What could Germany offer Italy in July 1940?

[kfbr392]

The biggest problem are unloading capabilities of african ports ( Tobruk, Benghasi and Tobruk). According to T.Jentz " Tank combat in North Africa...." only 5.LeichDiv were tranposrted from 11th II 1941 till 1st IV 1941, it's almost 2 months. ( Almost without interference from naval and air forces from Malta and Alexandria)
The second problem is disavantage of "land" transport in Africa. Only one road, lack of railroad, and enormous distances from ports to front).

That is correct. And this was already reported by General von Thoma in the fall of 1940. The "Sperrverband Lybien" (which became the DAK) was originally only intended to prevent the occupation of all of Lybia by the UK (and thereby protect Italy from aerial bombing, loss of moral and defeat), not to take the Suez canal.

So from the start the North African route to Suez and Mosul was the wrong way to go - due to the size of Lybian ports and strength of the Royal Navy.

The Balkan-Turkey route to Suez and Mosul ... that is an interesting "what if". One that could have been implemented militarily in the fall/ winter of 1940 if Hitler had decided to keep the peace (for now) with Stalin.

But back to the question "What could Germany offer Italy in July 1940?"
Here is my list:

Hand over/ sale of German stock:
- 47mm Pak (ö) (were of same design in the Italian army, this in fact happened in 02/1941)
- 88mm Flak + ammo
- Radar technology

Hand over/ sale of captured UK & French equipment:
- 25mm Pak (f)
- 47mm Pak (f) + (possibly German made) tungsten core AP ammo (can take on a Mathilda with some chance of success)
- French 105mm and 149/155mm artillery (these Schneider guns were similar to the ones produced and used in Italy for years) + ammo
- radios and optical equipment
- engineering equipment

Territorial gains for Italy in case of victory:
- Malta
- Eqypt


And of course a common command for the Med was needed - under German control. I know, I know, the Italians wanted to hear none of it (that is, until the military situation developed not necessarily to their advantage ....

[Tim Smith]

Italy already had an excellent counterpart to the German 88mm Flak - the 90mm 90/53.

Only problem with it was that not enough were produced - project not given a high enough priority.

http://www.comandosupremo.com/Cannone9053.html

[kfbr392]

Yes Tim, precisely.

With the benefit of hindsight, what the Italians needed most in the Western Desert in 12/1940 was probably a powerful longe range AT weapon that could destroy the Mathilda tank at any distance. The 88mm Flak had proven itself in the AT role in France (Rommels encounters with BEF Mathildas near Arras) and hence my three pronged approach to the Italian AT dilemma:
- 25mm Pak 112 & 113(f) in infantry companies (to take on these pesky armored cars)
- 47mm Pak 181(f) (803 captured in France) in heavy company of infantry battailions, and on regimental and divisional level
- 88mm Flak on divisional level

They needed the 88mm just for the reasons you mentioned - lack of production of their indiginous Flak in that calibre range.

[bf109 emil]

Italy already had an excellent counterpart to the German 88mm Flak - the 90mm 90/53.

Only problem with it was that not enough were produced - project not given a high enough priority.

http://www.comandosupremo.com/Cannone9053.html

Tim good point and maybe another question was Germany going to give up it's Flak guns used to defend her cities to be used in an anti-tank role by Italy...remember the 88 was not an anti-tank gun, but at this time it was used as a stop gap method (an done so by Rommel) by shear lack of numbers in AT guns in France and Afrika...hence if Italy needed AT Guns, why not ask for AT Guns then a much larger, more costly, harder to move or hide weapon...IIRC 88's used in Africa where done so in a defensive method to stop British attacks and deplete Britain armor, thus petering out an attack. I Don't recall 88 ever being highly mobile and spearheading an attack...hence Italy using 88 would have been in a similar role as did Germany use and in this point, would not a better AT Gun or longer artillery serve suffice as opposed to German forced to leave it's cities vulnerable while helping it's Allie

[kfbr392]

Tim good point and maybe another question was Germany going to give up it's Flak guns used to defend her cities to be used in an anti-tank role by Italy...

Reichsverteidigung was not such a pressing issue in 1940. Germany could have spared fifty 88's - those could have made a real difference during Operation Compass.

remember the 88 was not an anti-tank gun, but at this time it was used as a stop gap method (an done so by Rommel) by shear lack of numbers in AT guns in France and Afrika...hence if Italy needed AT Guns, why not ask for AT Guns then a much larger, more costly, harder to move or hide weapon...

Simply put: there was nothing like the 88 in terms of tank killing power 1939-42 in the axis arsenal.
Also, I read a report (P. Carell, "Die Wüstenfüchse") mentioning that during the Halfaya battles it was discovered that a dug in 88 was almost invisible. In fact, all object lower than 140cm above ground level were hardly visible due to hot air near the ground, while everything highter than 140cm appeard bigger than it actually was.

IIRC 88's used in Africa where done so in a defensive method to stop British attacks and deplete Britain armor, thus petering out an attack. I Don't recall 88 ever being highly mobile and spearheading an attack...hence Italy using 88 would have been in a similar role as did Germany use and in this point, would not a better AT Gun or longer artillery serve suffice as opposed to German forced to leave it's cities vulnerable while helping it's Allie

A Pak is always a copromise between size (especially height), weight, and cost to be minimized while muzzle velocity, accuracy and armor penetration are to be maximized. In the desert with its long range tank engagements, accuracy and muzzle velocity are hugely important. The 88 outclassed field guns in terms of accuracy and muzzle velocity, and its shell was just the right size to kill any tank at any distance (88s mounted in Tiger I panzers killed T-34's at over 3000 meters range).

[bf109 emil]

Simply put: there was nothing like the 88 in terms of tank killing power 1939-42 in the axis arsenal.
Also, I read a report (P. Carell, "Die Wüstenfüchse") mentioning that during the Halfaya battles it was discovered that a dug in 88 was almost invisible. In fact, all object lower than 140cm above ground level were hardly visible due to hot air near the ground, while everything highter than 140cm appeard bigger than it actually was.

yes but a dug in 88 does not help Italy in 1940 trying to capture North Africa...it will inflict casualties, but without armor or support or an suitable air-force or mobility these advantages taken by hurting Britain would not be a tide winning advantage, as Rommel and Dak showed, that hampering Britain by 88's was only advantageous if they quickly followed up a battle by perusing an enemy...something Italy would not have done nor was capable of doing...88's or not

[kfbr392]

yes but a dug in 88 does not help Italy in 1940 trying to capture North Africa...it will inflict casualties, but without armor or support or an suitable air-force or mobility these advantages taken by hurting Britain would not be a tide winning advantage, as Rommel and Dak showed, that hampering Britain by 88's was only advantageous if they quickly followed up a battle by perusing an enemy...something Italy would not have done nor was capable of doing...88's or not

oh I see what you mean ... yeah, I agree, no number of 88's by themselves would have gotten Mussolini on his white horse to Cairo

what I meant was this: during Operation Compass, the British were just one by one picking of the "forts" that the Italians had dug themselves into, all the way to Agheila. They used their tanks and armored cars for this. The Italians were in static defense positions, and their 47mm Pak (ö) was not powerfull enough to kill the Mathildas.

Now, had there been 88's and 47mm Pak (f), those positions could have been defended better and longer, Tobruk possibly held, and Rommel starting out from a more advantageous position.

Unfortunately, the Italians stalled the German offer for help until the whole Cyrenaica was lost. Adolf Hitler said with amusement to his generals: "Failure has had the healthy effect of once more compressing Italian claims to within the natural boundaries of Italian capabilities."

[Somua2]

Somua2 wrote:
Well I guess that's true from a strictly Italian point of view. However I tend to be part of the seal off the Med. school. I'm just not sure what it would have taken to seal off the straits of Gibralter from the South like Raeder wanted, but I do think it combined with the occupation of Egypt would have secured Italy for a long time.


"Italy was capable of neither - not even with German help. To take Gibraltar, Italy would need Spanish help. To take Egypt, Italy would need Turkish help."


"Tim's right with his perspective and maybe had Germany forced France into a complete surrender and lose of control of her NA colonies instead of an armistice and allowing Vichy control, Germany might have had the bargaining chip Spain wanted and desired to allow Wehrmacht troops to enter her soil and take Gibraltar, but without these Colonies and lands as desired by Franco as a bargaining tool, Hitlers trying to make a deal with Franco was IIRC as pleasant as a trip to the dentist and preferred by him over another meeting"

Raeder's plan was to "seal off the straits of Gibralter from the South". That would involve bullying Vichy into allowing transit and occupying Spanish Morocco. Vichy could resist militarily, but good luck. I don't see where 1940 Britain would get the land forces to oppose a determined German thrust through North Africa.

Franco might have liked this scenario in the context of a short wink and nod shooting exchange with Germany that preserves his neutrality but earns chits for later. After a few weeks there is a truce after which Spain can go back to trading with Germany without losing access to the wheat and oil market. Always kind of reminded me about how Vichy accepted the invasion of Madagascar and the levant without declaring war.

If Germany had been able to sell a deal to Mussolini, I think most have agreed in other threads that Britain could have lost Egypt to an Axis thrust with adequate German participation. The thrust from Turkey would have been great, but not necessary for closing Suez. Now what it would have taken to close off the Western Med. from South of Gibralter is a question I've wondered about for a long time.

[bf109 emil]

what I meant was this: during Operation Compass, the British were just one by one picking of the "forts" that the Italians had dug themselves into, all the way to Agheila. They used their tanks and armored cars for this. The Italians were in static defense positions, and their 47mm Pak (ö) was not powerfull enough to kill the Mathildas.

Now, had there been 88's and 47mm Pak (f), those positions could have been defended better and longer, Tobruk possibly held, and Rommel starting out from a more advantageous position.

Unfortunately, the Italians stalled the German offer for help until the whole Cyrenaica was lost.

lol...exactly as as the Mediterranean and North Africa was the Italian Field, and if Italy had any success, would Rommel have even showed up or been allowed to aid the Italians with Italy's permission...most don't realize that it was Italy and Comando Supremo calling the shots in NA in WW2, with Rommel being under the Italian Leadership/control

[Tim Smith]

Somua2 wrote:
Raeder's plan was to "seal off the straits of Gibralter from the South". That would involve bullying Vichy into allowing transit and occupying Spanish Morocco. Vichy could resist militarily, but good luck. I don't see where 1940 Britain would get the land forces to oppose a determined German thrust through North Africa.

Franco might have liked this scenario in the context of a short wink and nod shooting exchange with Germany that preserves his neutrality but earns chits for later. After a few weeks there is a truce after which Spain can go back to trading with Germany without losing access to the wheat and oil market. Always kind of reminded me about how Vichy accepted the invasion of Madagascar and the levant without declaring war.

If Germany had been able to sell a deal to Mussolini, I think most have agreed in other threads that Britain could have lost Egypt to an Axis thrust with adequate German participation. The thrust from Turkey would have been great, but not necessary for closing Suez. Now what it would have taken to close off the Western Med. from South of Gibralter is a question I've wondered about for a long time.

Vichy might well resist an Axis invasion of North Africa - they had a large army there. Plus Germany would be breaking the terms of the Armistice with France, so French North Africa would be very tempted to join the Free French movement. This is very soon after the fall of France, remember, so the French would still be very anti-German, and definitely anti-Italian. Germany would have to occupy all of Vichy-controlled France, the way she did in OTL in late 1942.

Britain couldn't supply much in the way of troops to North Africa, and none at all unless Vichy decides to let them land unopposed. The 1st Canadian Infantry Division was definitely available in the UK.

[Somua2]

"Vichy might well resist an Axis invasion of North Africa - they had a large army there. Plus Germany would be breaking the terms of the Armistice with France, so French North Africa would be very tempted to join the Free French movement. This is very soon after the fall of France, remember, so the French would still be very anti-German, and definitely anti-Italian. Germany would have to occupy all of Vichy-controlled France, the way she did in OTL in late 1942.

Britain couldn't supply much in the way of troops to North Africa, and none at all unless Vichy decides to let them land unopposed. The 1st Canadian Infantry Division was definitely available in the UK."

One thing we should consider is that this scenario would take place IIRC shortly after the British attack on the French fleet. That could really affect Vichy decision making.

I don't disagree that Vichy might resist. Germany could if necessary occupy European Vichy quite easily. I imagine they would allocate at least a panzer corps and maybe a mixed mountain and infantry corps to the task (of forcing the way through French North Africa and occupying Spanish Morocco). Not huge, however, keep in mind that in a much more difficult resource allocation period, Luftflotte II was assigned to support Rommel for a time. I think it likely that such a mission would be provided with something like a full Luftflotte.

Could or would Vichy/Vichy North Africa/Vichy North Africa turned Free French with British support really defeat such a challenge?

[phylo_roadking]

Could or would Vichy/Vichy North Africa/Vichy North Africa turned Free French with British support really defeat such a challenge?

Think of the advantages over OTL -

1/Britain doesn't have to get troops and materiel either through the Med end-to-end or the long way round the Cape - in effect it just has to get them as far as Gibraltar +150 miles more relatively safe waters to get them ashore in Oran! Ships can be debarking in North Africa only a week after leaving the UK....or even, given the combined French-RN superiority then in the Med, as far eastward as Tunis or Algiers!

2/ Axis transfers to Libya come under the SAME pressure as OTL in late 1942 - the further WEST the Commonwealth forces in Egypt push the Italians back into Libya, the fewer ports the Axis has available - the effects of this have been discussed recently on a couple of WIs for events in 1942

It is really not beyond the bounds of comprehension that Hitler simply doesn't put the DAK into North Africa to assist the Italians, with the chances of eventual success being visibly FAR slimmer than OTL with a "hostile" Tunisia immediately to the west of Libya....

With an "allied" Algeria or Tunisia - both of them FAR easier to reach and supply than Egypt - I can see the campaign changing to the British settling down hard in Cyrenaica as the "anvil", and the WESTERN British/French offensive against Libya doing the manouvering/fighting, squeezing the Italians/Germans (if they arrive) against the Western Desert Force in their rear.

[Tim Smith]

One thing we should consider is that this scenario would take place IIRC shortly after the British attack on the French fleet. That could really affect Vichy decision making.

Britain sinking the French fleet is not as bad as Germany kicking the hell out of the Vichy army in Algeria. Indeed, many Vichy officers might finally get the point of why the French fleet was sunk in the first place - to stop the treacherous Nazis getting it, not to hurt France. After all, if the fleet hadn't been sunk, it would now be in danger of being captured by the Germans....

I expect that Vichy would refuse British offers of help initially, and try to defend their neutrality alone, but once their army starts getting smashed up by Germany, they might reconsider, figuring that the British are the less evil of the two sides.

[Mostlyharmless]

After the attacks on the French Fleet at Mers-El-Kebir and Dakar, could the French have been persuaded to allow the Germans to send a force of Stukas and Bf-109s to Oran with less than a division of troops to protect the airfields in order to "Protect the Fleet Fleet from further British attacks"? Naturally, such a force would have made Gibraltar much less useful as a British base.

[phylo_roadking]

After the attacks on the French Fleet at Mers-El-Kebir and Dakar, could the French have been persuaded to allow the Germans to send a force of Stukas and Bf-109s to Oran with less than a division of troops to protect the airfields in order to "Protect the Fleet Fleet from further British attacks"? Naturally, such a force would have made Gibraltar much less useful as a British base

No.

1/ Algeria was NOT short of either manpower to defend its airfields NOR aircraft Don't forget the French had evacuated a significant part of its air assets to North Africa in the chaos immediately after the Armistice.

2/ German aircraft operating from Vichy Algeria would have brought it into the war - the one thing neither it NOR the Germans wanted, both parties at that point in the war wanted France OUT of the war!

Anyway - don't forget the French DID bomb Gibraltar on several occasions with minimal damage after Mers-el-Kebir.