Malta fall 1942

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phylo_roadking
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Re: Malta fall 1942

#61

Post by phylo_roadking » 17 Sep 2009, 15:26

Italys best shot at Malta was the one they were completely unprepared for. That is a suprise attack on their DoW in June 1940.
Carl - not "completely". The Admiralty had decided in early Spring to reinforce Malta when possible, and improve its defences. They (more than any of the other services) were aware of JUST how valuable Malta was and fully expected an Axis attack at SOME point. This came up recently in the long research thread and accompanying WI involving Malta and the illustrious if you remember.

There's ONE major problem about June 1940 - this was right at the start of Hitler's strange six-week "peace offensive" facing Britain following the armistice with France. Not only would he refuse German assistance - he'd probably freeze supplies of oil to Italy to in effect sit on Mussolini.

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Re: Malta fall 1942

#62

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 17 Sep 2009, 23:09

All true as far as that goes. Still thats when the Brits were least prepared and scrambling to reorganize after the May/June debacle. A suprise attack on Italys DoW in mid June is before the German 'Peace effort' and catches the Brits at the peak of their disarray.


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Re: Malta fall 1940

#63

Post by BDV » 17 Sep 2009, 23:28

But then, that would have required a modicum of planning and cooperation between Italy and Germany, which was sorely lacking at the time (1940) - and never got significantly better later on.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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Re: Malta fall 1942

#64

Post by phylo_roadking » 18 Sep 2009, 00:21

A suprise attack on Italys DoW in mid June is before the German 'Peace effort'
Not sure on this - I'll have to check Fleming. There were IIRC THREE major speeches by Hitler that HE regarded as peace overtures (most people ACTUALLY regard ambassadors in various neutral countries opening negotiations as REAL overtures :lol: ) There's also anything up to a week for the German occupation forces to reach and garrison all parts of the occupied zone of France, while (and with an additional week or three) in conjunction with the surrendered French forces they recover to parks/depots the droves of abandoned equipment on battlefields or in transit, take control of stockpiles etc. I don't think the Wehrmacht as a whole could actually action a major change of strategic direction like this in the weeks immediately following the French Armistice. There's ALSO the ongoing (at that point) issue of the French Fleet taking itself off to North Africa to contend with. It's a busy few weeks for the Germans even on a purely military basis...
Still thats when the Brits were least prepared and scrambling to reorganize after the May/June debacle. A suprise attack on Italys DoW ...catches the Brits at the peak of their disarray.
But how disarrayed was the Navy? :wink: Certainly it was the Admiralty that was driving the defence of the island. Events did indeed slow down their upgrade plans - but the defenders made the best of what they had...the blocking of Ti'qali, starting to level Luqa, the uncrating and assembly of the Gladiators etc. So on Malta the activity was feverish rather than in disarray, for they had lots to do and little to do it with :wink:
But then, that would have required a modicum of planning and cooperation between Italy and Germany
Germany couldn't have given the FJ to an assault in JUNE, even if Hitler had been willing; Norway, Belgium and Holland had cut the 7th Flieger to ribbons, as well as nearly half the Transportverband's Ju52s. They COULD have assisted by shifting the useful parts of the LW south...but it took "three weeks" after mid-June to bring the units attrited in the campaign in France back up to anything like full effectiveness for the BoB, which puts any real LW tactical support or softening-up bombing contribution forward to mid-July.

An attack on Malta in mind-June would have been by the Italians alone, given Hitler's position vis-a-vis prosecuting the war against Britain in the aftermath of Dunkirk - and all the caveats about the RN weighing-in to disrupt the amphibious operations and RM element apply...as well as the Italians having only three battalions of paratroopers in June 1940.

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Re: Malta fall 1942

#65

Post by phylo_roadking » 19 Sep 2009, 00:59

On the AA question - there's an interesting P.S....

Depending on the direction of the wind on the day of the attack - if the troop carriers have to fly over any of the naval anchorages on the island, any ships in harbour can add their defensive AA to the ground fire.

This seems to have been common practice anyway in Grand Harbour etc. UNTIL the advent of the "barrage box" tactic, when in February 1941 RN ships at anchor were asked NOT to add to the heavy AA defensive fire any more as it interfered with the land-based AA gunners' new tactics.

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Re: Malta fall 1942

#66

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 19 Sep 2009, 02:30

[quote="phylo_roadking"]
But how disarrayed was the Navy? :wink: Certainly it was the Admiralty that was driving the defence of the island. Events did indeed slow down their upgrade plans - but the defenders made the best of what they had...the blocking of Ti'qali, starting to level Luqa, the uncrating and assembly of the Gladiators etc. So on Malta the activity was feverish rather than in disarray, for they had lots to do and little to do it with :wink: [quote]

Across the board they were much less arrayed than before. While neither the Italain DoW and the French situation that week were toal suprises the RN was scrambling to prepare for Itlaian hostilities and a probable French surrender. Naval operations to evacuate the remaining BEF from the Atlantic ports, and preperations to evacuate the Narvik enclave were underway. Yes, the RN was 'busy' that month.

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Re: Malta fall 1942

#67

Post by phylo_roadking » 19 Sep 2009, 02:44

Naval operations to evacuate the remaining BEF from the Atlantic ports
...but still run IIRC by Ramsay out of Dover - and completed BEFORE the French Armistice :wink: I'd need to check dates - but also completed before the Italian DoW?
and preperations to evacuate the Narvik enclave were underway
Preparations for the withdrawal had been made before Narvik was actually taken, remember...nor did it require any extra resources given over to the withdrawal.
the RN was scrambling to prepare for ... a probable French surrender
When did the Admiralty send out the orders for CATAPAULT?

And Cunningham and Flag Officer Gibraltar (at that point in time Somerville of Force H) had quite a degree of autonomy in organising and running their commands. So it's not really "across the board" - operations in Western Europe and Scndanavia were really only exercising the efforts and resources of the Home Commands, not Gibraltar or Alexandria.

If anything - it's BECAUSE of concerns like Norway and France closer to home that the various farflung Flag Officers in the Empire had the varying degrees of authority/independence of action that they had :wink:

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Re: Malta fall 1942

#68

Post by phylo_roadking » 19 Sep 2009, 02:57

I can answer my own question on CATAPAULT....partially;

It can have been no earlier than the Cabinet meeting of June 24th - when it was decided by the British that the assurances of Article 8 of the Armistice would be disregarded by the Germans - despite Darlan's assurances to Churchill on that same date.

Which means it's a fortnight after the Italian DoW on the 10th of June and a possible ATL Italian suprise attack. So for the two weeks FOLLOWING the Italian DoW, the RN commands in the Mediterranean wouldn't have been distracted by preparations for CATAPAULT etc.

In fact -
In March 1940, measures were taken to have the RAF Station Hal Far provided with a Station fighter Flight under the command of Wing Commander G. R. O’Sullivan. Nevertheless, Air Commodore F. H. Maynard, who in January 1940 had been appointed A.O.C. Malta, eventually was informed by Group Captain N. G. Gardner, Chief Administrative Officer, that apart from a few Swordfish (mostly floatplane version) in use by 3 A.A.C.U. (Anti-Aircraft Co-operation Unit) for target-towing duties, and a solitary radio-controlled de Havilland Queen Bee, the RAF had no other aircraft on the island! However, after consultation with his staff, Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, then Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, gave his permission to the RAF for the loan of six of the in Kalafrana stored Sea Gladiators. Among these were N5521, N5525, N5527, N5530 and N5533, which were taken in hand by flying officer Collins, Officer-in-Charge of the Aircraft Repair Section at Kalafrana. He had the biplanes assembled and delivered to Hal Far by early March. Furthermore Collins, who knew that his services would now be needed at Hal Far, volunteered to man a badly-needed maintenance crew, made up by eager British and Maltese servicemen.
Commodore Maynard knew that no trained fighter pilots were available on the island, but hardly had the word spread when volunteers began to gather. Flight Lieutenant George Burges, who had been Personal Assistant to Maynard was the first to volunteer. From Hal Far’s original staff came Squadron Leader Alan C. ‘Jock’ Martin, who was later picked to command the Flight. Two other members from the Hal Far Station Flight, Flying Officer William J. ‘Timber’ Woods and Flight Lieutenant Peter G. Keeble, enlisted as well. The other three volunteers were Flying Officer John L. Waters from 3 A.A.C.U, Flying Officer Peter W. Hartley also from 3 A.A.C.U and Flying Officer Peter Alexander who had previously been serving with an Experimental Flight, which had been operating the radio-controlled Queen Bee target drones. Sergeant L. F. Ashbury was also attached to the flight for a short time. Among these pilots it was only John Waters who had any previous experience with the Gladiators since he during March had been sent aboard HMS Glorious for one week (!) of fighter training with 802 Squadron.

With the invasion of Norway on 9 April 1940, HMS Glorious was recalled to England with great haste. On 11 April 1940 when she left Malta, she had re-embarked 802 Squadron with 9 Sea Gladiators. Apparently (all of her records were lost when she sank) she embarked the nine indicated above (N5518, N5521, N5525, N5526, N5527, N5530, N5532, N5533 and N5535). She landed three of these just before her final voyage (N5532, N5533 and N5535), all of which were re-assigned to 804 Squadron, FAA. The remaining six (N5518, N5521, N5525, N5526, N5527 and N5530) were apparently the six aboard her when she sank. This means that the six Sea Gladiators (among them N5521, N5525, N5527, N5530 and N5533) “borrowed” to the RAF and the Hal Far Fighter Flight were re-possessed by the FAA, probably because they were already assembled and could be used quickly.

This left 12 Sea Gladiators at Malta. Of these, RAF “borrowed” four new (N5519 "Charity", N5520 "Faith", N5524, N5531 "Hope") which were assembled and formed into the Hal Far Fighter Unit on 19 April 1940. These were supplemented by two more (N5522, N5529) in May after one of the original four had been damaged when Squadron Leader Martin hit a large wooden packing case on the side when landing at Hal Far, flipping N5524 onto its side; Martin was unhurt. The damaged Gladiator was repaired and had been air tested by 6th June.
The Sea Gladiators on Malta were standard Fleet Air Arm pattern except that they were assembled without arrester hooks, dinghies, or sea markers. The assembled fighters were subsequently fitted with armour plate behind the pilots’ seats and with variable-pitch three-blade airscrews.
On 23 April R/T and armament training, as well as live bombing, was carried out in co-operation with 3 A.A.C.U. At least N5520 was flown by John Waters during this exercise.
However five days later the news that the Gladiators were to be withdrawn and shipped to the Middle East, shattered the morale of the small RAF unit. To further demoralise the group the fighters were dismantled. Rumours that HMS Eagle was expected to call at Kalafrana to collect the aircraft could not have come at a worse time. In actual fact some of the Sea Gladiators in storage were subsequently shipped to Alexandria (at least N5535 and two others).
On 29 April, the Hal Far Fighter Flight was disbanded. Nevertheless, with the packing procedure barely over, counter orders were received by Flying Officer Collins an on 3 May the unit was reformed to receive the return of the fighters (at least N5519, N5520 and N5531 was flown during May, i.e. both ‘Charity’, ‘Faith’ and ‘Hope’).
It will be seen therefore, that at least six Gladiators, not only the three famous Faith, Hope and Charity, aided in the defence of Malta.
Group Captain George Burges offers an explanation for the legend of the ‘immortal trio’:

”From time to time people refer to the story of ‘Faith, Hope and Charity’. Reference to Admiralty records proves that there were quite a few other Gladiators on the island when hostilities with Italy started. We were certainly given four aircraft to set up the Hal Far Flight, and there were certainly some others at Kalafrana in crates and from time to time aircraft with other ‘rudder numbers’ appeared to replace casualties. Whether these other aircraft had been completed in their crates I do not know. An enormous amount of improvisation had to go on to keep aircraft operational and a ‘new’ fuselage would have ‘second-hand’ wings or engine. As the ‘rudder number’ was on the fuselage this would seem to be yet another new aircraft.”
“Thus it was only during our training period, before the war started for us, and for only about the first week or ten days of the war period that the population ever saw three Gladiators in the air together – from then on it was two and sometimes only one. During this period none of us ever heard the aircraft referred to as ‘Faith, Hope and Charity’ and I do not know who first used the description. Nevertheless, the sentiment was appropriate because the civil population certainly prayed for us and displayed such photographs as they could get hold of. There is no doubt that the Gladiators did not ‘wreak death and destruction’ to many of the enemy, but equally they had a very profound effect on the morale of everybody in the island, and most likely stopped the Italians just using the island as a practice bombing range whenever they felt like it.”
All this means that the Fighter Flight not was a last minute panic organisation, but had been in existence and equipped for nearly three months before the outbreak of hostilities.
http://surfcity.kund.dalnet.se/malta.htm

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Re: attacking in summer of 1940

#69

Post by Jiri » 27 Sep 2009, 00:59

curiousabouthistory wrote: What would the British have slaughtered the Germans and Italians with? Malta was defended by 4,000 light infantry in the summer of 1940. They had 42 light AA guns, no airplanes, no heavy weapons and no armor.
As I and Phylo Roadking previously tried to point out to princeliberty10311517, Gladiators, although not numerous, WERE fighter aircraft, and WERE present on Malta by June 10 1940.
Can you give me your source on number of Malta AA guns?
As I mentioned earlier, my numbers on antiaicraft artillery are somewhat different.
In June 1940, when Italy declared war on UK, Malta had 34 heavy and 22 light anti-aircrat guns. This is not particularly impressive air defence, but much better than sixteen guns in '39.
Source: Fortress Malta by James Holland.
True, the civilians of Crete were using rifles left over from their wars against the Ottomans, and knives and clubs, but the men of Crete were well known as hard fighters. Pretty much the entire male population of the Island rose up to repel the invasion. So, it is not accurate to imply it was a few barely armed partisans.
Here you've got a point. No Cretan civilians. Just Malta civilians and two territorial battalions of Royal Malta Regiment, supplemented by a third one upon mobilisation.
no heavy weapons, no armor.
Are you forgetting permanent coastal fortifications of Malta?

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Re: Malta fall 1942

#70

Post by phylo_roadking » 27 Sep 2009, 01:06

A couple of other points on the Crete-Malta comparisons...
Pretty much the entire male population of the Island rose up to repel the invasion
That would be difficult; the fighting only covered about 35-40% of the island at its total extent.
No Cretan civilians. Just Malta civilians and two territorial battalions of Royal Malta Regiment, supplemented by a third one upon mobilisation.
The Malta Regiment battalions would be far better equiped per head than the "Greek Regiments" organised by the British on Crete...for the Greek government had been VERY unhappy at the prospect of the British arming and training soldiers who would (eventually!) end up fighting the "Athens" government once again! :lol: They had objected for many months to the mustering of the volunteer regiments - and ordered the British to stop entirely the arming and training of Pendlebury's guerillas.

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Re: The logistics are not there.

#71

Post by Jiri » 27 Sep 2009, 01:08

curiousabouthistory wrote:
Malta had no real defenses in the summer of 1940. 4,000 lightly armed infantry and a few light AA guns. They had no fortifications, no air cover, no heavy guns. The fortifications were not built up until 41-42.
Malta - or at least usable ports - was being fortified since times of Crusades and the Great siege, nad other period of fortification works came when Britain seized this island - and another by the end of 19th century, and even this fortifications were not always the most modern, stone could still hold its own against light equipped infantry, which is the best Italians and Germans could hope to be able to land in June/July 1940.

And some coastal fortifications built in 20th century were certainly able to withstand severe unishment and even inflict losses on Italian invasion fleet. For example Fort Campbell battery, built in 1937, with three 6inch guns.

BTW - may I ask you on your sources? As for mine, Charles Stephenson's Fortifications of Malta 1535-1945 (which is not very thorough work, given his scope and relative brevity) claims that fortification program started after the Abyssinian crisis (i.e. above mentioned Fort Campbell), and "at the oubreak of World War II, and particularly after Italy declared war in 1940, the pace of construction of coastal defences underwent a step change". According to James Holland's Fortress of Malta, on most endangerous places, pillboxes were already built, when Italy declared war.

Which according to me, proves, that AT LEAST some coastal pillboxes were built on June 10 1940.

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Re: Malta fall 1942

#72

Post by Jiri » 27 Sep 2009, 01:26

curiousabouthistory wrote:
Assuming that Hitler and Mussolini have a meeting and agree that Malta is a top priority and commit every available resource necessary, I don't see why conquering Malta is such a big deal.

I make four assumptions. 1. The Luftwaffe will be committed to this operation in whatever numbers necessary and the appropriate units moved to Sicily, Italy, and Libya. The Luftwaffe will make neutralizing the air threat from the British air craft carriers a top priority. 2. All necessary German parachute and commando units needed for the operation will be committed and moved to Sicily, Italy, and/or Libya. 3. The Italian Navy will be ordered to stop hiding and commit every ship that has a gun on it to the operation and the ships will be moved into positions in southern Italy, Sicily, Albania, and Libya.

In June/July 1940, when the Battle of Britain was about to begin (:-)), Malta hardly looked more important than Britain itself, seemingly at the brink of defeat.

In view of 1940 informations, nobody average reasonable (indeed this is quite wild idea even for Hitler:-))) could justify diverting any significant assets (either aircraft or airborne units) from potentially decisive theatre of war in favour of improving the Axis position on theatre which importance could be predicted only with foresight of German defeat over Britain.
And, 4. The operation is carried out the moment the new/refitted Italian battleships come on line.
Would it mean conserving the Axis assets sometime until September 1940?

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