What if France had prepared differently for WW2?

[maltesefalcon]

Perhaps but what if the mass of troops poised for the breakthrough at Sedan had instead been hurled at the Dyle line?
Either way I think the Allies were for it.

[phylo_roadking]

The French took the beating they did stopping the Germans in the Gembloux Gap because historically there were a number of mistakes made in the application of the Dyle Plan and a couple of unforeseen problems...

1/ When they arrived in position - the French found the Belgians had dismantled large sections of the Cointet fencing to move it backwards...a couple of times! - and many sections weren't put back together again, and the whole cohesiveness of many sections of the defence line with river lines, flooded river bottoms etc. was broken.

2/ in many cases the French had to take position further back than they intended/planned because of this.

3/ the French planned to arrive in time to lay out minefields in front of their positions, but historically, with Belgian forces recoiling through their positions - and French forces from the Ardennes recoiling directly west and west-northwest from the Ardennes - they weren't able to do much mining.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Just a quick throw of my two centimes before I finish reading the entire thread. All of this would only be possible if the French took the time to read what their allies already knew. I read somewhere (kill me I don't remember where exactly) that after capturing Paris the Germans found a big fat file filled with memorandums and analyses of how to fight against the Blitz, how to effectively counter German tanks, how not to use CAS and medium bombers and so on. The documents were written by generals of the only Allied state that had any combat experience at that point, that is Poland. The file was sealed tight and probably never even opened. After all to the French such remarks were of little value, as after all the Poles lost, so their ideas must've been wrong as well...

BTW, even if the story of the file is not true, there is a grain of truth in it in that the French apparently learned nothing from the Polish lesson.
Cheers

Be facinating to read extracts from and analysis of the Polish 'after action reports'. I've heard the French did interview & record what the refugee Polish officers had to say when they trickled into France. Perhaps the file you refer to derived from them?

I dont think the French learned "nothing". In the French military literature I notice many changes large and small directed in the winter and spring of 1939/40. What I also notice is a lack of a broad training program to bring the ground forces up to complete readiness. Some formations were very well trained by spring. Others like the two 'B' divisions that defended the Sedan sector had accomplished very little training since mobilization in 1939.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Perhaps but what if the mass of troops poised for the breakthrough at Sedan had instead been hurled at the Dyle line?
Either way I think the Allies were for it.

The quality of the regiments, divisions, and corps, in the French 1st Army and BEF on the Dyle line was far better than the third rate corps defending Sedan. Better trained, equipped, & better staff officers from the division HQ up through army level. The density of the Allied divisions in the 'Dyle line' was approx twice that along the Meuse River from Namur to Longwy. The front covered by the divsions of the Fr 1st Army was slightly less than prescribed for the defense. Along the Meuse River the division sectors when the crossing assualt came on 13 May were nearly twice the doctrinal allowance.

Sure three more mechanized corps with another 1000+ tanks would be difficult to cope with. Conversely the Germans will not be fighting second and third rate battalions led by unprepared officers and spread far to thin. Casualties of both men and material would probablly be far higher for both sides & while the Allies may very well have to evacuate Belgium and parts of northern France a spectacular breakthough and expoitation is less likely.

[phylo_roadking]

Sure three more mechanized corps with another 1000+ tanks would be difficult to cope with. Conversely the Germans will not be fighting second and third rate battalions led by unprepared officers and spread far to thin. Casualties of both men and material would probablly be far higher for both sides & while the Allies may very well have to evacuate Belgium and parts of northern France a spectacular breakthough and expoitation is less likely.

If and when the Dyle Line gives way and the German advance can hit the French frontier and the makeshift "Maginot" Line extension that Rommel scythed through historically - they'll have both been severely attrited BY the fighting in Belgium....and the French and British will have had more time to consoldidate defences to the rear of the Dyle. And of course the forces - including armour - of "BEF II" will instead as planned have arrived in Flanders as part of the reinforcement for the Dyle...gives a whole different complexion to the fighting after the defence of the Gembloux Gap.

[maltesefalcon]

Interesting. But one would then need to assume that the advances towards the Dyle line would still progress at more or less the same rate as the historic timeline.

In reality the Germans were weakening this sector to allow the Allies to advance into their trap.

An alternate plan with the original much stronger thrust through Belgium may see the Germans reach the Dyle and beyond before the allies. The battle of Gembloux Gap might never have happened at all.

On another note I've been searching around for data on allied air activity prior to May 1940. Have found little or no evidence that either France or Britain made much of an effort to pre-emptively attack the Luftwaffe at that time. Even if they did not soften up their enemy somewhat; they would at least know exactly where the Lufwaffe's forward air strips were so they could attack in earnest in May.

[phylo_roadking]

On another note I've been searching around for data on allied air activity prior to May 1940. Have found little or no evidence that either France or Britain made much of an effort to pre-emptively attack the Luftwaffe at that time.

Can only speak for what little I know of the RAF's activity; fighters in France were IIRC ordered NOT to stray over the German border, and of course Bomber Command was operating under VERY strict regulations regarding damaging private property! And either side left each other's photo-recce planes largely unmolested. Remember - this was the period when Bomber Command spent fuel and lives bombing the Germans with glorified bogroll...

In reality the Germans were weakening this sector to allow the Allies to advance into their trap.

Mmmmm - not really; the Dyle Plan wasn't exactly a closed book to the Germans. It was very much an open secret that the British and French would advance into Belgium, given their various public pronouncements. They didn't NEED to sucker the Allies in - for the SAME strictures on no defensible geographical festures beyond the Dyle in Eastern Belgium affected THEM just as much as it affected the natives In other words - the Allies weren't going any further than the Dyle!

The change was really to rob resources from the attack in the centre to stiffen the forces available for the Ardennes.

An alternate plan with the original much stronger thrust through Belgium may see the Germans reach the Dyle and beyond before the allies. The battle of Gembloux Gap might never have happened at all.

This was where the Belgian "sponging" tactics and roadblocking in Eastern Belgium comes in, slowing the rate of German advance onto the Dyle Line

Even if they did not soften up their enemy somewhat; they would at least know exactly where the Lufwaffe's forward air strips were so they could attack in earnest in May.

Doesn't really matter - as soon as the Germans capture the Albert bridges and began throwing up other river crosings - they were always going to be magnets for the Allies' available bombing capacity

[maltesefalcon]

I know about the leaflet campaigns and the no bombing of private property.

The RAF did bomb naval targets and lay mines between Sept 39 and May 40. Some of that effort could have been directed toward Luftwaffe bases instead. By saving their entire aircraft complement for the actual battle, they left the Germans the iniative both on the ground and the air. Not only that, without some smaller missions behind them, most of the aircrew had no relevant combat experience come May 10. The Germans had many pilots who flew in Spain and Poland, giving them the edge.

Once the battle began the RAF needed to send out time wasting recce missions to locate enemy airstrips. By contrast the Luftwaffe had a pretty good idea where the Allies forward bases were and attacked them right away.