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Tim Smith wrote:From where, exactly, would the Hudsons launch? And on what date?
Hard to answer but page 137 of Armstrong's book provides some detail of a July 2/41 interview by a reporter from the
American Aviation Daily of a British aircraft agent, Sir Vivian, for the July 15/41 issue:
"
If Britain was in such dire need of Lockheed Hudson bombers, the reporter asked, why were there 155 of them sitting idly at the Lockheed Air terminal in Burbank, California ?"
Also reported is that, "
Within a few days of the interview, the Hudson Bombers had been spirited away to Canada."
Along with any chance of providing some of them to the Chinese.
Armstrong's book also reports that Lockheed was producing only 12 Hudsons per month for the British so for 155 to build up there in Burbank,
many months must have passed during which 66
could have been diverted by FDR instead to an
AVGII for use in China, without doing any obvious harm to the British who hadn't the necessary numbers of pilots to use them at the time anyway.
Granted, some time would have been needed to fit twin bomb bay fuel tanks in each Hudson (as was done historically for the San Francisco to Hawaii bound B-17s) so that the necessary trans-Pacific legs could be managed. Stateside recruiting and training of
AVGII aircrews would also have taken some time but I would guess that offensive
AVGII missions in China might have begun as early as October 31/1941, had FDR so agreed with Chennault and Chaing Kai-shek.
Launched from where is also not an easy question to answer but pages 74/109 support an air operations start date of Oct.31'41 as co-inciding with the end of the monsoon season and give:
Chuchow (aka Zhuzhou) to Nagasaki - 730 miles
Chuchow to Yawata Steel Works - 800 miles
Chuchow to Tokyo - 1,355 miles
Chuchow to Kobe - 1,060 miles
Chuchow to Osaka - 1,085 miles
Kunming to Hanoi - 355 miles
Kweilin (aka Guilin)to Hainan - 380 miles
A half incendiary bomb load with just one bomb bay fuel tank should give the Hudson the needed range to firebomb even Tokyo and return.
Page #38/39 provides details of a November 1940 memo from Chaing Kai-shek to FDR:
"There are 136 airfields available in China, more than half of which are in excellent condition, and all serviceable for both bombers and pursuits. Several of these airfields are within 650 miles from Japan and they are so located that they are not easily vulnerable to army attacks. Japanese garrisons are nowhere in proximity and land attacks would require, in most cases, the concentration of several divisions over extremely difficult terrain without communications, thus leaving adequite time for defense or for the transfer of menaced airbases."
and continues with:
"This Special Air Unit could operate in conjunction with the Chinese Army which, so supported, could effectively take offensive action against Canton, to relieve Hong Kong; against Hankow, to clear the Yangtze Valley; or again the Unit could operate independently in attacking Japan proper, Formosa and Hainan."
Chennault's views on using incendiaries against Japanese cities is explained by the entries on pages 61/62 which are taken from Report Number 161-40 of the American Naval Attache in Tokyo, dated September 30, 1940:
"Fire-fighting facilities are woefully inadequite. Hoses are old, worn and leaky. Water mains are shut off at night. Little pressure is available. Fire hydrants are few and far between.
Sluggish canals and drainage pools are used for suction of hand pumped and hand carried fire apparatus ...
Nine tenths of Japanese houses are roofed with brittle [easily shattered by a falling 4lb incendiary bomb] tiles. Ninety-nine out of a hundred are constructed of flimsy wooden materials which catch fire with alarming rapidity. Incendiary bombs sowed widely over an area of most Japanese cities would result in the destruction of the major portions of these cities ...
Bomb shelters are few in number and totally inadequite to accomodate even a minimum percentage of the population.
Transportation facilities are already overcrowded and the evacuation of civilian population would be attended by tremendous difficulties. Since every home in Japan is already crowded, few accomodations for refugees are available.
A complete list of important bombing objectives, including aircraft factories, steel and gas works, main transportation systems and government buildings will be prepared and forwarded.
I cannot help but think that just 66
AVGII Hudson bombers making a first time surprise night time air raid on say, downtown Nagasaki, with 1,600/4 = 400 incendiary bombs each (for a total of 66x400 = 26,400 firebombs) would have caught the attention of even General Tojo's bound for war government ? Certainly the Emperor and the Japanese people as a whole would have been much better acquainted with the probable eventual results of going to war with the Americans, the British Commonwealth and the Dutch, as well as the Chinese. Their new peace treaty with the Russians not withstanding.
Would such a "mini-atom bomb like" firestorm demonstration have convinced them to NOT go to war against the Allies ? Sadly, probably not IMO but then there were still a lot more nights available for more firebomb raids between October 31/41 and December 7/41 weren't there ?
Granted though that supplying that many 4lb incendiaries, the bomber's fuel & spares and properly trained effective fighter escorts would have made the task much more difficult than I have made it seem to be here. To say nothing of two way night navigation, over water, sans GPS.
Still though, a huge but wasted opportunity, especially considering that FDR did say as early as December 1940 that:
"It would be a nice thing if China bombed Japan."