Are these two "What If" theories overly simplistic?

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phylo_roadking
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Re: Are these two "What If" theories overly simplistic?

#151

Post by phylo_roadking » 05 Jun 2009, 18:07

In no particular oder...
As for the rest of your examples, it seems you misunderstood me. 'Closed off' means that the direct route through the Mediterranean was closed off - accepting the Tiger convoy as an exception - to British shipping. Anything bound for the Delta had to go via the cape. As I also wrote upthread, the RN could reinforce Malta, albeit at a cost.
So TIGER was the only exception??? 8O
In the first week of April, "Ark Royal" escorted by Force H sailed from Gibraltar and flew off 12 Hurricanes for Malta.
In the one month of June alone, carrier "Ark Royal" once on her own, at other times accompanied by "Furious" or "Victorious", flew off more than 140 aircraft for Malta
From what position? :wink: I.E. which side of the Sicilian Narrows???
After covering the 'Tiger' convoy, "Ark Royal" joined by carrier "Furious", was once again south of Sardinia and flying off a further 48 Hurricanes to Malta on the 21st.
I.E. transited the Sicilian Narrows a SECOND time...
On the 23rd, south of Sardinia, sustained Italian air attacks started. Cruiser "Manchester" was hit and destroyer "FEARLESS" sunk by aircraft torpedoes. Next day the transports reached Malta safely
I.E. transited the Sicilian Narrows...
Early in the month, two cruisers, cruiser-minelayer "Manxman" and two destroyers successfully carried reinforcements and supplies from Gibraltar to Malta.
I.E transited the Sicilian Narrows...
DECEMBER 13th - Action off Cape Bon, Tunisia - Destroyers “Legion”, “Maori”, “Sikh” and Dutch “lsaac Sweers” under the command of Cdr G. H. Stokes sailed from Gibraltar to join the Mediterranean Fleet at Alexandria
I.E. transited the Sicilian Narrows...!

The exceptions to your rule about the CENTRAL Med being closed are stacking up...
Look at the map. You don't have to sail through the Sicilian narrows to make it Cape Matapan and back if your starting point is Alexandria.
Exactly. LOOK at the map; you specifically said the Luftwaffe closed the Central med. Look again at that list of naval actions...and how many of them involved RN vessels operating within range of LW/RA airfields in Sicliy, Libya...I.E. the CENTRAL Med...and Crete. And did that stop them operating?
This scenario presupposes a much more closely coordinated Axis strategy
The ENTIRE idea of a German-driven and -supported offensive in North Africa in 1940 presupposes a more closely coordinated Axis strategy than OTL :wink: I'm QUITE happy to accept your point that this could not have happened...for then Mussolini's famous refusal of German aid in Africa in mid-1940 stands as the main stumbling block for this WI....
Yes. But in this scenario, the RM will have the benefit of Luftwaffe air cover. Not that that will mean the guaranteed slaughter of RN ships, but all other things being equal, the Axis will be stronger in this scenario.
This I doubt - for as discussed previously the recent lesson of Norway was that RN vessels required a VERY high sortie rate and level of attack to do ANY damage to them. Or a major defensive failure such at Crete.
Why would the RN in your view decide to deploy more surface forces to Malta than they historically did?
Why? Because with a major offensive being launched in the Desert in 1940 strong enough with enough german support to reach the Suez Canal - there will be a much higher rate of traffic along the sea route from Italy to Libya. Given all we know about desert logistics - any effort the British can make against that Sea Bridge will be directly reflected in how fast and how far that spearhead can move.
In your view, and with an eye to the January 1941 OTL over Malta and the May 1941 OTL around Crete, what would the survival prospects be for said force?
Better that you accept - if you look at the results of LW attacks on RN shipping off Norway, the sortie rate required to do damage/loss etc...and the Crete scenario required several factors affecting RN destroyer and light cruiser performance to be in place for losses to occur - as discussed before.
Early war PM and CID directives pertaining to the Middle East put the safety of the Nile Delta far above the desirability of the continued use of Malta as a base to interfere with Axis shipping.
...except it's no longer the early-war scenario...which was the major front of the war being in Western Europe somewhere, and everything else being peripheral. In this WI - after the Fall of France - the Germans choose to open a major front in North Africa, supplied via Italy... so the Nile Delta IS being threatened overland while at the same time the RN has an opportunity to influence that land campaign by interdicting Axis supply lines.

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Re: Are these two "What If" theories overly simplistic?

#152

Post by Sid Guttridge » 05 Jun 2009, 19:23

Hi Phylo,

So, we are agreed, there was no reason why an airborne operation against Malta couldn't have been launched in the second half of 1940.

How the Germans would have dealt with British defences is another matter, but there seems to be no reason to believe that the Malta garrison of about 3,000 infantry and "just 34 heavy anti-aircraft guns to protect an entire island with its three airfields, a massive harbour complex, and over 200 miles of coastline." (Fortress Malta by James Holland, p.27) could have defended itself successfully in the event of Axis landings by sea and air.

It is clear (1) that Malta was vulnerable in 1940 and (2) the Germans and Italians had the resources to mount an invasion within the parameters originally set out for this thread - i.e. that neither Operation Sea Lion nor Operation Barbarossa are mounted.

The same is true of Gibraltar and the British position in Egypt in 1940. All three were protected primarily by a lack of German interest in the Mediterranean Theatre that year, not by Britain's limited military defences in them.

Had the Germans turned their central attention to the Mediterranean in the second half of 1940, there seems no strong reason to believe that they couldn't have attacked all three successfully with only a minor proportion of their armed forces - provided they got Italian and Spanish co-operation.

Cheers,

Sid.


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Re: Are these two "What If" theories overly simplistic?

#153

Post by Sid Guttridge » 05 Jun 2009, 19:47

Hi Phylo,

You seem to want to argue with:

'Closed off' means that the direct route through the Mediterranean was closed off - accepting the Tiger convoy as an exception - to British shipping. Anything bound for the Delta had to go via the cape. As I also wrote upthread, the RN could reinforce Malta, albeit at a cost.

.....but instead essentially confirm it.

All your Malta examples are covered by the above paragraph. All your examples of naval vessels running the gauntlet through the Mediterranean don't seem to include a single merchantman. Apart from the Tiger convoy, what supplies are you suggesting the British delivered to the (Nile) Delta via the Mediterranean sea route during this period?

The Royal Navy stopped basing major surface vessels in Malta for a good reason. It was only 60 miles from Sicily and the Luftwaffe was capable of hammering them there in port. For long afterwards the Royal Navy was reduced to occasional surface forays into the central Mediterranean. Functionally, throughout this period the Mediterranean was closed as a significant artery of British imperial supply traffic, at the cost of an estimated 1,000,000 tons of extra merchant vessels continuously tied down on the longer Cape route. Thus, when Jon G. writes "Anything bound for the Delta had to go via the cape.", he is essentially right.

Cheers,

Sid?

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Re: Are these two "What If" theories overly simplistic?

#154

Post by phylo_roadking » 05 Jun 2009, 22:32

So, we are agreed, there was no reason why an airborne operation against Malta couldn't have been launched in the second half of 1940.
We are anything but - given
1/ the reduced number of Ju52s as discussed;
2/ the shortage of gliders;
3/ the shortage of parachute silk;
4/ the part-trained status of the FJ replacements after the losses of Holland and Norway
5/ the unwillingness of Hitler and OKW to give an airborne operation the "lead" in an attack as opposed to just local or blocking actions; as a P.S. Halder mentions this in his diaries IIRC, that another reason for just the two landing ops in Sealion was they didn't want the having to rush to the relief of the probably-beleagured FJ (given the events in Norway and Holland)become the main focus of the action.

(At this point we could discuss more the knife-edge balance of Crete - only grabbed from the jaws of defeat by a warcrime and a decision by Julius Ringel to risk the lives of his men. But that would be taking things too far off-topic, it's been discussed elsewhere)
there seems to be no reason to believe that the Malta garrison of about 3,000 infantry and "just 34 heavy anti-aircraft guns to protect an entire island with its three airfields, a massive harbour complex, and over 200 miles of coastline." (Fortress Malta by James Holland, p.27) could have defended itself successfully in the event of Axis landings by sea and air.
There seems no reason to believe that ATL the British government would maintain Malta's defences at that level, once they became aware of Hitler's plans for the Mediterranean.

As for abandoning or NOT defending Malta...it would be worth noting that by the end of the several days' discussions around the time of Dunkirk regarding making peace overtures via Mussolini...Churchill was certainly of the opinion that the would not be willing to see Malta given away :wink: The loss of the islands to Italy was regarded as a likely price Mussolini would ask for as mediator, and that was a price too much.

If it was too much when Britain was at its lowest ebb - then it's again asking too much to suppose that Britain wouldn't bolster the defences once the threat in the Mediterranean was identified as opposed to a threat to the UK - as proven by them shipping aircraft to Malta as soon as the buildup of Fighter Command at home was completed.
All your examples of naval vessels running the gauntlet through the Mediterranean don't seem to include a single merchantman. Apart from the Tiger convoy, what supplies are you suggesting the British delivered to the (Nile) Delta via the Mediterranean sea route during this period?
Sid, if you don't mind, I was answering Jon's contention that the Central Med was closed to shipping...whichs turns out to be patently NOT the case.
For long afterwards the Royal Navy was reduced to occasional surface forays into the central Mediterranean
Actually, it sems the Royal Navy was "reduced" to a LONG series of regular forays back and forth. I'm sure you're quite aware that I didn't paste up the COMPLETE list...as only a few were needed to prove - or rather disprove - the point.

And regarding this - and Jon's contention that Fliegerkorps X "closed" the Central Med...and his comment that the historical timeline confirms this... I've been looking at the said timeline; strangely enough - in those first few months of 1941, until the LW began to transfer aircraft away again from Sicily to Russia, the damage the RN suffered from the Luftwaffe in the Central Med amounts to -
Illustrious damaged,
Southampton sunk,
Gloucester damaged...and that is exactly IT 8O

In fact, as for your point about no cargo ships in the Central Med - let's look at that same five-month period of increased LW activity; during that time we do indeed have the EXCESS event that saw Illustrious damaged, Southampton sunk, and Gloucester damaged. Part of the EXCESS mission was to escort laden merchantmen from the Delta to Malta, and return empty cargo ships from Malta to Egypt. Despite the high level of sorties carried out againt the convoy...Not a single full or empty cargo ship was sunk by the the LW going in either direction...

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Re: Are these two "What If" theories overly simplistic?

#155

Post by Jon G. » 05 Jun 2009, 23:05

phylo_roadking wrote:In no particular oder...
As for the rest of your examples, it seems you misunderstood me. 'Closed off' means that the direct route through the Mediterranean was closed off - accepting the Tiger convoy as an exception - to British shipping. Anything bound for the Delta had to go via the cape. As I also wrote upthread, the RN could reinforce Malta, albeit at a cost.
So TIGER was the only exception???...
Good Lord, you're still missing my point, though this time it must be deliberate. All your examples, without exception, are of convoys to Malta, while I patently and obviously am talking about anything bound for the [Nile] Delta. Sid explained it to you already much more eloquently than I could have done.

Now, can you point to any post-January and pre-Alamein examples of British shipping making it from Gibraltar to Egypt or Libya, accepting the Tiger convoy as an exception? 'Shipping' both in context and in general obviously meaning merchant ships.

As for your loss list, you haven't bothered counting anything else or anything smaller than cruisers, have you?

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Re: Are these two "What If" theories overly simplistic?

#156

Post by bf109 emil » 05 Jun 2009, 23:34

so why would the Med. be sealed off if Malta fell to Germany or the Axis? Italian convoys still sailed and made port in Africa and now we assume the British couldn't do so as well? and what success would the Axis have at resupplying Malta from losses due to Allied bombering as surely the shoe would fit the other foot if Axis controlled this Island? All these what if's have gone astray...now we can ask if the Med fell into Italian hands, why not pretend Churchill sent messengers to convince the Vichy in North Africa they to would soon fall into the control of the Italians and pretend they and there ports in the Atlantic and bases in Africa have now sided with the British in return of British aid and assurance they would be assisted and not left holding the bag prior to an Axis take over as of there colonies in Africa

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Re: Are these two "What If" theories overly simplistic?

#157

Post by phylo_roadking » 05 Jun 2009, 23:40

Good Lord, you're still missing my point, though this time it must be deliberate. All your examples, without exception, are of convoys to Malta, while I patently and obviously am talking about anything bound for the [Nile] Delta. Sid explained it to you already much more eloquently than I could have done
No, Jon - YOU are missing the point - that we're talking about shipping THROUGH the Central Med zone - and that INCLUDES traffic of ANY sort from Gibraltar through the Sicilian Narrows to Malta.
As for your loss list, you haven't bothered counting anything else or anything smaller than cruisers, have you?
Jon - feel free to peruse the same timeline; from January 1941 to May 1941...you won't find any other RN losses from the LW in the Central Mediterranean - you know, the bit YOU said would be closed by the Luftwaffe? Not the Eastern Med. Yes, you'll find losses - from mines, Italian submarines etc. - but no others by the Luftwaffe. None in January ecept the three mentioned, none in February, none in March, none in April and none listed in May up until transfers began Eastward.
Now, can you point to any post-January and pre-Alamein examples of British shipping making it from Gibraltar to Egypt or Libya, accepting the Tiger convoy as an exception? 'Shipping' both in context and in general obviously meaning merchant ships.
You can feel free to narrow the goalposts IF you really want, Jon; unfortunately for you - ANYONE reading the last few pages of this post will be more than aware that YOU have been repeated saying that the Luftwaffe would be able to close the central Med - and I've proved they haven't; YOU have repeatedly and specifically said that the RN would have difficulty operating in the Central Med because of the Luftwaffe and on at least one occasion challenged me to say why I thought they wouldn't - remember these???
The RN surface units in Malta got absolutely plastered when the Luftwaffe entered the scene in January 1941
And in any event, the historical timeline shows that it was costly to keep any surface units anywhere near Malta after the Luftwaffe had entered the scene.
In your view, and with an eye to the January 1941 OTL over Malta...what would the survival prospects be for said force?
As for the RN's attention, the central Med was hot waters for the RN's surface ships when Fliegerkorps X entered the scene
...so I PROVED they wouldn't. FIVE MONTHS in-theatre and they sank just ONE ship and damaged two more. You yourself even mentioned the Southhapton and Illustrious; I can't help it that you didn't check to actually see if there were more...any more.

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Re: Are these two "What If" theories overly simplistic?

#158

Post by Jon G. » 05 Jun 2009, 23:49

[Multi-edited post to keep everything in one place]
phylo_roadking wrote:...You can feel free to narrow the goalposts IF you really want
Which part of anything bound for the Delta did you not understand? Additionally, which part of the RN could reinforce Malta, albeit at a cost did you miss?

If I want to consult Wikipedia's blurbs on Malta convoys, I'll do so myself. No need for you to copy-paste them here. Additionally and as simple advice, I'd be a little careful posting repeated examples of Malta convoys - repeatedly - from that source and then go on to exclaim that I had 'proven' anything.
...ANYONE reading the last few pages of this post will be more than aware that YOU have been repeated saying that the Luftwaffe would be able to close the central Med...
Anyone? The only one other than you commenting on it - Sid - certainly had no problem understanding what I wrote.

---
From Playfair I, pp 323-324, addressing the situation in the Central Med in Januay 1941.
Playfair wrote:...The Navy had enjoyed great freedom of movement in the Central Mediterranean, and almost complete freedom of movement elsewhere, when the only opposition had been from the Italians; but it had been quickly shown that the movement of ships within the range of German dive-bombers in daylight was very expensive. This at once affected the passage of the single ship Northern Prince, with her badly needed cargo for Greece. There could be no question of sending her through the Mediterranean, and at the end of January she left Gibraltar to join a convoy routed round the Cape...

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Re: Are these two "What If" theories overly simplistic?

#159

Post by phylo_roadking » 06 Jun 2009, 00:17

Which part of anything bound for the Delta did you not understand.
....and what part of THIS did you have any difficulty understanding???
I would have thought my point was obvious - in the months it takes to do ALL that...the British are able to reinforce the Canal Zone and Egypt by the Cape route from the UK and the Commonwealth.
forcing the British to take the infinitely longer route around Cape Horn.
A lot is made of this. However...historically the British DID survive major issues in the Med by using this route, and the air bridge across Africa to move aircraft
Once the British are free to move troops from the UK or redeploy them while at sea - that vulnerablity can be changed in a short time, far shorter obviously than having to go round the Cape.
...referring in context ONLY to getting reinforcements to Gibraltar or Malta, NOT to Egypt.

Throughout this entire thread I have ONLY ever suggested reinforcing Egypt from the UK in the few weeks' hiatus caused by Hitler's attempted diplomatic overtures - that would temporarily freeze German offensive action awaiting the outcome...as it did historically.

Otherwise - if you care to check back - MY point has been that the time required to reduce a Malta reinforced from the UK or from Egypt, together with the time required to take Gibraltar and close the mediterranean, together with the time needed to assmble everything required in North Africa for and to support an overland campaign....would buy time for the British to reinforce the Canal Zone from forces already on their way by sea by late Spring 1940 or that were historically sent in the summer of 1940...via the Cape of Good Hope.

Remember - OTL the Italians invaded Egypt on the 9th of September; 13 weeks from the Fall of France. 13 weeks to draw up plans for an overland offensive in North Africa and the Near East, move ALL forces, supplies etc. into position, secure the assistance of Italy and Spain, beseige and reduce Malta, besiege and reduce Gibraltar...by the stage all THAT is concluded in preparation, British troops sent out from the UK can be starting to reinforce the defences of Egypt - via the Cape. As they did historically.

I've already had to correct Sid on this at least once, several pages ago. Please, Jon - don't you start creating strawman arguments on my part by accident or whatever. And in case you should take exception to that - I'm sure you'll remember -
exactly; once the siege starts. BEFORE that the British are free - and once they see the UK invasion threat diminishing...eager to reinforce and strengthen Gibraltar and Malta
Which operation do YOU think could be done faster? Moving a Canadian 1st Division that was already packed for transportation abroad the few dozen miles to South of England ports and on to Gibraltar and Malta...
...confirming what I've just said.
If I want to consult Wikipedia's blurbs on Malta convoy, I'll do so myself. No need for you to copy-paste them here
Why on earth would you be consulting Wikipedia??? I DID say earlier that all my RN details were being taken from http://www.naval-history.net/WW2CampaignsRNMed.htm

EDIT:
Additionally and as simple advice, I'd be a little careful posting repeated examples of Malta convoys - repeatedly - from that source and then go on to exclaim that I had 'proven' anything.
Additionally and as simple advice - go back and actually CHECK where I'm sourcing from before you make statements like THAT! :lol:
Anyone? The only one other than you commenting on it - Sid - certainly had no problem understanding what I wrote
Jon, I said "reading"....not "commenting". Or do you want to retract those occasions listed above where you said the RN would be "plastered", in "hot water" etc.? Now, that is, that historical events have proved that Fliegerkorps X was thoroughly average against the RN in the Central Med in their five months' posting in 1941 - if not plain "poor".
Last edited by phylo_roadking on 06 Jun 2009, 01:02, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Are these two "What If" theories overly simplistic?

#160

Post by Jon G. » 06 Jun 2009, 00:39

phylo_roadking wrote:
Which part of anything bound for the Delta did you not understand.
....and what part of THIS did you have any difficulty understanding???
I would have thought my point was obvious - in the months it takes to do ALL that...the British are able to reinforce the Canal Zone and Egypt by the Cape route from the UK and the Commonwealth.
That was not what I was addressing, which should be obvious. Either you are backtracking, or you are simply talking of something else. My comment about the sealing-off of the central Med to Egypt-bound British shipping is clearly related to the historical record, not to a half-assed what-if scenario.

You will note that I have not contested that the British could have reinforced the Middle East faster than they did historically. Upthread, I have pointed out that not all reinforcements for the Middle East would have to pass the Cape, simply because said reinforcements would not originate from mainland UK, but rather from Dominions - Australia, New Zealand, India, and also from Africa itself.

What I have contested, however, is the possibility, and even the desirability, of reinforcing Malta earlier and with more men and material than was done historically. I've done so mostly with reference to the historical record - i.e. Malta's situation got a lot more serious when the Germans entered the scene - and also with reference to pre-war planning, which cast doubt on the feasability of the continued use of Malta as a RN base. But that's not what you're addressing in your latest post.

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Re: Are these two "What If" theories overly simplistic?

#161

Post by phylo_roadking » 06 Jun 2009, 00:53

What I have contested, however, is the possibility, and even the desirability, of reinforcing Malta earlier and with more men and material than was done historically.
and also with reference to pre-war planning, which cast doubt on the feasability of the continued use of Malta as a RN base
...and as I've said before - the ATL nature of the change in strategic direction of the prosecution of the war by the Germans forces the British to take on board a whole NEW set of tactical and strategic requirements in the Med - such as interdicting the Axis' main (possibly only) supply route.

Why on earth would the British try fighting a DIFFERENT war in the Mediterranean and North Africa - I.E. against the GERMANS....with plans made for fighting the Italians on their own? 8O I'm sure you'll agree that the British HISTORICALLY changed how they planned to go about the war in the Med once the Germans arrived in 1941? So exactly what stops them doing so in this ATL 1940?
and also with reference to pre-war planning, which cast doubt on the feasability of the continued use of Malta as a RN base
...and pre-war planning was out the window visibly as early at May 1940 at least...when Churchill rejected the idea of approaching Mussolini as an intermediary or fear of being asked to give up Malta. Remember - he was intending to hold onto the islands even when Britain was in dire straits before war with Italy even began EDIT:....which incidently patently contradicts what Budden says about "Britain" considering abandoning Malta after the Fall of France 8O In that section of your scan there's a Note[58] against that particular statement of Budden's - can you check where he sourced that from???
Malta's situation got a lot more serious when the Germans entered the scene - . But that's not what you're addressing in your latest post
Malta's situation as a location of course got a lot more serious; but that's not what YOU were addressing -

"The RN surface units in Malta got absolutely plastered when the Luftwaffe entered the scene in January 1941"
"it was costly to keep any surface units anywhere near Malta after the Luftwaffe had entered the scene."
"the central Med was hot waters for the RN's surface ships when Fliegerkorps X entered the scene"
This at once affected the passage of the single ship Northern Prince, with her badly needed cargo for Greece. There could be no question of sending her through the Mediterranean, and at the end of January she left Gibraltar to join a convoy routed round the Cape
The important word there is probably..."single" - as in...not escorted???

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Re: Are these two "What If" theories overly simplistic?

#162

Post by Sid Guttridge » 06 Jun 2009, 13:29

Hi Phylo,

Certainly there were a reduced number of Ju52s, and there may well have been shorages of gliders (though by Crete the shortage was of pilots for them) and parachute silk and not all paratroops were fully trained. Yet the Germans still planned to invade England from the air in September 1940. Clearly none of these factors were deemed to prevent a aerial landing in the UK, so there seems no reason to believe that they would have prevented an aerial attack on Malta. They would doubtless limit the initial scale of an attack, but not prevent one altogether.

Cheers,

Sid.

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Re: Are these two "What If" theories overly simplistic?

#163

Post by Sid Guttridge » 06 Jun 2009, 13:55

Hi Phylo,

To continue,

Indeed, "there seems no reason to believe that ATL the British government would maintain Malta's defences at that level, once they became aware of Hitler's plans for the Mediterranean." Which brings us back to my point that the British would be playing catch up on exterior lines in response to Greman moves in the Mediterranean - moves which they might not detect contemporaneously or respond to adequately.

All we can say with reasonable certainty is that the British were vulnerable in the Mediterranean in the second half of 1940 and the Germans could switch more resources there faster than the British acting responsively. Thus there was a strategic military opportunity available to the Axis in the Mediterranean in the second half of 1940, the exploitation of which may well have depended more on the diplomatic reaction of Italy and Spain to any German intervention in their backyard than on Britain's ability to physically resist.

"abandoning or NOT defending Malta" is not one of my propositions, so I won't address it.

The fact that "the damage the RN suffered from the Luftwaffe in the Central Med only amounts to Illustrious damaged,
Southampton sunk and Gloucester damaged" might simply reflect the reduced RN presence there due to the Luftwaffe forcing the abandonment of Malta as a major surface warship base. The fact that EXCESS had to run to Malta from Egypt, presumably carrying supplies often originating in the UK, only serves to emphasise the point that the Central Mediterranean was closed to British merchant traffic.

The Luftwaffe doesn't have to sink a single British merchantman to stop the Mediterranean being used as a thoroughfare by them if it successfully intimidates the British out of sending them through in the first place.

Cheers,

Sid.

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Re: Are these two "What If" theories overly simplistic?

#164

Post by phylo_roadking » 06 Jun 2009, 16:19

Sid,
Yet the Germans still planned to invade England from the air in September 1940
I'm quite sure you're intelligent enough to know they weren't "planning to invade England from the air" that's another unnecessary exageration - they were planning several limited tactical operations in support of the invasion. There's a VERY major difference that you are quite aware of - or should be by now.
Clearly none of these factors were deemed to prevent a aerial landing in the UK, so there seems no reason to believe that they would have prevented an aerial attack on Malta.
But taken together they were indeed enough to "limit the initial scale of an attack" to two airfield landings close to the putative bridgehead and two small combat engineer actions against shore batteries.

And I'm quite sure you remember that back up the thread I noted that the Germans would be far more limited in what they could land on Malta in 1940 compared mid-war...NOT that they would be prevented from landing AT ALL. So it's good to see YOU now agree with ME.
Which brings us back to my point that the British would be playing catch up on exterior lines in response to Greman moves in the Mediterranean -
However - OTL events prove differently; namely, the British being prepared to reinforce Malta's air capacity via the Mediterranean starting in mid-summer 1940
in response to Greman moves in the Mediterranean - moves which they might not detect contemporaneously....
Again, events prove differently - that the British began to reinforce Malta's air capacity BEFORE any overt offensive moves in North Africa by the Italians...
...or respond to adequately
...and did so WHILE the BoB was raging.
and the Germans could switch more resources there faster than the British acting responsively
And THAT is my point; the British DIDN'T act responsively - historically they acted PROACTIVELY both by reinforcing Malta's air capacity diretly...AND by sending troops beginning in August, a MONTH before the Italian invasion to the Canal Zone via the Cape.

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Re: Are these two "What If" theories overly simplistic?

#165

Post by Gooner1 » 06 Jun 2009, 18:58

With Malta in Axis hands I think its not necessarily obvious which side has been relieved of the greater headache. The RN took big losses in ships damaged and sunk keeping it supplied and the need to keep the Island supplied was a dominating factor in Britain's whole Mediterranean strategy.

The Axis convoys aren't off the hook either; from the Delta Swordfish can reach Tobruk and from decks much further, Wellingtons can reach Benghazi. The 10th Submarine Flotilla can operate from Alex.

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