What could Germany offer Italy in July 1940?

[Mostlyharmless]

In several threads it is noted that the Axis powers have their best opportunity to take control of the Mediterranean in Summer 1940. There is generally a long discussion of logistics but the posters supporting the view that the Axis missed an opportunity can point out that a force of the strength deployed under Rommel in August 1942 would have taken Egypt in the Autumn of 1940. Then everyone agrees that the real problem was political and that the Italians did not want the Germans in the Mediterranean.

So if the Germans want to take Egypt and then advance to take the rest of the Middle-East, which would give them oil by rail via Turkey and enable them to threaten Baku from the South, how do they get the Italians to agree? They can offer bits of the British Empire, Greece and Yugoslavia after the war, German technology and military equipment and a bigger share of Rumanian oil. Should those be enough? Is there anything else to offer?

[AVV]

Good evening, Mostlyharmless!

What about French territories (both African colonies and Metropoly)? For example, Tunisia and Algeria or Cote d'Azur.

Best regards, Aleks

[Dave Bender]

Italians did not want the Germans in the Mediterranean

This is approaching the situation wrong.

Let Italy fight their own war. When they get into trouble in Greece and/or North Africa they will come begging for German assistance. Then Italy will pay whatever Germany demands or they will get no assistance.

[phylo_roadking]

Italians did not want the Germans in the Mediterranean

This is approaching the situation wrong

But it's also true, for that IS what happened historically - Hitler offered help in September 1940, Mussolini refused it.

What about French territories (both African colonies and Metropoly)? For example, Tunisia and Algeria or Cote d'Azur

Aleks - not Hitler's to give. An attempt to take possession of them to give to Italy (had Italy ever wanted them! ) would have been an abrogation of the Armistice with France. Remember - Franco asked for them as the price of Spain's coming into the war - and Hitler couldn't do it

[Dave Bender]

Hitler was a fool concerning foreign affairs.

Italy was clashing with Britain in the Med and East Africa. By tying German foreign policy to Italian foreign policy he made it impossible for Britain to accept a German peace offer. 1940 Germany should make peace with Britain, standing aside while Britain and Italy slug it out in the Med.

[phylo_roadking]

1940 Germany should make peace with Britain

Remember - he DID try....or rather, did what HE thought was making peace proposals!

Italy was clashing with Britain in the Med and East Africa. By tying German foreign policy to Italian foreign policy he made it impossible for Britain to accept a German peace offer

Techincally - he didn't. Mussolini told him politely to butt out of the Med - and he went. Things only changed four months later when Italy was being beatenand Mussolini came bleating for help

[Dave Bender]

To: Italy
From: Germany
Subject: Mussolini came bleating for help

Not my problem.

Respectfully,

Joachim von Ribbentrop
Reichsminister des Auswärtigen

[AVV]

Good evening!

Aleks - not Hitler's to give. An attempt to take possession of them to give to Italy (had Italy ever wanted them! ) would have been an abrogation of the Armistice with France

Well, Germany could have promised these territories. And if the war had really ended with decisive German victory, I think, Hitler would have had all the reasons to ignore any agreements with France.

had Italy ever wanted them!

AFAIK, Nizza was Italian territory up to the middle of the 19th century. So, its return would be justified from historical point of view.

Best regards, Aleks

[Mostlyharmless]

I agree with AVV that Hitler could also have promised French territories as he can decide which enemy to make after the war. I strongly disagree with Dave on the advantages to Germany of a Mediterranean strategy. However, when I start to say why, I realize that I had already posted my views earlier http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 1&t=146796. The problem with that and other threads is that we never seemed to agree on whether the mixture of bribery and flattery available could have persuaded the Italians to accept massive German help. By not agreeing, I don't mean that not everyone agreed with me but that no one was willing to predict Mussolini's probable reaction.

[Terry Duncan]

Germany could offer anything she wished in order to get Italian help, though quite where other than the Med is hard to see in 1940, and the German fleet is of little help to the Italians in dealing with the RN. Possibly the best course would be to promise whatever was needed to get Italy onside (even Spain too) and then see if they wished to meet the promises after the war was over. Very cynical but quite common when nations take on allies simply to wage war.

[T. A. Gardner]

The best thing Germany could have done was talk Italy into staying out of the war. Italy's declaration opened up an entirely new front for the Axis; one that Germany was unprepared to operate in and ill-equipped to do so in any case.
Had Italy stayed out of the war the Mediterrainian would not be a front that Britain could exploit or one Germany needed to defend. Italy could have continued to negotiate with various nations for oil and resources and, even acted as a conduit for Germany in this regard to some degree.
With the Italians still holding Ethiopia and ports on the Indian Ocean they could have imported materials and supplies from Japan and Asia as well as provide a safe haven for German shipping and possibly even commerce raiders and submarines.
If anything, from the German perspective having Italy neutral is a bonus.

[phylo_roadking]

Not just North Africa - the Balkans campaign gave the British a prospective opening to approach Germany via the Balkans...one that was SO thoroughly obvious that Wavell had forces ready to move to Greece BEFORE Anthony Eden asked him British policy there wasn't actually that unsuccessful until the Germans arrived at Mussolini's request; they had "turned" Yuogoslavia, which gave them a potential point of entry far up the Adriatic IF the Italian Navy could be drawn out and attrited - something the RN tried several times in 1940/41. And of course, their political bolstering of Greece and the Italian collapse had sent the Greeks onto the offensive.

[Mostlyharmless]

It certainly is possible to argue that Germany would have been better off with a neutral Italy. However, once Italy had entered the war, there was a fleeting opportunity to take Egypt IF German aircraft and panzer divisions could be moved to positions under Italian control. The tactical superiority of German armour is generally agreed but can can they get there quickly and can they be supplied?

Probably they can get there quickly. Hitler decided to create the Africakorps on 9th January 1941 and Rommel himself landed at Tripoli on 14th February. By 15 April, he had pushed the British back to the Egyptian border at Sollum except for Tobruk.

The logistical issues are coupled with the issue of air power. During the North African campaign, Axis logistics was hindered by British surface ships and air power. However, in Summer 1940 British air power in the Middle East was so weak that the arrival of the Luftwaffe would have quickly forced British surface ships from the Central Mediterranean. For example, against the Gladiators and Sea Gladiators (there was only one Hurricane), long ranged Bf 110 squadrons could have escorted German and Italian bombers from Sidi Barrani to Alexandria and forced the British Fleet to withdraw. Similarly, Bf 110s could have defended Italian warships from daylight air attacks. German dive bombers from Sicily could have seriously damaged any large warships attempting to pass through the Mediterranean and dive bombers from near Sidi Barrani or from Rhodes could have attacked any ships sailing from Egypt westwards.

Thus as there were more Italian merchant ships available in 1940, less damage to ports and less danger of attack, a force equal to the Axis strength in Egypt in 1942 could have been landed and supplied during 1940 and such a force would have taken Egypt. Once the Egyptian ports fall, the logistical constrains diminish as only submarines operating from Gibraltar threaten the supply lines.

Taking Egypt in 1940 would have ended any British threat to the Balkans and probably allowed German control to extend to Iraq, which might allow oil to be imported via Turkey and would certainly stop any future Lend-Lease via Persia to the USSR. I also suspect that the Italian forces in Eritrea could have been reinforced and resupplied and perhaps Aden taken, allowing submarines to be based there and forcing the British to escort convoys in the Indian Ocean.

[phylo_roadking]

By 15 April, he had pushed the British back to the Egyptian border at Sollum except for Tobruk.

Arguably - not hard to do! THEY were at the end of their logistical tether...and the British tanks he was wrapping up or pushing back were very badly worn out after the hundreds of miles' advance through the desert. Shows what FRESH armour can do, close to supply lines...an in turn, when Rommel reached the end of THAT for his forces, HIS elastic was to snap back

However, in Summer 1940 British air power in the Middle East was so weak that the arrival of the Luftwaffe would have quickly forced British surface ships from the Central Mediterranean

M-H - this is NOT the case; British ships, including capital ships, were moving through the Central Med from West to East and back right up until April-may 1941. They were equally free to move at will against the Italians.

The presence of air power isn't the issue - its' the positioning of them, and minimising any weaknesses against them. The losses off Crete for instance weren't casued primarily by air power...but by circumstances greatly diminishing the ability of RN vessels to defend themselves against air power

Similarly, Bf 110s could have defended Italian warships from daylight air attacks.

THIS I doubt; the Bf110 was an aircraft with very well known flaws in the fighter role.

German dive bombers from Sicily could have seriously damaged any large warships attempting to pass through the Mediterranean

The ONLY major vessel they historically seriously damaged in the period or close to it was Illustrious, via a lucky hit on its half-raised elevator with an armed, fuelled Fulmar on it. Meanwhile, if you search you'll find one WI thread and one long research thread that detail the RN fleet movements in and through the Central Med in late 1940/ear;y 1941...you might be suprised!

and dive bombers from near Sidi Barrani or from Rhodes could have attacked any ships sailing from Egypt westwards.

Rhodes is questionable unless they simply fly through to North Africa, fuel and return.

Thus as there were more Italian merchant ships available in 1940, less damage to ports and less danger of attack

You really need to find those threads! The RN carried out a number of port bombardments on the Italian mainland during the period,had one major and victorious engagement with the Italian Navy IIRC, and tried more several times to lure them out of port. Meanwhile, the RAF from Malta were bombing Italian ports and cities...

a force equal to the Axis strength in Egypt in 1942 could have been landed and supplied during 1940 and such a force would have taken Egypt.

Unfortunately the Med was STILL and "English Lake" in the period. There was NO serious attrition of RN forces, and a historically demonstrated willingness to harass Italian traffic, both civil and naval. Even at the worst of the siege 18 months-2 years leter, the RN kept a destroyer squardon and subs in Malta to harass Italian convoys!

Once the Egyptian ports fall, the logistical constrains diminish as only submarines operating from Gibraltar threaten the supply lines.

Don't forget the ports in Palestine too

Taking Egypt in 1940 would have ended any British threat to the Balkans

Except you're forgetting ONE major difference. OTL the British took control of the defence of CRETE in November 1940....and proceeded to build up what Cunningham and the Admiralty regarded as THE finest naval anchorage in the entire mediterranean - Suda Bay. IT and its future was only ever threatened by the fall of Greece historically - and there's NO way that the Axis can reduce Egypt in three months, that's asking too much. Even physically, I doubt tanks could MOVE that fact from Libya all the way to Egypt and Palestine against opposition AND with increasing wear and tear, logistical shortages etc.

The one thing that IS likely to happen is that in the absence of an Italian campiagn in the balkans in avour of a full campign against Egypt, the British move against Rhodes and the Dodecanese That sews up the Eastern Med....and if necessary, all the British do is what the GERMANS did OTL two years later in Tunisia - fall back over the border into Vichy Lebanon/Syria and put a political/military gun to their heads.

And you really cannot minimise the Royal Navy's domination of the Med in 1940...AND their willingness to DO something with that superiority

[phylo_roadking]

But you ALSO have to remember is that the British government took the decision to ramp up action in North Africa against the Axis first, in mid-August. By the end of the month troop convoys (four BIG ones IIRC) were starting to leave the UK (one left before the end of August) round the Cape to the Middle East....and dropped troops before taking some on to the Far East.

In other words - the British had a longrange "sea bridge" on hands to the Western Desert very early....AND it was going to be unattrited on that route - while the Axis would have to face ALL the problems of attempting to operate on the other side of an RBN-dominated sea. Meanwhile the British were also equally prepared to ram convoys right through Central Med right up until the Spring of 1941.