Are these two "What If" theories overly simplistic?

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Jon G.

Yup, these things are hopelessly speculative. That is why I restricted myself initially to general observations about the advantages of Germany turning early to the Mediterranean.

I think the Commonwealth in the Indian Ocean theatre was already producing divisions as fast as it could as the Italians were already a real threat and the Japanese a potential one. It might have got a couple more ANZAC divisions to the theatre in 1940, but only at some expense to their readiness for combat.

The essential problem was that there were no standing divisions in any of the Indian Ocean colonies, let alone corps or armies. The white Commonwealth countries had small volunteer armies like the UK, but on a much smaller scale, and needed expanding from a very small base. They did not have the industrial resources to equip entire divisions with modern weaponry and still relied heavily on the UK.

The black African colonies produced only infantry battalions that did not normally assemble even in pairs and lacked support services for a higher formation. There was no realistic possibility of getting an African division in the field that was likely to be able to stand up to the Germans in 1940.

The Indian Army had widespread responsibilities and could produce about two divisions quickly, both of which went to the Middle East. It, too, was essentially an infantry (and cavalry) force, relying on British artillery and a brigade of British infantry to make up divisional strengths. However romantic a view we may have of the virtues of the Indian Army, not much of it was initially fit to take the field in modern mechanized operations.

Certainly more Commonwealth troops could have been rushed earlier to the Middle East, but I would suggest that the British were already sending those they considered most fit for divisional operations as fast as they could anyway.

Cheers,

Sid.

P.S. I agree that Malta never closed the supply route to North Africa, but for the sake of this scenario I would suggest that it should be attacked early when most vulnerable, as its fall would largely eliminate any standing threat to Axis supplies to North Africa. Most of the resources later used against Crete were potentially available and the Luftwaffe could dominate the air and surface seas around the island in 1940 as it did twice later under more challenging circumstances. The biggest problem here would probably be that the Italians lacked a dedicated amphibious force at this time and much improvisation would be required.

[phylo_roadking]

Sid,

Most of the resources later used against Crete were potentially available

EXCEPT transport aircraft...

and the Luftwaffe could dominate the air and surface seas around the island in 1940

As it did around Crete. BUT operating inside the Aegean by night, and by day when well-armed, the Royal Navy still disrupted both improvised amphibious forces...

[Gooner1]

I think the Commonwealth in the Indian Ocean theatre was already producing divisions as fast as it could as the Italians were already a real threat and the Japanese a potential one. It might have got a couple more ANZAC divisions to the theatre in 1940, but only at some expense to their readiness for combat.

6th and 7th Australian Divisions were both in Palestine completing their training when Italy declared war, most of what would be the 9th DIvision was diverted to the UK but returned to the Middle East by early '41. The first and third echelons of the 2nd New Zealand Division were in Egypt by early September. Presumably without an invasion threat those elements of 2 NZ Div and 9th Australian in the UK could be dispatched to the ME somewhat sooner.

The Indian Army had widespread responsibilities and could produce about two divisions quickly, both of which went to the Middle East. It, too, was essentially an infantry (and cavalry) force, relying on British artillery and a brigade of British infantry to make up divisional strengths. However romantic a view we may have of the virtues of the Indian Army, not much of it was initially fit to take the field in modern mechanized operations.

With an early German entry into North Africa it may well be that Wavell would be content with a defensive strategy (work on building defensive positions at Alamein began as soon as Italy declared war IIRC) until sufficient mechanized forces were available to him. In this scenario I can't see the Germans being lucky enough to first meet the Western Desert Forces deep inside Libya.

P.S. I agree that Malta never closed the supply route to North Africa, but for the sake of this scenario I would suggest that it should be attacked early when most vulnerable, as its fall would largely eliminate any standing threat to Axis supplies to North Africa.

The Axis really need both Malta and Crete to secure their sea lines of communication I would suggest.

[phylo_roadking]

The Axis really need both Malta and Crete to secure their sea lines of communication I would suggest.

...and to stop the British agreeing with the Greeks the use of Suda Bay in October-November 1940; this would threaten Italian possessions in the Aegean at a stroke, and give the British a springboard to put forces into Yugoslavia after the coup there.

[Jon G.]

Well, German losses to enemy action during the transfer of the DAK were zero. Three times zero is still zero

But ATL the British are presented with a much longer-duration target of opportunity...and a German lifeline they have to try and break.

They're not necessarily going to break it because they have to. I have no problem accepting that Malta's defenses could have been strengthened from their pitiful 1940 OTL state, but speculated increased Axis activity in the Med in 1940 will go hand in hand with an earlier bombing campaign against Malta. Historically, Axis convoys for Tripoli did fine while Malta was being bombed - that is, in early 1941 and again in the spring of 1942; consult the tables which I linked to, above.

Additionally, I surmise that part of the rationale behind this scenario will be Vichy cooperation, or as a minimum Vichy acquiescence, which should leave the much larger ports of Frenc North Africa - much farther away from Malta - open to Axis shipping.

And that traffic open to RN interception - AND be outside the range of the RA/LW.

Look to the OTL. RN and RAF ability to interfere with early Axis reinforcements to Tunisia was limited - why would it play out differently in this scenario? And how and why would the RA & LW with access to bases in Sardinia and Libya be out of range of a prospective convoy route from either southern Italy or southern France to Tunisia?

If the LW deploys into Vichy territories and operates from there - that's not Vichy "cooperation" that's Vichy effectively in the war....and opens Vichy North Africa to attack by whatever means the British can muster. Certainly gives them something imaginative to do with the British Army in the "Axis" rear...

I was essentially outlining a ratified 1940 version of the OTL 1941 Paris Protocols, which didn't pull Vichy fully into the war OTL. Why would they do so in 1940?

Where would a British army operating in the Axis rear be based? Barring cooperation with Spain they are going to be very far away from French North Africa.

...That is why I restricted myself initially to general observations about the advantages of Germany turning early to the Mediterranean.

I agree with your general observations, and I also agree with your reservations - namely that the principal stopping block of this entire scenario would be political, more than strategic-military.

...I agree that Malta never closed the supply route to North Africa, but for the sake of this scenario I would suggest that it should be attacked early when most vulnerable, as its fall would largely eliminate any standing threat to Axis supplies to North Africa. Most of the resources later used against Crete were potentially available and the Luftwaffe could dominate the air and surface seas around the island in 1940 as it did twice later under more challenging circumstances..

Well, as I maintain, the Axis don't have to take Malta if they want a decisive outcome in the Mediterranean early on. As they did in the OTL the Axis could suppress Malta without actually taking it, and with the Italians standing on the Egyptian border at the onset of hostilities, just keeping Malta supplied will be both costly and difficult for the RN. No British aircraft will be able to reach Malta easily while the Italians sit tight in Libya; no need to take it by force if you can simply starve it out. To all intents and purposes (accepting the Tiger convoy as an exception), the central Mediterranean was effectively closed off to British shipping when Italy entered the war.

[phylo_roadking]

They're not necessarily going to break it because they have to.

No - I said "a German lifeline they have to try and break." There's no guarantee they will - but they have to try. It's asking far too much to assume they'd ignore such an attractive SINGLE point-of-failure

increased Axis activity in the Med in 1940 will go hand in hand with an earlier bombing campaign against Malta.

...and increased bombing of the UK in 1940, including attacks on Southampton, didn't IIRC cause any losses to RN ships in harbour there, including the South Coast anti-invasion flotillas...

Historically, Axis convoys for Tripoli did fine while Malta was being bombed

...when, historically, Force H had already withdrawn to Gibraltar

RN and RAF ability to interfere with early Axis reinforcements to Tunisia was limited - why would it play out differently in this scenario?

The RN withdrew to Gibraltar out of range of the RA/LW long before 1941; ATL they have major reasons to try and stay. The sea/air bridge between Italy and Libya is the only practical one, the shortest, and the nearest to the initial frontline. I'm suprised you regard it as realistic to assume the British would not attempt to disrupt it; historically they supported Tito to stop chromium shipments passing through Yugoslavia, closed down as far and as early as they could German ore traffic through Norwegian coastal waters, SOE's plans to mine river traffic on the Danube in late 1940, etc., etc.; interruption of economic and military supply lines was right at the top of the British repetoire.

Add to that in 1940 the British controlled the Western and Eastern med - and when the Italians tried in the end to stop them they came off worst.

I was essentially outlining a ratified 1940 version of the OTL 1941 Paris Protocols, which didn't pull Vichy fully into the war OTL. Why would they do so in 1940?

In this case - it's not how the French view them, but how the BRITISH regarded what was happening that might be more decisive As we known from elsewhere - the USA was pretty ambivalent towards Vichy; they recognised them...but certainly didn't support them.

[bf109 emil]

Jon G wrote'
Historically, Axis convoys for Tripoli did fine while Malta was being bombed - that is, in early 1941 and again in the spring of 1942; consult the tables which I linked to, above.

I agree with this, but also must say that it was a thorn in the side of the Axis strategy, the wasting of resources, planes, fuel, pilots to continue bombing whilst to continue shipping plays an eventual depletion of resources that could be better sustained in an offensive role rather then a required or necessity scenario. Much the same as Tobruk was sustained and kept in check from having the resources to break out and was also basically neutralized, but here again leaving it or wasting resources to continually try and cause it to remain this way helped to eat up resources, ones which the Axis could ill afford to squander

[Jon G.]

They're not necessarily going to break it because they have to.

No - I said "a German lifeline they have to try and break." There's no guarantee they will - but they have to try. It's asking far too much to assume they'd ignore such an attractive SINGLE point-of-failure

Perhaps. But beyond assumption stands the fact that the OTL DAK transferred to Libya entirely without losses.

increased Axis activity in the Med in 1940 will go hand in hand with an earlier bombing campaign against Malta.

...and increased bombing of the UK in 1940, including attacks on Southampton, didn't IIRC cause any losses to RN ships in harbour there, including the South Coast anti-invasion flotillas...

Instead of looking at what didn't happen at Southampton in 1940, it may be more fruitful to look at what did happen in the OTL once the Luftwaffe entered the scene in January 1941; the Illustrious was put out of action for a year, and the Southampton was sunk. Why would that not happen in a 1940 timeline, even if we hand-wave away the poor state of Malta's air defenses in 1940 and the better weather which would obtain in a mid.to-late 1940 scenario?

Historically, Axis convoys for Tripoli did fine while Malta was being bombed

...when, historically, Force H had already withdrawn to Gibraltar

Wink? Force H was never based at Malta. The only lettered force stationed there during this timeframe was Force K, which was put out of action by a minefield off Libya. Force H never 'withdrew' to Gibraltar, it was always stationed there.

RN and RAF ability to interfere with early Axis reinforcements to Tunisia was limited - why would it play out differently in this scenario?

The RN withdrew to Gibraltar out of range of the RA/LW long before 1941; ATL they have major reasons to try and stay...

But stay where phyol? How much closer than ATL would the RN and RAF/RNAS possibly be? I personally can easily see an early Axis 1940 Mediterranean offensice peter out, but it's not gonna happen in the central Med - it is going to happen in Cyrenaica.

I was essentially outlining a ratified 1940 version of the OTL 1941 Paris Protocols, which didn't pull Vichy fully into the war OTL. Why would they do so in 1940?

In this case - it's not how the French view them, but how the BRITISH regarded what was happening that might be more decisive As we known from elsewhere - the USA was pretty ambivalent towards Vichy; they recognised them...but certainly didn't support them.

OK, but that does not change the geography issues which I raised above.

[phylo_roadking]

As a P.S. to the value to Malta to the British - even when being bombed...

http://home.cogeco.ca/~gchalcraft/sm/malta.html

Between 1st January 1941 and 1st May 1942, the fifteen Malta Force Submarines had sunk 75 vessels with a total tonnage of nearly 400,000 tons.

From June 1940 to the end of 1944 the flotillas had accounted for:
one million tons of Axis shipping in the Mediterranean theatre, three cruisers, over 30 destroyers, torpedo boats and several German and Italian submarines.

[Jon G.]

As a P.S. to the value to Malta to the British - even when being bombed...

http://home.cogeco.ca/~gchalcraft/sm/malta.html

Between 1st January 1941 and 1st May 1942, the fifteen Malta Force Submarines had sunk 75 vessels with a total tonnage of nearly 400,000 tons.

From June 1940 to the end of 1944 the flotillas had accounted for:
one million tons of Axis shipping in the Mediterranean theatre, three cruisers, over 30 destroyers, torpedo boats and several German and Italian submarines.

Did you read the tables which I linked to above? A breakdown over several years does not tell us much, 'even when being bombed' notwithstanding, how many bombs do you think were dropped on Malta between early 1943 and the end of 1944?

[phylo_roadking]

Jon,

it may be more fruitful to look at what did happen in the OTL once the Luftwaffe entered the scene in January 1941; the [i[Illustrious[/i] was put out of action for a year, and the Southampton was sunk. Why would that not happen in a 1940 timeline, even if we hand-wave away the poor state of Malta's air defenses in 1940 and the better weather which would obtain in a mid.to-late 1940 scenario?

We don't NEED to just "hand-wave" it away; there's no OTL Battle Of Britain - so once Fighter Command's home establishment of @720 fighters (I'll need to check) is back up on roster and the losses of 450 fighters in the battle for France were made good by 10th July, the start of the first stage of the BoB...given that there are no OTL major losses to Fighter Command in the last two weeks of July, and all of August, September and the first weeks of October - modern aircraft rolling of the production lines are available to finish converting the remaining Gladiator and Blenheim 1F squadrons in the UK to Spitfires/Hurricanes AND begin transfers of new aircraft abroad By the end of the summer there will have been HUNDREDS of aircraft rolling out of Supermarine and Hawker that aren't needed at home ATL by Fighter Command. They simply can't be accomodated in Fighter Command's command-and-control system. Ditto for those squadrons in the UK that were temporarily equiped with American types - all reequiped and the "imports" freed up for use elsewhere.

And together with all those extra ATL aircraft....there are no BoB-equivalent aircrew losses to the RAF...

Wink? Force H was never based at Malta. The only lettered force stationed there during this timeframe was Force K, which was put out of action by a minefield off Libya.

Jon, you're quite right about Force K, I was getting Force H mixed up with the withdrawal of the remains of it and Force B from Malta after the unmarked minefield event...

BUT part of the reason the British couldn't interfere with the first tranfers of the DAK to Libya was there was at THAT point in the war nothing suitable stationed at Malta. Force K was established ASAP specifically to counter that traffic, and in November 1941, Force K successfully destroyed an entire German convoy in an action off Cape Spartivento, forcing the Italians to consider Tripoli ‘practically blockaded’. Soon after Force K was reinforced by the arrival in Malta of Force B with two light cruisers, Ajax and Neptune, and two K class destroyers. These were so effective that during November 1941 OTL the Axis supply line suffered 60 percent losses.

ATL...with no invasion threat...once that is detected, the vessels from the anti-invasion flotillas can be re-distributed. There's no reason at all that an equivalent of Force K/B isn't set up at Malta as soon as the British know the war will turn hot in the Med.

As for

How much closer than ATL would the RN and RAF/RNAS possibly be?

...and for those peolple who have said that the Central Med was "off-limits" to the RN/British from the Italians entering the war - no; I'm afraid this was NOT the case.

SEPTEMBER 1940

Royal Navy in the Mediterranean - Reinforcements were sent to the Mediterranean Fleet in Alexandria right through until the end of the year. They were covered from Gibraltar by Adm Somerville's Force H, then met in the central basin by Adm Cunningham and escorted the rest of the way. The opportunity was usually taken to carry in supplies of men and material to Malta. Early in September new fleet carrier "Illustrious" with its armoured flight deck, battleship "Valiant" and two cruisers were transferred in this way in Operation 'Hats'. On passage with the new arrivals, aircraft from Force H's "Ark Royal" attacked Sardinian targets. After joining up with carrier "Eagle" and now in the eastern Mad, "Illustrious" sent aircraft against Rhodes. The Italian Fleet sortied during these operations, but failed to make contact. The arrival of "Illustrious" allowed Adm Cunningham to go ahead with his plans to attack the Italian battlefleet at Taranto.

So Illustrious and Ark Royal and Eagle are available to ferry aircraft to Malta if thought necessary; Norway had proved RAF types could use RN flight decks at a pinch, and OTL 1942 was to prove they could fly off even a short-ish escort carrier deck. In the event of a major campaign starting in North Africa, I think it will be discovered a lot sooner...

In fact...for anyone who would say it simply couldn't be done and wouldn't be done - oh, look

AUGUST 1940
Malta - The decision was taken to reinforce Malta and in Operation 'Hurry', carrier "Argus" flew off 12 Hurricanes from a position southwest of Sardinia.

APRIL 1941
Malta - In the first week of April, "Ark Royal" escorted by Force H sailed from Gibraltar and flew off 12 Hurricanes for Malta. Three weeks later the operation was repeated with 20 more aircraft.

AND at a time when the Central Med was supposedly "closed" to the RN? What ELSE was the RN doing when it supposedly wasn't able to operate there?

AUGUST 1940
In the middle of the month, Mediterranean Fleet battleships "Warspite", "Malaya" and "Ramillies" bombarded Italian positions around Bardia in Libya, just over the border from Egypt

OCTOBER 1940
12th/14th - From Alexandria a convoy safely reached Malta covered by the Mediterranean Fleet with four battleships and carriers "Illustrious" and "Eagle". As the Fleet returned on the 12th, attacks were made by Italian light forces southeast of Sicily. Cruiser "Ajax" sank Italian torpedo boats "AIRONE" and "ARIEL" and badly damaged destroyer "ARTIGLIERE" which was finished off by heavy cruiser "York". Later heading back east, the carriers launched air strikes against Leros island in the Dodecanese.

FEBRUARY 1941
9th - Force H Attack in the Gulf of Genoa - "Ark Royal," "Renown" and "Malaya" sailed right up into the Gulf of Genoa, northwest Italy. The big ships bombarded the city of Genoa while "Ark Royal's" aircraft bombed Leghorn and laid mines off Spezia, all on the 9th. An Italian battlefleet sortied but failed to make contact.

...and several others. All the above from http://www.naval-history.net

how many bombs do you think were dropped on Malta between early 1943 and the end of 1944?

How many bombs were dropped doesn't matter; what DOES matter is that those submarine activites and SO many other Rn activites in the Med were simply NEVER stopped; hampered yes, and at times the RN took major losses - but they still continued to operate.

[phylo_roadking]

Sorry, I can't help it....

while "Ark Royal's" aircraft bombed Leghorn

'"Course, you know this means war, boy!"

[Jon G.]

...

how many bombs do you think were dropped on Malta between early 1943 and the end of 1944?

How many bombs were dropped doesn't matter; what DOES matter is that those submarine activites and SO many other Rn activites in the Med were simply NEVER stopped; hampered yes, and at times the RN took major losses - but they still continued to operate.

What does matter from the perspective of the transfer of Axis forces to North Africa is the direct relationship between increased Axis activity over Malta and the increased survivability of Axis shipping on the North African routes.

As for the rest of your post, yes, the RN could reinforce Malta if & when they wanted to, but only at the cost of deploying major naval forces to the Med. With Rommel knocking on the door to the Nile, as this scenario supposes would happen, Malta would not matter much in the equations.

[phylo_roadking]

As for the rest of your post, yes, the RN could reinforce Malta if & when they wanted to, but only at the cost of deploying major naval forces to the Med.

Jon - this is a WI about THE major focus of the war shifting to North Africa and the Middle East in the second half of 1940. Why would you think the British wouldn't do that exact thing? It's the ONE area they START with an advantage in - once it becomes obvious that the RM's capital ships aren't going to put to sea - and naval forces...when SO much of the Axis effort requires transport by sea in and out of handily-bombarded parts...are possibly the most useful interdiction forces they can put into the Med.

The Germans can't get the shrunken KM into the Med; until Romania comes into the war there isn't enough POL to give to the Italians for their fleet; the threat to the UK is diminished; and the British find out the Germans are redeploying to the Med. What reasons are there NOT to strengthen the Med squadrons as fast as they can?

We historically have LOTS of examples of the British reinforcing the RN in the Med and replacing losses, right through the war; in this WI therefore, it's only a case of doing more and doing it sooner. "Sooner" happens when they realise what is happening, "more" happens when the anti-invasion flotillas can be redeployed. To say they won't bucks a historical trend that's evident right from 1940 to 1944.

[Jon G.]

Well yes, broadly speaking. This is what-if territory after all, and as such wholly unproductive in relation to teaching us anything new.

My objections pertain to that the combined efforts of the Royal Navy & RAF would not suffice to stop an Axis effort to reinforce North Africa in 1940 dead in its tracks. They couldn't & didn't in 1941; they wouldn't in 1940, either.

Beyond the political obstacles which would bury this scenario right from the start (= namely the impossibilty of aligning Spanish, Vichy, Italian & German aims with one another), I remain confident that a 1940 Axis offensive in the Mediterranean would not succeed anyway because an Axis army operating inside Egypt would have to rely on extremely poor Libyan and Egyptian infrastructure; essentially this whole scenario is a non-starter.