. I would refer you to the Operation Sea Lion plan for the invasion of the UK in September 1940 - a much more demanding objective than Malta at that time. This provided for 7th Flieger Division to make several drops, including the seizure of Lympne airfield, so that 22nd Air Landing Division could fly in. This, in itself, implies the necessary transport aircraft were thought to be available in September 1940.

I still haven't detected a substantive objection, just generalized scepticism.

Cheers,

Sid.

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Re: Are these two "What If" theories overly simplistic?

#149

Post by phylo_roadking » 05 Jun 2009, 15:32

You can quibble all you want about the supposed condition of Maleme airfield, but the fact remains it was successully seized by the Germans from the air and supported, in your own words, the arrival of "reinforcements/supplies/heavyier equipment..... by Ju52's LANDING"
...supported after IIRC four days.

What is your evidence that the condition of the airfields on Malta (all of which had apparently been used by Italian commercial aircraft before the war) was worse?
Worse? Well, the fact that the British lorried quarry rubble from the Luqa quarries and set it all over the dry lake bed at Ti'Qali as natural "dragon's teeth" to prevent any landings on any part of the circular lakebed, not JUST the runway...certainly makes it worse! That's a THIRD of the suitable 1940 landing grounds removed.
I would refer you to the Operation Sea Lion plan for the invasion of the UK in September 1940 - a much more demanding objective than Malta at that time. This provided for 7th Flieger Division to make several drops, including the seizure of Lympne airfield, so that 22nd Air Landing Division could fly in. This, in itself, implies the necessary transport aircraft were thought to be available in September 1940.
In the SECOND version of the Sealion plans; in the FIRST, the FJ were relegated totally to the General Reserve for lack of transport. Even in the second version, they were relegated to TWO drops only - behind Lympne and Hawkinge with the limited objective of holding the Royal Military Canal, rather than to seize forward landing grounds to "drive" the invasion as in Norway and Holland. These small operations, together with a number of small combat engineer "specific objective" glider drops on either side of the landing beaches - the Dover coastal gun emplacements. etc. - were ALL Student could get out of Hitler when he heard what was in the first version of the invasion plans while in his sickbed and sent officers to lobby for some role. He is recorded as being critical of the limited use the FJ were to be put to, especially when he met with Göring at Karinhall after his discharge from hospital in August.

Interestingly - MacDonald points up three other major problems for a prospective major airborne operation in the September 1940 period :wink: (which was, after all, the period of the expected and planned-for Sealion...so all factors impinging on FJ performance THERE apply to a September 1940 drop in the Med TOO...)
"Nearly all the gliders had been used up in the assault on Eben Emael and there was also a serious shortage of parachute silk."
...and after the major losses in Norway and Holland
"...many of the new recruits had not completed their parachute training"
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Yes, and that will free up ressources. However, it does not follow that those ressources would be deployed at Malta.
Likewise - it doesn't follow that once the British have word of a major offensive against Egypt and the Canal Zone being planned and forces moved for via one sea route...they would make no effort to interdict that route. That's wishing TOO much inactivity from the British...and a PM who had driven the plan for mining Norwegian waters to - after all - civilian German ore carriers...
Before you begin comparing the short-lived Force K with the Med fleet
No - I'm comparing them to the three 12-destroyer/one cruiser anti-invasion flotillas on the South and South-East coast of England in the summer fo 1940...gathered to do the same job, interdict a Sea Bridge.
Now you just need to demonstrate that Churchill indeed would have pressed hard for the re-deployment of the Royal Navy's Mediterranean fleet to Malta in the event of the Germans shifting their attention south earlier than they did historically.
Jon, that redeployment is NOT what I'm talking about; I'm talking about and have done for several pages now is the redeployment of the anti-invasion flotillas from the UK to the Med, including one or more to Malta.

And don't forget - the Germans viewed this redeployment of forces as a real possibility 8O Hitler to Mussolini, 20th January 1941 OTL -
"...England would then not have to bother further about a landing and could employ the bulk of her forces where she wanted on the periphery."
nor 2/ will Taranto have happened in this scenario.
Why? :wink: All the preliminary events to a Taranto-style event will still be in place; increased traffic in the Med to/from Italy by the Axis in preparation for the offensive will require escort, will they not? The Italian Fleet WILL have to make a similar sortie at some point to the July 1940 convoy escort -
"JULY 1940
9th - Action off Calabria or Battle of Punto Stila - On the 7th, Adm Cunningham sailed from Alexandria with battleships "Warspite", Malaya", Royal Sovereign", carrier "Eagle", cruisers and destroyers to cover convoys from Malta to Alexandria and to challenge the Italians to action. Next day - the 8th - two Italian battleships, 14 cruisers and 32 destroyers were reported in the Ionian Sea covering a convoy of their own to Benghazi in Libya..."
...for the KM won't be there to escort troop convoys to North Africa from the East Med Squadron - and there's no reason for the outcome to be different; the Italian Fleet pinned in harbour for x-number of months and short of oil. Punto Stila wasn't fought by vessels based at Malta, nor was Taranto actioned by units based at Malta :wink: ...
because 1/ there will be no Balkan & Soviet distractions pulling the Luftwaffe east
No, no Barbarossa...but no guarantee Mussolini can be kept in check in the Balkans.
The net effect of the Luftwaffe's arrival on the scene in January 1941 was that the central Mediterranean was closed off to British shipping
Jon, that's an exaggeration. if it was "closed" - then Cape matapan would never have happened, nor the March 1941 convoy made it to Malta, nor THIS -
APRIL 16th - Action of Sfax, Tunisia - Capt P. J. Mack with destroyers "Janus", "Jervis", "Mohawk" and "Nubian" sailing from Malta intercepted a German Afrika Korps convoy of five transports escorted by three Italian destroyers off Kerkennah Islands, east of Tunisia. All Axis ships were sunk including the destroyers "BALENO" (foundered next day), "LAMPO" (later salvaged) and "TARIGO". In the fighting "MOHAWK" was torpedoed by "Tarigo" and had to be scuttled.
....nor THIS -
Malta - In the first week of April, "Ark Royal" escorted by Force H sailed from Gibraltar and flew off 12 Hurricanes for Malta. Three weeks later the operation was repeated with 20 more aircraft. From the other end of the Mediterranean, Alexandria-based battleships "Barham", "Valiant" and "Warspite" together with carrier "Formidable" covered the movement of fast transport "Breconshire" to Malta. On the 21st they bombarded Tripoli on their return
...nor THIS -
Royal Navy Operations in the Mediterranean - Early in the month (MAY, my mote), Force H and the Mediterranean Fleet carried out another series of complicated supply, reinforcement and offensive operations. (1) Five fast transports sailed from Gibraltar with tanks and supplies urgently needed for the Army of the Nile (Operation 'Tiger'). Four arrived safely. (2) On passage they were accompanied by battleship "Oueen Elizabeth" and two cruisers sailing to join the Mediterranean Fleet. (3) Two small convoys were escorted westward from Egypt to Malta. (4) Other units of the Mediterranean Fleet shelled Benghazi, Libya on the night of the 7th/8th. (5) After covering the 'Tiger' convoy, "Ark Royal" joined by carrier "Furious", was once again south of Sardinia and flying off a further 48 Hurricanes to Malta on the 21st.
...nor this -
JUNE 1941 - Malta - With German forces now in Greece and Crete the problems of supplying Malta were even greater. From airfields in Crete as well as Libya, the Luftwaffe and Italian Air force were as close to the eastern convoy routes from Alexandria, as Sardinia and Sicily were to the western ones through the Strait of Gibraltar. Nevertheless the men and material were fought through for the defence of Malta and its use as an offensive base. In the one month of June alone, carrier "Ark Royal" once on her own, at other times accompanied by "Furious" or "Victorious", flew off more than 140 aircraft for Malta. Meanwhile submarines carried in urgently needed fuel and stores.
...nor THIS -
JULY 21st-24th - Malta Convoy, Operation 'Substance' - 'Substance' set out from Gibraltar with six transports covered by Force H with "Ark Royal", battlecruiser "Renown", cruisers and destroyers. Battleship "Nelson", three cruisers and more destroyers reinforced Force H from the Home Fleet. On the 23rd, south of Sardinia, sustained Italian air attacks started. Cruiser "Manchester" was hit and destroyer "FEARLESS" sunk by aircraft torpedoes. Next day the transports reached Malta safely. On the 26th the Italians launched an attack on Grand Harbour with explosive motor-boats, human torpedoes and aircraft, but failed to reach the recently arrived ships. By the 27th, Force H and a return empty convoy were in Gibraltar. During this operation, Mediterranean Fleet carried out diversionary manoeuvres in the eastern basin.
...nor THIS -
AUGUST 1941 Malta Convoy - Operation 'Style' - Early in the month, two cruisers, cruiser-minelayer "Manxman" and two destroyers successfully carried reinforcements and supplies from Gibraltar to Malta. On the way, cruiser "Hermione" rammed and sank Italian submarine "TEMBIEN" southwest of Sicily on the 2nd.
....nor THIS -
DECEMBER 13th - Action off Cape Bon, Tunisia - Destroyers “Legion”, “Maori”, “Sikh” and Dutch “lsaac Sweers” under the command of Cdr G. H. Stokes sailed from Gibraltar to join the Mediterranean Fleet at Alexandria. Off Cape Bon, Tunisia they sighted two Italian 6in cruisers, “DA BARBIANO” and “DI GIUSSANO” returning from an aborted mission to carry a deck cargo of petrol to Tripoli. In a short night action and without being seen, the destroyers quickly sank both cruisers with gunfire and torpedoes. Italian loss of life was heavy.
Need I go on with Operation HALBERD, or the Action off Cape Spartivento, etc.?

The Central Med was NEVER "closed". Yes, they took losses...
November 13th - As Force H returned to Gibraltar after flying off more Hurricanes from "Ark Royal" and "Argus" for Malta, the famous and much 'sunk' "ARK ROYAL" was hit by one torpedo from "U-81". Next day she foundered in tow only a few miles from home. One man was killed. "U-81" was one of four U-boats that had just passed into the Mediterranean
November 25th - Force K hunted for Italian convoys to North Africa supported by the Mediterranean Fleet with battleships "Barham", "Queen Elizabeth" and "Valiant". In the afternoon north of Sidi Barrani, "BARHAM" (right) was hit by three torpedoes from "U-331" and as she slowly turned over and capsized, split apart in an almighty explosion. Recorded on film her apparently calamitous end is often used in naval films and documentaries. Although over 800 men were lost with her, a remarkable number were saved. Just before this tragedy, Force K had sunk two more Axis supply ships west of Crete. At this stage 60 percent of Axis North African supplies were being lost to attacks by British aircraft, submarines and warships.
...etc. and the losses off Crete - which arguably wouldn't happen without an Italian foray into the Balkans :wink: - and the losses at the end of the year off Sirte - which AGAIN were down to the Italian Navy and NOT the Luftwaffe... 8O

Jon G.
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Re: Are these two "What If" theories overly simplistic?

#150

Post by Jon G. » 05 Jun 2009, 17:21

phylo_roadking wrote:
Yes, and that will free up ressources. However, it does not follow that those ressources would be deployed at Malta.
Likewise - it doesn't follow that once the British have word of a major offensive against Egypt and the Canal Zone being planned and forces moved for via one sea route...they would make no effort to interdict that route. That's wishing TOO much inactivity from the British...
It's not a question of wishing inactivity. Rather, you are placing too much store in the importance of Malta. Early war PM and CID directives pertaining to the Middle East put the safety of the Nile Delta far above the desirability of the continued use of Malta as a base to interfere with Axis shipping.
Before you begin comparing the short-lived Force K with the Med fleet
No - I'm comparing them to the three 12-destroyer/one cruiser anti-invasion flotillas on the South and South-East coast of England in the summer fo 1940...gathered to do the same job, interdict a Sea Bridge.
Right, then you have changed your position. Upthread, you appear to argue that the RN would not have withdrawn its Mediterranean fleet from Malta if the Germans had entered the theater earlier than they did historically. And in any event, the historical timeline shows that it was costly to keep any surface units anywhere near Malta after the Luftwaffe had entered the scene. Yep, the small Force K kept going for a couple of months, but then the Luftwaffe had moved most of its Mediterranean forces east by the time Force K came into being.
Now you just need to demonstrate that Churchill indeed would have pressed hard for the re-deployment of the Royal Navy's Mediterranean fleet to Malta in the event of the Germans shifting their attention south earlier than they did historically.
Jon, that redeployment is NOT what I'm talking about; I'm talking about and have done for several pages now is the redeployment of the anti-invasion flotillas from the UK to the Med, including one or more to Malta.
Then I don't understand why you've spent so much time questioning the whys and hows the two services were in disagreement over the evacuation of the RN's Med fleet to Alexandria.

Why would the RN in your view decide to deploy more surface forces to Malta than they historically did? In your view, and with an eye to the January 1941 OTL over Malta and the May 1941 OTL around Crete, what would the survival prospects be for said force?
nor 2/ will Taranto have happened in this scenario.
Why? :wink: All the preliminary events to a Taranto-style event will still be in place; increased traffic in the Med to/from Italy by the Axis in preparation for the offensive will require escort, will they not? The Italian Fleet WILL have to make a similar sortie at some point to the July 1940 convoy escort -
Yes. But in this scenario, the RM will have the benefit of Luftwaffe air cover. Not that that will mean the guaranteed slaughter of RN ships, but all other things being equal, the Axis will be stronger in this scenario.
...
because 1/ there will be no Balkan & Soviet distractions pulling the Luftwaffe east
No, no Barbarossa...but no guarantee Mussolini can be kept in check in the Balkans.
This scenario presupposes a much more closely coordinated Axis strategy. I admit that is totally unrealistic, but there you are: if the Axis can cooperate on a North African offensive, they can also cooperate on Mussolini not invading Greece without Hitler's prior knowledge and consent.
The net effect of the Luftwaffe's arrival on the scene in January 1941 was that the central Mediterranean was closed off to British shipping
Jon, that's an exaggeration. if it was "closed" - then Cape matapan would never have happened, nor the March 1941 convoy made it to Malta, nor THIS -
Look at the map. You don't have to sail through the Sicilian narrows to make it Cape Matapan and back if your starting point is Alexandria.

As for the rest of your examples, it seems you misunderstood me. 'Closed off' means that the direct route through the Mediterranean was closed off - accepting the Tiger convoy as an exception - to British shipping. Anything bound for the Delta had to go via the cape. As I also wrote upthread, the RN could reinforce Malta, albeit at a cost.

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