Alternative Strategies for the US Civil War

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Hanny
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Re: Alternative Strategies for the US Civil War

Post by Hanny » 16 Dec 2018 12:00

South wrote:
15 Dec 2018 21:26
Good afternoon Hanny,

Something I forgot:

Ref: [Confederacy's] "constructed the third most powerful navy in the world...";

Is construction indicative of the fleet's power ? Isn't it really a pre-Jutland Sound strategic matter ?

Less the exceptions and many blockade runners, the Confederate's navy had sailing restrictions due to the USN.

......

Forgot the type of vessel and specifics but recall the Confederacy's Secretary of State Judah Benjamin, escaped to London.


~ Bob
eastern Virginia, USA
CSA built a navy from scratch, its head from inception chose commerce raiding and blockade running and technological ( steam ironclads, floating Battys) superiority was how best to counter the material advantage of the north. By wars end, US flagged merchants had been swept of the sea, whaling fleet annihilated, so great was its success that the post war treaty between UK( whom built many of the commerce raiders) and USA for compensation, the US argued in court the war had been lengthened by 2 years from UK imports and supply of commercer raiders. He orderd 5 ironclads to be built, USA had rejected them at this point, and went on from there, by wars end they were all gone, but most at the hands of the CSA and or taken by land forces taking the4 harbour, and very few defeated by naval action. Its numbers iron clad steam screw ships, floating battys, made it the third most powerful fleet in the world as only UK US had invested so heavily in the new technology.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

Hanny
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Re: Alternative Strategies for the US Civil War

Post by Hanny » 16 Dec 2018 12:05

Takao wrote:
15 Dec 2018 23:36

That was the 1st section, read the 2nd section
So?. POTUS by law is delegated when congress is in session the authority to supress insurrection in a part of a state against that stat on aplication for federal aid from teh Governor and the notice from the judiciary inurection exists. Neither existed in any of the states he listed.


Hanny wrote:
15 Dec 2018 12:04
POTUS only gets to be CinC when the US is opposed by a foreign nation. Something Lincoln denied to have happened.
Not according to Article 2, Section 2 of the US Constitution

[/quote]

Acording to the 1792 Act he has to fulfil two pre requisites, when they are, as per the constitution he becomes the CinC, otherwise not.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

South
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Re: Alternative Strategies for the US Civil War

Post by South » 16 Dec 2018 12:49

Good morning Hanny,

We're both using different types of analysis. Anything approaching mathematical certainty is typically wrong. I usually use the word "mess". "Messy" is also OK.

Two themes were involved in this:
1. Only the Congress many declare war
2. The POTUS is Commander in Chief of the armed forces

As of perhaps even now-and I'm not even going to approach current events with the first reason being that need for a large staff and some library tables to assemble all the material-the Vietnam era and post Vietnam era with the "paste-up"War Powers Acts, shows that all this is much about ruthless political power politics and less so about jurisprudence as explained by Blackstone, the US Supremes and the rest of the legal beagles.

Good for closely related research: Letters of Marque

......

Ref: "So the 1792 is clear ... to have judicial notice ..."; Review how Alexandria Hamilton handled the "Whiskey rebellion". Again, these personalities weren't Albert Schweitzers and Mother Teresias. Political stability concurrent with the revenue streams arriving on time governed. As an aside - and I am NOT discussing; just mentioning it for a matter for reflection - the US' current Terrorism Insurance activation does NOT allow for judicial review.

......

I've got a basic familiarity with the Confederate Navy. Your statements are correct.

Yet, my analysis does not rely on units afloat; only their value to the strategic objectives. The Confederacy was split ("First At Vicksburg" is a still-used US military slogan") and the foreign commerce of the Confederacy was hindered to the point of existential matters. It wasn't existential with the Mexican land routes but the Brownsville, Texas area (Fort Brown) was under siege.

Returning to the strategic objectives; If only Confederate President Jefferson Davis knew that B-52 air superiority over North Vietnam mirrored his Confederate Navy: high quality with limited value.

......

Other post; Takao is correct re the situation and environment of the time.


~ Bob
eastern Virginia, USA

Hanny
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Re: Alternative Strategies for the US Civil War

Post by Hanny » 16 Dec 2018 13:32

Hi Bob

Im using a textual analysis for the 1792 Militia acts, insurection is defined as part of state against that state, thats it.

In 1795 Act its changed to whenever, by reason of unlawful obstructions, combinations, or
assemblages of persons, or rebellion against the authority of the
Government of the United States, it shall become impracticable, in
the judgment of the President of the United States, to enforce, by
the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, the laws of the United
States within any State or Territory [thereof] .

and SCOTUS had rulled The Constitution confers on the President the whole Executive
power.... He has no power to initiate or declare a war either
against a foreign nation or a domestic State. But by the Acts of
Congress of February 28th, 1795, and 3d of March, 1807, he is
authorized to call[] out the militia and use the military and naval
forces of the United States in case of invasion by foreign nations,
and to suppress insurrection against the government of a State or of
the United States.

So no he was factually wrong, why?, because the administration used the wrong Militia act, and replaced its call with the correct one, the 1795 one So at the time everyone agreed the 1792 act was not the law of the land.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

South
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Re: Alternative Strategies for the US Civil War

Post by South » 16 Dec 2018 14:11

Good morning Hanny,

Much of this traces back ~ 20 years earlier.

SCOTUS did not have its Marlbury versus Madison authority yet.

The major problem of the new US Government - and I really shouldn't even write this because I'm living not that far from the homes of Madison, Jefferson, Washington, ... - was the inability of Congress to cope with the urgent matters of state that POTUS had arriving on his desk.

President Washington constantly - and properly - referred these urgent matters to Congress but frequently received no authority from Congress to act on the POTUS-sent matters because of the different conflicting political blocs in Congress.

Not that much has changed up to 1998 (20 years ago as per our AHF margin re current events to history).

POTUS has (had-it's changed much) authority to exclusively conduct foreign affairs...and if the diplomatic maneuvers caused a casus foederis or casus belli ?!

Be careful with "everyone agreed".

Don't neglect "inherent authority".

Return to my 2 governing vocabulary words: "mess" and "messy".

......

Not too much is new under the Sun.

A personal opinion: Jefferson's home is the nicest. Of course he was America's first John D. Rockefeller, the richest American of the time.


~ Bob
eastern Virginia, USA

maltesefalcon
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Re: Alternative Strategies for the US Civil War

Post by maltesefalcon » 16 Dec 2018 17:31

Couple updates. My earlier comment on tax confiscation of Southern farms may have been based on poor research on my part. I was thinking of this situation:

Property Tax: The Revenue Act of 1861 instituted a tax on real estate, levied in proportion to each state's population. While the act's enforcement mechanism was limited, it formally established a system of tax districts, assessors, and collectors, laying the groundwork for the Internal Revenue Service's formation on July 1, 1862. (Per Wiki summary)

Also due to the somewhat mandatory repudiation of debt to Northern creditors.Thinking further it is more likely farms were seized by private creditors, so I will concede that point.(Maybe watched too many bad movies LOL.)

However I will stand firm on the inferiority and vulnerability of the Southern railroad network. They had far fewer miles of track and many of the private railroads were either different gauges or did not provide a continuous connection with the next one.

Citing one example of the dependence on these roads and vulnerability of same:

To be sure, running the guns at Vicksburg allowed Grant Mississippi river access; to (eventually) get goods and supplies to his army. But this was not immediately fatal to Southern troops holding the area. By this time the river was occupied by Federals at both ends, so was already of reduced value to them. What was fatal was the Battle of Champion Hill, part of which resulted in Grant's forces cutting the main rail line into the city from Jackson. When combined with the destruction of the rail bridge during the Battle of Big Black shortly after, this effectively ended Pemberton's hope of resupply and reinforcement.

Futurist
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Re: Alternative Strategies for the US Civil War

Post by Futurist » 17 Dec 2018 07:37

David Thompson wrote:
16 May 2010 16:57
(Google has links to several contemporary reviews).
Could you please post the relevant Google link(s) here, David?

BTW, it's interesting that this man wrote this book when he was almost 80! He wrote this book in 1877 and he was born in 1799!

Hanny
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Re: Alternative Strategies for the US Civil War

Post by Hanny » 17 Dec 2018 09:05

Pages 9/10 he sets out military manpower for each side. US Oct 61 800,000 rising to a million. CS 600,000 with 200,000 effectives.He comments of Mc having not using all his forces at Antietam.he comments in all the battles the US outnumberd the CS 2 sommetimes 3 to 1, when Grant came east 4 to 1.

He makes the error of using 200k CS effectives V 800,00k pfd.

Actual like for like is this:
1861 April to july CS 115,000 CS 115,000
Dec 351,448 to 575,917
April 1862 40,1395 to 637,126
June 1862 476,891 to 624,234
Dec 1862 446,622 to 918,121
Dec 1861 481,160 to 860,737
Dec 1864 445,203 to 959,460
Only in 62 and 64 was the odds 2:1.

Example of PFD and effectives in 1862
AoMiss under Johnston 49,737 effectives from 68,752 PFD AoOhio Buel 40,866 effectives from 61,844 PFD/Ao WTenn Grant 36,544 from 60,663 PFD


At Antietam the only forces McClellan does not commit to the battleline are Barnes' brigade, Morell's Division, 5th Corps, and 4 regular battalions of Sykes' division (3rd US, 2/12th US, 1st/6th US (consolidated) and 1/17th US). As a proportion of available forces itMc commits more than either Lee or Meade committed over 3 days at Gettysburg, and in numbers present for battle, was around under 10% of the 87000 he brought to battle.

Whilst 5th and 6th Corps suffered few casualties and didn't make assaults, they were not unused. The 6th Corps relieved the shattered line of Sedgwick and 12th Corps and stopped a developing Confederate counterattack which was aborted with 6th Corps came into line.

5th Corps had only 1 brigade in reserve (Barnes) and 4 battalions of regulars. The bulk of the regulars were engaged across the creek and the other 2 brigades of Morell's division were ordered to reinforce Sumner to give weight to an expected attack late in the day. When Burnside's 9th Corps cracked and Cox ordered a general retreat McClellan recalled these 2 brigades. At 1815 hours, with Morell back, McClellan tells Burnside to counterattack, and he'd advance Morell on his right. Burnside refused.

The two divisions of 6th Corps arrived in front of the Dunker Church ca. 1100-1300. When the lead brigade arrived (Hancock's) the rebels were just starting to advance troops to overrun the gunline of 2nd and 12th Corps which were unsupported with the collapse of Sedgwick and also the 12th Corps. They aborted the attack when fresh Federal infantry turned up.

Reserves are just that, present as reserves untill committed. Non mil minded authors confuse reserves with unused all the time. Some US reserves marched and counter marched for hours, under long rang artillary fire and sufferd losses, some quite high losses, and were never committed to action but were posistioned as reserves around the combat space.

Southmountain 1862
US 28000 2,325 losses +10%-8%
CS 18000 2685 losses +13%-15%

Harpers Ferry ( Halleck instructions to Mc where to come to its aid, and it was to defend HF, but not be a part of the AoP and subject to Mc orders)
US 14000 12,636 losses +2%-90%
CS 23000 286 losses +55%-1%

Antietam ( Engaged and unenged best fit using Carmens numbers (https://www.amazon.com/Maryland-Campaig ... 161121114X )
US 67,000 12,410 losses +15%-19%
CS 40000 10,316 losses +31%-26%

So for lee the campaign cost 13287. Inflicting 27371.
For Mc it cost 12641. Inflicting 13001.

Campaigns also need to be considerd in the overall picture of national troop numbers.

1862 CS strength was 85% of US for Mc and 74% overall.
1864 CS strength was 55% of US

For the Army of Northern Virginia, present for duty, is 75,305 on September 2, 1862.
For AoP its 87,164 from 20th Sept.
commander can ony have used and reused the number he had started with, and recieved as replacement reinforcement, before loss to sick/straggaling etc.

In 1862 US total strength was 576000 to CS 351000, so lee dropped that by 4.75% to Mc droopping CS strength by 3.7%
Campaign 62 ( Lee ANV with 21% of CS forces, inflicted 4.75% losses on US for a cost of 3.7%, Mc with 15% of US forces ) CS was effiecent by 20% over Mc and 34% over combined US.
For Lee 75,305 PFD is therfore +36%-18%
For Mc 87,164 PFD is therfore +15%-17%
For Mc and HF 101,164 PFD is therfore +13%-27%

Comparing that to Grant
At the Wilderness, Grant had 118,000 men, suffered 18,000 casualties; Lee had 67,000 men, suffered 11,000 casualties.
At Spotsylvania, Grant had 100,000 men, suffered 18,000 casualties; Lee had 57,000 men, suffered 12,500 casualties.
At North Anna, Grant had 115,000 men, suffered 2,600 casualties; Lee had 63,900 men, suffered 1,600 casualties.
At Cold Harbor, Grant had 130,000 effectives, suffered 13,000 casualties; Lee had 75,700 men, suffered 5,000 casualties.
Total forces employed. Grant 192200 with 51600 losses Lee 106000 with 30500.
Grant inflicted 17% on lee and suffered 28%, lee inflicting 49% and sufferd 28%.

In 1864 US 861000 to CS 481000, so lee dropped 6% of us strength and Grant dropped 6.4% of the CS total strength.
campaign 64 ( Lee with 22% of CS forces, inflicted 6% losses on US for a cost of 6.4%, Grant with 22% of US forces.) CS was effiecent over Grant by 32%
For Grant PFD is therfore +17%-28%,
For lee PFD is therfore +49%-28%.

In both campaigns the US was on the offensive, so the CS had the posture bonus of defending, an example of effieciency from, CS offensive camapign ought therfore be usfull to show relative US to CS effiecency when on the offensive.

Penninsula Campaign US was 6% more effiecent than CS, overall an 11% advatage to US as a defender, compared to CS 20% against Mc and 32% against Grant when lee defended.
US 105000 inflicted 29298 is a cost benifit of +6%
CS 112000 inflicted 23119 is a coast benifit of -5%

Fredericksburg Campaign 1862 (Lee ANV with 22% of CS forces, inflicted 2.2% on US for a cost of 1.2%, Burnside with 21% of US Forces, CS was more effiecent by 18%.
US 122,009 PFD is therfore +3%-10%
CS 78,513 PFD is therfore +16%-5%

2nd Bull Run Campaign 1862 (Lee with 14% of CS forces, inflicted 2.5% on US for a cost of 2%, Pope with 13% of US forces) CS was more effiecent by 24% over Pope.
US 77,000 PFD is therfore +9%-19%
CS 50,000 PFD is therfore +29%-15%

In 1862 US had 576000 PFD losses acounted for 54486 of them at Lees hands. CS had 351000 PFD and losses to all comers against lee had acounted for 24786

So with a manpower superiority of 5.7 to 3.5, the US was losing 5.4 to 2.4, this was Lees achievemnet in the East in 62.


Theatre strength for 31 May 1862:

CS 159266 agregate in VA and NC with 119778 being PFD.
Johnstone in his Army contained 91424 agregate with 68740 PFD.
Mc in his Army had 127166 with 98008 PFD.
US in VA and NC 275798 agregate with 209785 PFD

Lee assumes command and his 26th June strength was.
Lee inherited 67740 and was reinforced by Jackson with 23000 Holmes 15000 and 22000 from GA and SC released by Davis from defending Richmond, present for duty for the Army of Northern Virginia would be (60,000 reinfourcments agregate is roughly 50,000 PFD, less losses at 7 pines in which CS outnumber US, of 6000 CS)would be around 110,000 to 112,220 Confederate present for duty after the arrival of Jackson's command of course its all how you do the adding up, if your intrested in agregate or PFD or engaged, but its highly likly Lee had more than Mc. Mc was ounumbered in all butb one of the major engements in 7 days. lee had control off 70% of the CS assets in Theatre.

Mc commanding an Army in theatre had 38% of the Theatre assets to command. This why it fails, insufficent troop number for the offensive despite them being in Theatre. Mc was a political enemy of the government, dont forget, and had less control of theatre assets than somone Lincoln/congress would have had confidence in, and was on there side politicaly


In 64 Grant was Theatre commander and had everything under his authority:

Grant's main army (all figures 30 Apr 64 trimonthly reports where available)
Army of the Potomac: 102,869 PFD
9th Corps: 19,250 PFD
Stripped from the Washington Defences and new Drafts: 30,264 PFD
Department of Virginia and NC: 53,049
deduct District of NC: - 6,334
Total force = 199,088 PFD

Grant as Theatre commander had 51% of Theatre assets at start of operations,and recieved 15% more as reienforcemnts/replacements. Thats why he was a success then.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

Hanny
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Re: Alternative Strategies for the US Civil War

Post by Hanny » 17 Dec 2018 10:55

maltesefalcon wrote:
16 Dec 2018 17:31

Citing one example of the dependence on these roads and vulnerability of same:

To be sure, running the guns at Vicksburg allowed Grant Mississippi river access; to (eventually) get goods and supplies to his army. But this was not immediately fatal to Southern troops holding the area. By this time the river was occupied by Federals at both ends, so was already of reduced value to them. What was fatal was the Battle of Champion Hill, part of which resulted in Grant's forces cutting the main rail line into the city from Jackson. When combined with the destruction of the rail bridge during the Battle of Big Black shortly after, this effectively ended Pemberton's hope of resupply and reinforcement.
Nothing wrong with watching old films!.

Grant cut loose from his riverborne supplies, for all but munition supplies and lived of the land. Its the overwheming manpower advantage that settles the outcome, of course the geography was against him making it a tough nut to crack. RR had minimal impact on US logistics operations, and Johston was comming by road ( changed his mind because he was outnumbered) not rail, they just happened to be close together. Pemberton had supplies from river and rail and road and had them all cut. But he did have of supplies for the siege that resulted from that, but it was the inferoirity of numbers that ment the siege could not be broken.

April 1,Pemberton Department of Mississippi and Eastern Louisiana PFD numbers/location.
At Vicksburg 22,061 PFD.
Bowen near Port Gibson 4,654 PFD.
Gardner at Port Hudson 16,287 PFD
Loring 7,227 PFD

Grant's Department of the Tennessee: 97,344 PFD
Banks' Department of the Gulf: 35,670 PFD operating against Port Hudson.

There are much better example of importance of RR, https://www.amazon.co.uk/Victory-Rode-R ... 0803294239 for instance Mc landing in the Penn and building his RR to supply his approach on Richmond
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

maltesefalcon
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Re: Alternative Strategies for the US Civil War

Post by maltesefalcon » 17 Dec 2018 14:57

Reinforcements had the option to travel by road or rail of course. But the city's civilian inhabitants and all the troops needed to be fed as well. Not practical to do this with a city this size wthout either rail or water transport of bulk goods. Not long term at least.

Grant may have had the numbers but was unable to force the issue by batter and storm. He needed to starve them out. Which he did eventually.

(IIRC Pemberton wanted to break out of the seige in the early stages but was ordered to hold the city at all costs.)
Last edited by maltesefalcon on 17 Dec 2018 17:53, edited 1 time in total.

Hanny
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Re: Alternative Strategies for the US Civil War

Post by Hanny » 17 Dec 2018 15:21

Dont forget its civilian population was under 4600 and in March, had been told to evacuate the city, or prepare acordingly for the siege, so mil and civilian had several months to bring in stores, its impossible to know how many civilians were there, but i do knopwn how the CS planned to feed the army, in addition to the stores laid up which lasted the garrison 47 days, was, amongst other things, 5000 Texas beeves that Grant captured and feed his own army with that he got as they walked to Vicksburg, 5000*1200lbs each is 3 million days rations, garrison of 30k that another 100 days fresh food from that single supply effort.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

maltesefalcon
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Re: Alternative Strategies for the US Civil War

Post by maltesefalcon » 17 Dec 2018 18:02

Population notwithstanding, Grant won and Pemberton lost. We may be quibbling over minor details but it is refreshing to see a few members with interest in this conflict.

I'll try to think of another what if to discuss....

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RE: Alternative Strategies For The U.S. Civil War - (Well Sort Of).

Post by Robert Rojas » 17 Dec 2018 18:30

Greetings to cousin Maltese Falcon and the community as a whole. Howdy M.F! Well sir, in light of your posting of December 17, 2018 - 9:02am, old yours truly would like to echo your sentiments about the American Civil War or the War Between The States. I suspect (rightly OR wrongly) that there would be a greater AMERICAN interest with this particular topic if the discussion OR discussions did not degenerate into EITHER regional parochialism OR outright race baiting. As "outsiders" looking in, it is refreshing to review the less than politically charged point OR points-of-view of a Canadian (such as yourself) and an Englishman (such as Hanny) without wading through he usual rancor generated by my fellow citizens. I hope the both of you keep up the good work! Well, that's my latest two Yankee cents worth on this angst ridden chapter of American History - for now anyway. As always, I would like to bid you an especially copacetic day up in your corner of the proverbial GREAT WHITE NORTH of Canada - EH!?


Best Regards,
Uncle bob :idea: :) :wink: 8-) :thumbsup:
"It is well that war is so terrible, or we should grow too fond of it" - Robert E. Lee

maltesefalcon
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Re: Alternative Strategies for the US Civil War

Post by maltesefalcon » 17 Dec 2018 18:49

Thanks for comments above. I have more than a passing interest. In fact I was a re-enactor for more than 12 years till I got too old. Even managed to get in the mini series North and South Book II as an extra when they filmed combat scenes in Natchez in 1985.

As an aside, it is not paradoxical for Canadians to be interested in the largest conflict fought in North America. By some estimates 75000 citizens of British North America fought in the war.

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